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The order in which the keywords enter into the title suggests that this is
mainly a work on empirical issues related to the European process of eco-
nomic integration, while the methodology chosen for the investigation, the
use of Sraffian Schemes and subsystems, is somehow secondary. Neverthe-
less, the Sraffian Schemes and the notion of subsystems are at the very core
of the articles presented here.
Indeed, at the beginning of the research, the aim was mainly to inves-
tigate the potential application of Sraffian subsystems, and specifically to
apply them to the study of alternative allocation of resources. As it is re-
ported in most of the following chapters, a subsystem has been defined by
Sraffa as a “smaller self-replacing system the net product of which consists
of only one kind of commodity” Sraffa (1960, p. 105).
The net product of a Sraffian scheme is a vector of physical goods1,
which are destined to the final demand.
The industries of an economic system are strictly interconnected among
them. This is well represented by Sraffian Schemes, which are Leontief-
type Input-Output tables expressed in real terms with the vector of the em-
ployed labour relative to each industry. Therefore, when the production of
a specific good is increased (or decreased) it is not just the related industry
that has to increase (or decrease) the inputs used. All the industries that
provide the inputs are affected, and hence all the industries providing the
inputs for the other inputs are in turn affected and so on.
The notion of subsystem allows to keep track of the overall changes
implied in the variation of the net product of a specific good. The notion of
subsystem is very useful in order to study how an economic system would
change when shifting one specific resource, for example labour, from one
sector to the other. The study of subsystem is useful for the evaluation of
alternative allocations of resources inside an economic system and, hence,
alternative specialization patterns.
1Throughout this thesis the term ”physical” is to be associated with the notion of
actual physical goods and services. It has been decided to use the term ”physical” to
mean a commodity which is measurable in “real” terms as opposed to its exchange value.
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Partly thanks to Samuelson, from the beginning of the work that led to
this dissertation it became clear that subsystems would be a powerful way
to study Comparative Advantages in the framework of Sraffian Schemes
or, as Samuelson puts it, in “the realistic Sraffa scenario” (Samuelson, 2001,
p. 1206).
The idea to focus the attention on Europe was also somehow in the air
from the very beginning of my PhD research work. This choice is strictly
related to the specificity of the approach adopted. Studying specialization
processes and Comparative Advantages from the point of view taken here
means also to study how well the countries considered are integrated. That
is to say, it means to study if a group of countries succeeded in specializing
in an efficient way, so that there is little scope for increasing production
and hence consumption through alternative allocation of resources—see
Chapter 1.
While this question may be interesting for whichever group of coun-
tries, a specialization process of this kind is theoretically feasible just when
the institutional framework is favorable to such an outcome. Specifically, a
fundamental condition is the absence of barriers to trade or of other protec-
tionist measures among the countries considered. Given data availability
and the power of the European common institutions, Europe seemed a
privileged case for this kind of study.
The papers presented in this thesis are not typical of the traditional lit-
erature on Sraffa. The declared objective of (Sraffa, 1960, p. vii) was to lay
the foundations for a critique of the marginal theory. Although he used a
framework close to the one of Leontief (1951), based on the classical rep-
resentation of the economy as a circular flow, their interests were different
since Sraffa’s analysis was much more focused on theoretical analysis than
on applying the Input-Output framework for practical problems (Kurz and
Salvadori, 2006).
Subsequent literature on Sraffa’s work keep elaborating theoretically on
his main insights, for example providing an interpretation of his work in
terms of long-term equilibrium or analyzing the implications for marginal-
ist theory of Sraffa’s main propositions, a task that Sraffa had left open—for
the legacy of Sraffa’s work see Kurz (2000) and Aspromourgos (2004).
Empirical applications of Sraffian Schemes are rare. Gossling (1972)
applied the notion of subsystems for analyzing productivity trends in the
U.S., but much empirical researches on topics related to Sraffa are much
more recent, as for example those of Shaikh (1988), Velupillai and Zam-
belli (1993), Han and Shefold (2006), Degasperi and Fredholn (2010), Zam-
belli and Fredholn (2010), Mariolis and Tsoulfidis (2011), Shaikh (2012),
Schefold (2013), Zambelli et al. (2014), Zambelli (2017).
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Some of them are inspired by Sraffa’s work in order to provide new
measures of productivity and technological progress—Degasperi and Fred-
holn (2010), Zambelli and Fredholn (2010) and Zambelli et al. (2014). Others—
Han and Shefold (2006) and Zambelli (2017)—use empirical methods to
address the “capital controversy” or “two Cambridges debate”, a debate
originated from Sraffa’s contribution and focused basically on the realism
of the neo-classical assumptions about the form of the aggregate produc-
tion function.
As explained by Zambelli (2017), the debate remained without a clear
answer also because of the lack of empirical investigations on the topic,
a problem that the author disentangles thanks to modern computing tech-
niques, specifically devised algorithms and a fairly wide databank on Input-
Output tables—the World Input-Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015), the
same which is used here.
The spirit of this thesis is similar to the one of Zambelli (2017). In the
first two Chapters of this thesis the main aim is to check whether a well-
known theory, namely the theory of Comparative Advantages, is compati-
ble with the available data. Empirical Input-Output tables and computing
techniques are coupled with Sraffa’s insights in order to check the tenabil-
ity of specific economic theories.
In the third Chapter it is shown that a similar methodology can be ap-
plied in order to deal with a very practical problem, that is to say how
to limit greenhouse gases emission—a maybe unexpected consequence of
studying specialization processes through the lenses of Sraffian Schemes.
Even if the topic and the approach of this thesis may seem far from
the great part of the Sraffian literature, some of Sraffa’s theoretical insights
may have important implications.
The study of specialization processes with the approach adopted here
can be divided in two problems. The first is the productive problem, which
is the study of the productive structure of a group of countries to check
whether it is compatible with Comparative Advantages or environmen-
tal preservation. In order to do this, we construct scenarios of alternative
specialization patterns in which Comparative Advantages are exploited
and/or CO2 is minimized and we compare the actual situation with these
scenarios through the use of specifically devised indexes.
The second is the distributive problem, which is the study of how the
overall surplus of a group of countries can be redistributed in order to
make a more efficient or CO2-saving specialization pattern convenient for
all the countries involved. If this distributive task is left to the market,
then it becomes important to understand the mechanism of the formation
of prices which, in a Sraffian framework, depends on the distribution of
7
the surplus among wages and profits. As explained in Chapters 1, 2 and 3,
this problem is not treated here because it is quite demanding. My hope is
that the inclusion of these important Sraffian elements, following the meth-
ods used in Zambelli et al. (2014) and Zambelli (2017), in the framework
presented here will be done in the future.
The identification of the proper databank has not been an easy task.
As explained above, Sraffian Schemes are basically Input-Output tables
expressed in real terms. However, this kind of data is rarely available.
The alternative chosen here has been to deflate the original Input-Output
tables in order to compute Input-Output tables at constant prices. The orig-
inal Input-Output tables, at current prices, has been taken from the World
Input-Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015), while the deflation procedure
has been devised specifically for this series of papers.
This would be a more than acceptable alternative, provided that the
proper data and deflators are available. But also this kind of data is not
very easy to be found. Moreover, there does not seem to be consensus
on the best deflating procedure. The fact that Sraffian Schemes and re-
lated subsystems are seldom applied to investigate empirical issues may
be somehow due to the lack of data and to the scarcity of evidence on
which procedure provides the most reliable results.
Nevertheless, as explained in Chapter 4, different databases have been
combined in order to obtain tables as close as possible to Sraffian Schemes.
These tables are the basis of all the articles presented in the remaining three
core chapters of the dissertation.
A final comment should be dedicated to the algorithmic work behind
this thesis. Most part of the research has been devoted to the construction
of the appropriate algorithms for the many different problems tackled in
the following chapters. For each chapter there is a set of algorithms that
my supervisor and/or myself have written with the software Matlab.
There has been an effort to construct specific algorithms for most of the
main objectives of this thesis. It can be asserted that the construction of
these algorithms has been part of the study of the problem.
The underlying algorithmic contents are almost hidden in the follow-
ing chapters. The description of the algorithms used is for the most part
relegated to the appendices. Moreover, they contain just the fundamental
information, trying to convey the key-parts of the algorithms used in the
most synthetic and simplest possible way. This is done in the hope that it
will facilitate the reading of the thesis, leaving the most technical aspects
to specific parts for the interested reader.
Chapter 1 lays the foundations of the first three chapters. The funda-
mental features of subsystems are provided and an example of their ap-
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plication for the study on Comparative Advantages under the assumption
that only final goods can be traded is analyzed. The notion of Net Prod-
uct Possibility Frontier, which represents a benchmark scenario in which
Comparative Advantages are fully exploited, is presented and analyzed.
Then, the Net Product Possibility Frontier is computed for a set of Euro-
pean countries, in order to check whether the countries specialized in the
sector in which they have Comparative Advantages as assumed by the
theory.
In Chapter 2 a fundamental assumptions of Chapter 1, namely that only
the final goods are traded while the means of production are not, is relaxed
in order to allow free mobility across countries both of final goods and
of the means of production. The new scopes in terms of allocation of re-
sources are analyzed and then the new Net Product Possibility Frontier is
computed. The conclusions reached in Chapter 1 hold or are strengthened
under the new set of assumptions.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the study of the relations between specialization
patterns and CO2 emissions. It is shown that exploiting alternative spe-
cialization patterns, a group of countries can reduce the CO2 emissions,
keeping fixed a given vector of net product. Moreover, the gains from a
better exploitation of Comparative Advantages may be combined with the
benefits deriving from a lower CO2. The scopes for reducing CO2 and
combining such reductions with a higher economic efficiency, due to a bet-
ter exploitation of Comparative Advantages, are studied in the European
context and also for an extended sample of 30 countries.
Chapter 4 deals with the problems related to the deflation of Input-
Output tables, which are basically two. The first is the aggregation prob-
lems, i.e. the fact that one industry of an Input-Output table generally
aggregates many different goods. The second is the nominal values prob-
lem, i.e. the fact that Sraffian Schemes are built supposing to have informa-
tion on real quantities, while Input-Output tables are expressed in nominal
terms. The chapter analyzes the possible strategies to deal with these prob-
lems and the procedure followed to deflate the Input-Output tables used
in this thesis is described.
In the conclusions, the main results of the four chapters are synthetized




European Economic Integration and Comparative
Advantages
Michele Boglioni and Stefano Zambelli
Abstract
On the basis of a set of Input-Output tables we computed the Eu-
ropean Net Product Possibility Frontier (NPPF ) for the years from
1995 to 2011. During this period, several barriers to trade have been
removed, allowing higher levels of trade and regional integration.
Subsequently, we propose a method to check whether the pre-
diction to be derived from Comparative Advantages (CAs) theory,
namely a specialization pattern that allows to reach the NPPF , is
verified.
The results suggest that CAs were not exploited well during the
period considered and no positive trend emerged.
The implication of our results is that there is ample scope for a co-
ordinated policy aimed at improving allocation of resources. Further
research on this topic seems to be necessary.
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Introduction
In this paper we compute the n-commodities Net Product Possibility Fron-
tier (NPPF )—a sort of production possibility frontier built on the con-
cept of net product—of a set of European countries. Subsequently, we
determine the Comparative Advantages (CAs) of each European country
involved, and we verify whether European countries have a productive
structure that is consistent with the specialization implied by CAs.
National production systems are highly interconnected—i.e. produced
goods are used as final consumption goods as well as means of production—
and this fact is well-encapsulated in the available Input-Output tables.
This implies that for each sectoral production we have to consider the con-
tributions of both direct and indirect labour. The totality of labour involved
in the production of the individual industry surplus—i.e. the individual
commodity net product—can be computed through the Sraffa-Gossling-
Pasinetti notion of subsystem (Sraffa, 1960; Gossling, 1972; Pasinetti, 1989).
Once the total production system is described in terms of Sraffian Schemes
or Leontief Input-Output tables, a subsystem for the production of good i
is defined as the part of the total system, considering the interindustry pro-
duction of the means of production, which is necessary for the exclusive
production of the social or national surplus of commodity i.
As it is well known—see Gossling (1972, pp.26-27)—the sum of all the
subsystems is equal to the total system. This property allows the use of
Input-Output tables in order to investigate n-dimensional Net Product Pos-
sibility Frontiers, i.e. NPPF for many goods and many countries.
Samuelson (2001) admitted that the insertion of means of production
(or intermediate goods) renders the economic scenario to study CAs more
realistic. He named these scenarios “the realistic Sraffa scenario” (Samuel-
son, 2001, p. 1206). This paper is the first of a series of papers aiming to set
up a framework that allows the study of CAs for the case of many different
virtual scenarios such as:
1. free trade and mobility of final goods, but no mobility of workers—
i.e. workers don’t migrate;
2. free trade and mobility of final goods and of the means of production
and/or workers;
3. free transfers of the knowledge of production techniques, free trade
and mobility of the final goods and means of production.
In this paper we construct the NPPF associated with the first case
above and leave the other two cases to subsequent works.
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The data used for the computation of the NPPF is the World Input
Output Database (WIOD) and covers the period 1995-2011 (Timmer et al.,
2015). We assume that each sector present in each Input-Output table is
a method of production specific to the individual countries. As will be
explained below, the European NPPF is the set of those vectors of sur-
plus that efficiently exploit a given amount of resources. Therefore, all
the points below the European NPPF are inefficient points, i.e. points
in which the net product is lower than the one reachable when CAs are
properly exploited. In the case that inefficiency has been found or demon-
strated, feasible alternative vectors of net product where CAs would have
been exploited are studied.
We have refined our investigation with the computation of an Ineffi-
cient Frontier (IF ). An IF is a set of possible net products obtainable
when resources are allocated at the European level in the worst possible
way. It could be asserted that the IF represents the case in which there is
specialization, but this specialization is totally inefficient.
These computations are performed through a specifically designed al-
gorithm. We compute not only the achievable efficiency improving (or
efficiency worsening in the case of the IF ) vectors of production, but also
how the economy of each country would have to be restructured in order
to reach these efficient NPPF -points or the inefficient IF -points.
In this paper we verify whether CAs-compatible specialization pro-
cesses occurred. This being the case there would be no scope for efficiency-
improving policies.
We have found that the CAs did not emerge. This is evidence that a
scope for efficiency-improving policies may exist, but further and more
detailed research on this matter would be needed.
This paper is structured in four sections. In Section 1.1 the notion and
the properties of subsytems are discussed. In Section 1.2 it is explained
how to use these subsystems to construct the n-dimensional Net Product
Possibility Frontiers and Inefficiency Frontiers. In Section 1.3 the data bank
used for the empirical section is discussed, along with an example of Eu-
ropean NPPF s and some remarks about the assumptions implied in its
construction. In Section 1.4 the n-dimensional NPPF is used to analyze
three things: a) potential gains from specialization; b) the evolution of Eu-
ropean markets with respect to their frontier; c) the pattern of specializa-
tion needed to reach the gains. The paper is concluded with a summary of
the results obtained.
12
1.1 Definition and properties of subsystems
The notion of subsystem was introduced by Sraffa in the first appendix of
his work Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities as a “smaller
self-replacing system the net product of which consists of only one kind of
commodity” Sraffa (1960, p. 105). Gossling explained how to compute it
in an iterative way and used it for the analysis of productive trends in the
USA Gossling (1972)1.
Suppose a start from the following representation of a national eco-
nomic system
A, l 7→ b (1.1.1)
where A is the n×n input matrix, l is the n×1 labour vector and b is the n×1
gross product vector. In other words, matrix A and vector l represents the
inputs of the n production processes that are carried out in the economic
system, while b is a vector representing the gross output of each of these
production processes.
Each row i of matrix A, [ai1, ai2, . . . , ain], represents the means of pro-
duction used by industry i for the production of the total gross industry
output bi. And li is the amount of labour used.
The column j of matrix A, [a1j, a2j, . . . , anj]′, represents the means of
production produced by industry j and used for the production for the
output by all the industries i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
If we subtract from vector b the sum—by column—of the inputs of pro-
duction described by A we obtain what is called surplus, or net national
product and it is often represented by the n × 1 vector y—see (Pasinetti,
1989, p. 79) and (Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, p. 168).
Formally
y = (diag(b)−A)′ι (1.1.2)
where diag(b) is a diagonal matrix with the gross output vector b on its
main diagonal and ι is the summation vector—i.e., all entries are equal to
1.
In this context y = [y1, ..., yn]′ is a vector of physical quantities, which
expresses how much of each good goes to the final demand and is used
for consumption, investment or exports. If these goods are aggregated in
a unique measure through the means of current market prices, we obtain
what is commonly known as Gross Domestic Product.
1The concept of vertically integrated sector, as in the definition of Pasinetti (1989, pp.
369-376), is similar to the concept of subsystems. See also (Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, pp.
168-169).
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Each row i of matrix A, and the associated elements i of l and of b
represents a method of production.
In order to compute a subsystem—see Gossling (1972)—each row of
A, as well as the relative amount of labour and gross output, must be re-
proportioned in such a way that each component of the net output vector
is 0, except for the commodity in which we are interested. Denote with
y¯i the vector [0, ..., yi, ..., 0]′, where i identify the sector. In order to find a
subsystem, we have to compute a reproportioning vector xi such that
(diag(b)−A)′xi = y¯i (1.1.3)
from which we have
xi = ((diag(b)−A)′)−1y¯i (1.1.4)





so that, for convenience, we can define a subsystem Si as
Si = [Ai|li|bi] (1.1.6)
As stressed by Gossling (1972), subsystems have two important prop-
erties:




Si = [A|l|b] (1.1.7)
2. the alteration of one subsystem affects just the final output of the
commodity relative to the subsystem modified, but not the other ele-
ments of the net output vector.
As explained below, these two properties make subsystems an instru-
ment particularly suited for the construction of a Global or European Net
Product Possibility Frontier.
2A vertically integrated sector, as in the definition of Pasinetti (1989, p.375), is just the
vector obtained summing up the rows of a matrix Ai—see equation 1.5—, divided by a
constant.
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1.2 The construction of a Net Product Possibility
Frontier
The Net Product Possibility Frontier, abbreviated as NPPF , is the bench-
mark on which the subsequent analysis is based.
In the standard textbook exposition of the Ricardian theory we find that
the explanation of the Production Possibility Frontier (PPF ) is limited to
the two countries case. It is important to stress that in most textbooks the
only input of production is labour (i.e capital is not considered). Hence
there is no difference between gross and net output. Or said in other words
all the production is production of final goods. Moreover, this implies that
the only labour involved in the production of, say, cloth, is just the labour
employed directly in the sector “cloth”3.
Here concepts similar to those presented in the textbooks are used, but
extended to the Input-Output framework in which there are more than two
goods. Consequently, the total inputs involved for the production of the
net output of a certain good i are the sum of the direct and indirect means
of production used, see above the definition of subsystems, eq. 1.1.5. We
believe that the definition of the national frontiers is more general with
respect to the standard representation because it is directly linked with the
computation of the yearly national added value, but is is not exactly the
same thing.
As it will be clear below, in the context of this paper we do not compute
the aggregate value of production. This would require the computation
of prices, which we do not. What we do is to consider the net national
product as a vector formed by the social surplus of an economic system.
On one hand there is a disadvantage in following this approach because we
are bound to work with an n-dimension surplus vector. On the other hand
this allows us to avoid the complications associated with aggregation and,
most importantly, to keep track of the necessary inter-industrial relations.
In other words, following (Samuelson, 2001, p. 1206), we are working
inside “the realistic Sraffa scenario” where we consider the coexistence of
many final goods as well as many inputs.
1.2.1 The computation of the autarkic national frontiers
CAs theory is strictly linked to the economic concept of “technology”.
Here, a “technology” is just a specific combination of the inputs aij for
3In some versions of this theory, it is also showed that it is possible to unify the
two PPFs of the two countries in a unique frontier, which may be called simply PPF
(Samuelson, 2001) or world transformation frontier (Gandolfo, 2014)
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j = 1, ..., n and li that gives a specific output bi. For example, in standard
textbook in which labour is considered as the only input, the difference
in productivity in sector i between the domestic and the foreign country is
supposed to reflect the different technologies used in sector i in the domes-
tic and in the foreign country.
As explained in Section 1.3.1, this is a diffused practice in economic lit-
erature, but it may be misleading. For this reason, in this paper we prefer
the notion of “method of production” to identify a specific combination of
inputs and output. The assumptions made on the methods of production
are: a) labour is the only primary resource, so that it cannot be produced
but just reallocated ; b) the methods of production are divisible so as to
maintain fixed proportions among inputs and outputs, i.e. the relative pro-
portions are independent from the level of activity.
Consider the example of an economic system composed of three sec-
tors represented in Tab. 1.1. The three goods produced are iron, coal and
wheat—rows 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Table 1.1: A hypothetical economic system
Sector Input Labour Gross Output
Iron Coal Wheat
Iron 2 3 2 2/5 16
Coal 5 4 2 2/5 14
Wheat 6 2 3 1/5 9
Tot 13 9 7 1 /
This economic system can be divided in three subsystems, but before
it is convenient to define the augmented subsystem S∗i . If ai = Aiι and







so that in the last row is reported the sum of each input necessary for the
production of the gross output vector.
The three augmented subsystems are
S∗1 = S∗2 = S∗3 =
0.65 0.97 0.65 0.13 5.19 0.81 1.22 0.81 0.16 6.49 0.53 0.81 0.54 0.11 4.32
0.64 0.51 0.25 0.05 1.78 3.47 2.78 1.39 0.28 9.73 0.89 0.71 0.36 0.07 2.49
0.90 0.30 0.45 0.03 1.36 2.20 0.73 1.10 0.07 3.30 2.90 0.97 1.45 0.10 4.34
2.19 1.78 1.36 0.21 / 6.49 4.73 3.30 0.51 / 4.32 2.49 2.34 0.28 /
16
which if summed up gives back the original system.
Suppose starting from the frontier for iron and coal, and consider S∗1
and S∗2 . As can be seen, the total labour employed are, respectively L1 =
0.21 and L2 = 0.51. Hence, the maximum net product of iron when all the
labour of the two subsystems is devoted to the production of the net output
of iron can be computed using the subsystem Ŝ∗1 = S∗1 × (0.51 + 0.21)/0.21
that is to say
Ŝ∗1 = S∗1 × (L1 + L2)/L1 =
2.23 3.34 2.23 0.45 17.82
2.19 1.75 0.88 0.18 6.13
3.10 1.03 1.55 0.10 4.66
7.52 6.13 4.66 0.72 /
(1.2.2)
Subsystem Ŝ∗1 shows that the maximum possible surplus of iron, when
the surplus of coal is zero, amounts to more or less yˆ1 ≈ 10.3. It is inter-
esting to analyze the matrix Ŝ∗1 + S∗3 , which represents the original system
once a specialization in iron has happened—and hence the subsystem of
coal has been set equal to 0
Ŝ∗1 + S∗3 =
2.77 4.15 2.77 0.55 22.15
3.08 2.46 1.23 0.25 8.62
6 2 3 0.2 9
11.85 8.62 7 1 /
(1.2.3)
As can be seen in (1.2.3), the surplus in iron is 10.3, which is equal to the
surplus of the subsystem of iron once the surplus of coal is 0. The surplus
of wheat is exactly the original one. The sum of labour is also unchanged.
This means that, due to the properties of the subsystems stated before, the
specialization procedure is a ceteris paribus procedure. By shifting the total
labour of the two subsystems into one subsystem, we are simulating a re-
arranging of the production such that the net production of iron reaches its
maximum, keeping fixed the level of employment and leaving unaltered
all the remaining sectors.
An analogous procedure can be performed to simulate the specializa-
tion in coal, which gives yˆ2 ≈ 7.05. The two points (0, 7.05) and (10.3, 0)
represents the intercepts on the axis of the national frontier for the net pro-
duction of iron and coal, which is illustrated in the northwest orthant of
Fig. 1.1.
It is important to note that the the gradient of the frontier does not
depend on the quantity of labour involved in the two subsystems. Sup-
pose, for example, that we want to normalize the frontier on the quantity
of labour involved. The original gradient g of the frontier is
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The surpluses should be divided by the sum of workers in the two sub-
systems because, coherently with the subsystem approach, all the labour
directly and indirectly involved in the production of the respective goods
must be considered.
It is easy to see, as shown in (1.2.6), that the gradient of the frontier per













What changes is just the quotient of the frontier q, which has to be
rescaled by L1 +L2. This property has important implications for the anal-
ysis of specialization processes.
Suppose the case of a partial specialization in iron at the expense of
the net output in coal. The changes from the point of view of the single
subsystems are summarized in Fig. 1.1.
The net output in iron and coal shifts from point Y to point Y ′ of the
graph on the northwest part. This implies that the total labour increases
in the iron subsystem but decreases in the coal subsystem. As a conse-
quence, the wheat-iron frontier shifts outwards—graph on the northeast—
while the coal-wheat frontier shifts inwards—graph on the southwest. For
the property summarized in eq. 1.2.6, the new frontiers are parallel to the
original ones. Moreover, the figure highlights the fact that the net output
in wheat is fixed at the original level.
It is important to note that a specialization process of this kind does not
alter the net output of other sectors, but it does alter the domain of all the
frontiers in which the two subsystems are involved—except for the frontier
relative to the two sectors considered. They contract or expand according
to the contraction or expansion of the subsystems.
It should be kept in mind that we are working with subsystems. Mov-
ing from Y to Y ′ means that all the inputs used in the production of iron
and coal—labour and capital goods—are increased or reduced in a spe-
cialization process. The richness of using Sraffa-Gossling subsystems is
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Figure 1.1: Specialization in the iron sector. The three graphs show
the national frontiers relative to the hypothetical system described in
Tab. 1.1, and the consequences of a specialization in the iron sector.
the fact that direct and indirect uses of all the means of production are con-
stantly tracked. Labour is only one of these means of production. The dif-
ference between labour and the other means of production is that labour
is not produced, while the others means of production are. On the one
hand, the complexity of industrial interactions is kept, while on the other
the analysis is simplified in a rigorous way.
1.2.2 From the autarkic national frontiers to the NPPF for a
set of countries
Once a set of national frontiers has been computed for a group of coun-
tries, we can study the case in which redistribution of the national surplus
among the different countries could take place. The theory on CAs sug-
gests that some of the feasible specialization patterns allow to improve total
net product, that is the sum of autarkic national net products.
The redistribution mechanism that allows this process to take place is
normally assumed to be the market. In a market framework, the existence
of patterns of specialization that would allow to produce a higher net prod-
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uct is just one side of the problem, because there is the associated problem
of analyzing whether the terms of trade would be consistent with special-
ization patterns convenient for the single countries.
However, a discussion of this point would imply to analyze the forma-
tion of prices and hence the distribution of the net product among wages
and profits. An analysis of this kind would require too much space here
and it is left for future studies.
Here, we just focus on the assessment of whether for a given set of
countries, namely the European countries, there is scope for better special-
ization so as to allow the achievement of higher levels of the European Net
Product. Whether this specialization and the associated redistribution of
surplus among the countries should or could take place thanks to interna-
tional agreements or through the market mechanism (i.e. market prices)
is not a matter of this paper. Below we will consider country specializa-
tions that are Pareto improving, in the sense that there exists alternative
allocations of produced resources such that individual countries could in
principle enjoy higher vectors of consumption goods, i.e. higher surplus.
The NPPF is the fundamental construction for this kind of analysis.
We explain its meaning and use with the aid of a simple example. The
graph on the northwest orthant of Fig. 1.2 shows the NPPF for three
countries and two goods: iron and coal. The three segments below the
shaded area are the three national frontiers.
Suppose that, when the system is autarkic, the citizens of each coun-
try are satisfied with the surpluses represented by the three dots yA1 , yA2 , yA3
of Fig. 1.2. Any other point along the national frontiers would imply a
different vector of net output, which could not clearly dominate the origi-
nal one, in the sense that in order to improve the net output in one good,
countries would have to diminish the net output in the other good. With-
out inserting specific assumptions on the preferences of the consumers of
each country, each point may be as good as any other.
However, if we consider the system as a whole, new possibilities be-
come available. From this perspective, the object of the analysis is the net
total product, which is the sum of the production of the three countries. In
Fig. 1.2, the net total product is represented by point Y A. For example, if





iron,c, so that the coordinates of point Y A are (Y Acoal, Y Airon).
The NPPF of a group of countries represents the maximum possible
net total product in iron Y Airon for any feasible net total product in coal Y Acoal,
given that the amount of labour is fixed. A way to compute it is to order
the three national frontiers from the flatter to the steeper4. As can be noted,
4For an alternative framing of the problem from the point of view of linear program-
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Figure 1.2: A three countries, three goods example of NPPF . The
three graphs show what a specialization process implies from the point
of view of the three NPPF s that can be constructed when three goods
are considered.
point Y A is considerably far from the NPPF . In fact, it is closer to another
frontier, IF , which represents the minimum possible net total product in
iron Y Airon for any feasible net total product in coal Y Acoal, keeping fixed the
total labour employed. The IF is formed by the same national frontiers
that compose the NPPF , they are just ordered in the opposite way5.
All the points inside the area delimited by the IF and theNPPF can be
reached with a proper specialization pattern. For this reason, the area de-
limited by the two frontiers has been called the Specialization Space (SS).
Specifically, all the points inside the triangle Y AQR in the northwest
orthant represent Pareto-improving solutions, i.e. feasible vectors of net
product, in which the surplus of iron and coal are both higher than in the
original vector. This means that, with an appropriate distributive mech-
ming, see Samuelson (1966).
5This implies that the assumptions explained at the beginning of Section 1.2.1 are the
same for both the frontiers.
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anism, the citizens of the three countries could enjoy a higher surplus
than the one originally given by the autarkic condition. Therefore, for
whichever preferences the citizens of the three countries we consider, if
“more is better”, as it is generally assumed in economics, the coordinated
solution is to be preferred to the autarkic one because it is Pareto improv-
ing.
Suppose that country 2 shifts its labour force from coal to iron in order
to realize the net product vector represented by point yB2 , while country
3 shifts its labour in the opposite direction in order to reach the vector
yB3 . Country 1 does not change its net product vector. The new net total
product is represented now by point Y B, which is higher than Y A with
respect to both iron and coal, while the net product in wheat is the original
one.
In the original situation, countries 2 and 3 were not exploiting their
CA, implying that the net total product of the three countries was close to
the IF . The specialization process led each country close to a full special-
ization in the sector in which it has a CA, increasing the net total prod-
uct up until a point close to the maximum potentialities of the system
considered—i.e. close to the NPPF .
According to much of the literature on the CAs, the “invisible hand”
associated with trade occurring in free markets should generate a special-
ization process of this kind, as explained by Samuelson (2001). Each coun-
try should specialize in the sector that has a CA in order to move the net
total output vector at the outer frontier of the shaded area.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is better to stress that this kind
of analysis does not imply any evaluation of the efficiency of the meth-
ods of production of the single countries. We assume that the the realized
methods of production are the ones we derive from Input-Output tables.
This does not at all imply that the individual countries are using the best
or most efficient technique. For clarifications on the data used for the com-
putation of the international frontiers see Section 1.3.1.
The two additional graphs have been reported to help the reader visu-
alize what this kind of process implies for the overall system when more
than two goods are produced. This is important in order to understand the
workings of the algorithm used for the computation of the n dimensional
frontier—see Section 1.4 and Appendix 1.A.
Suppose that the graph on the northwest is a bidimensional projection
of a system in which wheat is produced. The orthants on the northeast and
on the southwest describe what this specialization process implies for the
wheat-iron and coal-wheat frontiers. Since country 2 increases the quantity
of labour in the subsystem of iron at the expense of the subsystem of coal,
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its wheat-iron frontier shifts outwards (compare point yB2 with point yA2
and their relative frontiers of the graph on the northeast orthant). On the
other hand, the coal-wheat frontier of country 2 shifts inwards—see graph
on the southwest orthant. The national frontiers of country 3 move in the
opposite direction. The new frontiers are represented by the dashed lines,
which form the new NPPF s and IF s that delimit the specialization space
SSB.
1.3 NPPF s in Europe
1.3.1 The Data
The Input-Output tables used in this paper have been taken from the World
Input-Output Databank (WIOD) (Timmer et al., 2015). The data set pro-
vides Input-Ouput tables called WIOTs (World Input-Output Tables) di-
vided in 35 sectors, for 40 countries, from 1995 to 2011. This analysis is
focused on European countries, so we extracted data for 17 of them, as
reported in Tab. 2.3 at the end of the paper. There are some other Euro-
pean countries in the database which have been excluded because of their
relatively small dimensions and the diversity of their structure6.
The number of sectors has been reduced from 35 to 17. The analysis of
the Net Product Possibility Frontier is useful when applied to commodi-
ties that can be standardized and exported, while it is less relevant when
applied to the services that are intrinsically local7. For this reason, the sec-
tors included are those that enters the Standard International Trade Clas-
sification of the United Nations. The list of sectors considered and those
excluded is reported in Tab. 2.4 at the end of the paper.
Computing NPPF s on the basis of real data implies assuming that
the available empirical Input-Output tables’ data—at constant prices—are
equivalent to national industry aggregate methods of production. This also
implies that the inputs aijs for j = 1, ..., n and outputs bis are considered to
be homogeneous across sectors and countries as if they were made of the
same physical substance.
6The countries excluded are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Romania.
7As explained above, studying the European NPPF implies to suppose that the total
European production could be concentrated in some selected countries, and then redis-
tributed among all the countries. While manufactured products can be, and actually are,
produced in places that are often far from the consumer, this is not possible for many
services, the provision of which depends on the direct relationship between the customer
and the provider. This is the case of education, health services, retailing sales, restaurants
& hotels, and many other sectors excluded from Tab. 2.4.
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It has to be noted that the assumption that I-O tables represent meth-
ods of production or technologies is not so rare in the literature— see, for
example, Leontief (1985), Han and Shefold (2006), Zambelli and Fredholn
(2010), Zambelli et al. (2014), Zambelli (2017) or, in a context closer to this
paper, Ten Raa and Mohnen (2001).
The entries of the I-O tables are influenced by many factors different
from technology as, for example, the state of the aggregate demand and
the business cycle, the price of commodities, the distribution of the value
added in wages and profits and the institutional framework. Technology
itself may depend on the specific set of prices and on the distribution of the
net product among workers and producers—as well as among different
producers.
Nevertheless, we work with ex-post realized values, and hence the
quantities observed are the result of actual choices. Evaluating the way in
which factors other than technology may influence the data would require
information unavailable to us.
Another problem in considering I-O tables as expressing aggregate meth-
ods of production is that in reality the inputs aijs and the outputs bis are
formed through the aggregation at market prices of a mix of goods that
change from one cell to the other. The problem that market prices are used
instead of quantities would not be relevant if relative prices between each
good and the general level of prices were sufficiently homogeneous across
the countries involved and they would not change in time.
Since prices in reality change across sectors, countries and time, the
I-O tables have been properly deflated in order to obtain constant price
data. There are at least two ways to do this. The first is the double de-
flation method and the second is based on the RAS algorithm (Dietzen-
bacher and Hoen, 1998). As explained by the WIOD research group, the
second strategy works better on their I-O tables. They provide most of the
time-deflators needed to do it, describe how to obtain the additional data
required and explain the steps to be followed to correctly apply a specific
version of the RAS algorithm in Los et al. (2014).
The WIOD research group computes previous-year-prices tables, so
they are not interested in the variation of prices across countries, which
is important from the point of view of this paper. Therefore, their defla-
tors have to be weighted with an index of the level of the sectoral prices
of the countries considered. In order to do this, we have used the level
of prices provided by the International Comparison Program of the World
Bank. For detailed information on the procedure followed here to deflate
the I-O Tables see Chapter 4.
However, this deflation procedure cannot solve the problem that we are
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working with aggregate industries. Problems of this kind are pervasive in
economics. Empirical economists have no choice but working with aggre-
gate measures and index numbers. Without knowing the quantity and the
prices of the goods involved in determining the cells of the I-O, or without
having finely disaggregated tables, this problem cannot be solved.
1.3.2 An European Net Product Possibility Frontier
An example of European NPPF is reported in Fig. 1.3a. It represents the
frontier of the production in “Agriculture, Hunting, Foresting and Fishing”—
Sector 1 of Tab. 1.4— and “Machinery, Nec”—Sector 13—in 2002. The
segments below the European frontier represent the national frontiers that
form the NPPF , while the circles on the segments identify the observed
national productions.
Figure 1.3: An example of Net Product Possibility Frontier in Europe
(a) The European NPPF for
Agriculture and Machineries in 2002
(b) The national frontiers composing
the European
Agriculture-Machineries NPPF
reported in Fig. 1.3a
Point Y represents the total production of the sample and is not on the
frontier, which means that countries are not exploiting their CAs in the two
sectors considered here. The area Y QR is the set of the Pareto-improving
Net Total Product. The points at the frontier betweenQ andR represent the
highest possible combinations of machineries and agricultural commodi-
ties inside this set, the efficiency improving set for the production of these
two goods in 2002.
As explained below, the algorithm for the computation of the the n-
dimensionalNPPF searches for efficiency improving vectors in an n-dimensional
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area which is analogous to the Y QR triangle in Fig. 1.3a. Specifically, we
search for alternative allocations of resources that allow improvement to
the net product in all the sectors considered by the same ratio. In Fig.
1.3b, the segments of the national frontiers have been highlighted in or-
der to stress the fact that the new net total product allows shifting of the
net national product points—the circles—inside the respective triangles.
In other words, an efficient productive pattern allows, at least in principle,
improvements to the consumption of all the countries in all the sectors.
Two important features of this approach must be stressed. The first is
that, in this study, no assumption is made about unused resources. Com-
puting the NPPF s relative to a given quantity of labour does not imply
assuming that Europe was on a full-employment equilibrium. The per-
spective adopted here is simply different: it is a problem of allocative effi-
ciency, not of economic growth and full employment.
The second is that studying different allocations of labour does not
mean that we reduce all the inputs to labour. As explained in Section
1.2, working with subsystems means that each time labour is reallocated,
all the other inputs are adjusted so as to keep the original proportions in
which they enter into the production function of each sector. Substitution
between labour and the physical means of production is here not possible,
and we do not resort to a reduction of all the inputs to the embodied labour
they contain.
1.4 The n-dimensional NPPF
In order to evaluate how far European countries were from the n-dimensional
NPPF , it is useful to determine a point on the n-dimensional NPPF that
allows a simple measure of the distance between the actual vector of Net
Total Product and the efficient one.
The algorithm that finds the point in the n-dimensional case is explained
in Appendix 1.A, but the basic idea can be described in the two-dimensional
case. Among the set Y QR of Fig. 1.3, there is a special subset for which
the surplus of both goods increases by the same proportion. In Fig. 1.4 this
set is formed by the points lying on the segment Y E, which lies on the ray
passing through the origin and the historically observed production point
Y .
A point on the straight segment Y E is a feasible higher surplus where
the proportions between the goods do not change in the aggregate. This is
a situation where a higher level of consumption is achievable after special-
ization, but could not be achieved in the autarkic case.
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Figure 1.4: The efficient point of production and the gains from spe-
cialization. Point E represents which could be the net product if coun-
tries exploited fully their CAs, while Y represents the historical net
product. SegmentEY represents how much it could be gained through
a proper specialization.
Using the notation of Fig. 1.4, the ratio GS, where GS stands for gains






The indexes described below are all based on a point in the n-dimensional
space which is equivalent to point E in Fig. 1.4. Please note that point E
implicitly defines Comparative Advantages: all the countries on the right
of E have a CA in sector j, while all those on the left of E have a CA in i.
If Europe is not on theNPPF , it is interesting to know if it is closer to an
efficient allocation of resources—NPPF—or to an inefficient allocation—
IF .
For example, in Fig. 1.5, the intersection between the ray 0E and the IF
is called W . It can be noted that the distance from the frontier 0E is similar
in the two graphs. Nevertheless, the situations described are different. In
Fig. 1.5a, the distance from the NPPF reflects an inefficient use of resources
in both absolute and relative terms, since point Y is closer to W than to E.
Differently, in Fig. 1.5b, Y is clearly closer to E than to W .
In order to explain the indexes used below, it is convenient to provide
some mathematical definitions, such as the matrix of the Net Products and
the Net Total Product vector. Given that yc = [y1,c, ..., yn,c]′, where n is the
number of sectors, is the vector of the recorded net output of country c, the
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Figure 1.5: Two NPPFs
(a) In this case, Comparative
Advantages are not very strong, and
hence the difference between the
efficient production point E and the
inefficient production point W is not
very high.
(b) Here, Comparative Advantages
are stronger than in Fig. 1.5a, and
hence the difference between the
efficient production point E and the
inefficient production point W is
higher.












where m is the number of countries. Summing up all the sectoral net prod-
ucts of each country, i.e. the elements of each column of Y, the vector of
the Net Total Product NTP is obtained (see (1.4.3)).












where ι is the summation vector
The efficient Net Total Product, i.e. the vector of the coordinates of a
point equivalent to E in the n-dimensional space, is called NTPE .
The efficient Net Total Product vector NTPE is just the sum by column
of an n × m matrix YE where m is the number of countries considered
and n the number of sectors as before. The matrix YE is the matrix of
the efficient net products yEi,c, since an element yEi,c of matrix YE represents
which should be the net product of the good i in country c in order to reach
the n-dimensional NPPF .
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In the same way, the most inefficient Net Total Product vector NTPW is
the sum by column an n×mmatrix YW of the most inefficient net products
yWi,c , since an element yWi,c of matrix YW represents which should be the net
product of the good i in country c in order to reach the n-dimensional IF .
1.4.1 Evolution of Efficiency in Europe from 1995 to 2011
The first aspect to be analyzed is the distance of the real Net Total Product
NTP from the efficient Net Total Product NTPE . As explained in Section
1.2.2, the theory on CAs suggests that if markets are left free to operate,
they should drive the Net Total Product vector on the NPPF . Therefore,
the NTPE and the NTP should coincide.
In practice, even if an improving NTPE vector is found, we should find
that it is at least close to the original NTP. A way to measure the distance
between them is to compute the GSF vector8
GSFt = (NTPEt −NTPt)NTPt = [GSF1,t, ..., GSFn,t] (1.4.4)
In a similar way, the potential loss of an inefficient specialization pat-
tern can be measured as IF
LSFt = (NTPWt −NTPt)NTPt = [LSF1,t, ..., LSFn,t] (1.4.5)
In Tab. 1.2, the GSF and the LSF vectors relative to 2008 are reported.
Please note that both the GSF and the LSF are constant across sectors
for all the sectors that were historically in surplus. This happens by con-
struction, since we are interested in knowing how much the NTP can be
increased keeping the proportion across sectors unaltered.
Another characteristic is that both GSF2,2008 and LSF2,2008,as well as
GSF12,2008 and LSF12,2008, are 0. This is because the Net National Product in
Sector 2, labeled “Mining and Quarrying”, and in Sector 12, labeled “Basic
metals and Fabricated Metal” is negative for many countries9. One of the
constraints of the problem is that countries cannot worsen their deficits,
because this would imply the use of additional resources produced out-
side the system. The algorithm allows in some cases for a reduction of
8The symbol  means division element by element, that is to say that each element
of the dividend is divided by the element of the divisor that occupies the same position
inside the matrix.
9The NTP for Sector 2 is negative during all the period considered, while for Sector
12 just starting from 2008
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Table 1.2: Potential gains from specialization and costs of ineffi-
ciency in 2008. Column NTP2008 reports the net product of Europe
for each of the sectors considered. GSF2008 and LSF2008 represent re-
spectively how much it could be produced in the efficient and in the
most inefficient specialization patterns—see eq. 1.4.4 and 1.4.5
Sectors NTP2008 GSF2008 LSF2008
1 1426.58 24.39% -21.48%
2 -1671.84 0% 0%
3 6003.20 24.39% -21.48%
4 1071.50 24.39% -21.48%
5 230.18 24.39% -21.48%
6 324.58 24.39% -21.48%
7 1956.09 24.39% -21.48%
8 1828.60 24.39% -21.48%
9 3630.32 24.39% -21.48%
10 501.55 24.39% -21.48%
11 1222.71 24.39% -21.48%
12 -510.52 0% -0%
13 4925.65 24.39% -21.48%
14 7272.64 24.39% -21.48%
15 6838.81 24.39% -21.48%
16 1672.14 24.39% -21.48%
17 2.826.68 24.39% -21.48%
Source: Our own computation based on WIOD database
the deficits, but it is not the case of Sectors 2 and 12, whose deficits are
maintained fixed both in the efficient and in the inefficient scenario.
Given that these two constraints hold for all the years for both the
GSF and the LSF, for simplicity we can compare the two scalars GSFt =
GSFi,t ∀ i 6= 2, 12 and LSFt = LSFi,t ∀ i 6= 2, 12 instead of the vectors GSF
and LSF.
Table 1.2, relative to 2008, shows that the production of each sector can
be improved by circa the 24.39%, which means that in 2008 European mar-
kets were quite far from the NPPF . Observing the LSF2008 it is also clear
that the distance from the Inefficient Frontier measured with the |LSF | is
lower than the GSF , and hence the system was closer to the IF—i.e. to an
inefficient allocation of resources—than to the NPPF—i.e. to an efficient
allocation of resources—, although the distances were not very different.
The evolution of markets during the period 1995-2011 is described by
the two graphs in Fig. 1.6. The first graph shows the evolution of the
GSF—Fig. 1.6a—,and the second the evolution of the Relative Efficiency





, ∀ i 6= 2, 12 (1.4.6)
For the properties of NTPE and NTPW , the REt is equal for all the
sectors except for Sectors 2 and 12. In fact, eq. (1.4.6) can be reformulated




NTPEi,t − Yi,t + Yi,t −NTPWi,t
Yi,t
= GSFi,t
GSFi,t − LSFi,t (1.4.7)
Since it has already been shown that GSFt = GSFi,t ∀ i 6= 2, 12 and
LSFt = LSFi,t ∀ i 6= 2, 12, then REt = REi,t ∀ i 6= 2, 12. REt ∈ [0, 1], where
0 means that the system is on the IF and 1 means that the system is on the
NPPF .
This is the Relative Efficiency index since in some sense, while the GSF
is a measure of the absolute distance from the NPPF , the RE is a mea-
sure of the relative distance, allowing an evaluation of whether the NTP is
closer to the NPPF or to the IF .
Figure 1.6: Indexes of absolute and relative distance from the NPPF
and the IF
(a) GSF index. It represents how
much could be increased the net
product of Europe in the efficient
specialization pattern—see eq.
1.4.4
(b) RE index. It is a measure of
the position of the Net Total
Product between the NPPF and
the IF . If RE < 0.5, the set of
countries is closer to an efficient




As can be seen from Fig. 1.6a, the absolute distance of the NTP from
the NPPF increased over the period considered. Until 2004 the trend is
not very clear, while from 2004 to 2009 the increase is clear, despite some
oscillations in the order of the 1%-3%, and it passes from 21.27% in 2004 to
27.42% in 2009. In years 2010 and 2011 the index still there is an oscillation
of 3% which firstly reduces the index to 24% and then increases it up again
to the 27%.
With respect to the relative distance from the frontier, theRE index was
fairly stable during the period considered—see Fig. 1.6b—, implying that
the oscillations of the GS index tended to be compensated by analogous
oscillations in the LSF index. The RE stayed during the whole period
considered between 0.51 and 0.55. This more or less stable trend suddenly
changed in 2010-2011, where the IF became sensitively closer during these
years. In fact, as can be seen from 1.6a, the distance from theNPPF did not
improve in 2010-2011. Therefore, the fact that Europe shifted towards an
even more inefficient allocation of resources must be due to the reduction
of the distance from the IF .
During the period considered not only the distance from the NPPF
was not reduced, but Europe stayed slightly closer to an inefficient than to
an efficient allocation of resources. This implies that CAs do not seem to
have exerted a decisive influence on specialization patterns.
1.4.2 Comparative Advantages and labour reallocation
Once the matrix of the efficient net product YE has been computed, it is
possible to derive information on the CAs of each country. A way to do it

















where i = 1, ..., n identifies the sectors, c = 1, ...,m the countries and
t = 1, .., T the years. The matrix ESRt, which collects the ESR related to
each country and each sector at time t, is called from now on the efficient
specialization pattern at time t, while the matrix RSRt, an analogous matrix
for the all the RSR at time t, is called the real specialization pattern at time t.
Due to lack of space here it is not possible to report these matrices be-
cause, it would mean to analyze 17 tables, each of which with 17 row and
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17 columns. These Tables are provided in Appendix 1.B to this article.
In Appendix 1.B, along with the ESR and the RSR, another index is
presented. The algorithm explained in Appendix 1.A allows to compute
the quantity of labour that should be employed in the efficient specializa-








where lEi,c,t and li,c,t are, respectively, the quantity of workers employed
in sector i of country c at time t in the efficient scenario and in the original
data set.
As explained in Appendix 1.B, comparing the ESR with the RSR is
the most correct way to analyze CAs, but the lm can also be used as a
rough proxy of CAs10. The advantage of working with labour reallocation
is that it allows for a simple aggregation across sectors, and hence it is
a convenient measure of the structural changes that each country would
have to bear in order to realize an efficient specialization pattern. It is easy
to compute the share of workers that should change job inside a country in










The LM index is just a sum across sectors of the absolute values of the
lm index, with the difference that the denominator is now doubled. This
is because, otherwise, each worker would be counted two times: when he
exits from a sector and when he enters into another.
The results are reported in Tab. 1.5. There are two points to be high-
lighted with respect to Tab. 1.5. The first is that there are marked differ-
ences between countries with respect to the share of workers to be shifted.
The graph in Fig. 1.7a has been created to show this feature. Countries
such as Portugal and, especially, Greece would need to restructure deeply
their economies in order to align their real specialization pattern with the
efficient pattern. Other countries such as Germany and France are closer to
10In fact, when a country has a CA in a certain Sector the lm is positive, otherwise it
tends to be negative. However, the strength of the CA may appear very different when
using the two indexes. For further information, see Appendix 1.B
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Figure 1.7: Cross-country average and standard deviation of the
Labour Mobility index LM , 1995-2011. The LM index counts how
many workers should have changed their job in order to fully exploit
the CAs so as to realize the efficient specialization pattern.
(a) Cross-year average LM (b) Cross-country average LM
it from the point of view of the LM index, although they would still have
to shift more than the 40 % of their labour force.
The second feature to be stressed is that values higher than 50% repre-
sent the majority of the cases and there is no overall trend to improve them.
This is highlighted in Fig. 1.7b, in which the cross-country average LM has
been reported, along with the standard deviation. As can be noted, the dis-
tance is stable until 2004 a bit over the 60%, then it decreases in 2005 and
it stays on average around the 58% from 2005 to 2011. This is somewhat
unexpected, since the GSF increased starting from 2004.
This implies that even if the distance from the NPPF increased, the
sectoral productivities, intended as output per labour, has moved in such
a way that the social costs of fulfilling such a gap from the NPPF de-
creased in time. The decrease is slight, more or less 2 percentage points,
but present. However, a simple inspection of Table 1.5 reveals that this is
not the result of a common trend across countries. Quite on the contrary,
while some countries as Austria or Belgium improved, other countries as
Denmark, Great Britain or Poland did not exhibit any stable improvement




The main result of this paper is that for the period considered the European
economy as a whole was not on the NPPF . The distance between the
European economy and the NPPF grew throughout the years from 23%
in 1995 to 27% circa in 2011. This implies that there is scope for a higher
level of specialization that would allow higher consumption possibilities
for each country. This is evidence that what to be expected from the theory
of Comparative Advantages (CAs), as explained in the first Section of this
chapter and in Samuelson (2001), is not realized.
As a provisional explanation of why the NPPF remained during the
period considered far from the real net product vector, we have two major
possibilities. The first could be attributed to market imperfections to be
associated with the intrinsic complexity of the exchange process. The sec-
ond could be attributed to regulations and/or inappropriate institutional
frameworks.
The results suggest that, even if the institutional framework plays an
important role, there exist intrinsic limits to the capacity of markets to drive
the specialization process towards an efficient scenario. Before the period
considered, 1995-2011, regulations have been implemented so as to allow
higher market integration. Ever since the 50s, Europe has started an eco-
nomic integration project which received a decisive impulse in 1986 with
the Single European Act. This treaty aimed at removing the remaining
barriers to the free circulation of goods, workers and capitals by 1992, an
objective that was completed with the Maastricht Treaty. In fact, one of the
mandates of the Maastricht Treaty was to forbid any restriction to the free
circulation of capitals, which were still somehow limited by the member
states. The introduction of the euro in 1999 (2001) was the final step of the
construction of a single European market.
In an institutional framework built with the precise purpose of easing
the functioning of markets, we expected to see a progressive reduction of
the distance from the NPPF over the period considered—from 1995 to
2011. What emerged is exactly the opposite.
In order to evaluate the gap from the NPPF from another point of
view, a benchmark called Inefficient Frontier (IF ) has been computed.
As the name suggests, the IF describes the most inefficient allocation of
resources—in the same way as the NPPF describes the efficient allocation
of resources. The computation of the IF allows checking whether Europe
was at least relatively closer to an efficient or to an inefficient allocation
of resources. The result is that Europe stayed more or less in the middle
between these two scenarios during all the period considered.
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In the paper it is presented another index which may be useful to eval-
uate the distance from the NPPF , which is called the Labour Mobility
(LM ) index. The LM index computes the quantity of labour that in princi-
ple should have to be shifted in order to reach the NPPF . The main result
is that, on average, the LM index is about the 60% of the labour force,
which is a remarkable quantity of workers. There is a decrease in 2005,
but it is a slight shift, since for the rest of the period considered the LM
oscillated around the 58%. Moreover, strong differences among countries
persist over time with respect to this index and while some of them im-
proved, many of them oscillated without reaching a stable improvement.
Overall, this evidence does not contradict the idea that when markets
are left free to operate, different technological endowments may play a role
in the specialization process. What seems questionable is the conjecture,
conveyed by CA theory, that each country will be involved so as to realize
an efficient division of production. The data presented in this paper does
not show any evident movement of this kind.
It is possible that the results depend on the fact that capital goods,
workers and technologies are not really confined to their original coun-
tries as it has been assumed here. Relaxing the constraints on these factors,
different scenarios could be obtained, which may throw a different light on
the functioning of real markets.
The results exposed here suggest that there is ground to investigate fur-
ther the real working and consequences of Samuelson (2001)’s “invisible
hand” in free markets.
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Table 1.3: The list of countries
1 AUT Austria 10 GRC Greece
2 BEL Belgium 11 HUN Hungary
3 CZE Czech Republic 12 IRL Ireland
4 DEU Germany 13 ITA Italy
5 DNK Denmark 14 NLD Netherlands
6 ESP Spain 15 POL Poland
7 FIN Finalnd 16 PRT Portugal
8 FRA France 17 SWE Sweden
9 GBR Great Britain
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Table 1.4: The list of sectors*
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
2 Mining and Quarrying
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
4 Textiles and Textile Products
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products
10 Rubber and Plastics
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
13 Machinery, Nec
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment
15 Transport Equipment
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
*The sectors excluded are Construction; Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Ve-
hicles and Motorcycles; Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except for Vehicles
and Motorcycles; Retail Trade Except for Vehicles and Motorcycles, Repair of House-
hold Goods; Hotels and Restaurant; Inland Transport; Water Transport; Air Trans-
port; Other Supporting and Auxiliary Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies; Post
and Telecommunications; Financial Intermediation; Real Estate Activities; Renting of
M&Eq and Other Business Activities; Public Administration and Defense, Compul-
sory Social Security; Education; Health and Social Work; Private Households with
Employed Persons.
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Table 1.5: Labour mobility index LM*, evolution 1995-2011
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Mean St. Dev.
AUT 77.31 75.11 70.86 75.17 77.48 76.39 76.90 70.18 67.75 75.23 62.78 55.72 54.51 57.76 51.99 40.96 31.53 64.57 13.45
BEL 61.42 72.18 68.11 69.68 67.90 65.55 71.63 65.57 62.79 71.68 61.70 62.75 55.21 51.92 53.03 51.54 34.45 61.59 9.52
CZE 65.70 57.40 63.43 73.17 58.54 74.19 73.76 71.06 70.93 74.84 72.72 75.55 72.73 56.41 73.74 66.78 66.22 68.66 6.22
DEU 29.47 47.19 50.82 50.37 49.73 49.72 43.25 45.53 41.19 46.51 39.31 36.28 32.35 34.40 41.54 50.12 41.40 42.89 6.55
DNK 69.47 67.93 80.98 82.31 75.88 74.76 71.28 74.58 60.34 62.73 76.39 73.76 77.09 78.67 77.83 79.40 80.00 74.32 6.02
ESP 45.36 40.38 71.30 48.95 49.03 53.75 52.35 45.09 52.45 45.63 43.55 55.87 49.81 50.74 59.40 46.21 46.03 50.35 6.99
FIN 73.80 75.80 60.64 58.39 64.32 60.47 67.69 65.45 70.89 67.87 59.71 67.65 73.57 61.24 58.66 57.72 63.11 65.12 5.67
FRA 55.08 55.59 55.77 50.82 51.81 37.57 51.43 61.89 50.33 53.95 44.24 43.66 52.40 40.23 48.22 49.47 46.62 49.95 5.93
GBR 73.43 55.92 60.19 57.28 69.86 66.70 68.69 56.60 72.43 72.02 57.35 60.96 60.16 47.19 67.84 47.92 67.00 62.44 7.89
GRC 82.03 83.17 82.09 81.86 83.91 83.89 86.52 78.30 83.51 73.75 76.27 89.37 74.09 74.60 84.59 84.25 46.33 79.33 9.33
HUN 34.03 34.48 34.48 40.48 67.60 58.29 57.63 63.02 69.16 33.99 47.97 50.13 47.83 34.42 50.16 54.74 63.41 49.52 12.14
IRL 72.19 68.70 67.08 73.33 72.95 62.52 64.81 66.90 71.30 65.63 67.04 64.76 69.69 76.59 76.06 74.00 66.85 69.43 4.10
ITA 57.30 60.33 54.89 60.22 56.77 59.14 54.04 59.38 54.65 54.23 61.77 50.65 62.88 56.84 59.11 58.54 46.06 56.87 4.07
NLD 55.69 53.68 55.57 53.77 42.09 54.55 55.49 55.92 55.45 55.38 50.73 55.30 60.72 60.48 41.84 48.53 51.99 53.36 5.04
POL 55.95 62.98 68.09 66.81 62.27 56.71 76.28 55.92 61.23 73.54 50.23 59.15 62.98 58.89 64.79 69.15 67.75 63.10 6.55
PRT 65.39 67.71 67.98 73.90 73.74 75.27 70.71 83.12 82.48 84.76 75.97 79.24 77.55 82.72 76.06 75.35 76.05 75.76 5.48
SWE 63.49 62.90 65.38 67.51 65.85 66.35 66.48 68.66 69.69 72.64 46.55 49.65 41.90 43.16 43.06 43.02 40.55 57.46 11.62
Mean 61.01 61.26 63.39 63.77 64.10 63.28 65.23 63.95 64.50 63.79 58.49 60.61 60.32 56.84 60.47 58.69 55.02
St.dev. 14.02 12.45 11.02 11.97 11.12 11.17 10.92 10.04 10.94 13.04 11.97 13.12 12.63 14.38 13.32 13.13 14.26
*The labour mobility index LMc,t computes the share of workers that should change their job inside each country in order to reach the










Appendix 1.A The algorithm for the computation of the
n-dimensional NPPF
The algorithm for the computation of the n-dimensional NPPF is an iterative algo-
rithm that analyzes all the possible two-goods NPPF s that is possible to construct
with a given number of sectors. The procedure is based on the idea that the two-goods
NPPF s are a sort of partial derivatives of the full n-dimensional NPPF , in the sense
that they provide a measure of how much the net product of two goods can increase—
other things being equal. This is possible thanks to the properties of subsystems—see
Section 1.2.1.
In an n-dimensionalNPPF , the number of sectors considered is n, so that the num-
ber of possible couples of n sectors is nk = n!2!(n−2)! . In some sense, the n-dimensional
NPPF can be analyzed from nk bidimensional perspectives.
Since nk couples of sectors can be considered, a generic couple of sectors can be
defined as (ik, jk), so that ΩNPPF = {(i1, j1), .., (ink, jnk)}. For each couple (ik, jk), it
is possible to compute the related GSk, and organize them in a vector called GS =
[GS1, ..., GSnk]′. Then, it is easy to find GSmin = min(GS), that is to say the minimum
of the elements belonging to the vector GS. The GSmin provides a benchmark for
evaluating the maximum possible expansion in all the sectors considered, reachable
through a proper reallocation of workers across sectors.
Actually, the aim of the algorithm is to find a new Net Total Product vector NTP1 =
[Y 11 , ..., Y 1n ]′, such that ∀ Yi > 0 ∈ NTP, the corresponding Y 1i ∈ NTP1 gives Y 1i /Yi −
1 = GS∗ > 0, while ∀ Yi < 0 ∈ NTP, the corresponding Y 1i ∈ NTP1 gives Y 1i = Yi.
In words, in vector NTP1, all the positive elements of the original vector NTP
must be increased by the same proportion, while all the negative elements have to be
kept fixed. The GSmin is a sort of upper boundary for the GS∗: probably, applying to
the original NTP a proportion GS∗ > GSmin, the resulting NTP1 would be outside
theNPPF . On the contrary, if a certain ratio r ∈ (0, 1) of theGSmin is applied to NTP,
it is highly probable that NTP1 = (1 + r × GSmin) ×NTP is feasible, an hence GS∗
should be computed as GS∗ = r ×GSmin.
Then, the problem becomes to compute a matrix Y1 = Y ◦ X, where symbol ◦
means the Hadamard or element-by-element product, such that
Y1ι = NTP1 (1.A.1)
The problem can be solved using linear programming. In order to explain how to
frame the problem from the point of view of linear programming, consider an example
of 3 goods and 3 countries.
As should be clear from Section 1.2.1, the net product y of good i in country c is
a linear function of the total labour employed in subsystem i of country c. We define
with Li,c the quantity of labour employed in subsystem i of country c, while Lc is the
total labour employed by country c. The vector L′ is given by
L′ = [L1,1, L1,2, L1,3, L2,1, L2,2, L2,3, L3,1, L3,2, L3,3] (1.A.2)






Then, consider the matrix
YC =
y1,1 0 0 y2,1 0 0 y3,1 0 00 y1,2 0 0 y2,2 0 0 y3,2 0




L1,1 L1,2 L1,3 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 L2,1 L2,2 L2,3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 L3,1 L3,2 L3,3
 (1.A.5)
The, solving the problem
min L′x (1.A.6)
s.t. YCx = NTP1
LCx = L
we find a vector x of reproportiong factors, which is the factorization of the matrix
X that allows to compute an Y1 such that Y1ι = NTP1. Moreover, the overall quantity
of labour to be shifted to reach NTP1 is minimized.
Standard linear programming packages allow to condition the boundaries in which
each element x ∈ x can move. A lower boundary has to be set to 0 for all those x ∈ x
that are related to a positive net product, in order to avoid the possibility of generating
deficits. Those x that are related to a negative net product can be constrained to 1 in
order to keep fixed the deficit—as in the cases of Sector 2 and, from 2008, Sector 12 in
our sample.
The overall algorithm can be summarized as follows
1. Compute all the possible nk two-goods NPPF in ΩNPPF and the associated vector
GS;
2. Find the minimum GSmin = min(GS);
3. Compute the objective vector NTP1 = (1 + r ×GSmin)×NTP, where r ∈ (0, 1)
is a predefined parameter;
4. Solve problem 1.A.6, with the appropriate boundaries, in order to find a vector
of reproportioning factors that allows to compute the matrix Y1 such that Y1ι =
NTP1
5. Start a new loop from point 1.
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Iteration after iteration, the NTP improves thanks to the specialization process.
The algorithm stops when the scopes for improvements, quantified by max(GS), are
less than a predefined parameter. The computations have been performed using the
software Matlab.
It is important to apply just a portion r ∈ (0, 1)—step 3—of GSmin, not just to be
sure to find an NTP that lies inside the frontier, but also because in so doing, at the
successive loop, further scopes for improvement can be found. Actually, at each loop
the shift of labour between i1 and ji, between i2 and j2 and so on changes the amount
of labour available for each of the nk couple of sectors and redefines the structure
of the nk frontiers—see Section 1.2. Hence, it is important not to exploit fully the
scope identified by GSmin at the first loop. Otherwise the algorithm could terminate
too early, i.e., when sizable expansion, in presence of a different reallocation, is still
possible.
As Jones (1961) demonstrated, it is be possible to follow another approach in order
to establish Comparative Advantages. The method suggested by Jones (1961) allows
to assign to each country a single sector of specialization in order to reach the maxi-
mum possible efficiency. However, the rule devised by him would not be applicable
directly in his case, since if each country specializes completely in just one sector, the
production would be scarce in some sectors and abundant in others, in such a way that
the demand could not be satisfied. Moreover, it is not clear how Jones’s rule could be
adapted to control for scarce resources in addition to the primary resource, as in the
case of Sector 2 of our sample—see Section 1.4.1. Nevertheless, it being understood
the differences, our conjecture is that the algorithm described here should tend to the
solution found by Jones (1961).
Appendix 1.B Tables on Comparative Advantages and labour
mobility Index
1.B.1 Measures of Comparative Advantages


















where i = 1, ..., n identifies the sectors, c = 1, ...,m the countries and t = 1, .., T
the years. The matrix ESRt, which collects the ESR related to each country and each
sector at time t, is called from now on the efficient specialization pattern at time t, while
the matrix RSRt, an analogous matrix for the all the RSR at time t, is called the real
specialization pattern at time t. The results of these two indexes are reported in Tables
1.6-1.22.
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The results for Sector 2 and, in some years, for Sector 12 have not been reported be-
cause, as explained in Section 1.4.1, the great majority of countries are in deficit in this
index, implying a negative Net Total Product in this sector. For this reason, although
countries can reduce their deficits in Sector 2 and Sector 12, nobody can specialize in it,
making the comparison between the ESR and the RSR not very interesting. Since Ta-
bles 1.6-1.22 contain a lot of data, it is better to avoid reporting irrelevant information.
Therefore, we have chosen to exclude Sector 2 from Tables 1.6-1.22.
Where theESR is higher than theRSR, the countries considered have a CA. For ex-
ample, it is evident from Tab. 1.6 that the main CAs of Austria were in Sector 12—Basic
Metal and Fabricated Metal—during the period 1996-2004, in Sector 15—Transport
Equipment—during the period 2006-2010 and in Sector 8—Coke, Refined Petroleum
and Nuclear Fuel—during the period 2007-2011. In most of the cases, the algorithm
identifies 2 or 3 sectors of specialization—although cases in which there 1 or 4 sectors
of specialization are not rare. For all the other Sectors, countries are said to have a
comparative disadvantage, as it is the case of the production of Agricultural goods
in Austria. In an efficient scenario it should have been 0 for all the years considered.
In reality, it was always above 1.3%, although with a declining trend, which means
that the real specialization progressively approached the efficient specialization in this
case.
As for what concerns the two biggest European countries, it emerges that Ger-
many had historically a strong CA in Sector 15—Transport Equipment—and in some
years Sector 4—Textiles and Textile Production—, Sector 6—Wood and Products of
Wood and Cork, Sector 11—Other Non-Metallic Mineral—. France excelled in Sector
1—Agriculture—, Sector 9—Chemicals and Chemical product—and Sector 4—Textiles
and textile production.
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Table 1.6: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Austria*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 2.39 1.73 0.02 -0.19 1.85 2.46 3.17 2.53 2.54 1.79 1.10 2.07 1.64 1.75 1.41 0.23 -0.53
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003
R 1.81 1.74 1.77 1.75 1.66 1.65 1.52 1.66 1.66 1.66 1.82 1.91 1.85 1.91 1.95 1.84 1.78
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004
R 1.76 1.87 1.88 1.81 1.67 1.72 1.63 1.70 1.66 1.47 1.72 1.78 1.60 1.86 1.43 1.39 0.91
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.005
R 1.38 1.30 1.51 1.48 1.69 1.79 1.62 1.60 1.53 1.53 1.69 1.47 -1.47 0.58 1.41 -3.29 -13.11
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.006
R 8.04 8.86 8.50 8.03 5.75 8.07 7.37 6.60 6.85 7.18 13.18 18.74 10.20 14.19 10.01 12.41 14.56
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 2.45 2.54 2.76 2.80 2.76 2.73 2.68 2.62 2.62 2.61 2.71 2.99 3.31 4.12 2.94 3.43 2.64
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 73.48 11.27 10.52 61.41 56.938
R 0.83 0.85 0.69 1.68 1.63 1.15 1.48 1.36 1.34 1.14 1.98 0.96 2.76 16.41 15.29 79.45 75.79
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -6.439
R 1.05 1.11 1.10 1.12 1.19 0.89 0.77 1.06 0.89 0.96 1.38 1.53 1.51 1.83 1.17 -8.19 -25.96
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.5910
R 2.08 2.28 2.84 2.53 2.45 2.71 2.67 2.33 2.20 2.28 4.06 2.12 1.56 3.58 1.04 -9.45 -37.47
E 74.04 41.66 70.34 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0011
R 3.80 4.06 3.87 3.48 3.37 3.35 3.29 3.10 3.45 2.04 3.09 3.91 4.01 3.90 3.35 2.87 1.71
E 0.20 25.16 6.01 60.29 84.22 36.24 43.77 4.12 15.66 39.82 0.00 0.00 0.01 / / / /12
R 3.26 3.81 4.54 4.90 5.44 3.38 4.15 2.52 3.77 3.50 4.55 4.79 12.60 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.22 0.00 20.41 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0013
R 2.48 2.51 2.63 2.66 2.77 2.76 2.84 2.75 2.96 2.70 2.84 3.10 3.06 3.58 3.22 1.49 -0.98
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.71 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014
R 2.69 2.67 2.49 2.44 2.32 2.31 2.57 2.68 2.57 2.51 0.93 1.89 1.70 1.89 1.72 1.72 1.48
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 20.25 14.72 19.57 11.37 5.76 0.0015
R 1.27 1.35 1.43 1.34 1.38 1.39 1.41 1.81 1.63 1.96 2.06 1.99 1.98 2.01 1.73 1.84 2.06
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.56 0.00 0.0016
R 3.02 3.27 3.07 2.97 2.66 2.71 2.76 2.89 2.86 2.82 3.05 3.30 3.22 3.78 4.15 3.92 3.66
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017
R 1.79 1.93 1.89 1.87 2.24 2.41 2.64 2.63 2.70 2.70 3.31 3.07 3.10 1.31 2.35 -21.06 -17.57






and represents the share of European net output that Austria should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Austria actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Austria had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.7: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Belgium*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 0.44 0.27 0.63 1.14 1.15 0.98 -1.91 -0.62 0.72 -1.14 1.68 1.32 0.82 -1.15 0.90 -0.55 0.66
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 9.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.73 6.563
R 3.32 3.36 3.29 3.43 3.10 3.16 3.35 3.23 3.14 3.32 3.28 3.42 3.27 3.54 3.52 3.44 3.57
E 0.00 0.01 26.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.024
R 3.83 3.93 4.46 4.51 4.82 3.82 3.83 3.87 3.90 4.01 3.95 4.25 4.06 3.91 4.25 4.34 4.96
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.045
R 0.51 0.58 0.53 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.55 0.51 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.87 1.10
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 28.21 52.45 0.01 0.03 0.04 43.38 0.04 0.01 0.01 14.066
R 1.61 1.40 2.67 2.42 2.78 3.57 3.31 3.41 3.38 3.43 5.01 8.68 3.77 5.07 4.08 3.84 5.21
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 2.52 2.55 2.46 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.77 2.75 2.68 2.97 2.74 2.67 2.82 2.74 2.49 2.37 2.67
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 3.14 0.05 2.18 2.09 0.81 0.478
R 4.98 4.86 3.67 6.01 5.01 6.29 6.07 5.46 5.28 6.35 7.03 6.09 6.60 3.21 2.81 0.50 0.48
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.019
R 4.73 4.60 5.60 5.06 5.41 5.96 5.51 5.62 5.81 6.15 5.85 6.24 5.09 5.67 5.69 6.01 7.93
E 0.00 21.16 5.86 75.14 94.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.08 99.96 99.92 0.54 45.21 0.01 0.02 0.2210
R 2.48 2.67 3.45 2.89 3.00 2.02 2.04 2.35 2.02 2.52 6.03 4.10 4.12 5.51 3.48 4.67 7.32
E 17.07 54.02 26.69 20.98 17.51 32.50 0.00 19.97 23.87 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1411
R 4.78 4.24 4.95 4.38 4.41 4.03 3.88 4.40 4.20 4.04 3.28 4.27 4.36 3.85 3.85 4.76 4.52
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.14 44.02 18.21 9.41 40.94 0.00 0.01 0.02 / / / /12
R 4.48 4.57 6.42 6.44 8.41 4.88 6.03 4.80 4.96 5.89 8.66 8.79 28.63 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0113
R 1.84 1.75 1.82 1.92 1.80 1.91 1.84 1.79 1.78 1.79 1.65 1.57 1.49 1.47 1.42 1.39 1.41
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014
R 1.68 1.41 1.71 1.70 1.63 2.07 1.60 1.39 1.57 1.58 1.19 1.00 0.82 0.68 0.74 0.62 0.56
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.92 4.12 11.75 10.80 15.10 0.00 3.5215
R 3.16 2.99 2.81 2.90 2.71 2.82 3.05 3.16 2.76 2.70 2.79 2.87 2.51 2.45 2.49 1.96 2.05
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0416
R 2.92 2.74 2.67 2.58 2.39 2.80 2.78 2.65 2.65 2.75 2.63 2.76 2.72 2.69 2.55 2.38 2.62
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0117
R 1.87 1.80 1.81 1.78 2.00 1.71 1.71 1.83 1.64 1.48 1.80 1.86 1.84 1.51 1.93 2.01 2.10






and represents the share of European net output that Belgium should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Belgium actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Belgium had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.8: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Czech Republic*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 18.51 10.57 13.41 19.98 0.38 23.07 26.33 22.96 32.30 21.60 24.74 20.00 21.89 0.02 18.67 21.81 17.181
R 3.16 2.65 2.77 2.44 2.91 1.06 2.30 2.32 3.28 2.06 1.80 2.33 1.74 2.05 1.40 2.28 2.22
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.51 0.00 0.00 0.303
R 1.98 2.04 1.86 2.25 2.13 1.92 2.03 2.19 1.69 2.00 1.58 1.81 1.54 1.56 1.60 1.43 1.47
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.014
R 0.97 1.48 1.28 1.21 1.02 0.97 0.87 0.83 0.76 0.90 0.55 0.01 1.15 1.48 0.95 1.10 1.37
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.015
R 1.47 1.19 0.99 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.64 0.07 0.33 0.29 -0.01 -0.72 -3.89 -2.29 -0.01 -1.52 -2.96
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.036
R 3.09 3.69 2.90 1.84 2.99 3.22 2.42 1.63 1.66 3.02 3.81 -63.98 2.82 3.81 3.22 3.03 3.78
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 1.25 1.35 1.48 1.40 1.30 1.14 1.27 1.43 1.47 1.69 1.35 2.15 1.91 1.85 1.54 1.79 2.04
E 0.01 0.00 0.00 2.22 0.03 0.02 1.18 0.00 6.92 2.55 10.07 0.98 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.008
R 23.37 24.88 12.75 1.35 1.15 0.72 1.35 1.16 1.66 1.23 2.16 0.52 2.98 0.84 0.39 -1.56 -1.97
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009
R -0.51 0.12 0.74 0.54 0.79 0.43 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.03 0.19 0.37 0.30 0.48 0.19 0.57 0.83
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.0910
R 1.04 1.14 1.17 0.40 0.21 1.08 0.59 0.23 1.43 1.78 1.23 0.66 -0.64 -1.09 -0.92 -1.22 -1.52
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0111
R 2.22 2.51 2.44 2.26 2.58 2.27 1.99 2.43 2.45 1.80 2.29 3.05 3.11 2.69 2.15 2.94 2.60
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 3.49 1.28 4.31 4.39 4.17 2.32 2.11 1.11 0.73 -0.08 -0.94 0.57 -0.54 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0013
R 0.98 1.29 1.24 1.31 1.14 1.15 1.18 1.26 1.38 1.49 1.44 1.70 1.88 2.00 1.65 1.81 1.90
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0114
R 0.99 1.41 1.23 1.01 1.25 1.12 1.12 1.04 1.39 2.30 1.27 1.56 1.61 2.00 1.17 1.46 1.48
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.86 0.00 1.27 0.7815
R 0.80 1.08 1.22 1.09 1.12 1.38 1.50 1.69 1.61 1.81 1.95 2.38 2.48 2.80 2.96 2.99 3.43
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0116
R 1.32 1.25 1.45 1.26 1.48 1.78 1.79 2.06 1.92 1.91 1.69 1.93 1.89 1.79 2.02 2.54 2.67
E 26.85 44.71 27.27 0.00 1.91 2.78 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.0117
R 4.01 3.98 3.43 4.07 4.91 5.04 4.89 4.58 4.64 4.27 3.82 3.79 -1.03 0.52 3.36 3.98 4.24






and represents the share of European net output that the Czech Republic should have produced in
order to realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European
countries considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that the Czech Republic actually
produced. An ESR > RSR means that the Czech Republic had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.9: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Denmark*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 15.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 7.81 5.68 13.00 7.56 14.07 17.50 14.12 23.95 15.971
R 1.43 1.43 1.18 1.30 0.74 1.77 0.72 0.49 0.05 1.27 -0.79 -2.29 -0.86 -1.03 -0.18 1.30 0.99
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003
R 1.81 1.74 1.72 1.82 1.67 1.67 1.65 1.72 1.73 1.55 1.90 2.08 1.79 1.80 1.76 1.66 1.62
E 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.014
R 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.73 0.61 0.63 0.61
E 0.14 99.94 96.25 99.99 99.97 99.93 46.45 54.52 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.035
R 0.45 0.40 0.33 0.29 0.34 0.45 0.29 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.07 0.01
E 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.026
R 0.92 0.63 1.48 1.04 2.16 1.47 0.94 0.97 1.34 1.45 0.17 3.67 2.12 2.65 1.64 1.47 1.35
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 1.19 1.19 1.20 1.32 1.33 0.72 0.83 0.63 0.76 0.67 1.17 0.89 -0.81 -0.14 1.14 0.96 0.71
E 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 23.02 49.89 81.46 73.86 71.90 79.05 33.33 72.69 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008
R 0.51 0.60 0.43 0.75 0.61 0.36 0.48 0.53 0.39 0.33 -0.42 0.44 0.21 -0.05 -0.12 -0.07 -0.32
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.019
R 0.66 0.83 1.10 1.08 1.27 1.21 1.47 1.40 1.36 1.42 1.59 1.64 1.52 1.56 2.02 1.93 2.39
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0210
R 1.54 1.71 1.88 1.64 1.68 1.51 1.54 1.70 1.62 1.64 2.48 1.80 2.24 2.42 1.63 2.12 2.82
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0011
R 1.00 0.92 1.38 1.40 1.53 1.16 0.99 1.07 0.98 0.94 1.08 1.36 1.57 1.24 0.92 0.91 0.93
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 0.66 -0.09 0.15 0.87 -0.55 0.77 0.59 0.79 0.36 0.49 0.50 0.14 1.99 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0113
R 2.10 2.01 2.15 2.05 1.86 1.90 1.83 1.95 1.81 1.78 1.61 1.60 1.67 1.88 1.96 1.81 1.86
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014
R 1.35 1.46 1.43 1.26 1.38 1.36 1.51 1.68 1.42 1.46 0.91 1.15 1.14 1.10 1.07 1.15 0.86
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0715
R 0.61 0.64 0.57 0.50 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.16 0.15
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0116
R 2.41 2.32 2.32 2.29 2.11 2.10 2.04 1.95 1.93 1.89 1.97 2.09 1.97 1.64 1.55 1.66 1.61
E 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017
R 1.20 1.32 1.27 1.23 1.47 1.43 1.43 1.34 1.34 1.28 1.17 1.24 1.05 1.16 1.11 1.41 1.48






and represents the share of European net output that Denmark should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Denmark actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Denmark had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.10: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Finland*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 1.80 0.61 -1.54 -2.95 -1.50 -3.51 0.99 -1.36 -2.14 -1.63 1.52 1.46 1.53 1.38 0.05 -1.30 1.03
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003
R 0.88 0.84 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.87 0.86 0.91 0.94 0.91 1.12 1.24 1.20 1.16 1.21 1.23 1.23
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004
R 0.52 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.42 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.54 0.51 0.56 0.52
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.015
R 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.39 0.47 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.53 0.37 0.43 0.51 0.47
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.016
R 7.27 6.60 6.36 5.06 11.89 7.34 7.31 6.58 8.48 8.07 -6.24 -9.72 11.06 12.51 9.18 11.04 11.97
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 5.19 5.61 5.87 6.20 5.28 5.07 4.61 4.98 4.97 5.52 6.27 6.46 8.14 6.76 5.02 7.60 7.34
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.47 2.16 1.64 1.57 1.87 2.15 17.64 4.17 2.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008
R 0.85 1.12 0.74 1.75 1.47 1.29 1.28 1.50 1.34 1.36 2.23 1.39 2.64 0.69 0.56 0.14 0.03
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.609
R 0.91 1.06 1.12 1.06 0.78 1.00 0.88 1.04 0.82 0.94 1.30 0.98 1.05 1.01 0.93 1.38 1.79
E 3.27 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0110
R 1.42 1.35 1.96 1.76 1.84 1.67 1.75 1.86 2.14 2.06 3.26 2.25 2.71 3.42 2.14 2.96 4.78
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.2811
R 1.16 1.35 1.36 1.34 1.33 1.32 1.23 1.31 1.46 1.48 1.59 1.74 1.79 1.55 1.16 1.61 1.46
E 23.10 32.42 4.59 6.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 1.50 2.10 3.17 3.42 3.33 2.18 2.06 1.97 2.11 2.62 5.86 5.01 18.15 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 13.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0013
R 2.06 2.08 2.44 2.36 2.22 1.92 1.87 1.93 2.08 2.16 2.00 2.04 2.27 2.26 1.95 1.60 2.28
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.30 15.84 17.29 18.80 22.90 20.84 19.44 25.32 28.79 32.34 29.77 23.03 22.77 22.1214
R 1.55 1.78 1.88 2.36 2.59 3.15 2.98 3.67 2.96 2.98 5.56 4.81 5.16 6.11 5.17 5.04 4.03
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0015
R 0.70 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.46 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.53 0.26 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.34 0.28
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0016
R 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.90 0.80 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.95 1.01 1.02 1.02 0.95 0.92 0.80 0.80 0.82
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1517
R 0.71 0.77 0.82 0.81 0.86 1.04 0.95 0.98 1.04 1.05 1.18 1.03 0.88 1.02 1.06 1.38 1.21






and represents the share of European net output that Finland should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Finland actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Finland had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.11: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in France*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 43.60 89.41 84.57 43.53 1.55 37.17 33.12 73.20 0.01 72.70 43.34 0.01 0.01 75.73 0.00 7.32 66.691
R 32.96 23.19 26.99 27.03 27.44 25.94 29.72 29.37 34.27 22.58 29.75 34.83 26.35 32.19 20.27 20.51 31.57
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 40.64 10.19 16.77 27.37 60.63 22.47 22.68 0.01 43.55 19.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.993
R 12.77 13.25 13.08 14.07 15.90 15.57 15.23 14.94 14.05 15.49 16.31 10.97 16.10 15.64 18.00 18.07 16.00
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 91.57 99.73 0.01 7.35 99.99 99.93 99.99 99.95 99.99 0.03 99.404
R 9.92 9.98 9.93 9.87 12.44 11.84 12.55 13.90 13.48 13.70 18.56 16.76 17.74 11.47 16.43 15.75 12.04
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.035
R 8.08 8.13 8.71 9.34 12.26 12.57 10.63 9.80 9.11 8.77 8.97 9.11 10.92 9.01 8.99 10.96 10.96
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.046
R 7.53 8.83 5.20 4.65 6.94 5.48 5.95 6.17 6.47 6.37 7.48 21.33 10.98 4.78 11.45 18.33 6.94
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 11.51 11.85 11.21 11.37 12.35 11.64 12.94 12.08 12.73 12.71 14.76 13.93 3.65 4.80 13.09 10.05 5.90
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.96 13.78 10.78 4.75 12.04 0.00 0.79 0.01 8.14 0.00 0.00 4.418
R 7.96 6.44 3.66 8.01 7.27 12.37 19.96 15.57 16.25 14.30 -3.19 29.47 -22.55 10.22 23.61 6.64 5.60
E 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 30.29 57.21 28.57 30.56 99.95 20.77 30.91 99.98 16.83 14.53 97.59 40.73 0.029
R 4.29 9.36 11.34 10.94 13.54 15.90 15.71 13.12 13.28 11.18 23.19 23.21 23.05 21.85 19.29 27.82 21.67
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.64 99.95 99.92 99.6210
R 11.65 11.97 13.55 10.52 9.81 9.42 9.00 6.14 5.27 11.72 -14.14 18.68 23.23 16.18 23.35 51.88 36.45
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0111
R 10.18 9.54 11.43 10.53 9.36 10.97 9.11 10.17 9.14 8.89 10.80 13.16 13.16 10.13 10.18 13.99 9.59
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 7.42 6.89 3.59 2.61 4.93 11.81 11.68 11.44 10.55 11.62 14.14 13.50 29.36 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.10 0.00 65.09 0.10 14.13 64.86 0.0713
R 8.18 8.35 7.22 7.37 9.31 9.29 8.35 8.16 8.06 9.81 13.59 13.03 12.98 11.94 13.35 15.45 13.16
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.11 28.07 0.1314
R 9.39 7.78 11.65 10.55 10.42 11.67 12.72 11.86 10.81 11.95 13.88 9.39 11.65 12.74 15.92 16.60 13.50
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 47.58 9.11 27.39 0.00 0.01 0.0315
R 15.22 15.96 15.48 14.90 18.75 17.96 17.86 17.31 17.27 16.75 21.18 19.55 17.64 18.01 17.16 18.44 13.10
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0116
R 10.64 10.53 9.77 10.70 12.33 12.58 13.75 14.37 13.80 12.48 13.06 12.17 11.70 10.54 10.22 9.99 10.51
E 21.91 49.23 17.58 99.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0117
R 22.77 22.96 22.51 22.18 11.75 11.26 10.94 12.93 12.85 12.61 14.37 13.27 13.69 14.00 12.90 15.38 16.73






and represents the share of European net output that France should have produced in order to realize
the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries consid-
ered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that France actually produced. An ESR > RSR
means that France had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.12: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Germany*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.001
R 5.68 4.54 10.71 9.89 1.65 2.78 8.45 6.22 6.25 15.04 17.41 19.53 19.45 17.73 18.98 15.67 15.57
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 18.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 65.00 34.18 50.63 28.82 0.18 0.023
R 19.94 19.45 19.89 17.30 18.07 19.61 18.90 20.31 19.64 19.31 19.89 22.43 20.18 19.75 17.29 16.48 16.90
E 0.00 99.85 73.80 99.41 99.98 99.83 8.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 99.95 0.424
R 14.90 14.86 14.08 14.01 14.04 12.66 12.60 12.08 12.22 13.26 13.39 13.57 13.97 14.20 13.29 13.48 14.88
E 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.055
R 7.35 7.28 7.18 7.01 7.26 6.66 6.42 6.90 5.57 6.91 6.46 6.23 2.10 2.42 7.21 4.93 2.84
E 0.01 0.02 99.95 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 99.96 99.91 56.58 99.88 99.98 99.97 85.156
R 31.92 33.28 38.88 23.02 23.88 29.63 22.90 29.72 23.57 22.30 24.07 28.63 10.62 10.53 14.45 4.88 3.29
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 13.43 20.80 17.16 15.77 17.32 20.59 19.19 17.56 15.38 15.63 16.95 16.98 17.76 19.55 17.47 14.39 15.47
E 0.00 84.01 22.64 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.82 0.00 7.01 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008
R 11.15 11.98 41.12 14.18 15.36 12.47 10.94 12.02 14.67 13.36 13.98 3.46 5.93 5.06 3.57 -2.87 -3.42
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.019
R 35.15 34.29 29.90 30.16 29.62 27.34 27.59 26.38 26.52 29.79 29.01 31.88 28.84 30.48 27.59 27.78 37.04
E 19.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 51.03 91.20 0.10 0.64 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.1310
R 34.23 42.10 34.18 31.50 28.66 32.29 30.23 30.22 30.20 31.55 60.64 25.88 18.15 20.95 26.00 11.90 15.65
E 7.46 0.02 0.01 61.49 0.02 31.99 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 99.98 82.17 70.75 35.58 99.99 93.54 72.5511
R 21.51 21.81 16.20 22.31 16.53 20.50 19.72 19.47 16.29 21.46 24.34 30.06 33.72 26.65 25.60 29.68 26.82
E 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.03 17.41 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 26.42 27.77 6.65 16.20 -8.38 23.26 25.04 33.36 32.02 32.93 26.51 18.17 -10.27 / / / /
E 49.45 28.46 0.00 1.20 11.02 0.14 63.21 50.24 33.50 7.90 28.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0113
R 35.87 35.14 33.74 33.71 35.68 35.80 38.27 34.92 36.70 32.75 33.96 33.96 33.78 35.45 34.89 33.18 34.84
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 54.49 0.01 0.01 53.58 79.13 10.76 23.91 12.39 17.25 0.01 0.00 20.9414
R 30.72 30.47 26.12 29.40 30.35 27.52 27.70 28.18 32.12 32.18 28.49 31.22 29.60 26.49 26.52 26.80 28.93
E 99.99 99.97 84.50 100.00 99.99 68.98 99.99 99.99 99.98 99.95 91.08 28.00 64.42 40.32 73.53 88.15 95.4815
R 34.86 34.07 35.20 36.50 35.91 35.15 36.44 35.33 35.85 37.51 36.26 36.34 38.64 38.53 38.73 38.36 41.82
E 0.00 0.00 70.59 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0216
R 20.34 19.32 20.14 18.87 17.77 18.24 17.01 15.63 15.25 15.71 18.19 19.39 17.96 18.79 17.76 17.06 17.83
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0117
R 15.44 15.71 15.80 14.74 18.96 17.27 16.85 16.39 15.84 15.30 18.03 18.68 19.20 19.63 19.71 25.66 24.58






and represents the share of European net output that Germany should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Germany actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Germany had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.13: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Great Britain*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 1.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 52.15 39.73 40.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.34 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 0.85 12.33 11.46 8.48 8.15 6.05 6.78 10.96 4.50 8.58 4.70 -0.15 0.84 12.71 9.83 11.47 8.50
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 30.67 62.93 29.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 22.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.72 0.00 25.31 0.013
R 13.05 12.84 12.86 12.50 12.19 11.74 11.78 11.83 11.51 11.15 12.13 13.14 11.49 10.84 10.43 11.19 12.76
E 99.99 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.00 99.96 92.63 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.064
R 12.39 12.07 11.71 10.78 11.84 9.67 8.36 8.71 9.20 8.72 9.48 9.65 9.25 9.62 9.73 9.58 11.57
E 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 53.47 45.43 99.91 99.92 99.99 99.97 99.97 99.89 100.12 100.17 0.305
R 4.85 4.39 3.75 2.86 3.70 3.54 3.27 3.37 3.06 2.88 3.38 3.21 3.76 3.83 4.10 4.65 8.50
E 99.96 99.93 0.01 99.99 99.93 99.86 99.92 71.75 47.50 99.94 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.056
R -4.92 -4.39 -18.24 4.96 -9.79 -7.63 -1.51 2.31 6.20 6.19 -1.07 7.36 6.41 6.23 6.43 4.14 8.68
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 21.26 19.94 20.15 19.43 19.55 17.81 17.65 17.56 18.30 18.47 16.25 15.45 19.43 16.17 15.47 15.95 18.79
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008
R 10.04 9.40 7.28 11.12 11.86 12.62 11.33 10.68 10.51 10.52 23.11 14.40 18.30 7.21 6.23 1.46 1.72
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009
R 16.18 14.90 13.08 14.00 12.83 14.24 13.56 12.82 12.56 14.85 12.14 12.58 10.45 9.51 10.71 9.04 12.66
E 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0210
R 15.50 10.16 5.21 15.67 17.25 15.69 16.80 15.19 14.97 10.27 -0.93 16.11 16.62 13.31 15.31 11.91 30.92
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0111
R 10.93 11.12 11.26 8.85 10.08 9.55 8.62 7.52 9.31 9.14 9.41 11.37 11.31 9.48 9.60 12.10 11.47
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 58.77 63.53 0.02 / / / /12
R 13.25 17.50 17.47 12.75 18.12 7.44 8.45 6.30 7.00 12.06 13.13 12.95 44.63 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.54 34.89 17.18 49.38 0.00 56.9213
R 12.22 11.64 12.56 11.85 8.79 8.95 9.49 8.90 8.89 8.92 9.72 8.92 8.55 8.58 9.26 10.71 12.02
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0114
R 17.51 16.31 17.07 16.77 15.79 16.75 13.99 14.44 12.29 10.99 10.12 9.14 8.57 7.68 8.76 7.66 7.74
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0115
R 14.94 14.23 13.55 14.64 12.72 12.84 12.12 12.10 12.64 11.57 11.54 11.66 10.60 10.97 12.12 13.26 14.76
E 99.99 99.98 0.01 100.00 99.99 99.96 99.97 99.99 99.98 99.99 100.00 99.99 99.99 99.09 84.43 99.69 99.8416
R 13.08 13.48 13.25 13.09 12.78 12.03 12.38 13.67 13.38 13.83 13.52 13.58 13.18 12.97 13.71 14.99 15.51
E 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.56 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 33.35 34.75 20.40 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.0217
R 11.88 11.83 12.03 12.69 10.00 16.18 14.06 11.26 14.19 14.05 17.76 17.14 20.12 19.28 17.31 22.22 21.45






and represents the share of European net output that Great Britain should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Great Britain actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Great Britain had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.14: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Greece*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 7.05 5.43 4.80 4.73 5.76 5.87 6.29 2.95 2.05 4.64 4.67 2.77 2.26 1.40 2.91 3.25 2.34
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.243
R 1.52 1.61 1.65 1.86 1.74 1.78 2.13 2.31 2.31 2.16 2.10 2.37 2.01 2.23 2.37 2.15 1.97
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.014
R 2.71 2.73 2.55 2.72 3.11 2.51 2.20 1.85 2.90 1.59 1.55 1.53 1.42 2.65 2.51 2.41 2.36
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.11 97.845
R 0.84 0.83 0.77 0.84 0.84 0.91 1.10 0.32 -0.25 0.41 0.65 0.83 0.84 0.59 0.87 0.98 1.25
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.426
R 2.80 2.97 2.43 2.24 2.49 2.13 2.06 1.57 1.51 1.41 1.80 1.14 1.33 0.35 0.61 0.03 -0.73
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 1.50 1.40 1.22 1.24 1.23 1.01 1.13 1.21 1.23 0.35 0.20 0.55 0.23 -0.44 0.47 0.51 0.48
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 63.37 3.05 0.00 0.018
R 2.80 2.69 1.94 3.20 2.85 2.98 2.02 3.29 3.36 3.48 3.55 2.55 5.41 1.78 1.60 0.31 0.21
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.039
R 1.30 1.18 1.10 0.99 0.89 0.87 -0.02 0.27 0.80 1.07 0.79 0.68 0.71 0.84 0.74 0.62 0.71
E 77.61 78.17 94.09 16.10 5.86 16.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.84 0.00 0.00 23.34 53.65 0.00 0.00 0.0210
R 1.55 1.53 1.75 1.38 1.56 1.35 1.44 1.44 1.97 1.87 2.14 1.34 1.64 2.51 1.10 1.27 1.56
E 1.40 3.74 2.93 0.01 0.01 35.46 53.37 55.95 62.90 19.67 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.05 0.00 6.42 4.9611
R 1.64 1.84 2.01 2.01 2.13 2.03 2.47 2.09 3.56 2.82 2.29 3.06 2.75 2.03 1.70 1.91 1.53
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.09 41.22 36.44 99.93 / / / /12
R 1.73 2.18 2.25 2.26 3.11 1.34 0.44 1.51 1.61 2.01 3.14 4.16 11.00 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.04 8.47 0.0513
R -0.76 -0.75 -0.65 -0.51 -0.54 -0.20 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.22
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.35 16.26 2.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014
R 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.53 0.55 0.50 0.39 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.06 0.05 0.04
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0015
R 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.12
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0116
R 1.03 1.00 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.77 0.79 0.94 0.77 0.69 0.63 1.15 1.26 1.16 1.01
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0617
R 1.46 1.44 1.48 1.58 1.98 2.04 2.06 2.15 2.00 1.84 1.87 2.40 1.98 2.05 1.99 2.39 2.06






and represents the share of European net output that Greece should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Greece actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Greece had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.15: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Hungary*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 9.58 9.93 0.00 6.64 8.32 10.79 0.131
R 1.99 1.81 1.94 1.85 2.11 1.66 3.34 2.17 -2.37 3.32 4.02 3.85 2.16 4.24 3.23 4.46 4.79
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 4.89 7.00 6.72 3.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003
R 3.13 3.30 2.76 2.61 2.48 2.53 1.90 1.88 2.13 1.67 0.40 0.45 0.41 0.22 0.33 0.37 0.37
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004
R 1.11 1.25 1.20 1.27 1.26 1.07 1.16 1.06 1.12 0.89 0.29 0.39 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.21
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.015
R 1.44 1.63 1.74 1.61 1.60 1.23 1.06 0.69 0.26 -0.05 -0.29 -0.03 -2.00 -1.42 -0.44 -2.61 -4.75
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.016
R 1.12 1.18 1.10 0.91 1.10 1.24 1.20 1.02 1.18 1.00 0.06 0.85 0.74 0.67 0.44 0.74 0.66
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.93 24.52 0.00 11.70 19.29 25.32 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 0.66 0.58 0.69 0.72 0.80 0.80 0.90 0.91 1.11 0.97 0.48 -0.12 0.18 0.46 0.52 0.37 0.38
E 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 2.86 4.92 0.01 2.30 1.97 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008
R 4.10 3.38 2.55 6.84 6.75 4.27 2.67 2.41 3.11 2.71 1.02 0.06 1.65 0.06 -0.23 -1.26 -1.31
E 15.08 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009
R 2.28 1.83 1.62 1.17 0.78 0.55 0.44 0.50 0.74 0.39 -0.20 -0.17 -0.18 -0.35 -0.21 0.00 0.08
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0310
R 0.62 0.62 0.73 0.63 0.50 0.68 0.51 0.67 1.04 0.56 0.98 -2.36 -0.88 -6.21 -0.41 -1.33 -1.45
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 17.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.0111
R 0.94 0.97 0.98 1.05 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.94 1.10 0.98 0.54 0.70 0.77 0.72 0.60 0.79 0.71
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 0.86 1.07 0.96 0.49 0.12 0.60 0.43 0.56 0.73 0.63 -0.71 0.07 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.68 1.82 8.1213
R 0.35 0.33 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.27 0.34 0.48 0.37 0.20 0.34 0.15 0.33 0.50 1.14 1.68
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.24 7.17 3.21 0.00 1.39 0.00 0.00 4.66 2.35 0.00 0.00 0.0014
R 0.36 0.48 0.67 1.02 1.87 2.37 2.65 2.61 2.64 2.67 1.45 1.78 2.05 2.32 1.71 2.11 1.85
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.0015
R 0.50 0.60 0.81 1.08 0.99 0.97 0.93 0.95 1.14 1.12 0.77 0.87 0.93 1.21 0.89 0.86 0.89
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0016
R 0.39 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.31 -0.07 0.29 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.35
E 0.00 4.11 3.49 0.00 6.93 6.48 4.66 1.14 0.02 3.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017
R 4.28 4.17 4.01 3.81 4.33 4.33 4.24 3.64 3.50 3.61 0.87 1.07 0.92 1.00 0.86 1.08 1.02






and represents the share of European net output that Hungary should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Hungary actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Hungary had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.16: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Ireland*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 0.91 0.89 1.01 1.07 1.21 1.28 1.10 1.84 -0.49 -0.56 0.66 -1.46 -1.42 -0.70 0.43 -0.50 0.16
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003
R 1.45 1.37 1.34 1.35 1.29 1.35 1.50 1.46 2.13 2.14 1.84 2.18 2.09 1.97 2.15 2.32 2.37
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004
R 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.52 0.52 0.39 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.27 0.37 0.43 0.37 0.38 0.32 0.33 0.39
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.925
R 0.36 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.51
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.016
R 0.74 0.85 0.66 0.93 0.98 0.85 0.79 0.97 1.03 0.96 1.70 3.63 1.71 1.99 1.12 1.80 2.23
E 33.45 33.97 6.83 0.00 45.57 18.64 0.00 0.00 41.15 0.01 44.84 45.70 73.09 70.08 62.32 84.96 99.947
R 2.52 2.91 3.22 3.61 3.94 3.79 3.15 3.00 3.81 4.48 4.32 3.98 6.73 6.40 5.21 7.13 8.61
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008
R 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.29 0.24 0.06 0.09 -0.19 0.62 1.53 0.52 0.40 0.05 0.01
E 0.01 0.01 39.30 57.51 0.01 42.76 71.40 69.43 0.01 79.20 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 7.729
R 2.23 2.65 3.33 4.48 4.58 6.89 7.28 7.47 7.84 8.81 5.80 5.67 4.48 5.12 7.86 7.16 9.98
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0110
R 0.43 0.30 0.00 0.34 0.31 0.20 0.38 0.31 -0.08 0.32 -1.32 0.22 -0.06 -1.01 0.43 -0.64 0.00
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0011
R 0.91 0.99 1.10 0.93 1.13 1.01 0.98 0.90 0.75 1.20 0.27 0.38 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.60 0.58
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.34 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.11 -0.25 0.09 -0.81 -1.66 -0.91 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.0013
R 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.42 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.01 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.22
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014
R 3.26 3.24 3.89 3.48 3.96 4.85 4.53 5.08 4.60 4.19 3.27 3.03 2.76 2.91 2.53 2.72 2.81
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0015
R 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.30 0.0116
R 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.41 0.57 0.56 0.61 0.63 0.61
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017
R 0.36 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.48 0.63 1.12 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.90 0.92






and represents the share of European net output that Ireland should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Ireland actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Ireland had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.17: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Italy*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 14.06 13.29 11.42 12.05 15.51 16.53 -4.76 12.59 11.31 13.08 13.19 14.63 11.73 5.26 8.96 7.86 7.92
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.26 56.20 0.01 54.69 0.00 50.82 42.68 40.013
R 11.52 11.19 11.64 12.57 11.99 11.51 11.78 10.30 11.75 11.78 10.93 9.73 11.72 11.90 11.78 11.55 11.27
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.014
R 32.27 31.85 31.63 32.93 27.90 35.83 37.35 35.66 33.96 35.24 32.71 34.25 33.41 35.29 33.46 34.32 32.87
E 99.84 0.01 3.73 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.075
R 51.57 50.88 50.25 51.00 46.33 45.96 52.94 52.67 56.84 55.81 57.41 58.61 67.56 63.53 54.64 62.44 74.63
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.046
R 11.37 2.54 12.63 11.57 10.80 9.02 15.78 12.09 10.29 13.22 7.24 11.31 7.12 -4.07 4.96 2.64 -0.18
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.66 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.73 54.29 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.017
R 12.13 9.43 11.56 12.15 11.24 9.09 9.21 10.73 9.16 8.00 9.02 11.34 13.33 12.17 9.83 10.82 9.60
E 9.62 8.90 5.33 13.58 0.00 6.82 0.03 7.59 0.03 0.00 18.98 0.31 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.018
R 11.46 11.23 7.42 17.23 13.95 13.65 13.38 14.14 12.03 15.43 14.51 13.39 25.82 8.25 4.01 0.47 -0.20
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.019
R 9.99 9.04 10.16 9.72 8.88 4.96 6.05 9.41 8.33 4.22 3.72 -1.32 7.82 7.16 6.21 7.76 8.63
E 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 65.67 90.42 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.0710
R 14.90 14.06 19.74 17.11 18.44 17.14 18.33 19.68 19.87 16.32 29.27 19.81 19.67 26.26 13.35 14.92 22.07
E 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 46.55 0.01 13.12 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.1711
R 18.48 18.73 18.79 17.59 19.66 17.41 20.29 18.97 19.51 19.07 12.51 -5.00 -14.15 5.84 12.48 -6.92 8.36
E 0.08 16.40 0.00 0.00 0.01 61.41 12.17 60.24 74.89 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 / / / /12
R 14.66 21.59 21.03 21.66 30.86 23.25 21.44 19.09 19.22 8.09 28.80 29.13 73.48 / / / /
E 50.54 71.52 86.83 98.80 88.97 99.85 36.78 49.75 53.27 92.08 0.00 70.60 0.00 77.38 0.02 0.00 9.7313
R 22.58 22.92 24.83 23.97 24.07 22.98 20.37 23.31 22.13 23.74 19.86 20.00 20.02 18.21 18.12 17.62 18.05
E 99.98 77.38 53.35 47.75 44.34 0.00 73.99 50.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0114
R 16.31 15.62 15.36 13.62 12.23 10.09 11.94 11.31 12.25 12.08 6.26 7.32 7.47 7.02 5.69 5.13 4.69
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0015
R 11.70 11.55 11.90 10.28 10.04 9.82 9.97 9.59 8.77 8.72 6.25 7.44 7.33 6.94 6.80 6.00 4.86
E 0.00 0.00 29.39 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0316
R 23.75 24.07 23.11 23.22 23.97 24.46 24.08 24.01 24.01 24.12 23.02 22.29 21.34 21.00 20.58 21.05 20.69
E 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 25.45 0.92 1.66 0.10 9.45 22.66 0.00 0.00 18.49 15.14 11.58 15.18 7.4717
R 11.13 10.90 10.76 11.01 13.57 12.34 12.33 12.01 12.17 12.59 10.22 10.47 11.51 11.67 11.22 13.82 11.98






and represents the share of European net output that Italy should have produced in order to realize the
efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries considered
here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Italy actually produced. An ESR > RSR means
that Italy had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.18: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Netherland*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 20.55 0.00 2.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.011
R 3.50 4.23 2.70 5.82 7.56 8.26 7.79 7.50 8.05 6.17 7.60 6.31 4.44 -2.11 8.34 4.62 2.95
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 2.63 0.01 21.39 14.65 24.29 24.48 26.66 24.31 25.20 7.46 22.93 2.87 0.00 19.50 3.87 1.633
R 7.48 7.49 7.48 6.94 7.13 7.03 7.01 7.02 7.53 6.61 7.10 6.93 7.03 7.44 7.30 7.42 7.77
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.044
R 2.19 2.11 2.14 2.11 2.25 2.15 2.01 2.06 2.13 2.00 2.10 2.18 2.18 2.50 2.21 2.39 2.78
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.145
R 0.75 0.70 0.74 0.73 0.66 0.73 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.80 0.78 0.89 0.78 1.04 1.20 1.43
E 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.026
R 3.85 3.95 4.63 3.95 4.57 3.93 3.69 3.25 2.96 2.84 0.54 4.49 2.64 3.50 3.21 2.21 3.06
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 5.32 4.44 5.35 5.54 5.30 4.80 4.80 4.89 4.79 4.72 4.09 4.46 5.26 5.39 4.66 5.00 5.17
E 90.35 0.02 69.93 77.07 75.32 24.39 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 61.18 26.48 22.898
R 6.48 5.82 4.17 8.19 7.18 6.24 6.59 5.91 6.27 5.76 2.60 2.70 2.64 2.19 2.16 -0.08 0.13
E 61.20 99.89 60.68 0.00 28.13 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 69.08 0.00 83.16 85.45 2.34 59.25 97.999
R 11.20 10.24 10.21 9.16 8.86 10.25 9.84 9.77 9.90 11.34 8.49 9.14 8.43 7.83 8.94 9.70 14.26
E 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.0510
R 3.67 3.92 4.51 3.86 3.96 3.85 3.86 4.05 4.21 4.12 5.30 3.44 4.21 6.03 4.04 4.63 6.71
E 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0211
R 3.83 3.90 3.91 3.73 3.85 3.73 3.63 3.46 3.18 3.01 3.28 4.42 4.80 4.23 3.58 4.20 3.89
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 5.47 5.87 7.01 6.84 6.85 4.55 4.88 4.59 4.14 5.66 5.03 5.43 17.79 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.5113
R 3.09 3.25 3.15 3.49 3.02 3.52 3.70 3.94 3.58 3.76 3.42 3.59 3.69 3.51 3.71 3.93 3.90
E 0.00 0.00 4.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014
R 5.27 5.23 5.45 4.90 4.64 4.70 4.12 4.47 4.02 3.80 2.93 2.65 2.38 2.47 2.38 2.16 2.18
E 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0115
R 2.10 1.78 1.62 1.94 1.66 1.44 1.71 1.80 1.72 1.45 1.36 1.40 1.60 0.70 0.97 1.32 1.38
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0016
R 4.88 5.06 5.31 5.25 5.36 5.20 4.71 4.91 5.01 4.91 4.91 4.85 5.17 5.13 5.51 5.51 5.14
E 0.00 0.01 11.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0117
R 3.70 3.85 3.99 3.93 4.35 4.39 4.49 4.70 4.40 4.46 3.97 3.86 3.87 3.65 3.97 4.46 4.17






and represents the share of European net output that Netherlands should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Netherlands actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Netherlands had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.19: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Poland*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 4.94 3.92 8.39 8.40 3.21 3.13 13.10 2.63 2.01 7.02 -2.94 -8.51 4.71 6.56 5.03 4.89 3.18
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 3.12 0.00 0.19 0.013
R 3.73 4.27 4.55 4.97 4.67 4.96 5.05 5.16 5.59 5.42 5.13 6.58 5.65 6.13 5.98 6.35 6.64
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004
R 2.00 2.13 2.21 2.33 2.20 1.92 1.97 2.15 2.05 2.13 1.26 1.58 1.30 1.81 2.02 2.04 2.40
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.025
R 1.58 1.81 1.88 1.77 2.02 1.72 1.37 1.69 1.39 1.25 0.95 1.19 -0.19 1.05 1.54 1.40 -2.85
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.076
R 5.59 6.71 6.30 6.39 8.24 7.93 5.55 6.47 5.90 6.39 8.93 16.18 6.13 8.76 7.51 9.25 10.90
E 47.09 30.84 93.16 97.07 27.24 81.34 88.26 80.69 33.48 99.96 47.42 0.00 26.90 29.89 37.67 15.04 0.017
R 1.87 1.82 1.73 1.93 2.40 2.96 3.05 3.61 3.30 3.08 2.16 2.55 2.03 2.99 2.66 2.24 2.68
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.62 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.60 0.00 0.008
R 2.31 2.18 1.66 3.23 3.62 6.62 6.56 4.88 6.44 9.11 17.21 12.91 24.51 10.25 7.30 2.49 1.96
E 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.019
R 1.19 1.20 1.38 1.21 1.43 1.23 1.28 1.45 1.48 -0.87 -0.64 0.75 0.22 0.34 0.74 0.97 0.36
E 0.01 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 4.38 0.00 0.00 76.00 0.31 0.01 0.02 0.2110
R 1.76 1.86 1.98 2.09 2.79 3.85 3.90 5.56 6.02 5.47 6.63 4.66 3.17 6.03 4.80 5.41 10.50
E 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.00 82.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 17.80 27.71 63.75 0.00 0.02 15.6511
R 2.53 2.86 3.15 3.30 3.82 3.90 2.98 3.89 3.81 3.90 2.88 4.16 4.61 3.96 4.18 6.98 6.23
E 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 / / / /12
R 2.70 3.26 2.96 2.72 4.07 2.12 0.69 1.75 2.50 2.86 0.68 1.11 -6.02 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.85 0.00 0.01 15.86 24.66 23.5413
R 0.95 1.02 0.90 0.88 1.21 1.15 0.91 1.03 1.31 1.22 1.15 1.41 1.36 1.92 1.86 1.75 1.26
E 0.00 22.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 25.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0114
R 1.28 1.38 1.33 1.39 1.50 1.38 1.59 1.78 1.76 1.63 0.65 0.77 0.65 1.06 0.77 0.89 0.43
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0115
R 1.02 1.20 1.31 1.34 1.61 1.57 1.47 1.39 1.76 2.27 1.69 1.97 2.07 2.53 2.87 2.60 2.78
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0116
R 1.95 2.08 2.56 2.66 2.72 2.48 2.77 2.82 3.67 4.02 2.86 3.34 4.46 5.13 5.36 5.23 5.80
E 29.70 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017
R 8.43 8.13 8.69 8.54 9.79 10.00 10.28 10.03 8.68 9.21 4.56 4.34 4.38 4.99 4.14 5.85 5.17






and represents the share of European net output that Poland should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Poland actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Poland had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.20: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Portugal*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 0.95 1.28 -1.16 1.61 2.09 1.80 -0.84 1.14 1.17 1.57 0.01 2.52 2.30 1.04 1.46 1.29 1.24
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003
R 2.30 2.34 2.18 1.74 1.91 2.01 2.13 1.67 1.73 1.77 1.47 1.62 1.58 1.66 1.56 1.69 1.65
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004
R 5.08 4.92 5.29 5.15 4.78 4.40 4.31 4.50 4.65 4.72 4.32 3.34 3.27 3.67 3.61 3.51 3.73
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.025
R 6.21 5.71 6.28 6.22 5.86 6.54 5.17 5.68 5.30 5.41 4.09 3.87 4.00 3.77 4.50 3.92 4.21
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.016
R 4.26 4.98 4.96 5.71 4.96 4.52 4.24 3.00 4.14 2.75 6.24 7.31 2.74 3.91 2.82 2.87 3.08
E 19.44 35.17 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 1.69 1.61 1.72 1.54 0.90 1.23 1.26 0.94 1.15 1.34 1.36 1.29 1.59 1.67 1.64 1.85 1.90
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008
R 1.17 1.17 1.42 0.53 1.59 1.76 2.26 7.38 6.16 1.64 -0.76 -1.30 -2.06 -0.16 0.03 -0.06 -0.06
E 23.68 0.02 0.00 42.49 41.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.019
R 0.28 -0.09 0.15 0.43 0.44 -0.17 0.22 0.40 0.21 0.31 0.36 0.50 0.58 0.70 0.50 0.48 0.52
E 0.07 0.03 0.01 8.75 0.04 82.95 48.88 0.00 4.87 2.38 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.0510
R 0.87 0.89 1.24 1.04 1.10 1.03 1.28 1.24 0.47 0.67 1.85 0.48 0.75 1.68 0.95 0.91 1.17
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.0411
R 2.43 2.74 2.91 2.53 2.91 2.88 2.93 3.05 3.08 2.67 3.38 2.83 3.26 2.97 3.13 3.98 3.31
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 0.72 0.22 1.12 0.69 0.68 0.65 0.75 0.76 0.82 0.71 -1.19 0.51 -4.23 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0013
R 0.49 0.50 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.49 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.45 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.34
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014
R 0.58 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.66 0.69 0.68 0.83 0.88 0.82 1.00 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.59 0.48 0.43
E 0.00 0.00 15.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0115
R 0.46 0.87 0.91 0.87 0.69 0.61 0.54 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.89 0.91 0.74 0.68
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0016
R 1.90 1.79 1.86 1.98 1.68 1.76 1.70 1.60 1.69 1.63 1.17 1.10 1.12 1.10 1.26 1.20 1.11
E 0.00 1.89 5.48 0.00 0.00 0.02 32.20 83.11 75.76 71.00 66.64 65.23 61.08 58.20 69.89 84.80 77.2717
R 1.37 1.38 1.39 1.52 1.95 2.11 2.17 2.08 2.04 2.09 2.17 2.35 2.54 2.62 2.40 2.95 2.73






and represents the share of European net output that Portugal should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Portugal actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Portugal had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
58
Table 1.21: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Spain*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.01 0.00 0.00 36.49 45.91 0.01 0.08 3.84 59.86 0.00 0.00 62.49 64.02 0.10 58.88 36.12 0.011
R 13.60 17.75 14.47 13.58 15.54 19.44 18.56 15.00 22.88 12.59 16.11 16.20 18.76 13.66 15.85 20.23 14.41
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 13.32 30.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 41.99 40.32 32.51 14.63 27.01 35.43 12.06 8.18 29.01 0.87 19.04 33.233
R 11.06 10.94 10.86 11.84 11.01 10.85 11.27 11.32 10.61 11.17 10.64 10.60 9.98 10.21 10.53 10.40 10.21
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.014
R 8.22 8.15 8.94 8.71 10.12 9.15 8.92 9.32 9.68 9.19 8.04 8.58 8.44 9.22 7.98 7.49 7.53
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.045
R 12.48 14.22 14.41 14.67 15.32 15.74 13.59 15.00 14.64 14.34 14.14 13.89 15.72 16.61 14.68 15.34 18.21
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.036
R 7.41 8.34 8.11 6.99 7.56 7.20 6.59 5.60 6.11 4.51 5.38 6.78 7.07 8.20 7.83 7.28 8.91
E 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 7.11 4.63 5.21 4.37 5.13 7.45 7.79 7.98 8.38 7.94 8.22 7.94 9.28 9.50 8.29 8.33 9.00
E 0.00 5.06 2.08 4.06 0.00 11.72 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 13.02 15.92 23.44 0.02 2.11 2.46 1.068
R 8.97 10.22 7.82 10.92 15.43 13.32 9.45 9.89 7.30 9.19 9.51 8.53 19.42 8.05 6.41 1.96 1.92
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.019
R 6.94 5.34 5.47 6.55 6.25 6.59 6.54 5.96 6.10 6.28 4.42 3.98 5.05 4.77 5.42 5.90 7.54
E 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 8.74 29.15 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0510
R 4.78 2.59 3.63 4.85 4.62 4.99 4.96 5.01 5.02 5.21 -4.29 1.77 5.18 8.50 5.19 5.46 8.55
E 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 24.05 0.03 80.23 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 6.1311
R 11.97 10.98 12.79 12.79 14.56 13.36 15.38 15.78 16.66 15.47 17.70 19.46 22.89 18.67 15.65 18.12 14.57
E 76.60 25.94 89.39 33.52 15.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 9.23 -1.39 11.49 9.51 12.76 6.98 7.26 6.37 7.40 8.54 -7.95 5.79 -107.78 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.31 8.89 0.04 0.0413
R 3.05 3.95 2.91 3.99 3.88 4.05 4.01 4.39 3.86 3.96 3.72 3.62 4.17 4.38 4.53 3.84 3.84
E 0.00 0.01 41.67 24.59 23.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014
R 3.81 6.26 4.78 5.05 4.48 4.79 5.13 4.25 4.38 4.28 2.52 2.37 3.18 3.21 2.88 2.21 1.81
E 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 4.81 0.0815
R 8.44 9.14 8.97 8.46 8.14 8.84 8.42 8.77 8.63 8.17 7.58 7.09 7.86 7.82 8.01 6.40 6.25
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0116
R 9.04 9.53 9.61 9.98 9.90 8.99 9.22 9.02 9.30 9.55 9.91 9.31 10.50 10.55 10.88 9.67 8.45
E 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 26.33 0.02 17.09 15.62 14.69 2.78 0.00 0.01 0.01 26.53 18.52 0.01 14.9717
R 4.75 4.85 5.23 5.26 6.29 3.01 5.14 7.90 7.76 7.99 10.08 10.41 11.13 12.06 11.93 15.05 14.42






and represents the share of European net output that Spain should have produced in order to realize the
efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries considered
here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Spain actually produced. An ESR > RSR means
that Spain had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 1.22: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Sweden*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
R 4.31 4.63 4.18 3.75 4.62 4.50 5.23 4.27 5.90 3.60 -0.51 4.60 3.55 5.02 1.15 4.30 3.00
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 13.95 18.79 13.57 18.64 14.01 11.19 12.51 18.78 17.50 18.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003
R 2.25 2.23 2.17 2.10 2.15 1.81 1.91 2.09 1.86 1.88 2.36 2.53 2.12 2.05 2.25 2.41 2.42
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004
R 0.63 0.61 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.66 0.72 0.74 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.56 0.55 0.87
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.14 -0.31 -0.535
R 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.37 0.30 0.27 0.24 -0.11 -0.25 -0.45
E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.016
R 7.42 9.58 11.44 10.29 12.71 12.04 11.40 8.64 8.92 8.88 21.71 33.60 12.53 16.92 11.06 14.03 16.29
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007
R 8.40 7.34 7.02 8.20 6.76 6.76 6.76 7.10 8.12 8.86 7.95 6.49 5.16 5.99 7.56 7.23 6.62
E 0.01 1.98 0.00 3.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 2.73 2.48 3.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.68 18.45 8.78 14.208
R 2.88 3.07 2.54 4.80 4.12 3.74 3.91 3.57 3.83 3.99 5.66 3.81 4.19 25.48 25.97 12.43 19.44
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009
R 2.11 2.36 2.61 2.33 2.47 1.88 2.61 3.00 3.06 3.14 2.62 2.32 1.09 1.20 2.20 1.08 -0.42
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0110
R 1.47 0.86 2.19 1.79 1.82 0.53 0.72 2.02 1.64 1.63 -3.19 -0.96 -1.66 -8.06 -1.48 -5.43 -8.05
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0011
R 1.71 1.45 1.45 1.53 1.76 1.54 1.56 1.45 1.06 1.11 1.27 1.08 1.34 1.31 1.10 1.48 1.73
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /12
R 4.08 3.24 6.71 3.92 6.01 4.37 3.83 2.99 2.33 2.36 0.59 -8.46 -5.01 / / / /
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0013
R 4.00 3.54 3.73 3.92 3.88 3.78 4.04 4.25 4.15 4.36 3.72 4.07 3.88 3.41 2.63 3.43 4.01
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 63.91 47.29 50.61 50.61 50.85 49.16 56.7614
R 2.80 3.53 4.01 4.11 4.58 4.82 4.66 4.17 3.83 4.19 19.34 21.03 20.35 21.41 22.32 23.20 27.18
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0015
R 3.81 3.59 3.28 3.27 3.14 3.85 3.23 4.02 4.33 4.38 4.62 4.36 4.40 4.05 3.36 4.41 5.24
E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0016
R 2.22 2.05 2.41 2.64 2.52 2.43 2.49 2.09 2.03 1.70 1.67 1.85 2.31 1.89 1.48 1.88 1.60
E 21.51 0.01 34.81 0.00 39.35 52.21 44.29 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017
R 4.83 4.66 4.57 4.63 5.27 5.10 5.35 5.05 4.66 4.99 4.19 3.89 4.09 2.79 3.03 2.53 3.30






and represents the share of European net output that Sweden should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Sweden actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Sweden had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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1.B.2 Comparative Advantages organized by ranking
From another perspective, it may be interesting to have an overall view
on the countries that should play a leading role in specific sectors. The
Tables 1.23-1.38 have been reported for this purpose. From Tab. 1.23, for
example, it is evident that France or Spain–depending on the year—should
have been the leading countries in Agriculture, while other countries that
ranked pretty well in many years are the Great Britain, Denmark or the
Czech Republic.
Aside the value in the ESR, a sign +, - or = has been reported in Tables
1.23-1.38. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved
(+), lowered (-), or kept more or less constant (=) the net product. If the
distance between the ESR and the RSR has been lower than the 20% of
the RSR, the country has been considered to be close to its CA and an
equals sign has been reported.
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Table 1.23: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
FRA FRA FRA FRA GBR GBR GBR FRA ESP FRA FRA ESP ESP FRA ESP ESP FRA1
43.60+ 89.41+ 84.57+ 43.53+ 52.15+ 39.73+ 40.43+ 73.20+ 59.86+ 72.70+ 43.34+ 62.49+ 64.02+ 75.73+ 58.88+ 36.12+ 66.69+
NLD CZE CZE ESP ESP FRA FRA CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE DNK CZE DNK CZE2
20.55+ 10.57+ 13.41+ 36.49+ 45.91+ 37.17+ 33.12= 22.96+ 32.30+ 21.60+ 24.74+ 20.00+ 21.89+ 17.50+ 18.67+ 23.95+ 17.18+
CZE ESP NLD CZE FRA CZE CZE ESP DNK DNK DNK HUN DNK HUN DNK CZE DNK3
18.51+ 0.00- 2.01- 19.98+ 1.55- 23.07+ 26.33+ 3.84- 7.81+ 5.68+ 13.00+ 9.93+ 14.07+ 6.64+ 14.12+ 21.81+ 15.97+
DNK DNK DNK DNK CZE ESP ESP DNK FRA HUN HUN DNK FRA ESP HUN HUN HUN4
15.70+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.38- 0.01- 0.08- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 9.58+ 7.56+ 0.01- 0.10- 8.32+ 10.79+ 0.13-
GBR NLD ESP GBR NLD DNK DNK GBR SWE ESP GBR GBR NLD CZE FRA FRA ESP5
1.62+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 9.34+ 0.01+ 0.00- 0.02- 0.00- 7.32- 0.01-
ESP GBR BEL NLD DEU NLD NLD NLD GBR SWE DEU FRA GBR DEU DEU DEU NLD6
0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01-
BEL BEL GBR BEL DNK DEU SWE SWE NLD NLD ESP NLD DEU NLD NLD NLD DEU7
0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
DEU DEU DEU DEU BEL BEL DEU DEU BEL GBR NLD DEU BEL GBR BEL BEL BEL8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00-
SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE BEL BEL DEU DEU BEL ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
FIN ITA HUN ITA ITA ITA HUN ITA ITA ITA ITA BEL HUN BEL GBR GBR GRC10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
ITA HUN FIN HUN PRT HUN ITA HUN HUN BEL POL SWE POL POL SWE POL GBR11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
HUN FIN ITA GRC GRC GRC FIN POL POL POL SWE GRC SWE PRT POL SWE SWE12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
PRT PRT GRC FIN HUN FIN POL GRC FIN GRC PRT PRT GRC GRC PRT GRC POL13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
POL POL PRT POL FIN PRT GRC FIN GRC PRT GRC POL PRT SWE AUT PRT IRL14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
AUT GRC AUT PRT POL POL PRT PRT PRT FIN AUT AUT AUT FIN GRC AUT PRT15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
GRC AUT POL AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT FIN FIN FIN AUT FIN FIN FIN16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00-
IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.24: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Food, Beverages and Tobacco*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
FRA ESP GBR GBR FRA ESP ESP ESP FRA ESP ITA DEU ITA DEU ITA ITA ITA1
40.64+ 30.71+ 62.93+ 29.06+ 60.63+ 41.99+ 40.32+ 32.51+ 43.55+ 27.01+ 56.20+ 65.00+ 54.69+ 50.63+ 50.82+ 42.68+ 40.01+
DEU GBR FRA FRA NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD ESP NLD DEU ESP DEU GBR ESP2
18.02= 30.67+ 16.77+ 27.37+ 14.65+ 24.29+ 24.48+ 26.66+ 24.31+ 25.20+ 35.43+ 22.93+ 34.18+ 29.01+ 28.82+ 25.31+ 33.23+
SWE SWE SWE NLD SWE FRA FRA GBR SWE FRA NLD ESP ESP GBR NLD ESP FRA3
13.95+ 18.79+ 13.57+ 21.39+ 14.01+ 22.47+ 22.68+ 22.04+ 17.50+ 19.76+ 7.46= 12.06= 8.18= 9.72= 19.50+ 19.04+ 15.99=
ESP FRA HUN SWE CZE SWE SWE SWE ESP SWE DEU ITA NLD CZE ESP BEL BEL4
13.32+ 10.19- 6.72+ 18.64+ 10.70+ 11.19+ 12.51+ 18.78+ 14.63+ 18.71+ 0.61- 0.01- 2.87- 7.51+ 0.87- 8.73+ 6.56+
BEL HUN NLD HUN GBR GBR GBR FRA CZE HUN BEL BEL POL POL BEL NLD GRC5
9.17+ 7.00+ 0.01- 3.53+ 0.01- 0.03- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 6.07+ 0.30- 0.00- 0.06- 3.12- 0.00- 3.87- 2.24=
HUN NLD CZE CZE ESP ITA CZE CZE GBR ITA FRA GBR FRA ITA CZE POL NLD6
4.89+ 2.63- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 3.26- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.19- 1.63-
CZE CZE BEL ESP ITA CZE DEU ITA DEU GBR GBR FRA BEL NLD GBR DEU CZE7
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.18- 0.30-
NLD BEL DEU BEL BEL DEU HUN DEU BEL DEU CZE CZE CZE FRA POL CZE DEU8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
GBR ITA ESP ITA DEU DNK POL HUN DNK CZE DNK DNK GBR BEL FRA FRA POL9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
ITA DEU DNK DEU HUN BEL DNK AUT AUT DNK AUT PRT GRC DNK DNK GRC GBR10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
DNK DNK ITA DNK DNK HUN BEL BEL ITA GRC POL SWE DNK PRT GRC AUT IRL11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
FIN PRT GRC PRT PRT GRC FIN DNK PRT POL HUN AUT AUT GRC AUT SWE DNK12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
PRT FIN FIN POL GRC PRT AUT GRC HUN BEL GRC GRC HUN AUT HUN DNK PRT13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
GRC GRC PRT GRC AUT AUT ITA PRT POL AUT FIN HUN PRT SWE SWE PRT FIN14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
POL POL POL FIN FIN POL GRC POL GRC PRT PRT POL SWE HUN PRT HUN SWE15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
AUT AUT AUT AUT POL IRL PRT FIN FIN FIN SWE FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN HUN16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL FIN IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.25: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Textiles and Textile Production*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GBR DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU FRA FRA GBR GBR FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA DEU FRA1
99.99+ 99.85+ 73.80+ 99.41+ 99.98+ 99.83+ 91.57+ 99.73+ 99.96+ 92.63+ 99.99+ 99.93+ 99.99+ 99.95+ 99.99+ 99.95+ 99.40+
DEU DNK BEL DNK DNK GBR DEU DNK FRA FRA GBR GBR GBR GBR DEU FRA DEU2
0.00- 0.09- 26.19+ 0.58- 0.00- 0.14- 8.37- 0.26- 0.01- 7.35- 0.00- 0.06- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.03- 0.42-
ITA GBR GBR BEL GBR ITA DNK DEU NLD DNK DEU DEU DEU DEU GBR GBR GBR3
0.00- 0.03- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.06-
DNK BEL NLD ITA BEL FRA GBR GBR DEU DEU BEL ITA NLD NLD ITA NLD NLD4
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.04-
AUT NLD ITA GBR NLD DNK ITA ITA DNK ITA ITA NLD ITA DNK DNK BEL BEL5
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
ESP ITA ESP NLD ITA NLD ESP BEL BEL NLD NLD BEL DNK ITA BEL ITA ITA6
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
BEL AUT AUT ESP FRA AUT BEL NLD SWE BEL AUT DNK BEL ESP ESP AUT GRC7
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
NLD ESP FRA AUT AUT ESP NLD AUT ITA ESP ESP AUT AUT BEL NLD GRC ESP8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
PRT FRA DNK GRC ESP BEL AUT ESP ESP AUT PRT ESP ESP AUT AUT ESP CZE9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
FRA PRT GRC FRA GRC PRT PRT SWE AUT SWE GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC CZE DNK10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
SWE SWE PRT PRT SWE GRC SWE GRC GRC PRT POL PRT CZE CZE CZE DNK IRL11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
FIN FIN SWE SWE PRT FIN FIN PRT PRT GRC CZE CZE PRT PRT PRT POL PRT12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
GRC GRC FIN FIN FIN POL HUN CZE CZE FIN IRL POL POL POL POL PRT POL13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
POL HUN HUN POL POL HUN GRC FIN FIN CZE SWE SWE HUN SWE SWE SWE SWE14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
HUN POL CZE HUN HUN SWE CZE HUN HUN HUN FIN IRL SWE HUN HUN FIN FIN15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
CZE CZE POL CZE CZE CZE POL POL POL POL HUN HUN IRL FIN FIN IRL HUN16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL DNK FIN FIN IRL IRL HUN AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.26: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Leather, Leather and Footwear*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ITA DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK GBR DNK GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GRC1
99.84+ 99.94+ 96.25+ 99.99+ 99.97+ 99.93+ 53.47+ 54.52+ 99.91+ 99.92+ 99.99+ 99.97+ 99.97+ 99.89+ 100.12+ 100.17+ 97.84+
DNK DEU ITA ITA DEU ITA DNK GBR ITA DNK DEU ITA NLD GRC GRC GRC IRL2
0.14- 0.02- 3.73- 0.01- 0.01- 0.02- 46.45+ 45.43+ 0.02- 0.02- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.02- 0.01- 0.11- 1.92+
DEU ITA DEU DEU ITA GBR ITA ITA FRA ITA ITA IRL ITA NLD ITA NLD GBR3
0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.02- 0.02- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.00- 0.01- 0.30-
GBR ESP ESP ESP FRA DEU GRC DEU DNK DEU FRA DEU BEL ITA NLD ITA NLD4
0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.00- 0.01- 0.14-
PRT FRA GBR GBR GBR FRA DEU FRA DEU FRA DNK NLD DEU DNK DEU DEU ITA5
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.07-
ESP GBR BEL FRA ESP SWE FRA ESP ESP AUT IRL FRA DNK ESP DNK BEL DEU6
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.05-
BEL BEL FRA PRT BEL PRT SWE BEL AUT NLD NLD AUT FRA DEU BEL ESP BEL7
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.04-
FRA PRT PRT BEL NLD AUT AUT AUT BEL BEL AUT DNK IRL FRA AUT AUT ESP8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.04-
SWE AUT NLD NLD PRT BEL ESP NLD SWE ESP BEL ESP ESP BEL FRA DNK DNK9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.03+
AUT NLD SWE GRC AUT GRC PRT GRC NLD SWE POL GRC GRC AUT ESP POL FRA10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.03-
GRC HUN GRC SWE GRC NLD BEL SWE GRC PRT ESP BEL AUT IRL POL FRA PRT11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
NLD SWE AUT AUT SWE ESP NLD PRT POL GRC GRC POL POL PRT IRL CZE POL12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.02+
POL FIN HUN POL POL IRL IRL POL PRT IRL PRT PRT PRT POL FIN PRT CZE13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01+
IRL GRC FIN HUN HUN HUN FIN IRL CZE POL SWE SWE HUN HUN HUN FIN FIN14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.01-
FIN POL IRL FIN FIN FIN HUN CZE HUN HUN CZE CZE SWE SWE PRT HUN HUN15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.01+
HUN IRL POL IRL IRL CZE POL FIN IRL FIN FIN HUN CZE CZE CZE IRL AUT16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+
CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE POL CZE HUN FIN CZE HUN FIN FIN FIN SWE SWE SWE17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- -0.14- -0.31- -0.53-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.27: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Wood and Products of Wood and Cork*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GBR GBR DEU GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR BEL GBR DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU1
99.96+ 99.93+ 99.95+ 99.99+ 99.93+ 99.86+ 99.92+ 71.75+ 52.45+ 99.94+ 99.96+ 99.91+ 56.58+ 99.88+ 99.98+ 99.97+ 85.15+
DEU DEU GBR DEU DEU BEL DEU BEL GBR BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL2
0.01- 0.02- 0.01+ 0.00- 0.04- 0.05- 0.02- 28.21+ 47.50+ 0.01- 0.03- 0.04- 43.38+ 0.04- 0.01- 0.01- 14.06+
DNK BEL DNK BEL BEL DEU SWE DEU DEU DEU FRA GBR GBR GBR ITA POL GRC3
0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.04- 0.01- 0.02- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.42+
BEL NLD NLD DNK SWE SWE ITA SWE SWE DNK GBR ITA FRA POL GBR GBR POL4
0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00+ 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.07-
ESP DNK SWE SWE DNK ITA DNK AUT NLD SWE ITA FRA POL ITA POL ITA GBR5
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.05-
NLD ESP ESP ESP ITA DNK AUT DNK DNK ITA POL DNK GRC FRA ESP GRC ITA6
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.04+
SWE SWE BEL NLD ESP NLD BEL ITA FRA FRA ESP ESP ITA ESP GRC FRA FRA7
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.04-
ITA ITA ITA ITA NLD ESP NLD FRA ITA NLD AUT NLD DNK DNK DNK ESP ESP8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.03-
AUT AUT POL POL AUT AUT ESP NLD ESP AUT NLD AUT AUT GRC FRA CZE CZE9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.03-
FIN POL GRC GRC GRC FRA FRA ESP GRC POL DNK GRC ESP NLD CZE AUT NLD10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
POL GRC AUT AUT FRA POL FIN GRC AUT ESP GRC PRT NLD CZE AUT NLD DNK11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
GRC FRA FIN FRA POL PRT GRC CZE POL GRC CZE SWE CZE PRT NLD SWE PRT12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
FRA FIN FRA HUN PRT HUN HUN HUN CZE HUN PRT POL HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
HUN CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE POL POL HUN CZE FIN HUN PRT AUT PRT DNK SWE14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
PRT PRT HUN PRT FIN GRC CZE PRT PRT PRT HUN CZE SWE SWE SWE PRT FIN15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
IRL HUN IRL FIN HUN FIN PRT FIN FIN FIN SWE FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN IRL16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
CZE IRL PRT IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.28: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
POL PRT POL POL IRL POL POL POL IRL POL POL ITA IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL1
47.09+ 35.17+ 93.16+ 97.07+ 45.57+ 81.34+ 88.26+ 80.69+ 41.15+ 99.96+ 47.42+ 54.29+ 73.09+ 70.08+ 62.32+ 84.96+ 99.94+
IRL IRL IRL HUN POL IRL HUN HUN POL HUN IRL IRL POL POL POL POL POL2
33.45+ 33.97+ 6.83+ 2.93+ 27.24+ 18.64+ 11.70+ 19.29+ 33.48+ 0.02- 44.84+ 45.70+ 26.90+ 29.89+ 37.67+ 15.04+ 0.01-
PRT POL HUN ITA HUN CZE ITA ITA HUN IRL ITA PRT HUN ITA ITA ITA ITA3
19.44+ 30.84+ 0.00- 0.00- 24.52+ 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 25.32+ 0.01- 7.73= 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
ESP ITA CZE PRT ITA ITA ESP SWE SWE SWE BEL AUT ITA PRT AUT AUT DEU4
0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 2.66- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.03- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
ITA HUN ITA IRL PRT SWE SWE ESP ESP ITA FRA POL AUT CZE DEU DEU BEL5
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
FIN CZE ESP SWE CZE ESP IRL AUT ITA ESP ESP FRA BEL ESP BEL BEL CZE6
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
GBR ESP SWE ESP DEU AUT AUT CZE FRA FRA AUT BEL GBR AUT ESP CZE PRT7
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
GRC FRA GRC GBR ESP PRT FRA BEL CZE BEL DEU ESP PRT HUN CZE ESP GRC8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
HUN BEL BEL CZE SWE DEU GBR FRA AUT AUT GBR GBR CZE BEL PRT GBR HUN9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
AUT GBR PRT GRC GBR FRA BEL IRL BEL CZE HUN DEU FRA DEU FRA FRA FRA10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
CZE DEU FRA DEU FRA GBR DEU GBR GBR PRT PRT HUN ESP FRA GBR GRC ESP11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
BEL GRC GBR BEL GRC HUN FIN GRC PRT GBR FIN NLD GRC GBR HUN NLD NLD12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
SWE FIN NLD FRA AUT BEL PRT DEU DEU DEU CZE SWE DEU NLD NLD HUN FIN13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
DEU SWE FIN NLD BEL GRC CZE PRT NLD NLD NLD GRC SWE DNK DNK PRT GBR14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
FRA AUT DEU DNK FIN NLD GRC NLD GRC DNK SWE DNK NLD SWE GRC SWE DNK15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
DNK DNK AUT AUT NLD FIN NLD FIN FIN GRC GRC CZE DNK GRC SWE FIN SWE16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
NLD NLD DNK FIN DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK FIN DNK FIN FIN FIN FIN DNK AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.29: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
NLD DEU NLD NLD NLD DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK AUT GRC NLD AUT AUT1
90.35+ 84.01+ 69.93+ 77.07+ 75.32+ 49.89+ 81.46+ 73.86+ 71.90+ 79.05+ 33.33+ 72.69+ 73.48+ 63.37+ 61.18+ 61.41- 56.93-
ITA ITA DEU ITA DNK NLD FRA FRA DEU FRA ITA ESP ESP SWE SWE NLD NLD2
9.62= 8.90- 22.64- 13.58- 23.02+ 24.39+ 13.78- 10.78- 7.01- 12.04= 18.98+ 15.92+ 23.44+ 14.68- 18.45- 26.48+ 22.89+
SWE ESP ITA ESP FIN ESP DEU ITA CZE SWE FIN FIN FIN AUT AUT SWE SWE3
0.01- 5.06- 5.33- 4.06- 1.47= 11.72= 1.82- 7.59- 6.92+ 3.18- 17.64+ 4.17+ 2.94= 11.27- 10.52- 8.78- 14.20-
CZE SWE ESP SWE BEL ITA FIN HUN HUN CZE ESP BEL GRC FRA GRC ESP FRA4
0.01- 1.98- 2.08- 3.04- 0.07- 6.82- 1.64+ 2.86= 4.92+ 2.55+ 13.02+ 3.14- 0.05- 8.14- 3.05+ 2.46+ 4.41-
DNK NLD DNK CZE SWE FRA CZE SWE FRA FIN CZE HUN BEL BEL POL BEL ESP5
0.00- 0.02- 0.01- 2.22+ 0.05- 4.96- 1.18= 2.73- 4.75- 2.15+ 10.07+ 1.97+ 0.05- 2.18- 2.60- 0.81+ 1.06-
HUN PRT HUN DNK CZE FIN NLD FIN SWE DEU POL CZE NLD ITA ESP ITA BEL6
0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.03- 0.03- 2.16+ 0.04- 1.57= 2.48- 0.98- 4.62- 0.98+ 0.01- 0.22- 2.11- 0.05- 0.47=
DEU DNK CZE HUN HUN CZE ITA AUT FIN NLD HUN FRA ITA CZE BEL GRC GRC7
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.02- 0.03- 0.56- 1.87+ 0.02- 2.30+ 0.79- 0.01- 0.11- 2.09- 0.00- 0.01-
GRC HUN PRT FIN ITA DEU HUN BEL NLD HUN AUT ITA FRA ESP DEU DEU ITA8
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.03- 0.07- 0.01- 0.03- 0.31- 0.01+ 0.02- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.01+
POL CZE SWE BEL ESP BEL ESP NLD ITA ESP NLD AUT DNK POL ITA FRA DEU9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.03- 0.00- 0.00- 0.03- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+
BEL POL FIN POL AUT HUN BEL DEU ESP ITA GRC NLD HUN NLD FRA POL HUN10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.03- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+
FRA BEL FRA FRA POL SWE AUT ESP BEL AUT DEU DEU DEU DNK CZE HUN FIN11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00-
GBR GRC POL DEU FRA POL SWE CZE POL POL PRT GRC GBR HUN DNK CZE CZE12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+
AUT FRA GBR GBR DEU GBR GBR GRC GRC GRC GBR GBR CZE DEU PRT DNK DNK13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+
FIN GBR BEL AUT GBR AUT GRC POL GBR BEL BEL SWE SWE GBR HUN FIN POL14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00-
PRT AUT AUT PRT GRC GRC PRT GBR PRT GBR FRA PRT POL PRT FIN GBR PRT15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+
ESP FIN GRC GRC PRT PRT POL PRT AUT PRT SWE IRL PRT FIN GBR PRT GBR16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00-
IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL POL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.30: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Chemicals and Chemical Products*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
NLD NLD NLD IRL PRT FRA IRL IRL FRA IRL NLD FRA NLD NLD FRA NLD NLD1
61.20+ 99.89+ 60.68+ 57.51+ 41.57+ 57.21+ 71.40+ 69.43+ 99.95+ 79.20+ 69.08+ 99.98+ 83.16+ 85.45+ 97.59+ 59.25+ 97.99+
PRT HUN IRL PRT FRA IRL FRA FRA NLD FRA FRA IRL FRA FRA NLD FRA IRL2
23.68+ 0.04- 39.30+ 42.49+ 30.29+ 42.76+ 28.57+ 30.56+ 0.02- 20.77+ 30.91+ 0.01- 16.83- 14.53- 2.34- 40.73+ 7.72-
HUN FRA HUN NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD IRL NLD DEU DEU BEL PRT DEU GRC FIN3
15.08+ 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 28.13+ 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.04- 0.01- 0.60-
IRL PRT BEL HUN IRL DEU DEU DEU BEL DEU PRT NLD AUT DEU IRL DEU GRC4
0.01- 0.02+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.03-
POL IRL FRA BEL BEL PRT ESP ESP ESP PRT BEL BEL IRL IRL AUT BEL FRA5
0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
DEU POL PRT ESP ESP BEL DNK ITA DEU ESP IRL PRT POL POL BEL AUT DEU6
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.01-
ESP ESP FIN FRA DEU ESP PRT BEL PRT BEL AUT DNK DEU AUT POL POL BEL7
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
FRA BEL POL POL POL AUT BEL DNK SWE SWE POL AUT PRT BEL DNK IRL PRT8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
ITA DEU CZE ITA ITA POL ITA PRT ITA ITA ITA POL ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
BEL CZE AUT DEU DNK ITA GBR SWE DNK DNK ESP ITA GRC ESP GRC ESP ESP10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
AUT ITA DNK AUT AUT FIN FIN AUT AUT HUN FIN ESP DNK CZE ESP PRT POL11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
FIN FIN ESP FIN FIN HUN HUN POL HUN AUT DNK GBR GBR DNK PRT DNK DNK12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
GRC DNK GRC DNK SWE DNK SWE HUN POL POL GBR GRC ESP GRC CZE SWE CZE13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
DNK AUT SWE CZE CZE SWE AUT FIN FIN GRC GRC SWE CZE GBR GBR CZE SWE14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+
CZE GRC DEU SWE HUN GRC GRC GBR GRC FIN CZE CZE SWE SWE SWE GBR GBR15
0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
SWE SWE ITA GRC GRC CZE POL GRC GBR CZE SWE FIN HUN HUN HUN FIN HUN16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00-
GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR CZE CZE CZE GBR HUN HUN FIN FIN FIN HUN AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ -6.43+






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.31: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Rubber and Plastics*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GRC GRC GRC BEL BEL PRT DEU DEU ITA ITA BEL BEL POL GRC FRA FRA FRA1
77.61+ 78.17+ 94.09+ 75.14+ 94.06+ 82.95+ 51.03+ 91.20+ 65.67+ 90.42+ 99.96+ 99.92+ 76.00+ 53.65+ 99.95+ 99.92+ 99.62+
DEU BEL BEL GRC GRC GRC PRT ESP ESP POL DEU DEU GRC BEL BEL BEL BEL2
19.00- 21.16+ 5.86+ 16.10+ 5.86+ 16.96+ 48.88+ 8.74+ 29.15+ 4.38= 0.01- 0.02- 23.34+ 45.21+ 0.01- 0.02- 0.22-
FIN POL PRT PRT PRT DEU ITA ITA PRT PRT POL FRA BEL FRA DEU POL POL3
3.27+ 0.54- 0.01- 8.75+ 0.04- 0.04- 0.02- 0.02- 4.87+ 2.38+ 0.00- 0.02- 0.54- 0.64- 0.01- 0.02- 0.21-
PRT DEU NLD DEU DEU POL AUT AUT BEL GRC ITA ITA FRA POL POL DEU DEU4
0.07- 0.03- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.10- 1.84= 0.00- 0.02- 0.07- 0.31- 0.01- 0.01- 0.13-
ITA PRT DEU ESP POL ESP BEL BEL DEU DEU FRA PRT ITA DEU ITA ITA CZE5
0.01- 0.03- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.10- 0.64- 0.00+ 0.01- 0.02- 0.05- 0.01- 0.00- 0.09+
POL FIN FIN ITA ESP ITA GBR POL POL ESP PRT POL DEU ITA ESP CZE ITA6
0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.05- 0.21- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.04- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.07-
ESP NLD ESP AUT AUT BEL NLD GRC AUT BEL AUT GRC AUT PRT AUT ESP PRT7
0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.08- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.03- 0.00- 0.00- 0.05-
GBR ITA ITA POL ITA GBR GRC PRT NLD AUT ESP ESP GBR NLD CZE NLD NLD8
0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.05-
AUT DNK DNK FIN NLD AUT FIN NLD GBR FRA NLD NLD PRT CZE PRT GBR ESP9
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.05-
DNK ESP AUT NLD GBR NLD POL DNK FRA HUN GBR AUT NLD ESP NLD AUT HUN10
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.03+
NLD GBR GBR GBR FIN FRA DNK GBR DNK NLD GRC GBR CZE GBR GBR PRT GRC11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
BEL AUT POL DNK DNK DNK HUN FRA HUN DNK CZE DNK HUN AUT DNK HUN GBR12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.01- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.02-
HUN HUN HUN HUN SWE FIN FRA SWE SWE GBR HUN CZE ESP DNK GRC GRC DNK13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
SWE FRA SWE SWE FRA SWE SWE HUN FIN SWE DNK HUN DNK HUN HUN DNK IRL14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.01+
FRA CZE CZE FRA HUN HUN ESP FIN GRC CZE FIN SWE SWE SWE SWE IRL SWE15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.01+
CZE SWE FRA CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE FIN SWE FIN FIN FIN FIN SWE FIN16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.01-
IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL FIN AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- -0.59+






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.32: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Other Non-Metallic Mineral*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
AUT BEL AUT DEU POL GRC GRC GRC GRC ESP DEU DEU DEU POL DEU DEU DEU1
74.04+ 54.02+ 70.34+ 61.49+ 82.43+ 35.46+ 53.37+ 55.95+ 62.90+ 80.23+ 99.98+ 82.17+ 70.75+ 63.75+ 99.99+ 93.54+ 72.55+
BEL AUT BEL BEL BEL BEL ITA ESP BEL GRC POL POL POL DEU GRC GRC POL2
17.07+ 41.66+ 26.69+ 20.98+ 17.51+ 32.50+ 46.55+ 24.05+ 23.87+ 19.67+ 0.01- 17.80+ 27.71+ 35.58+ 0.00- 6.42+ 15.65+
DEU GRC GRC HUN DEU DEU ESP BEL ITA ITA AUT PRT HUN HUN ITA POL ESP3
7.46- 3.74+ 2.93+ 17.51+ 0.02- 31.99+ 0.03- 19.97+ 13.12- 0.03- 0.00- 0.01- 0.94+ 0.43- 0.00- 0.02- 6.13-
GRC POL ESP ITA ITA FRA DEU ITA ESP DEU ITA ESP GRC ITA POL ESP GRC4
1.40= 0.49- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.03- 0.02- 0.00- 0.01- 0.57- 0.08- 0.00- 0.00- 4.96+
POL DEU DEU ESP ESP ESP GBR DEU DEU HUN PRT FRA ITA PRT AUT BEL FIN5
0.01- 0.02- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.03- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01+ 0.06- 0.00- 0.00- 0.28-
ITA ITA NLD GRC GRC ITA BEL AUT AUT BEL ESP BEL BEL GRC ESP GBR ITA6
0.01- 0.02- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.05- 0.00- 0.00- 0.17-
ESP PRT ITA AUT AUT GBR AUT HUN FRA POL GBR GBR GBR ESP PRT AUT BEL7
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.14-
FIN NLD DNK POL GBR POL FRA POL GBR FRA BEL NLD NLD NLD BEL ITA PRT8
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.04-
GBR ESP FIN DNK NLD PRT NLD FRA HUN AUT NLD GRC AUT AUT GBR NLD NLD9
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
DNK FIN HUN FIN DNK AUT POL DNK DNK GBR FRA ITA FRA GBR NLD FRA GBR10
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
NLD HUN PRT NLD FRA NLD PRT NLD NLD DNK GRC AUT PRT BEL FRA HUN FRA11
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
HUN DNK POL PRT FIN HUN HUN PRT PRT NLD DNK HUN ESP FRA DNK PRT CZE12
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
PRT GBR GBR GBR PRT DNK SWE GBR POL PRT HUN DNK DNK CZE HUN CZE HUN13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
FRA FRA CZE SWE HUN SWE DNK SWE SWE SWE FIN CZE CZE DNK CZE SWE DNK14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
SWE CZE FRA FRA SWE FIN FIN CZE FIN FIN CZE FIN SWE IRL FIN IRL IRL15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
CZE SWE SWE CZE CZE IRL CZE FIN CZE CZE SWE SWE FIN SWE SWE DNK SWE16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL CZE IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL FIN IRL FIN AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.33: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ESP FIN ESP AUT AUT ITA BEL ITA ITA BEL GBR GBR GRC / / / /1
76.60+ 32.42+ 89.39+ 60.29+ 84.22+ 61.41+ 44.02+ 60.24+ 74.89+ 40.94+ 58.77+ 63.53+ 99.93+ / / / /
FIN ESP AUT ESP ESP AUT AUT BEL AUT AUT GRC GRC GBR / / / /2
23.10+ 25.94+ 6.01+ 33.52+ 15.76+ 36.24+ 43.77+ 18.21+ 15.66+ 39.82+ 41.22+ 36.44+ 0.02- / / / /
AUT AUT FIN FIN ITA BEL ITA DEU BEL GRC ITA BEL BEL / / / /3
0.20- 25.16+ 4.59+ 6.18+ 0.01- 2.14- 12.17- 17.41- 9.41+ 19.09+ 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- / / / /
ITA ITA BEL ITA DEU DEU DEU AUT DEU DEU BEL ITA AUT / / / /4
0.08- 16.40- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.18- 0.03- 4.12+ 0.02- 0.08- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- / / / /
DEU DEU HUN BEL FIN ESP ESP ESP ESP ITA AUT DEU POL / / / /5
0.01- 0.03- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01+ / / / /
GRC POL NLD DEU BEL FIN GBR FRA FRA GBR POL POL ITA / / / /6
0.00- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- / / / /
GBR BEL DNK DNK POL FRA FRA DNK POL ESP DEU AUT NLD / / / /7
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- / / / /
DNK GRC ITA GRC GBR GRC FIN GBR GBR POL FIN ESP DEU / / / /8
0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ / / / /
POL DNK CZE NLD GRC GBR SWE SWE SWE FRA FRA FRA ESP / / / /9
0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ / / / /
BEL HUN GRC HUN FRA SWE DNK POL GRC DNK ESP NLD HUN / / / /10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ / / / /
NLD GBR SWE GBR DNK POL HUN GRC DNK HUN NLD DNK FRA / / / /11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- / / / /
SWE NLD DEU POL SWE HUN GRC NLD NLD NLD PRT PRT PRT / / / /12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ / / / /
CZE CZE PRT SWE NLD DNK NLD HUN HUN SWE DNK FIN DNK / / / /13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- / / / /
PRT FRA GBR CZE CZE NLD CZE FIN FIN FIN HUN HUN FIN / / / /14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- / / / /
HUN SWE POL FRA HUN CZE PRT PRT PRT PRT CZE SWE CZE / / / /15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ / / / /
FRA PRT FRA PRT PRT PRT POL CZE CZE CZE SWE CZE IRL / / / /16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ / / / /
IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL SWE / / / /17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ / / / /






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.34: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Machinery, Nec*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA DEU DEU ITA ITA FRA ITA FRA ITA GBR FRA GBR1
50.54+ 71.52+ 86.83+ 98.80+ 88.97+ 99.85+ 63.21+ 50.24+ 53.27+ 92.08+ 51.10+ 70.60+ 65.09+ 77.38+ 49.38+ 64.86+ 56.92+
DEU DEU FIN DEU DEU DEU ITA ITA DEU DEU DEU POL GBR GBR POL POL POL2
49.45+ 28.46= 13.16+ 1.20- 11.02- 0.14- 36.78+ 49.75+ 33.50= 7.90- 28.48= 18.85+ 34.89+ 17.18+ 15.86+ 24.66+ 23.54+
FIN FIN ESP FIN ESP AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT GBR AUT ESP FRA GRC ITA3
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 13.22+ 0.00- 20.41+ 10.54= 0.01- 5.31+ 14.13= 8.47+ 9.73-
GBR DNK NLD ESP AUT BEL GBR BEL BEL GBR GBR FRA ITA FRA GRC HUN HUN4
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.10- 11.04+ 1.82+ 8.12+
DNK GBR AUT BEL BEL GBR BEL ESP GBR FRA BEL AUT POL POL ESP IRL NLD5
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 8.89+ 0.15- 1.51-
AUT AUT DNK AUT GBR FRA ESP DNK FRA BEL POL DEU GRC HUN HUN ESP FRA6
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.68+ 0.04- 0.07-
ESP BEL BEL DNK FIN ESP FRA FRA NLD ESP ITA BEL DEU AUT ITA GBR GRC7
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.00- 0.05-
BEL NLD DEU GBR DNK DNK NLD NLD ESP DNK NLD NLD BEL DEU AUT ITA ESP8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.04-
NLD ESP GBR NLD NLD NLD DNK GBR DNK NLD ESP ESP NLD GRC DEU DEU DEU9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
SWE POL PRT PRT FRA SWE SWE POL POL HUN PRT DNK DNK NLD BEL CZE BEL10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
POL FRA SWE SWE SWE PRT PRT SWE SWE POL GRC GRC HUN CZE DNK AUT DNK11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
PRT PRT GRC POL POL FIN FIN PRT HUN SWE HUN PRT ESP BEL NLD NLD CZE12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
FRA SWE CZE FRA PRT POL HUN HUN PRT PRT DNK HUN PRT DNK PRT BEL PRT13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
IRL CZE HUN CZE GRC HUN POL FIN FIN FIN FIN CZE CZE PRT CZE DNK SWE14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
CZE HUN FRA GRC CZE GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC CZE SWE SWE SWE FIN PRT FIN15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
HUN IRL POL HUN HUN CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE SWE FIN FIN FIN IRL SWE IRL16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
GRC GRC IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL SWE FIN AUT17
0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.35: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Electrical and Optical Equipment*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA DEU ITA ITA DEU DEU SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE1
99.98+ 77.38+ 53.35+ 47.75+ 44.34+ 54.49+ 73.99+ 50.14+ 53.58+ 79.13+ 63.91+ 47.29+ 50.61+ 50.61+ 50.85+ 49.16+ 56.76+
POL POL ESP ESP ESP FIN FIN AUT POL FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FRA FRA FIN2
0.00- 22.59+ 41.67+ 24.59+ 23.53+ 17.29+ 18.80+ 23.71+ 25.55+ 19.44+ 25.32+ 28.79+ 32.34+ 29.77+ 26.11+ 28.07+ 22.12+
ESP ESP NLD GRC GRC HUN HUN FIN FIN HUN DEU DEU DEU DEU FIN FIN DEU3
0.00- 0.01- 4.97= 15.35+ 16.26+ 13.24+ 7.17+ 22.90+ 20.84+ 1.39- 10.76- 23.91- 12.39- 17.25- 23.03+ 22.77+ 20.94-
DEU NLD FIN FIN FIN BEL GBR HUN AUT SWE FRA IRL HUN HUN DEU DEU FRA4
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 12.30+ 15.84+ 12.21+ 0.01- 3.21+ 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 4.66+ 2.35= 0.01- 0.00- 0.13-
GBR DEU GRC DEU DEU GRC DEU DEU ITA DNK HUN GBR GBR FRA GBR IRL GBR5
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 2.70+ 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
AUT DNK DNK NLD POL GBR NLD DNK NLD FRA GBR FRA FRA GBR AUT GBR POL6
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.04- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
NLD AUT AUT AUT GBR POL DNK POL DNK POL POL HUN GRC PRT DNK POL ITA7
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
DNK GRC IRL GBR AUT ITA ESP IRL ESP ITA BEL PRT AUT ESP ESP ESP CZE8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
IRL GBR GBR POL HUN NLD AUT ESP SWE AUT PRT DNK POL CZE ITA CZE ESP9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
GRC FIN DEU DNK NLD SWE BEL BEL BEL BEL AUT POL BEL ITA POL ITA NLD10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
FIN IRL BEL BEL IRL AUT FRA GBR FRA ESP ITA BEL DNK DNK PRT HUN HUN11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
BEL BEL POL HUN DNK ESP GRC GRC GBR GBR NLD ITA ITA NLD HUN AUT DNK12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
FRA FRA FRA SWE SWE FRA SWE FRA HUN NLD IRL AUT NLD POL BEL BEL BEL13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
PRT PRT HUN IRL BEL DNK POL NLD PRT PRT ESP NLD PRT BEL NLD NLD IRL14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
SWE CZE PRT FRA FRA IRL PRT SWE GRC IRL DNK ESP CZE AUT GRC DNK PRT15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
CZE SWE SWE PRT PRT PRT IRL PRT IRL GRC GRC GRC ESP GRC CZE GRC GRC16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
HUN HUN CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE IRL IRL IRL PRT AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.36: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Transport Equipment*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU FRA DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU1
99.99+ 99.97+ 84.50+ 100.00+ 99.99+ 68.98+ 99.99+ 99.99+ 99.98+ 99.95+ 91.08+ 47.58+ 64.42+ 40.32= 73.53+ 88.15+ 95.48+
ITA FRA PRT ESP FRA FRA FRA AUT FRA FRA BEL DEU AUT FRA BEL AUT BEL2
0.00- 0.01- 15.43+ 0.00- 0.00- 31.01+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.03- 8.92+ 28.00- 14.72+ 27.39+ 15.10+ 5.76+ 3.52+
AUT AUT NLD BEL BEL ITA ITA FRA ESP AUT AUT AUT BEL AUT AUT ESP CZE3
0.00- 0.00- 0.05- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 20.25+ 11.75+ 19.57+ 11.37+ 4.81- 0.78-
ESP ITA ESP AUT AUT HUN ESP ESP AUT BEL FRA BEL FRA BEL ESP CZE ESP4
0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 4.12+ 9.11- 10.80+ 0.00- 1.27- 0.08-
BEL PRT FRA FRA ESP ESP BEL BEL BEL HUN POL PRT GBR CZE GBR FRA DNK5
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.05- 0.00- 1.86- 0.00- 0.01- 0.07-
GBR BEL ITA ITA ITA BEL GBR ITA ITA ESP ITA ITA HUN HUN ITA BEL FRA6
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.03- 0.00- 0.00- 0.03-
FRA ESP HUN HUN POL PRT HUN HUN HUN ITA GBR GBR NLD ESP FRA POL NLD7
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
NLD NLD BEL PRT NLD GBR AUT NLD POL POL PRT POL ITA PRT POL GBR POL8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
POL POL AUT NLD GBR POL SWE PRT SWE SWE NLD ESP POL NLD CZE HUN GBR9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
FIN HUN FIN GBR SWE SWE PRT GRC NLD NLD ESP NLD GRC ITA PRT ITA PRT10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
DNK GBR DNK DNK PRT AUT NLD SWE PRT DNK HUN HUN PRT GBR NLD IRL ITA11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
SWE DNK POL POL DNK NLD DNK POL GBR GBR GRC GRC ESP POL DNK NLD HUN12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
HUN FIN CZE FIN HUN CZE FIN GBR DNK PRT CZE DNK CZE GRC GRC DNK GRC13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
CZE CZE GBR SWE FIN DNK POL DNK GRC GRC SWE CZE DNK DNK SWE GRC SWE14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
GRC SWE SWE CZE CZE FIN GRC CZE FIN CZE DNK SWE SWE SWE HUN SWE IRL15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
PRT GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC CZE FIN CZE FIN FIN FIN IRL IRL FIN PRT FIN16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL FIN FIN IRL FIN AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.37: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GBR GBR DEU GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR1
99.99+ 99.98+ 70.59+ 100.00+ 99.99+ 99.96+ 99.97+ 99.99+ 99.98+ 99.99+ 100.00+ 99.99+ 99.99+ 99.09+ 84.43+ 99.69+ 99.84+
DEU DEU ITA ITA DEU BEL ITA ITA ITA DNK BEL ITA ITA IRL AUT IRL BEL2
0.00- 0.00- 29.39+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.88+ 15.56+ 0.30- 0.04-
ITA DNK GBR DEU ITA DEU DEU FRA BEL ITA DEU BEL BEL BEL BEL BEL ITA3
0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.03-
DNK ITA BEL DNK DNK ITA BEL BEL FRA BEL ITA DEU DNK ITA DEU AUT DEU4
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02-
BEL BEL ESP BEL BEL FRA FRA DEU DEU DEU FRA FRA FRA DEU ITA DEU ESP5
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
ESP FRA AUT ESP FRA DNK DNK DNK DNK FRA AUT AUT DEU DNK DNK ITA DNK6
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
AUT AUT FRA PRT ESP AUT AUT AUT ESP AUT POL DNK AUT ESP ESP ESP POL7
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
PRT ESP FIN FRA AUT ESP ESP ESP AUT ESP ESP ESP POL AUT POL POL CZE8
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
FRA FIN DNK AUT PRT PRT PRT POL POL POL DNK POL ESP POL GRC FRA IRL9
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
FIN PRT PRT POL FIN POL FIN CZE CZE GRC PRT PRT GRC FRA FRA CZE FRA10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
POL POL GRC GRC GRC SWE SWE SWE PRT PRT GRC GRC HUN CZE CZE GRC GRC11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
CZE CZE CZE FIN POL FIN POL PRT SWE SWE CZE IRL CZE GRC PRT DNK PRT12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
SWE GRC NLD SWE SWE GRC HUN GRC GRC FIN IRL NLD PRT PRT NLD PRT NLD13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
NLD HUN SWE HUN NLD NLD CZE HUN FIN CZE NLD CZE IRL NLD FIN NLD FIN14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
GRC NLD HUN NLD CZE HUN NLD FIN NLD HUN FIN HUN NLD HUN HUN HUN HUN15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
HUN IRL POL CZE HUN IRL IRL NLD HUN NLD SWE SWE SWE FIN IRL FIN SWE16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
IRL SWE IRL IRL IRL CZE GRC IRL IRL IRL HUN FIN FIN SWE SWE SWE AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 1.38: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Electricity, Gas and Water Supply*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
POL FRA SWE FRA SWE SWE SWE PRT PRT PRT PRT PRT PRT PRT PRT PRT PRT1
29.70+ 49.23+ 34.81+ 99.99+ 39.35+ 52.21+ 44.29+ 83.11+ 75.76+ 71.00+ 66.64+ 65.23+ 61.08+ 58.20+ 69.89+ 84.80+ 77.27+
CZE CZE CZE PRT ESP GBR PRT ESP ESP ITA GBR GBR GBR ESP ESP ITA ESP2
26.85+ 44.71+ 27.27+ 0.00- 26.33+ 37.56+ 32.20+ 15.62+ 14.69+ 22.66+ 33.35+ 34.75+ 20.40= 26.53+ 18.52+ 15.18= 14.97=
FRA HUN FRA ITA ITA HUN ESP HUN ITA HUN ITA ESP ITA ITA ITA ESP ITA3
21.91= 4.11= 17.58- 0.00- 25.45+ 6.48+ 17.09+ 1.14- 9.45- 3.45= 0.00- 0.01- 18.49+ 15.14+ 11.58= 0.01- 7.47-
SWE PRT NLD ESP HUN CZE HUN ITA HUN ESP ESP ITA GRC GBR GRC GBR FIN4
21.51+ 1.89+ 11.33+ 0.00- 6.93+ 2.78- 4.66= 0.10- 0.02- 2.78- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.08- 0.00- 0.00- 0.15-
GBR POL PRT GBR CZE ITA ITA SWE GBR GBR AUT CZE ESP CZE GBR GRC GRC5
0.01- 0.01- 5.48+ 0.00- 1.91- 0.92- 1.66- 0.01- 0.02- 0.04- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.06-
ITA SWE HUN CZE POL ESP CZE DNK SWE CZE CZE AUT AUT GRC AUT AUT GBR6
0.01- 0.01- 3.49= 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.06- 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.02-
HUN ITA ESP NLD PRT PRT GBR GBR NLD DNK POL NLD NLD AUT NLD DEU CZE7
0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.02- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.02- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
PRT DNK ITA HUN GBR POL DNK GRC DNK NLD NLD DNK BEL NLD DEU NLD NLD8
0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
NLD NLD DNK DNK NLD NLD NLD NLD FRA SWE BEL DEU DEU FRA BEL BEL DEU9
0.00- 0.01- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
DNK GBR GBR POL DNK DNK GRC AUT POL POL DEU POL POL POL DNK CZE FRA10
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
GRC ESP POL SWE DEU DEU DEU POL GRC GRC GRC FRA CZE DEU POL FRA BEL11
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+ 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.01-
ESP BEL BEL BEL GRC GRC FRA FRA DEU FRA FRA BEL FRA BEL FRA POL POL12
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
BEL GRC DEU DEU AUT BEL AUT DEU AUT DEU DNK GRC DNK DNK CZE DNK DNK13
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
DEU DEU GRC GRC BEL FRA BEL BEL CZE AUT HUN HUN HUN HUN SWE SWE IRL14
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
AUT AUT FIN AUT FRA AUT POL CZE BEL BEL FIN SWE SWE IRL FIN HUN SWE15
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
FIN FIN AUT FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN SWE FIN FIN SWE IRL IRL HUN16
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00-
IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL FIN HUN FIN AUT17
0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00- 0.00+






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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1.B.3 The labour mobility index
The algorithm computes the quantity of labour that should be employed in
each sector by each country in order to realize the ESR. This can be used







where lEi,c,t and li,c,t are, respectively, the quantity of workers employed
in sector i of country c at time t in the efficient scenario and in the original
data set.
In Tables 1.39-1.55 the results for this index are reported, organized as
those of theESR and theRSR Tables—i.e. each Table represents a country.
Sector 2 and 12 are reported in this case since Tables 1.39-1.55 contain less
data than Tables 1.6-1.22, and a sector more does not worsen the clearness
of the Tables. It can be noted that the values are often but not always 0.
This happens because, as explained further on in the text, working with
subsystems means to reorganize the gross production, in order to reach
some objectives in the net product. The algorithm keeps the net deficit
in Sector 2 and Sector 12 equal to or lower than the original deficit. But
in order to do this, it may be necessary to adjust the gross production in
Sector 2 and Sector 12 and hence the quantity of employed in that sector.
However, it can also be noted that these adjustments are almost always
rather slight.
There is a strict relation between the CAs and this index. In order to
infer the CA of a country, in some cases it may be even easier just to check
whether the lmi,c,t is positive or negative and how high its absolute value
is, than to compare the ESRi,c,t with respect to RSRi,c,t.
For example, it has been noted above that Austria in an efficient pat-
tern should decrease its net product in Sector 1 down to 0 for all the years
considered—see Tab. 1.6. Since Austria employs a great ratio of its labour
force in that sector, the relative lm is deeply negative—see Tab. 1.39. The
30% circa of the labour force employed in Sectors 1-17 should leave Sector
1 in 1995 and be reallocated in other sectors—Sector 15 in many years and
Sector 16 in 2009, 2010 and 2011.
However, even if the ESR and the lm are strictly related, they may lead
to weigh in different ways the closeness of single sectors, or even of coun-
tries, to the efficient specialization pattern. This happens because adjusting
the net output in one sector implies a reallocation of labour that involves all
the system. This is due to the complexity of industrial relations assumed
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by the approach of subsystems. It may well be the case that a slight ad-
justment of the net product of a sector i in country c involves more labour
reallocation than a considerable net product adjustment in sector j in coun-
try d. It all depends on how much the single sectors are linked to others.
Therefore, the ESR and the lm are complementary rather than reciprocal
substitutes.
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Table 1.39: Labour mobility index of Austria*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -30.19 -30.25 -27.58 -27.17 -29.01 -29.04 -29.15 -29.67 -28.96 -29.18 -27.69 -26.51 -25.07 -27.79 -23.92 -11.61 -4.07
2 2.87 4.91 2.38 0.07 0.18 0.84 0.37 -0.69 -0.69 1.03 -0.64 -0.01 4.79 -0.83 -0.77 -0.90 -0.81
3 -8.24 -8.31 -8.20 -7.98 -8.00 -7.85 -7.68 -7.80 -7.86 -7.96 -7.93 -7.62 -7.78 -6.81 -6.99 -6.94 -6.18
4 -3.72 -3.55 -3.34 -3.32 -2.95 -2.95 -2.91 -2.70 -2.40 -2.36 -2.22 -1.42 -1.25 -1.31 -1.06 -1.33 -0.82
5 -0.72 -0.70 -0.72 -0.71 -0.70 -0.66 -0.63 -0.61 -0.58 -0.54 -0.52 -0.09 1.32 0.39 -0.07 0.64 1.74
6 -2.97 -3.18 -3.12 -3.20 -2.82 -3.15 -3.06 -3.45 -3.42 -3.32 -3.38 -2.91 -3.39 -3.19 -1.57 -3.72 -3.24
7 -2.94 -3.93 -3.66 -4.28 -4.40 -4.53 -4.33 -4.39 -4.18 -4.40 -4.24 -3.86 -3.47 -3.79 -3.45 -3.00 -1.91
8 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.12 -0.12 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 0.00 -0.10 -0.06 3.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00
9 -0.56 -1.21 -0.91 -1.54 -1.83 -0.89 -1.17 -1.11 -1.25 -1.11 -1.79 -1.30 -1.20 -1.64 -1.04 7.86 11.64
10 -1.81 -1.83 -1.69 -1.39 -1.31 -1.49 -1.39 -0.73 -0.28 -1.50 -0.50 2.63 2.88 2.36 1.86 4.44 7.81
11 74.44 36.98 65.60 -2.69 -2.58 -2.66 -3.07 -2.26 -2.94 -1.96 -2.65 -1.78 -1.79 -2.03 -2.20 -1.59 -1.09
12 -5.10 33.22 2.87 75.10 77.30 75.54 76.53 9.23 34.49 74.19 3.68 3.80 5.89 8.85 8.79 1.15 -1.02
13 -5.64 -6.16 -5.81 -6.31 -6.73 -6.70 -7.13 -6.31 33.27 -6.87 57.33 -2.57 -2.57 -4.23 -5.14 -2.98 1.83
14 -6.71 -6.62 -6.48 -6.72 -7.04 -6.99 -6.98 60.94 -5.28 -7.01 1.78 -2.19 -2.69 -2.54 -3.78 -5.92 -5.32
15 -2.59 -2.67 -3.09 -3.34 -3.65 -3.67 -3.76 -3.61 -3.63 -4.03 -4.15 49.29 36.59 46.16 28.79 11.19 -4.37
16 -5.10 -5.00 -4.91 -4.51 -4.27 -3.79 -3.70 -4.38 -3.95 -3.38 -4.34 -3.31 -3.15 -3.00 12.54 -2.96 -2.69
17 -1.01 -1.65 -1.32 -1.89 -2.08 -2.00 -1.87 -2.38 -2.23 -1.61 -2.64 -2.10 -2.15 -0.58 -1.97 15.67 8.51
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.40: Labour mobility index of Belgium*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 20.88 -11.06 -9.43 -10.52 -10.09 -10.87 -10.21 -7.86 -5.92 -10.94 -10.53 -10.91 -7.69 -10.03 -10.50 23.77 7.14
2 -0.52 5.28 -0.51 -0.49 -0.49 -0.48 -0.43 -0.43 -0.44 -0.05 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 -0.43 -0.49 -0.50 -0.50
3 28.01 -12.27 -12.23 -12.09 -12.10 -12.20 -12.31 -12.37 -12.61 -13.09 -11.66 -12.95 -12.96 -13.24 -12.37 27.31 16.92
4 -7.94 -7.30 44.67 -6.26 -5.37 -6.61 -6.36 -6.14 -5.88 -5.67 -4.71 -4.46 -4.33 -3.97 -4.67 -5.19 -4.76
5 -0.33 -0.46 -0.21 -0.34 -0.31 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.19 -0.18 -0.22 -0.23 -0.24 -0.22
6 -1.43 -0.96 -1.46 -1.31 -1.32 -1.41 -1.56 13.87 28.25 -1.72 -0.55 -0.83 19.62 -1.19 -1.02 -1.37 2.94
7 -4.30 -5.12 -5.34 -4.30 -4.31 -5.27 -6.10 -5.84 -5.27 -5.95 -5.04 -4.31 -4.36 -4.71 -5.31 -2.81 -2.75
8 -0.67 -0.64 -0.64 -0.54 -0.51 -0.62 -0.58 -0.67 -0.66 -0.71 -0.61 -0.22 -0.59 -0.17 -0.33 0.46 -0.27
9 -6.93 -2.99 -3.65 3.78 2.15 -6.51 -7.20 -7.37 -6.55 -7.14 -4.60 -2.32 -7.73 -6.89 -7.88 -7.95 -7.96
10 -2.18 13.40 0.99 46.92 51.81 -0.61 -1.96 -2.23 -1.95 -2.16 38.86 56.85 -0.05 15.54 -0.46 -1.92 -1.04
11 12.52 53.50 22.45 18.97 13.94 32.90 -3.14 18.47 22.77 -3.50 -2.69 -2.85 -2.56 -3.27 -3.42 -4.20 -3.57
12 -11.70 -8.24 -10.31 -9.75 -9.49 -3.19 71.63 33.23 11.78 71.68 -9.93 -10.42 -6.77 3.06 5.27 -3.82 -0.88
13 -4.54 -4.25 -4.41 -4.59 -4.39 -4.78 -4.88 -4.83 -5.03 -4.68 -3.79 -4.51 -2.73 -3.24 -1.88 -5.51 -4.43
14 -6.61 -5.97 -6.40 -6.34 -6.46 32.65 -5.08 -5.21 -5.83 -5.09 -1.79 -3.15 0.92 1.93 4.08 -5.96 -2.47
15 -7.70 -7.60 -7.73 -7.76 -7.65 -7.74 -7.77 -7.72 -7.64 -7.21 22.84 5.91 34.66 31.40 43.67 -6.56 7.45
16 -4.20 -4.08 -3.94 -3.87 -3.84 -3.45 -2.91 -3.19 -3.20 -2.61 -2.71 -2.91 -2.07 -2.04 -1.41 -2.73 -2.67
17 -2.39 -1.22 -1.87 -1.51 -1.58 -1.55 -0.91 -1.47 -1.58 -0.93 -2.44 -2.29 -2.74 -2.52 -3.04 -2.79 -2.92
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.41: Labour mobility index of the Czech Republic*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 46.00 26.54 42.36 73.05 15.22 74.19 73.71 71.06 70.42 74.63 72.21 53.78 72.73 15.82 73.71 62.98 57.93
2 -5.14 -4.84 -4.61 -4.26 -3.99 -3.69 -3.56 -2.84 -2.95 -2.85 -2.73 -2.80 -1.01 -2.87 -1.81 0.96 0.22
3 -6.84 -7.70 -6.56 -6.60 42.51 -4.81 -4.98 -6.29 -3.56 -6.33 -6.29 -6.85 -5.94 39.60 -6.30 -6.97 -4.60
4 -6.88 -7.58 -7.43 -7.59 -6.93 -7.18 -6.47 -5.70 -5.18 -5.41 -4.82 -3.88 -4.12 -3.54 -3.43 -3.65 -3.69
5 -1.80 -1.60 -1.42 -1.31 -1.17 -1.15 -1.08 -0.46 -0.60 -0.66 -0.57 -0.45 -0.19 0.99 -0.42 0.03 0.00
6 -3.47 -3.38 -3.19 -2.62 -3.24 -3.65 -3.38 -3.09 -3.48 -4.35 -3.63 21.75 -3.58 -2.30 -3.58 -3.56 -3.35
7 -2.74 -2.88 -2.83 -3.03 -1.09 -3.01 -3.08 -3.41 -3.52 -3.57 -3.39 -3.55 -3.56 -2.21 -3.60 -3.54 -3.75
8 -0.39 -0.42 -0.15 0.12 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.51 0.17 0.51 0.02 -0.08 -0.09 0.03 2.81 8.07
9 -0.68 -1.08 -1.53 -0.85 -1.30 -1.07 -0.57 -0.38 -0.56 0.04 -0.55 -1.33 -0.99 -1.17 -0.25 -0.75 -0.41
10 -1.78 -1.84 -2.06 -2.11 0.80 -2.83 -2.73 -2.22 -2.92 -3.47 -3.32 -4.05 -4.10 -0.49 -3.50 -0.89 -0.53
11 -4.28 -4.32 -4.19 -4.44 -3.97 -4.82 -4.60 -4.74 -4.56 -4.32 -4.48 -4.49 -4.22 -3.63 -3.83 -3.97 -3.84
12 -10.84 -2.24 -8.88 -11.92 -9.86 -12.45 -11.90 -10.70 -10.99 -10.95 -9.95 -12.46 -12.05 -14.53 -13.82 -14.51 -15.02
13 -7.79 -6.45 -6.39 -7.87 -7.26 -8.03 -7.53 -6.98 -7.74 -7.33 -7.60 -8.73 -8.82 -8.92 -7.15 -7.88 -8.14
14 -4.81 -4.58 -5.00 -7.80 -8.58 -9.34 -9.52 -9.62 -10.32 -11.03 -10.55 -11.71 -11.45 -10.69 -10.42 -9.95 -9.30
15 -4.61 -4.63 -4.76 -4.62 -4.95 -5.61 -6.04 -6.15 -6.25 -6.52 -7.25 -7.60 -8.11 -1.49 -7.86 -3.72 -6.20
16 -3.66 -3.84 -4.41 -4.63 -4.71 -5.01 -4.89 -4.91 -4.79 -4.77 -4.60 -4.53 -4.44 -4.10 -4.64 -4.64 -4.41
17 19.70 30.86 21.07 -3.52 -1.42 -1.49 -3.43 -3.55 -3.51 -3.30 -2.98 -3.13 -0.07 -0.39 -3.12 -2.75 -2.98
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.42: Labour mobility index of Denmark*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 69.47 -11.74 -13.10 -13.31 -10.98 -12.80 -12.02 -13.01 26.67 29.10 63.55 34.77 77.08 78.62 77.69 79.40 79.96
2 -0.25 -0.48 -0.43 -0.37 4.07 11.42 19.12 17.81 16.26 15.77 7.53 21.24 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.28 -0.06
3 -11.19 -9.89 -11.35 -11.53 -11.69 -11.38 -11.65 -12.89 -12.98 -11.77 -12.90 -13.17 -11.87 -11.86 -13.61 -15.68 -15.64
4 -3.20 -0.49 -2.38 0.44 -1.26 -1.63 -1.59 -0.84 -1.90 -1.82 -1.80 -1.70 -1.63 -1.61 -1.40 -1.49 -1.47
5 -0.22 67.05 80.98 81.88 67.87 54.29 36.23 40.99 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
6 -2.27 -2.05 -2.45 -2.50 -2.54 -2.47 -2.15 -2.18 -2.33 -2.47 -2.72 -2.75 -2.89 -2.85 -2.52 -2.26 -2.18
7 -7.95 -3.88 -6.09 -7.21 -7.69 -5.57 -5.66 -5.45 -6.57 -6.23 -8.07 -7.26 -6.35 -6.95 -7.50 -7.94 -7.39
8 -0.04 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 3.95 8.57 13.58 14.88 15.20 14.53 5.31 17.75 0.01 0.05 0.14 -0.02 0.04
9 -1.88 0.88 -1.66 -2.44 -2.60 -1.66 -2.03 -2.52 -1.56 -2.07 -5.24 -4.84 -5.39 -5.53 -5.22 -5.20 -5.05
10 -3.08 -2.28 -2.64 -3.03 -2.83 -2.71 -2.35 -2.80 -2.75 -3.03 -3.79 -3.56 -4.00 -3.71 -3.58 -3.58 -3.24
11 -3.08 -2.65 -3.18 -3.41 -3.47 -3.06 -2.69 -2.62 -2.19 -2.46 -2.95 -2.93 -3.29 -3.45 -3.04 -3.26 -2.97
12 -6.58 -5.27 -7.60 -7.82 -5.63 -7.34 -5.98 -6.74 -4.88 -6.55 -8.19 -8.15 -9.38 -10.29 -6.70 -6.89 -9.37
13 -11.16 -10.66 -10.92 -11.31 -10.09 -10.22 -9.95 -9.63 -10.13 -10.68 -11.87 -11.63 -12.36 -12.56 -13.08 -13.51 -13.39
14 -6.87 -7.03 -7.23 -7.53 -7.89 -7.83 -7.54 -8.18 -7.50 -8.34 -8.69 -8.77 -9.58 -9.75 -10.94 -11.06 -10.86
15 -3.65 -3.57 -3.55 -3.39 -3.12 -2.69 -2.50 -2.65 -2.31 -2.19 -2.61 -2.40 -2.67 -2.89 -3.17 -0.57 -0.30
16 -5.55 -5.21 -5.60 -5.59 -5.62 -5.42 -5.18 -5.05 -5.13 -5.05 -5.07 -4.99 -4.89 -4.29 -4.25 -4.77 -4.94
17 -2.50 -2.62 -2.68 -2.76 -0.48 0.49 2.35 0.89 2.20 3.32 -2.41 -1.52 -2.57 -2.74 -2.62 -2.85 -3.09
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.43: Labour mobility index of Finland*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -24.79 -22.71 -18.40 -11.46 -18.10 -12.04 -18.68 -14.84 -16.77 -15.47 -15.41 -17.77 -19.74 -19.10 -17.20 -16.39 -18.63
2 6.76 5.95 -1.02 -0.93 -0.94 -0.93 -0.95 -0.98 -0.98 -0.95 -1.00 -1.10 -1.06 -0.90 -0.09 -0.33 -1.32
3 -6.89 -6.55 -6.04 -5.96 -6.11 -5.03 -5.46 -5.15 -5.94 -5.64 -5.65 -6.36 -6.27 -6.06 -6.03 -6.26 -6.47
4 -2.56 -2.74 -2.67 -2.68 -2.35 -2.07 -2.04 -2.22 -1.26 -1.62 -1.41 -2.00 -1.89 -1.58 -1.77 -1.74 -1.72
5 -0.62 -0.57 -0.51 -0.53 -0.52 -0.48 -0.47 -0.46 -0.44 -0.42 -0.42 -0.23 -0.24 0.05 -0.29 -0.28 -0.02
6 -4.33 -4.00 -4.00 -3.56 -4.68 -4.39 -4.60 -4.59 -5.01 -5.02 5.89 -0.86 -4.81 -4.27 -4.82 -4.64 -4.81
7 -10.43 -11.58 -11.22 -10.76 -9.86 -9.99 -9.13 -9.67 -8.84 -9.34 -7.90 -9.57 -8.86 -7.43 -8.27 -8.89 -8.89
8 0.02 -0.34 -0.45 -0.45 0.06 0.44 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.23 3.45 0.92 0.14 -0.35 -0.43 -0.40 -0.19
9 -1.07 -1.73 -2.28 -1.95 -1.52 -1.77 -1.99 -2.21 -2.14 -2.00 -1.95 -1.93 -2.23 -1.65 -1.90 -2.71 -1.46
10 2.91 -1.58 -1.36 -1.25 -0.56 0.77 -0.12 -0.91 -2.07 -1.81 -1.08 -1.70 -2.03 -1.28 -1.63 -1.66 -1.93
11 -1.51 -1.75 -1.82 -2.02 -2.02 -2.25 -2.23 -2.36 -2.44 -2.52 -2.06 -2.45 -2.31 -2.09 -2.04 -1.96 -1.48
12 64.10 69.85 10.84 7.70 -1.87 -5.53 -4.90 -5.09 -7.02 -6.11 -6.10 -6.07 -6.29 7.51 8.66 6.93 3.91
13 -7.45 -7.66 49.42 -8.82 -8.09 -7.75 -8.49 -8.50 -9.52 -9.11 -8.96 -9.54 -9.97 -9.30 -7.04 -5.38 -9.12
14 -7.40 -8.28 -6.08 50.69 64.26 59.26 67.55 65.36 70.71 67.64 50.37 66.74 73.43 53.68 50.00 50.78 59.19
15 -3.64 -2.68 0.38 -3.25 -3.32 -3.34 -3.69 -3.64 -3.55 -2.98 -3.21 -3.39 -3.56 -3.42 -3.53 -3.53 -3.42
16 -1.70 -1.91 -2.47 -2.67 -2.59 -2.69 -2.68 -2.64 -2.73 -2.73 -2.53 -2.60 -2.57 -1.98 -1.39 -1.71 -1.88
17 -1.40 -1.73 -2.30 -2.09 -1.81 -2.21 -2.26 -2.20 -2.18 -2.16 -2.02 -2.08 -1.75 -1.83 -2.23 -1.84 -1.75
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.44: Labour mobility index of France*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 24.21 50.61 48.69 21.19 7.81 14.03 9.69 29.13 -2.58 44.69 4.56 -16.94 -19.03 16.46 -17.31 -14.94 25.59
2 -1.02 -0.02 -0.93 1.07 -0.81 -0.79 -0.64 -0.64 -0.65 -0.67 -0.69 -0.70 -0.71 -0.75 -0.74 -0.75 -0.75
3 30.24 0.16 7.08 15.55 40.07 8.83 9.54 -10.44 33.94 7.28 -11.82 -7.72 -12.65 -12.63 -10.96 -12.25 3.84
4 -5.55 -5.34 -5.16 -4.98 -4.53 -3.76 29.47 28.47 -3.28 -1.36 16.32 16.80 15.72 17.35 16.38 -2.16 15.89
5 -1.05 -1.02 -0.98 -0.93 -0.88 -0.84 -0.75 -0.67 -0.73 -0.69 -0.63 -0.57 -0.58 -0.49 -0.66 -0.72 -0.57
6 -1.61 -1.65 -1.32 -1.29 -1.29 -1.16 -1.43 -1.49 -1.39 -1.43 -1.15 -0.89 -1.29 -0.77 -0.97 -1.11 -0.84
7 -4.38 -5.69 -5.40 -4.85 -3.68 -4.67 -4.94 -5.17 -3.40 -4.98 -5.03 -3.56 -1.28 -2.52 -2.57 -1.95 -2.50
8 -0.50 -0.37 -0.31 -0.02 -0.17 -0.13 -0.05 0.01 -0.12 0.06 0.14 -0.21 0.06 -0.03 -0.18 -0.30 -0.03
9 -1.10 -1.64 -1.98 -2.24 3.93 7.03 2.73 4.28 16.39 1.91 1.86 10.98 -0.19 -0.27 12.89 2.49 -1.64
10 -3.12 -3.57 -3.32 -3.14 -2.01 -1.00 -2.59 -2.70 -0.19 -3.34 -0.39 0.84 -1.50 -0.81 7.80 3.90 1.30
11 -2.78 -2.76 -2.87 -2.68 -1.97 -2.22 -2.50 -2.66 -1.82 -2.47 -2.27 -1.23 -2.00 -2.12 -1.50 -1.72 -2.26
12 -9.36 -9.41 -9.24 -7.21 -8.65 -5.10 -10.44 -10.51 -9.02 -10.86 -2.60 0.21 5.26 -2.36 3.23 8.20 -10.97
13 -6.44 -6.31 -5.45 -5.07 -6.18 -5.11 -6.00 -5.17 -5.81 -6.11 21.36 -4.94 31.37 -5.16 2.16 27.80 -6.51
14 -7.84 -7.45 -8.29 -8.02 -8.53 -7.02 -8.78 -8.42 -8.00 -7.96 -5.87 -2.12 -4.80 -6.35 5.75 7.08 -6.82
15 -6.57 -6.57 -6.59 -6.65 -6.78 7.68 -7.15 -7.26 -7.30 -7.23 -7.39 14.82 -2.52 6.42 -8.61 -8.59 -6.74
16 -3.76 -3.80 -3.75 -3.73 -3.82 -3.47 -3.84 -3.85 -3.79 -3.91 -3.49 -2.66 -2.95 -2.93 -2.40 -2.12 -3.33
17 0.63 4.82 -0.19 13.00 -2.48 -2.30 -2.33 -2.92 -2.24 -2.95 -2.91 -2.11 -2.91 -3.04 -2.31 -2.86 -3.66
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.45: Labour mobility index of Germany*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -1.59 -8.31 -8.81 -8.76 -8.01 -8.39 -9.14 -9.32 -9.23 -9.68 -8.97 2.42 -2.95 3.61 -4.82 -9.39 -9.69
2 -1.00 0.01 -1.63 -0.43 -0.99 -1.35 -1.11 -1.10 -1.10 -1.06 0.38 -0.09 -0.09 -0.79 -0.02 0.48 0.19
3 0.84 -9.03 -9.39 -9.14 -9.48 -9.73 -9.74 -10.33 -10.64 -10.62 -10.26 27.43 11.90 22.89 10.04 -9.22 -8.97
4 -3.03 21.69 15.09 20.09 17.59 19.65 -0.28 -1.86 -1.61 -1.66 -1.55 -1.75 -1.56 -1.54 -1.49 11.83 -1.20
5 -0.39 -0.38 -0.33 -0.34 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.27 -0.23 -0.24 -0.22 -0.23 -0.13 -0.18 -0.24 -0.13 -0.08
6 -1.63 -1.67 4.63 -1.27 -1.10 -1.64 -1.12 -1.66 -1.41 -1.46 2.98 1.18 2.70 3.13 4.05 4.48 3.11
7 -3.80 -5.65 -5.14 -4.36 -4.52 -5.65 -5.42 -5.36 -4.36 -4.02 -4.83 -4.02 -3.62 -3.65 -3.52 -2.71 -2.88
8 -0.19 1.58 -0.07 -0.17 -0.22 -0.18 -0.13 -0.17 -0.08 -0.14 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.11 0.15
9 -3.83 -3.85 -3.40 -3.40 -3.74 -2.55 -3.11 -3.18 -3.32 -3.05 -3.70 -4.03 -3.86 -4.12 -3.60 -3.18 -3.21
10 0.10 -2.91 -1.43 -1.41 -0.34 -1.89 4.25 8.22 -0.09 -0.31 -1.20 -2.01 -0.11 -0.88 -0.70 1.42 1.84
11 -1.18 -2.33 -1.75 6.15 -1.59 2.43 -2.27 -2.22 -1.47 -2.28 9.68 5.25 4.01 1.56 9.22 6.24 5.16
12 -0.32 -0.08 1.87 1.64 7.95 -3.49 1.86 1.26 -3.26 -1.92 1.19 -6.08 1.66 -3.29 1.35 7.12 11.57
13 7.65 0.82 -8.49 -7.57 -4.95 -9.56 12.13 9.27 2.22 -5.73 1.42 -11.03 -10.39 -11.98 -12.19 -11.08 -10.47
14 -6.89 -7.44 -7.80 -8.82 -9.47 13.52 -6.00 -5.55 12.10 21.67 -3.77 -1.23 -4.92 -2.66 -10.14 -9.86 -0.19
15 20.87 23.09 17.51 22.49 24.19 14.12 25.00 26.78 26.87 24.83 23.66 -0.68 12.08 3.20 16.88 18.43 19.38
16 -3.13 -3.11 11.72 -2.71 -2.71 -2.98 -2.63 -2.47 -2.34 -2.40 -2.66 -2.85 -2.58 -2.98 -2.42 -1.98 -2.07
17 -2.50 -2.43 -2.59 -2.00 -2.31 -2.02 -2.01 -2.03 -2.05 -1.95 -2.06 -2.20 -2.10 -2.24 -2.34 -2.57 -2.65
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.46: Labour mobility index of Great Britain*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -6.89 -0.18 9.81 3.54 27.69 18.67 19.79 -3.00 -8.67 -10.26 -3.40 -10.21 -11.00 -7.29 -14.36 2.11 -14.26
2 -1.11 -0.94 -0.79 -0.81 -0.69 -0.04 -0.93 -0.85 -1.05 -1.03 0.29 0.34 -0.04 -0.90 -1.52 -0.96 -0.91
3 -10.19 19.83 50.13 17.36 -9.16 -9.25 -9.49 13.81 -10.35 -10.68 -10.72 -10.70 -10.76 1.38 -10.48 19.16 -11.27
4 38.35 -3.96 -4.46 -3.43 -3.10 -3.02 -2.53 -2.37 32.04 26.44 -1.77 -1.79 -1.75 -1.70 -1.89 -1.72 -1.83
5 -0.31 -0.32 -0.37 0.01 -0.24 -0.20 5.54 3.85 7.75 5.94 5.27 4.98 4.25 4.30 4.36 3.44 -0.10
6 14.30 13.78 0.01 12.46 17.42 19.15 17.31 14.12 8.75 16.51 5.99 3.81 2.24 2.79 1.56 2.46 1.42
7 -8.21 -6.96 -6.35 -6.93 -9.04 -9.45 -9.14 -8.22 -8.44 -8.07 -8.61 -8.35 -8.21 -7.37 -8.62 -5.72 -7.35
8 -1.26 -1.30 -1.25 -1.14 -1.32 -1.19 -1.22 -1.47 -1.46 -1.32 -1.20 -1.37 -0.86 -1.39 -1.45 -1.17 -1.75
9 -4.61 -5.49 -5.15 -5.53 -5.95 -5.70 -5.74 -6.20 -4.89 -4.94 -6.09 -6.47 -6.41 -5.88 -6.46 -5.43 -5.42
10 -2.53 -0.77 0.23 -2.14 -2.83 -2.97 -2.86 -2.08 -2.34 -1.52 0.37 -2.61 -1.99 -0.63 -2.00 -0.78 -1.94
11 -2.85 -2.66 -2.47 -2.36 -2.52 -2.62 -2.50 -2.12 -2.75 -2.72 -2.41 -2.43 -2.51 -2.46 -2.58 -2.20 -2.39
12 -7.65 -6.58 -8.33 -6.27 -6.76 -6.02 -5.58 -4.03 -5.30 -5.75 17.96 20.83 2.25 4.23 9.06 -1.68 10.59
13 -6.86 -6.27 -6.53 -6.65 -6.13 -6.12 -6.50 -5.49 -6.18 -5.56 -5.59 3.34 25.14 9.18 33.10 -6.47 34.02
14 -9.82 -9.49 -9.96 -10.17 -10.46 -10.76 -10.21 -9.19 -8.86 -8.37 -7.86 -7.54 -7.11 -7.36 -6.61 -7.78 -5.90
15 -9.08 -8.87 -9.34 -9.76 -9.64 -9.37 -9.64 -9.67 -9.91 -9.72 -9.70 -9.50 -9.53 -9.46 -9.14 -11.10 -11.13
16 20.78 22.32 -3.16 23.93 24.75 25.19 26.06 24.81 23.89 23.12 24.52 24.03 25.42 25.31 19.76 20.76 20.97
17 -2.07 -2.13 -2.04 -2.09 -2.02 3.68 -2.35 -1.92 -2.23 -2.07 2.94 3.63 0.85 -2.74 -2.74 -2.92 -2.76
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.47: Labour mobility index of Greece*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -53.48 -53.79 -53.26 -55.26 -56.38 -55.56 -54.12 -48.85 -49.16 -50.62 -50.55 -50.15 -47.71 -43.54 -47.99 -49.01 -22.00
2 -1.10 -1.14 -1.13 1.26 1.79 15.56 27.71 12.99 26.03 7.64 6.59 44.34 2.70 16.89 -1.33 -1.23 -1.28
3 -6.78 -7.03 -7.24 -7.58 -7.72 -8.20 -9.26 -9.13 -8.99 -9.86 -10.56 -11.10 -10.84 -11.25 -9.75 -9.79 4.62
4 -7.50 -7.56 -7.21 -7.58 -7.51 -7.67 -7.24 -4.70 -6.98 -2.30 -0.07 -5.38 -3.71 -6.78 -7.37 -7.17 -7.11
5 -0.66 -0.68 -0.59 -0.59 -0.57 -0.60 -0.71 -0.32 5.58 -0.41 -0.58 -0.62 -0.47 -0.17 -0.38 -0.33 33.66
6 -1.63 -1.72 -1.66 -1.71 -1.72 -1.72 -1.71 -1.29 -1.20 -2.05 -1.92 -1.80 -1.52 -1.08 -1.29 -1.11 0.58
7 -2.37 -2.50 -2.50 -2.78 -2.83 -2.71 -2.92 -2.96 -2.98 -0.10 -0.05 -3.55 0.34 10.36 -3.60 -3.52 -1.29
8 -0.26 -0.25 -0.23 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.02 -0.33 -0.31 -0.35 -0.20 -0.32 -0.26 14.49 0.72 -0.30 -0.22
9 3.71 2.77 3.30 -0.05 -0.78 0.71 -0.37 -0.49 -0.98 -0.79 -1.22 -1.92 1.87 1.65 -2.33 -1.49 -1.77
10 59.46 61.77 63.31 13.51 4.10 13.80 -0.96 -0.95 -1.23 0.41 -1.04 -1.33 19.91 30.98 -1.11 -1.63 -1.12
11 1.82 3.99 2.78 2.30 2.55 39.36 58.82 65.13 51.91 20.51 -2.49 -2.53 -1.90 -2.34 -2.21 5.70 7.47
12 -2.06 -2.18 -2.00 2.34 3.69 -1.28 -2.01 -3.51 -4.03 44.99 68.16 45.02 48.75 -0.16 4.21 3.38 -0.21
13 17.05 14.64 12.71 12.01 12.55 5.85 -0.34 0.19 -0.70 -1.51 -1.59 -1.96 -1.83 -1.90 77.25 73.08 -1.67
14 -0.72 -0.77 -0.76 50.44 59.22 8.62 -1.19 -1.17 -1.63 -1.57 -1.34 -2.08 -1.95 -2.04 2.40 2.09 -0.69
15 -1.62 -1.52 -1.46 -1.41 -1.34 -1.33 -1.14 -1.17 -1.33 -1.37 -1.47 -1.83 -1.77 -0.47 -1.69 -2.02 -2.47
16 -2.88 -2.88 -2.95 -2.98 -3.01 -3.10 -3.28 -2.97 -3.48 -2.82 -3.19 -3.22 -2.13 -4.87 -3.74 -4.86 -5.22
17 -0.97 -1.16 -1.11 -1.75 -1.87 -1.52 -1.27 -0.47 -0.52 0.20 1.52 -1.58 0.52 0.23 -1.79 -1.77 -1.28
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.48: Labour mobility index of Hungary*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 5.06 17.45 14.75 -7.43 -31.60 -31.17 -28.99 -27.90 -16.89 1.91 41.92 44.47 -22.82 17.69 45.01 40.02 -26.92
2 -2.09 -1.99 -1.66 -1.53 -1.46 -1.21 -0.84 -0.94 -0.88 -1.01 -1.09 -1.11 -1.09 -0.68 -0.49 0.04 0.40
3 8.85 16.28 19.47 6.15 -9.37 -9.77 -10.07 -10.32 -10.45 31.40 -7.23 -7.28 -10.02 -3.16 -5.67 -10.37 -12.78
4 -7.46 -7.21 -7.67 -7.93 -5.86 -5.89 -6.16 -5.53 -4.91 -5.92 -5.16 -5.31 0.41 -2.02 -3.36 -3.21 -1.24
5 -1.92 -2.04 -2.30 -2.12 -2.14 -1.52 -1.64 -1.62 -1.25 -0.72 -0.52 -0.71 7.72 1.96 -0.44 0.27 3.89
6 -1.56 -1.66 -1.81 -0.53 -0.40 -1.61 -1.47 -1.80 -1.99 -2.15 -0.21 -1.18 -2.04 -1.46 -1.16 -1.50 -0.80
7 -1.04 -0.86 -0.81 6.65 63.32 -1.44 33.46 58.60 68.86 -1.16 -2.58 -0.72 0.13 -2.06 -3.04 -3.19 -0.93
8 -0.13 -0.17 -0.16 -0.23 -0.19 -0.26 -0.24 0.12 0.30 -0.22 0.57 1.22 -0.32 0.17 0.78 10.96 11.30
9 20.12 -2.45 -2.22 -1.88 -0.93 0.41 -0.10 -0.63 -0.90 -0.64 5.47 4.43 3.69 7.44 4.37 -0.60 0.10
10 -0.58 -0.75 -0.58 -0.88 -0.10 1.78 0.76 -0.42 -0.88 -0.43 -1.94 -0.18 4.25 5.50 -2.12 -2.65 0.08
11 -1.41 -1.43 -1.29 27.68 -1.58 -1.01 -1.59 -1.80 -2.34 -1.81 -1.83 -1.96 1.10 -0.57 -1.85 -1.69 -1.30
12 -3.10 -3.17 -2.96 -1.38 -1.75 2.42 -0.14 -3.21 -5.45 -4.30 -0.46 -5.00 8.80 -7.70 -7.76 -6.19 14.43
13 -3.63 -3.67 -3.36 -1.93 -0.87 -0.29 -1.58 -1.67 -2.96 -3.07 -2.69 -3.80 -0.32 -3.51 0.00 3.46 33.21
14 -4.56 -5.10 -5.45 -6.73 -6.85 50.94 21.89 4.30 -10.81 -5.10 -12.23 -12.17 21.72 1.66 -11.11 -12.54 -7.32
15 -1.98 -2.35 -2.39 -3.00 -3.16 -2.37 -3.24 -3.86 -4.19 -4.53 -5.02 -5.09 -5.66 -5.80 -5.50 -4.89 -5.30
16 -1.80 -1.65 -1.82 -1.83 -1.34 -1.75 -1.58 -1.65 -2.57 -2.92 -3.14 -1.38 -1.68 -2.75 -2.85 -2.48 -2.11
17 -2.75 0.76 0.26 -3.07 4.27 2.74 1.53 -1.66 -2.69 0.67 -3.86 -4.24 -3.85 -4.69 -4.80 -5.43 -4.71
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.49: Labour mobility index of Ireland*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -29.52 -27.47 -26.63 -26.23 -27.50 -23.98 -22.20 -25.54 -26.50 -22.71 -25.02 -20.66 -22.18 -24.02 -23.69 -21.38 -16.48
2 -0.96 -0.62 0.17 0.31 -0.50 0.23 0.73 0.36 -0.89 0.80 -0.03 -0.52 -0.52 -2.13 -1.89 -1.88 -0.97
3 -9.54 -9.18 -9.03 -9.54 -10.02 -9.48 -10.04 -10.47 -13.48 -12.58 -12.49 -12.00 -11.87 -10.82 -11.45 -11.14 -12.45
4 -4.85 -4.49 -4.03 -3.45 -2.60 -2.19 -2.10 -1.95 -1.40 -0.78 -1.19 -0.82 -1.12 -1.27 -0.99 -0.98 -0.73
5 -0.28 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 -0.11 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.24
6 -0.65 -0.58 -0.96 -1.22 -0.68 -0.92 -1.39 -1.81 -1.59 -1.47 -1.29 -1.55 -1.81 -1.68 -1.49 -1.66 -1.68
7 72.19 68.29 9.38 -4.30 72.86 28.40 -4.09 -3.49 70.78 -4.11 65.20 61.15 69.69 75.88 76.06 74.00 64.02
8 -1.25 -1.26 -0.84 -0.77 -1.07 -0.19 -0.61 -0.47 -0.16 2.23 -0.06 -1.20 -0.94 -4.35 -3.71 -1.54 1.61
9 -1.71 -2.53 57.33 73.02 -4.50 33.55 64.08 66.54 -5.94 62.50 -6.01 -5.91 -4.74 -4.93 -5.97 -7.20 0.98
10 -0.31 0.41 0.20 -0.77 0.09 0.34 -0.10 -0.19 0.13 0.10 0.72 -0.59 -0.52 -0.16 -1.13 -0.05 -0.33
11 -2.49 -2.49 -2.43 -2.30 -2.64 -2.49 -2.41 -2.34 -1.69 -2.91 1.12 0.80 -1.41 -1.78 -2.00 -1.18 -1.28
12 -2.14 -1.92 -2.19 -2.62 -2.12 -2.06 -1.42 -1.18 -0.62 -1.51 -0.23 2.80 -2.55 -4.93 -3.47 -5.05 -5.30
13 -2.73 -2.20 -3.05 -2.93 -1.46 -1.94 -2.50 -1.75 0.38 -2.19 -2.62 -2.60 -2.65 -2.52 -1.99 -1.40 -3.40
14 -10.27 -10.74 -13.32 -14.25 -14.62 -15.56 -14.20 -13.03 -12.81 -13.13 -13.08 -13.87 -14.47 -14.82 -13.43 -16.92 -20.11
15 -2.15 -1.68 -1.75 -1.95 -1.87 -1.55 -1.91 -2.00 -2.46 -1.79 -1.74 -1.93 -2.05 -1.52 -2.18 -1.55 -1.81
16 -1.20 -1.22 -1.25 -1.32 -1.28 -0.90 -0.81 -0.95 -1.18 -0.88 -0.69 -0.78 -1.05 0.71 -0.79 -0.34 -0.72
17 -2.13 -2.09 -1.35 -1.44 -1.91 -1.13 -0.89 -1.59 -2.43 -1.46 -2.48 -2.28 -1.75 -1.59 -1.80 -1.64 -1.59
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.50: Labour mobility index of Italy*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -18.06 -18.42 -18.05 -17.39 -16.81 -16.69 -14.76 -16.28 -15.01 -14.41 22.99 -15.27 22.32 -15.15 21.76 27.47 15.15
2 -0.66 -0.64 -0.65 -0.66 -0.68 -0.65 -0.65 -0.71 -0.68 -0.66 -0.67 -0.65 -0.64 -0.64 -0.79 -0.71 -0.66
3 -6.87 -7.07 -7.17 -7.49 -7.39 -7.23 -7.02 -7.07 -7.34 -5.16 38.11 -7.11 36.76 -8.11 36.82 29.57 30.92
4 -10.92 -11.09 -10.77 -10.82 -9.45 -10.12 -10.28 -10.10 -9.62 -9.60 -9.37 -8.50 -8.83 -8.90 -9.54 -9.24 -9.00
5 4.34 -3.51 -3.04 -3.40 -3.17 -2.99 -3.25 -3.09 -3.10 -2.90 -2.87 -2.68 -2.78 -2.78 -2.77 -2.68 -2.82
6 -2.34 -1.74 -0.56 -2.10 -2.23 -1.89 -2.48 -2.35 -2.11 -2.47 -2.17 -1.68 -2.11 -1.20 -1.63 -1.70 -1.34
7 -2.92 -2.47 -3.02 -3.04 -2.09 -2.79 -2.67 -3.30 -2.65 -2.11 0.57 16.62 -2.87 -3.24 -2.71 -2.82 -2.23
8 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.29 -0.14 -0.31 -0.12 -0.24 -0.32 0.11 -0.32 -0.36 -0.36 -0.26 -0.29 -0.17
9 -1.72 -1.73 -1.97 -2.07 -1.99 -1.22 -1.29 -2.19 -1.01 0.31 -1.67 0.63 -2.51 -2.34 -2.22 -2.65 -2.44
10 -0.95 -0.82 -1.04 -1.03 -0.98 -1.28 -1.48 -1.75 6.39 9.86 -2.51 -1.24 -2.49 -1.13 -1.97 -2.18 -1.80
11 -2.85 -2.83 -2.89 -2.72 -2.86 -2.67 6.57 -2.92 -0.11 -3.20 -2.42 1.14 2.32 -0.75 -2.23 0.97 -1.25
12 3.33 9.40 7.16 8.21 6.21 23.93 2.67 23.52 30.30 9.26 -12.77 0.87 -13.38 16.21 -8.53 -9.44 -5.77
13 13.09 22.02 25.47 32.01 28.06 35.22 9.90 13.76 17.83 33.17 -9.65 31.39 -10.04 39.76 -10.24 -10.33 -3.62
14 36.53 28.90 19.49 20.00 20.59 -2.43 34.91 22.10 -4.83 -5.01 -6.85 -3.90 -7.45 -4.11 -6.31 -6.60 -5.39
15 -4.14 -4.05 -4.07 -3.89 -4.22 -3.67 -4.17 -3.82 -3.72 -3.67 -4.19 -3.67 -4.46 -3.45 -4.81 -4.78 -4.47
16 -4.23 -4.32 2.76 -4.08 -4.61 -4.23 -4.71 -4.39 -4.25 -4.73 -5.23 -4.46 -4.97 -4.68 -5.10 -5.13 -4.81
17 -1.63 -1.60 -1.58 -1.50 1.92 -1.13 -0.97 -1.28 0.13 1.64 -1.39 -1.16 1.48 0.88 0.53 0.54 -0.30
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.51: Labour mobility index of Netherlands*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 14.07 -12.61 -13.93 16.23 3.05 17.89 20.34 16.07 22.02 17.10 -7.72 23.13 -11.52 -15.65 2.39 -8.75 -14.05
2 7.28 0.85 9.92 4.55 5.03 1.10 -0.67 -0.70 -0.64 -0.69 2.48 -0.59 3.02 0.68 4.38 6.63 4.34
3 -9.98 -5.38 -10.34 28.75 16.20 34.30 35.15 39.84 33.43 38.28 3.74 32.18 -4.48 -10.21 28.19 -3.74 -8.40
4 -2.22 -1.80 -1.99 -2.01 -1.70 -1.95 -1.90 -1.75 -1.65 -1.54 -1.26 -1.47 -1.27 -1.24 -1.30 -1.20 -1.18
5 -0.34 -0.29 -0.30 -0.27 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11
6 -1.18 -0.81 -1.28 -1.40 -1.28 -1.40 -1.35 -1.37 -1.31 -1.31 -0.54 -0.98 -1.10 -0.96 -1.11 -0.69 -0.71
7 -6.93 -2.94 -6.19 -6.20 -5.53 -6.33 -5.85 -5.69 -5.43 -4.55 -5.04 -5.01 -5.53 -5.91 -4.20 -4.75 -4.78
8 6.88 0.05 8.40 4.24 4.67 1.26 -0.42 -0.42 -0.44 -0.43 1.59 -0.39 2.55 1.39 6.88 7.13 6.06
9 27.46 52.78 29.98 -4.61 13.15 -4.51 -4.75 -5.02 -4.79 -4.72 42.93 -4.94 55.15 56.76 -2.69 34.67 40.92
10 -1.48 -1.02 -0.99 -1.78 -1.21 -1.76 -1.77 -1.79 -1.78 -1.77 -0.99 -1.57 -1.19 -0.58 -1.26 -0.96 -0.63
11 -2.19 -1.89 -1.99 -2.24 -1.98 -2.17 -2.15 -2.03 -1.90 -1.86 -1.68 -1.96 -1.95 -2.05 -1.79 -1.81 -1.86
12 -7.09 -4.97 -4.75 -7.66 -5.33 -8.16 -8.20 -8.23 -8.01 -8.52 -6.47 -8.04 -5.99 0.60 -1.78 -1.01 0.67
13 -4.51 -4.58 -2.46 -5.44 -4.08 -5.77 -6.53 -6.22 -6.38 -6.45 -6.13 -6.83 -6.72 -6.31 -6.42 -5.97 -2.18
14 -6.07 -5.17 1.87 -6.77 -6.27 -6.76 -6.31 -6.52 -6.42 -6.53 -5.56 -6.43 -5.63 -5.59 -5.92 -5.54 -5.03
15 -3.39 -1.92 -1.65 -3.82 -3.14 -3.68 -3.88 -3.90 -3.95 -3.81 -2.73 -3.74 -2.90 1.05 -3.38 -3.03 -2.20
16 -9.40 -9.30 -9.71 -9.99 -10.06 -10.28 -9.90 -10.26 -10.79 -11.22 -11.20 -11.36 -11.30 -10.73 -10.98 -10.96 -10.70
17 -0.92 -0.99 5.41 -1.58 -1.27 -1.58 -1.62 -1.80 -1.78 -1.79 -1.25 -1.84 -0.99 -1.12 -0.88 0.10 -0.15
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.52: Labour mobility index of Poland*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -26.64 -36.44 -37.68 -35.55 -34.77 -23.46 -37.93 -17.62 -30.86 -34.51 -9.43 -29.25 -32.65 -22.78 -32.74 -35.68 -33.70
2 4.51 -1.39 -1.25 -1.51 0.53 -2.41 -3.98 -2.54 -2.62 -2.98 -3.91 -4.11 -3.64 -3.93 -3.92 -3.94 -3.42
3 -6.95 -6.56 -7.15 -6.91 -6.89 -6.59 -8.04 -7.94 -8.93 -8.82 -8.71 -8.75 -8.77 -3.49 -9.06 -8.73 -9.31
4 -6.16 -5.65 -4.83 -4.95 -4.09 -4.06 -4.83 -4.28 -4.25 -3.42 -3.76 -4.11 0.45 -3.57 -3.43 -4.16 -4.35
5 -1.13 -1.16 -0.99 -0.81 -0.98 -0.73 -0.91 -0.81 -0.70 -0.65 -0.62 -0.52 -0.30 -0.62 -0.67 -0.66 -0.25
6 -1.19 -1.31 -0.86 -0.80 -1.31 -1.58 -2.03 -2.38 -2.25 -1.78 -1.82 -1.96 -1.75 -1.64 -1.85 -2.39 -2.33
7 41.13 24.60 68.08 66.81 17.84 55.88 75.54 55.52 22.94 68.87 46.63 -1.74 21.54 22.21 31.51 9.21 -1.92
8 -0.08 -0.13 -0.18 -0.22 -0.10 -0.26 -0.42 -0.37 -0.22 -0.22 -0.14 -0.17 -0.15 -0.21 -0.12 -0.30 -0.31
9 -0.25 -0.02 0.01 -0.16 -0.34 0.83 0.74 0.40 0.45 4.47 3.60 -0.20 4.07 1.14 0.27 -0.52 -0.40
10 -0.75 0.17 -0.12 -0.38 -0.11 -0.91 -0.95 -1.44 -0.12 0.21 -1.14 -0.41 23.63 -0.76 -0.32 -0.16 -0.35
11 -1.60 -1.27 -1.82 -1.91 43.91 -2.13 -1.95 -2.33 -0.51 -2.25 -2.01 8.61 13.28 35.55 -1.67 -1.92 5.43
12 -3.20 -0.31 -3.24 -3.26 -2.12 -3.48 -3.29 -4.05 -0.47 -4.40 -4.01 13.07 -0.33 -4.20 6.77 13.22 16.37
13 -1.92 -2.05 -1.84 -1.84 -2.02 -2.20 -1.47 -1.72 -2.04 -2.16 -2.18 36.75 -2.41 -3.06 25.52 45.53 43.25
14 -1.51 38.20 -1.84 -2.06 -2.40 -2.15 -2.13 -2.14 37.85 -2.49 -2.12 0.72 -2.36 -3.11 0.72 1.18 2.69
15 -2.30 -2.47 -2.31 -2.39 -2.29 -2.38 -2.61 -2.39 -2.72 -3.37 -3.72 -3.60 -4.42 -4.69 -4.25 -3.70 -3.99
16 -2.29 -1.92 -2.00 -2.03 -2.82 -2.32 -2.84 -2.61 -2.50 -4.10 -3.69 -1.64 -3.81 -4.22 -3.76 -3.38 -3.76
17 10.32 -2.29 -1.96 -2.04 -2.04 -2.05 -2.90 -3.30 -3.05 -2.39 -2.96 -2.69 -2.39 -2.61 -3.00 -3.60 -3.65
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.53: Labour mobility index of Portugal*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -16.96 -17.23 -33.38 -31.18 -31.80 -32.48 -30.99 -35.35 -36.07 -36.97 -33.64 -37.13 -37.11 -37.14 -38.45 -38.97 -41.33
2 -0.25 -0.85 -0.93 1.61 1.55 -0.43 10.19 27.32 27.18 38.90 28.01 34.64 34.35 46.27 24.43 22.42 23.91
3 -6.39 -6.60 -6.63 -5.78 -6.60 -6.80 -6.78 -6.83 -6.94 -7.19 -7.37 -7.38 -7.57 -7.56 -7.27 -7.12 -6.85
4 -16.04 -15.99 -14.12 -13.89 -12.05 -13.24 -13.48 -14.88 -14.05 -14.20 -13.53 -12.48 -12.27 -12.29 -11.88 -11.63 -11.16
5 -4.54 -4.42 -4.34 -4.27 -4.20 -3.82 -3.90 -4.03 -3.86 -3.76 -3.64 -3.20 -3.13 -3.13 -3.04 -2.93 -2.77
6 -3.30 -2.93 -2.34 -3.60 -3.38 -3.11 -3.09 -3.33 -3.49 -3.34 -3.24 -3.27 -3.18 -3.25 -2.89 -2.76 -2.62
7 30.62 63.74 -2.48 -0.18 2.63 -2.07 -1.73 -1.43 -1.61 -2.09 -1.99 -2.05 -1.91 -2.17 -2.14 -1.94 -1.94
8 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.17 0.98 2.09 2.00 1.28 1.02 1.26 1.25
9 34.78 1.51 0.11 61.80 65.04 13.65 5.54 -0.47 0.33 0.12 1.07 0.16 -0.18 -0.74 -0.05 0.11 0.26
10 -0.42 -0.58 0.86 7.49 -0.03 60.32 33.79 -1.14 2.91 0.69 -0.86 -0.74 -0.86 -1.15 -0.54 -0.31 -0.21
11 -3.80 -4.03 -1.86 -3.35 -3.62 -3.73 -3.73 -3.84 -3.78 -3.79 -3.40 -2.65 -2.73 -2.93 -2.80 -2.67 -2.57
12 -2.72 -3.98 14.46 2.90 4.49 1.30 0.38 -3.44 -3.61 -3.63 3.29 -2.08 2.85 -2.59 3.14 5.12 4.55
13 -2.27 -2.47 -0.62 -1.72 -1.81 -0.91 -0.52 -1.67 -1.95 -1.94 -1.82 -1.90 -1.87 -2.10 -0.83 -0.96 -0.72
14 -2.86 -2.99 4.70 -3.11 -3.24 -2.96 -1.26 0.39 -0.57 -1.24 -0.09 0.20 -0.28 -1.06 2.58 2.89 3.20
15 -1.99 -2.09 42.74 -2.26 -2.31 -1.54 -1.75 -2.43 -2.23 -2.30 -2.34 -2.29 -2.48 -2.46 -2.32 -2.30 -2.17
16 -3.40 -3.50 -1.22 -3.72 -3.78 -3.30 -3.48 -4.27 -4.30 -4.32 -4.06 -4.07 -3.99 -4.15 -3.85 -3.75 -3.70
17 -0.45 2.46 5.11 -0.83 -0.92 -0.88 20.81 55.41 52.07 44.88 42.61 42.15 38.35 35.17 44.89 43.54 42.87
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.54: Labour mobility index of Spain*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -6.92 6.38 -27.73 19.59 23.30 18.91 18.66 14.32 38.36 2.93 10.40 50.06 48.15 17.89 52.12 29.90 8.02
2 -1.15 -1.30 -1.21 -1.10 -1.08 -1.01 -1.03 -1.05 -1.09 -1.13 -1.08 -1.06 -1.08 -1.02 -0.94 -0.95 -1.25
3 4.70 25.04 -10.52 -9.28 -9.15 34.84 31.37 24.33 7.88 18.86 32.49 5.69 1.61 27.78 -9.31 16.25 37.25
4 -6.11 -6.04 -6.25 -6.40 -6.49 -6.35 -6.16 -5.71 -5.36 -4.99 -4.51 -4.58 -4.26 -3.90 -3.54 -3.52 -3.41
5 -1.95 -2.19 -2.14 -2.19 -2.05 -2.00 -1.86 -1.93 -1.85 -1.74 -1.65 -1.51 -1.49 -1.42 -1.28 -1.31 -1.42
6 -1.67 -1.65 -1.90 -2.12 -2.26 -1.72 -1.68 -1.71 -2.22 -1.51 -0.99 -1.94 -2.06 -1.68 -1.98 -1.53 -1.19
7 -3.75 -2.21 -3.15 -3.48 -3.78 -4.02 -3.73 -4.17 -4.72 -3.82 -3.74 -5.22 -5.10 -4.40 -5.82 -4.63 -3.78
8 -0.17 -0.08 -0.14 -0.11 -0.15 0.00 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 -0.14 0.05 0.13 0.04 -0.33 -0.19 0.06 -0.16
9 -2.19 -2.08 -1.58 -2.56 -2.75 -2.78 -2.82 -2.63 -2.31 -2.37 -2.33 -2.56 -3.05 -2.96 -3.35 -3.75 -3.45
10 -1.64 -1.09 -0.40 -1.49 -1.47 -1.77 -1.71 0.44 4.65 -1.80 0.61 -1.79 -2.08 -1.41 -2.37 -0.89 -0.54
11 -3.78 -3.37 -3.70 -4.03 -4.23 -3.71 -3.93 4.31 -4.56 23.84 -4.25 -4.78 -5.15 -4.52 -4.35 -3.57 -1.21
12 40.65 8.96 38.20 11.24 1.67 -8.31 -8.35 -7.89 -9.45 -7.78 -3.63 -9.25 -2.04 -12.32 -11.16 -10.60 -10.88
13 -1.55 -3.41 -0.35 -3.02 -3.25 -4.15 -4.10 -3.77 -4.24 -3.16 -4.05 -4.56 -4.83 1.97 5.39 -4.40 -4.31
14 -3.07 -4.22 33.09 18.12 19.38 -4.52 -4.44 -3.73 -3.93 -3.87 -3.63 -4.12 -4.32 -3.69 -3.30 -3.43 -3.08
15 -6.45 -6.36 -6.63 -6.71 -6.87 -7.01 -6.88 -6.92 -6.93 -7.17 -6.95 -7.11 -7.25 -7.26 -6.40 -0.44 -6.79
16 -3.85 -4.97 -4.45 -5.07 -5.49 -5.54 -5.55 -5.45 -5.66 -5.47 -5.22 -5.64 -5.22 -5.81 -5.40 -4.84 -4.57
17 -1.11 -1.39 -1.15 -1.39 4.69 -0.84 2.32 1.70 1.55 -0.66 -1.52 -1.75 -1.88 3.10 1.88 -2.35 0.76
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 1.55: Labour mobility index of Sweden*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 7.16 -0.29 -3.18 3.37 -3.89 -2.52 -3.87 -1.84 -1.20 -5.06 -8.55 -10.58 -9.43 -10.11 -9.99 -11.43 -10.47
2 -0.95 -0.88 -0.93 -0.92 -0.86 -0.78 -0.79 -0.84 -0.89 -0.90 0.32 4.39 0.58 -1.00 -1.45 -1.37 -1.19
3 45.59 62.90 44.84 64.15 45.71 39.38 44.97 68.66 69.69 72.64 -6.85 -6.79 -6.33 -6.07 -6.27 -6.63 -6.27
4 -1.34 -1.20 -1.29 -1.24 -1.11 -1.23 -1.17 -1.14 -1.11 -1.06 -0.62 -0.62 -0.44 -0.50 -0.75 -0.58 -0.89
5 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 -2.75 -3.48 -2.88 -3.80 -2.89 -2.70 -2.79 -3.89 -4.11 -4.17 -3.32 -3.65 -3.37 -2.75 -2.04 -2.34 -1.99
7 -9.37 -8.24 -8.34 -8.71 -7.83 -8.74 -7.97 -7.47 -8.25 -8.25 -5.04 -4.22 0.23 -2.41 -5.77 -2.95 -1.30
8 -0.17 -0.07 -0.18 -0.07 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.33 -0.29 -0.16 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
9 -2.66 -3.02 -3.14 -3.41 -3.31 -2.35 -3.04 -3.83 -3.52 -3.04 -0.83 -0.78 1.83 0.80 -0.98 1.01 2.77
10 -1.45 -0.21 -1.34 -1.26 -1.33 -1.27 -0.68 -1.19 -0.88 -0.73 5.36 2.46 3.77 6.99 3.45 5.51 4.87
11 -1.69 -1.50 -1.47 -1.62 -1.68 -1.58 -1.55 -1.42 -1.02 -1.14 -0.42 -0.17 -0.06 -0.34 -0.17 -0.23 -0.47
12 -9.35 -8.17 -9.44 -9.30 -8.66 -10.16 -9.19 -9.44 -9.52 -9.70 13.30 27.05 16.34 17.33 21.07 22.15 18.59
13 -9.72 -9.18 -8.98 -9.80 -9.37 -9.35 -9.84 -10.02 -10.69 -10.80 -6.28 -8.58 -7.06 -6.09 -4.66 -5.79 -5.91
14 -9.40 -9.97 -9.94 -10.03 -10.21 -10.23 -10.49 -9.48 -9.47 -9.08 27.57 15.73 19.14 18.03 18.54 14.35 14.32
15 -9.13 -9.18 -8.70 -9.24 -9.09 -9.77 -9.37 -10.39 -10.93 -11.18 -9.75 -9.11 -9.67 -9.14 -7.56 -8.17 -8.33
16 -5.36 -4.89 -5.40 -5.34 -5.32 -5.37 -5.43 -5.03 -4.95 -4.20 -1.56 -1.87 -2.62 -2.46 -0.84 -1.82 -1.65
17 10.74 -2.46 20.55 -2.64 20.14 26.97 21.51 -2.53 -2.95 -3.16 -2.93 -2.90 -2.74 -2.17 -2.56 -1.67 -2.06
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and








European Economic Integration, Comparative Ad-




One of the most known theories on international trade suggests
that when markets are left free to operate countries should specialize
according to their Comparative Advantages. The results provided in
Chapter 1 suggest that Comparative Advantages do not seem to have
worked in Europe during the period 1995-2011.
The computation of the Net Product Possibility Frontier implies to
make assumptions about the tradability of the output as well as of the
means of production, i.e. the inputs of each industry. In this paper we
compute the Net Product Possibility Frontier associated to the case in
which the means of production are considered to be traded.
There is evidence that for the case of the European Union the na-
tional specialization and the efficient allocation of resources implied




In Chapter 1 we have computed the Net Product Possibility Frontier (NPPF )
for a group of countries. The NPPF is a useful tool to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of Comparative Advantages (CAs) in determining specialization
patterns.
CAs theory implies that when international markets are left “free” to
operate, each country should specialize in the industries in which it has a
CA. The efficient scenario described by the theory should emerge as the
result of the action of the free markets “invisible hand” (Samuelson, 2001).
When empirical observation demonstrate that these efficient scenarios
do not emerge there may be two main explanations. A first explanation
could be that the institutional framework is too different from the “free
markets” hypothesis, which is a fundamental condition for the realization
of CAs. A second explanation is that “free markets” are not so effective in
realizing the efficient specialization patterns as the theory on CAs suggests.
Boglioni and Zambelli (2016) provide evidence for the case of the European
Union in support of market failures.
The evidence provided in Chapter 1 was found by assuming that only
final goods were traded in the international markets, while the means of
production were produced and used domestically. Here we relax this as-
sumption and check whether the results are substantially the same.
The computed NPPF represents a benchmark which is a set of virtual
European Union best scenarios. The existence of these scenarios does not
imply that they are politically feasible, but the lack of empirically verified
efficient specializations represent evidence of market failures. When the
historical European net production is located at a sizable distance below
theNPPF , a search of feasible economic policies is theoretically justifiable.
This paper is composed by four sections. In Section 2.1 some basic no-
tions about subsystems, which are a fundamental keystone of the paper,
are briefly introduced. In Section 1.2 we explain how the assumption on
the mobility of the means of production changes the computation of the
NPPF , which may imply a different evaluation of the effectiveness of
CAs. In Section 2.3 the data bank used for the empirical section is pre-
sented, along with an example of European NPPF with and without mo-
bility of the means of production, and some remarks about the approach
adopted in this paper. In Section 2.4 the results obtained with the new
NPPF are compared to those discussed in Chapter 1.
98
2.1 Definition and properties of subsystems
Subsystems are the fundamental tool for the construction of a Net Product
Possibility Frontier (NPPF ), which is in turn the benchmark to evaluate
the effectiveness of CAs in determining specialization patterns. Subsys-
tems have been introduced by Sraffa in the first appendix of his work Pro-
duction of Commodities by Means of Commodities. He defined a subsystem as
a “smaller self-replacing system the net product of which consists of only
one kind of commodity” (Sraffa, 1960, p. 105).
Subsequently, Gossling has shown how to use them in an empirical
study of productivity trends in the USA (Gossling, 1972). The concept of
vertically integrated sector, as in the definition of Pasinetti (1989, pp. 369-
376), is similar to the concept of subsystems—see also (Kurz and Salvadori,
1995, pp. 168-169).
A productive process can be represented by
A, l 7→ b (2.1.1)
where A is an n × n matrix of physical inputs, l is the n × 1 labour vector
and b is the n× 1 gross product vector.
Each row i of matrix A, [ai1, ai2, . . . , ain] represents the means of pro-
duction used by industry i for the production of the total gross industry
output bi. And li is the amount of labour used.
The column j of matrix A, [a1j, a2j, . . . , anj]′, represents the means of
production produced by industry j and used for the production for the
output by all the industries i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
If we subtract from vector b the sum—by column—of the inputs of pro-
duction described by A we obtain what is called surplus, or net national
product and it is often represented by the n × 1 vector y—see (Pasinetti,
1989, p. 79) and (Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, p. 168).
Formally
y = (diag(b)−A)′ι (2.1.2)
where diag(b) is a diagonal matrix with the gross output vector b on its
main diagonal and ι is the summation vector—i.e., all entries are equal to
1.
In this context y = [y1, ..., yn]′ is a vector of physical quantities, which
expresses how much of each good goes to the final demand and is used
for consumption, investment or exports. If these goods are aggregated in
a unique measure through the means of current market prices, we obtain
what is commonly known as Gross Domestic Product.
Each row i of matrix A, and the associated elements i of l and of b,
represents a method of production.
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In order to compute a subsystem, each row of A, as well as the relative
amount of labour and gross output, must be reproportioned in such a way
that each component of the net output vector is 0, except for the commodity
in which we are interested. Denote with y¯i the vector [0, ..., yi, ..., 0]′, where
i identify the sector. In order to find a subsystem, we have to compute a
reproportioning vector xi such that
(diag(b)−A)′xi = y¯i (2.1.3)
from which we have
xi = ((diag(b)−A)′)−1y¯i (2.1.4)





so that, for convenience, we can define a subsystem Si as
Si = [Ai|li|bi] (2.1.6)
Gossling (1972) highlights two properties of subsystems which are fun-
damental for the purpose of this paper:




Si = [A|l|b] (2.1.7)
2. the alteration of one subsystem affects just the final output of the
commodity relative to the subsystem modified, but not the other ele-
ments of the net output vector.
2.2 Net Product Possibility Frontiers with free mo-
bility of the mans of production
The major purpose of this paper is to investigate how the assumption of
international mobility of the means of production changes the shape of an
NPPF , with respect to the case in which there is mobility only of final
consumption goods.
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2.2.1 National frontiers without mobility of the means of
production
In order to construct a national frontier, two assumptions are made: a)
labour is the only primary resource, it cannot be produced but just reallo-
cated; b) the methods of production are divisible so as to maintain fixed
proportions among inputs and outputs, i.e. the relative proportions may
be independent from the level of activity.
Consider the example of an economic system composed of three sectors
in Table 2.1. The three goods produced are iron, coal and wheat—rows 1,
2 and 3 respectively.
Table 2.1: A hypothetical economic system
Sector Input Labour Gross Output
Iron Coal Wheat
Iron 2 3 2 2/5 16
Coal 5 4 2 2/5 14
Wheat 6 2 3 1/5 9
Tot 13 9 7 1 /
The economic system in Table 2.1 can be divided in three subsystems.







In the last row of eq. 2.2.1 is reported the sum of each input necessary
for the production of the gross output vector, that is to say that If ai = A′iι
and Li = l′iι.
With respect to the hypothetical economic system described in Table
2.1, the three augmented subsystems—one for each good—are
S∗1 = S∗2 = S∗3 =
0.65 0.97 0.65 0.13 5.19 0.81 1.22 0.81 0.16 6.49 0.53 0.81 0.54 0.11 4.32
0.64 0.51 0.25 0.05 1.78 3.47 2.78 1.39 0.28 9.73 0.89 0.71 0.36 0.07 2.49
0.90 0.30 0.45 0.03 1.36 2.20 0.73 1.10 0.07 3.30 2.90 0.97 1.45 0.10 4.34
2.19 1.78 1.36 0.21 / 6.49 4.73 3.30 0.51 / 4.32 2.49 2.34 0.28 /
As captured by eq. 2.1.7, the sum of the three subsystems is the original
system.
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It is easy to check, using eq. (2.1.2), that in the subsystem of iron, the
net product of iron is the original one1, while the other net products are
zero. Moreover, it is important to stress that, as a simple inspection of eq.
(2.1.2) reveals, the net product of a specific good is a linear function of the
related subsytem, that is to say that
yi = αiSi (2.2.2)
where αi is a scalar coefficient embedded in the triple A, l and b—see the
explanation on the computation of subsystems as described by eq.s (2.1.1)-
(2.1.5) in Section 2.1.
Suppose to start from the frontier for iron and coal, so that we have
to consider S∗1 and S∗2 . As can be seen, the total labour employed in the
two subsystems is, respectively, L1 = 0.21 and L2 = 0.51. As explained in
Chapter 1, when the means of production are not be traded, the maximum
net product of iron with respect to the iron-coal frontier can be obtained
by computing the total labour employed in the two subsystems, that is
L1 + L2 = 0.72, and then rescaling the subsystem of iron in order to obtain
the following subsystem




2.23 3.34 2.23 0.45 17.82
2.19 1.75 0.88 0.18 6.13
3.10 1.03 1.55 0.10 4.66
7.52 6.13 4.66 0.72 /
(2.2.3)
Subsystem Ŝ∗1 shows that the maximum possible net product of iron,
when the net product of coal is zero, amounts to more or less yˆ1 ≈ 10.3.
Plotting the line passing through the original net product in coal and
iron (5,3) and the new point (0,10.3) we obtain the coal-iron frontier2. The
frontier is represented in in Fig. 2.1.
1The iron gross output is 5.19 while the total use of iron of means of production,
column 1 of S∗1 is 2.19. Therefore the surplus of the subsystem is 3 units of iron, and 0
units of coal and wheat.
2There is an alternative way to compute the equation of the frontier, which makes
clearer the role played by the industrial interrelations described by the triple A, l and
b—see Section 2.1—in determining the frontier.
Here we have assumed that labour is the only primary good, which implies the labour
constraint L1 +L2 = L¯, where L¯ is the total quantity of labour originally employed in the
two subsystems. However L¯, as well as the L1 and L2 related to a specific net output in
good 1 and good 2, are fully determined by triple A, l and b through eq.s (2.1.1)-(2.1.5).
Indeed, as can be deduced by eq. (2.2.2), L1 and L2 are related to y1 and y2 through
simple linear functions as L1 = α1y1 and L2 = α2y2. Therefore, the equation of the
frontier is given by
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Figure 2.1: The coal-iron national frontier. National coal-iron frontier
under the assumption that the means of production cannot be traded
or redistributed among countries
Since, as shown in (2.2.2), the net product is a linear function of the sub-
system, the maximum possible net product yˆ1 can be computed by taking
the original surplus y1 = 3 and applying to it the reproportioning factor
(L1 + L2)/L1, as the following equation shows
y1 × L1 + L2
L1
= 3× 0.720.21 ≈ 10.3 = yˆ1 (2.2.5)
In this case the constraint that the total amount or labour involved is at
most L1+L2 implies that the net production of coal must be set equal to 0.
Therefore, the original system becomes
α1y1 + α2y2 = L¯ (2.2.4)
where α1, α2 and L¯ are parameters embedded in A, l and b. We may replace the assump-
tion on the total quantity of labour with another assumption, without altering sensitively
the underlying logic.
Suppose that we want to assume that the primary good is an exhaustible energy like
coal instead of labour. Then L¯ would become C¯, i.e. the total quantity of coal used in
the two subsystems, while coefficients α1 and α2 would be the same—because of (2.2.2).
These three parameters would still be determined by the triple A, l and b—through eq.s
(2.1.1)-(2.1.5)—, which are, hence, the ultimate determinants of the equation of the frontier
(2.2.4).
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Ŝ∗1 + S∗3 =
2.77 4.15 2.77 0.55 22.15
3.08 2.46 1.23 0.25 8.62
6 2 3 0.2 9
11.85 8.62 7 1 /
(2.2.6)
There are three things to be noted about the economic system described
by (2.2.6). The first is that the surplus in iron is 10.3, which is equal to
the surplus of the subsystem of iron once the surplus of coal is 0. The
second is that the surplus of wheat is exactly the original one, so the above
procedure has not altered at all the third sector. The last one is that there is
still production of coal, whose gross product is 8.62, and it is what is barely
needed to have a net output in the other two sectors.
This means that this hypothetical country is still producing all the means
of production needed to produce the new net output vector. Therefore, the
specialization process is somehow incomplete, in the sense that the coun-
try under analysis still has an amount of labour that could be shifted from
the production of coal to the production of iron, provided that the country
could import a quantity of coal sufficient for its needs.
2.2.2 National frontiers with free mobility of the means of
production
When international movements of the means of production are allowed, a
country can buy some of the inputs of its productive process from abroad.
Therefore, the minimum surplus of an industry i is no longer 0, but may
be a negative number. That is a national system may use as means of pro-
duction i more than it produces. When this happens all the labour force
that would have to be used for the production of a surplus of sector i may
be used in other sectors.
In the example described above, this implies that the feasible national
frontier is not bound to the first orthant of the plane as represented in Fig.
2.1, but it crosses the axis and extends to the second and the fourth orthant.
The computation of the two extremes of the new frontier is a bit more com-
plicated in this case and it is explained in Appendix 2.A.
With the procedure explained in the Appendix and following the exam-
ple of Section 2.2.1, we compute the minimum net product in coal, which
is yˇ2 = −8 and the maximum net product in iron, which is yˆ1 = 22. There-
fore, point (-8,22) is the left extreme of the iron-coal frontier in the coal-iron
plane. Because of the linearity property described by 2.2.2, in order to com-
pute the subsystems of coal and iron in this new framework, we just have
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to rescale all the elements of the two subsystems by, respectively, −85 and22
3 .
The subsystems of coal and iron become respectively
qS∗2 =
−1.30 − 1.95 − 1.30 −0.26 −10.38
Ŝ∗1 =
4.76 7.13 4.76 0.95 38.05
−5.56 − 4.45 − 2.22 −0.44 −15.57 4.67 3.74 1.87 0.38 13.08
−3.52 − 1.17 − 1.76 −0.12 −5.28 6.62 2.21 3.31 0.22 9.94
−10.38 − 7.57 − 5.28 −0.82 / 16.05 13.08 9.94 1.55 /
which gives a total system
Ŝ∗1 + qS∗2 + S∗3 =
4 6 4 0.8 32
0 0 0 0 0
6 2 3 0.2 9
10 8 7 1 /
(2.2.7)
It is interesting to note that the movements of the means of production
requires the use of negative subsystems. In fact, when a sector is in deficit,
its relative subsystem computed with eq. (2.1.3) gives as a result a negative
matrix Si. This may not square well with the original definition of subsys-
tem, according to which a subsystem should describe all the resources that
are directly and indirectly involved in the production of the net product of
a good. When a subsystem is computed on a sector in deficit, it means that
the national system has to import from the other national systems the not
domestically produced means of production.
In some sense, we could think to those numbers as the resources that
would be necessary to produce the good for which the system is in deficit
using the domestic technologies. The point in using negative subsystems
is that they allow to work with non self-replacing systems, i.e. systems that
produce an insufficient quantity of some means of production—see Chiodi
(1992)—, keeping the accounting right.
Indeed, in eq. (2.2.7) it can be noted that: (1) sector 2 is nullified, so
all the resources have been drained from sector 2 and destined to sector 1,
which was the main objective of this procedure; (2) the final net outputs
yˇ2 and yˆ1 are exactly the desired ones, -8 and 22 respectively; (3) the total
sum of labour is equal to unity, which means that the constraint on labour
is satisfied; (4) the net product of wheat is the original one.
Using the formulas in Appendix 2.A, we can compute an analogous full
specialization in coal. In this case, the maximum net product of coal would
be yˆ2 = 18, while the minimum net product of iron would be yˇ1 = −16.
Point (18,−16) represents the right extreme of the coal-iron frontier, which
is plotted on the northwest orthant of Fig. 2.2. In the other two orthants are
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Figure 2.2: Specialization in the iron sector. The three graphs show
the national frontiers relative to the hypothetical system described in
Tab. 2.1, and the consequences of a specialization in the iron sector.
reported the wheat-iron frontier—northeast orthant—and the coal-wheat
frontier—southwest orthant.
Fig. 2.2 also shows what a specialization in the iron sector at the ex-
pense of the coal sector implies for the overall system. Suppose that the
net output in iron and coal shifts from point Y to point Y ′ of the graph
on the northwest part. This implies that the total labour increases in the
iron subsystem but decreases in the coal subsystem. As a consequence,
the wheat-iron shifts outwards—graph on the northeast—while the coal-
wheat frontier shifts inwards—graph on the southwest. As explained in
Chapter 1, the new frontiers must be parallel to the original ones.
2.2.3 NPPFs for a set of countries with mobility of the means
of production
The importance of studying both the cases of no mobility and free mobil-
ity of the means of production becomes clear when we compare the Net
Product Possibility Frontier (NPPF ) obtained in the two cases.
It has to be noted that when the NPPF of a group of countries is stud-
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ied, it is assumed that a redistribution mechanism exists, such that coun-
tries can give up part of their national production and receive back some
goods they have not produced. For a discussion of this assumption, see
Chapter 1, but what is important to stress here is that this redistributive
mechanism is generally assumed to be the market.
Indeed, as (Samuelson, 2001, p.1205) explains, the theory on CAs sug-
gests that when markets are left free to work, the “invisible hand” should
lead each country to specialize in such a way that the overall net product
is maximized—keeping fixed the available resources.
The main problem we deal with in this article is that different assump-
tions on the mobility of the means of production influence our evaluation
of the effectiveness of the “invisible hand”.
In order to explain the point, consider an example of three countries as
the one in Fig. 2.3. Suppose that the three countries produce the surpluses
represented by the three dots y1, y2, y3 of Fig. 2.3, and suppose that trade
among countries is allowed just for final goods, while the means of pro-
duction have to be produced domestically. As explained before, this im-
plies that countries cannot shift their net product outside the boundaries
defined by the two axes.
In Fig. 2.3, this means that the three countries can move their net prod-
uct vector along their respective frontiers—the segments below the shaded
area—inside the range delimited by the two axes. As a consequence, the
net total product point Y cannot exit from the area delimited by the solid
lines inside the shaded area SS. This no-mobility of the means of produc-
tion region is delimited by the solid NPPF in the upper part and by the
solid Inefficient Frontier (IF ) in the lower part. It is called the Inefficient
Frontier because it defines the minimum possible net total product in iron
for every feasible net product in coal. As can be noted, point Y is closer to
the solid upper boundary than to the lower one.
This means that resources tend to be used in an efficient way and that
countries tend to specialize in the sector in which they have a CA. There-
fore, basing our assessment on the area delimited by the solid lines, we
would conclude that the “invisible hand” of international markets is work-
ing as the theory on CAs suggests.
However, when the means of production can be shifted internationally,
the scenario changes sensitively. Each country can reach also the produc-
tive points represented by the dashed part of their national frontiers, and
the net total product point Y can move inside all the shaded area SS, de-
limited by the dashed NPPF and IF . Specifically, all the points inside
the triangle Y QR represent feasible vectors of net product, in which the
surplus of iron and coal are higher than in the original vector.
107
Figure 2.3: A three countries, three goods example of NPPF . The
three graphs show what a specialization process implies from the point
of view of the three NPPF s that can be constructed when three goods
are considered.
For example, country 2 could shift resources—i.e. physical means of
production and labour—from coal to iron in order to realize the net prod-
uct vector represented by point y′2, while country 3 could shift productive
resources in the opposite direction in order to reach the vector y′3. Country
1 does not change its net product vector. The new net total product is rep-
resented now by point Y ′ , which is higher than Y with respect to both iron
and coal, while the net product in wheat is the original one.
As can be noted, the scopes for improving the net product are much
wider than in the case in which just final goods are traded. Moreover,
in this case, point Y is closer to the IF than to the NPPF . This means
that the evaluation on the working of CAs is exactly reversed with respect
to the final-products-only case. Using as benchmark scenarios the dashed
NPPF and IF instead of the solidNPPF and IF , we would conclude that
countries are far from exploiting their CAs and hence that the “invisible
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hand” of international markets is not leading countries to exploit well the
resources they have3.
This example shows that the assumption on the mobility of final goods
could in principle change our evaluation of the effectiveness of the “in-
visible hand” in international markets. Please note that the example of
Fig. 2.3 is relative to the simple case of three goods and three countries.
For the sake of the exposition we keep the global net production in wheat
fixed. As explained below, for our theoretical and empirical investigation
we consider alternative allocations of resources that allow a proportional
global increase in the surplus of all the industries. The number of countries
considered and the number of industries is much larger than 3.
In Chapter 1 it has been found that the “invisible hand” did not seem to
work well in Europe during the period 1995-2011. In this paper we check
whether this conclusion holds when the means of production are assumed
to be freely mobile across countries.
2.3 NPPF s in Europe
2.3.1 The Data
The Input-Output tables used in this paper have been taken from the World
Input-Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015). The data set provides Input-
Ouput tables called WIOTs (World Input-Output Tables) divided in 35 sec-
tors, for 40 countries, from 1995 to 2011. This paper is focused on European
countries, so we extracted data for 17 of them—those reported in Tab. 1.3
at the end of the paper. There are some European countries in the database
which have been excluded because of their relatively small dimensions and
3The two additional graphs in Fig. 2.3 have been reported to help the reader to visu-
alize what the specialization process that leads to improve the net product from Y to Y ′
implies for the overall system when more than two goods are produced. This is important
in order to understand the workings of the algorithm used to compute the NPPF in an
n-dimensional case.
Suppose that the graph on the northwest orthant is a bidimensional projection of a sys-
tem in which wheat is produced too. The orthants on the northeast and on the southwest
describe what the specialization process described above implies for the wheat-iron and
coal-wheat frontiers. The change of the SS in these two dimensions is due to the fact that,
as it has been shown in Section 2.2.2, when a country shifts its labour force from one sub-
system to another along one specific frontier, the other frontiers shift inwards or outwards
depending on the specific specialization process. Therefore, the NPPF and the IF in the
other dimensions also change and hence they redefine the shape of the SS.
For a more detailed explanation of this process and of the algorithm used for the com-
putation of the NPPF and of the IF in the n-dimensional space see Chapter 1.
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the diversity of their structure4.
The number of sectors has been reduced from 35 to 17. The analysis of
the Net Product Possibility Frontier is useful when applied to commodi-
ties that can be standardized and exported, while it is less relevant when
applied to the services that are intrinsically local5. For this reason, the sec-
tors included are those that enters the Standard International Trade Clas-
sification of the United Nations. The list of sectors considered and those
excluded is reported in Tab. 1.4 at the end of the paper.
Comparative Advantages theorems are all developed on the basis of
real quantities, while Input-Output (I-O) tables are generally structured in
a limited number of industrial sectors, in which many goods are aggre-
gated through the use of market prices. The aggregation problem cannot
be solved without having finely disaggregated I-O tables, but it is at least
possible to deflate the I-O tables properly in order to take into account the
fact that prices changes across countries and through the years. For a dis-
cussion of these problems and of the procedure adopted to deflate the I-O
tables see Chapter 1.
2.3.2 An European Net Product Possibility Frontier
An example of EuropeanNPPF has been reported in Fig. 2.4a. The sectors
considered are “Agriculture, Hunting, Foresting and Fishing”—Sector 1 of
Tab. 1.4— and “Machinery, Nec”—Sector 13—in 2002. The solid blue line
represents the frontier in the case of trade of final products only, while the
dashed line is the new frontier. As can be noted the new frontier is fairly
higher than the solid one.
The segments below the European frontier represent the national fron-
tiers that form the NPPF , while the red circles on the segments identify
the observed national productions. The dashed part of the segments repre-
sents those combinations of net national product which become available
when the means of production can be traded.
In this paper we search for efficiency-improving vectors that would al-
low to improve the consumption of each country according to their pref-
4The countries excluded are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Romania.
5As explained above, studying the European NPPF implies to suppose that the total
European production could be concentrated in some selected countries, and then redis-
tributed among all the countries. While manufactured products can be, and actually are,
produced in places that are often far from the consumer, this is not possible for many
services, the provision of which depends on the direct relationship between the customer
and the provider. This is the case of education, health services, retailing sales, restaurants
& hotels, and many other sectors excluded from Tab. 1.4.
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Figure 2.4: An example of Net Product Possibility Frontier in Europe
(a) The European NPPF for
Agriculture and Machineries in 2002
(b) The national frontiers composing
the European
Agriculture-Machineries NPPF
reported in Figure 2.4a
erences. In other words, we investigate those specialization patterns that
allow to shift point Y inside the triangle Y QR. In such a way, with a proper
redistributive pattern, the net national product of each country could shift
inside the respective triangles–see Fig. 2.4b. In other words, a redistribu-
tion of this kind would be Pareto improving, because it would allow each
individual country to reach a higher level of consumption. This higher
level of consumption would not be feasible without specialization and co-
ordinate trade.
In this article there is no space to enter into the details of how a redis-
tribution of this kind could take place and whether it would be possible to
reach it through market exchanges, but moving inside the Y QR we ensure
the basic condition to make it possible.
Another point to be stressed is that this is a pure allocative study. It is
out of the scope of this paper to investigate whether countries are on a full-
employment equilibrium or not, so that no assumption is implied on how
far the full-employment equilibrium might be from the scenario described
below.
Finally, please note that thanks to the use of subsystems—see Section
2.2—all the inputs are considered all the time. Substitution between dif-
ferent inputs is not allowed, and we do not resort to a reduction of all the
inputs to the embodied labour they contain. In so doing, the complexity of
industrial relation is not reduced or bypassed.
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2.4 The n-dimensional NPPF and the indexes
There are two basic information which are important for the evaluation
of Comparative Advantages. One is the distance of the actual Net Total
Product from the NPPF and the other is the distance from the IF . They
can be measured in many ways. A simple way to measure the distance
from the NPPF in a bidimensional context is the following—see Fig. 2.5
GS = E2 − Y2
Y2
= E1 − Y1
Y1
(2.4.1)
where GS stands for Gains from Specialization. This measure is based
on point E, which is the only point that is efficient—in the sense that it
lies on the NPPF—and at the same time keeps unaltered the proportions
between the two goods—because it lies also on the line passing through the
origin and point Y . Point E implicitly defines Comparative Advantages:
all the countries on the right of E have a CA in sector j, while all those on
the left of E have a CA in i.
Point E represents the Net Total Product vector that should be reached
if CAs worked well, assuming that the preferences of European consumers
would not change, increasing the amount of goods consumed. This also
implies that point E allows, at least in principle, to redistribute the ad-
ditional Net Total Product produced—Y1E1 and Y2E2—to each country ac-
cording to the ratio in which each country consume the goods considered—
see Section 2.3.
In a similar way, we can compute the distance from the IF in the fol-
lowing way:
LS = W2 − Y2
Y2
= W1 − Y1
Y1
(2.4.2)
where LS stands for losses from specialization. The two indexes can be
combined in a third one that is




in which the distance Y1E1 is now weighted on the distance E1W1, which
is the range in which Y1 can move.
It is called RE index because it is a measure of relative efficiency. The
GS index is a measure of absolute efficiency, in the sense that it measures
how much the Net Total Product could be improved if CAs are exploited
well. The RE indicates whether the actual specialization is closer to an
efficient or an inefficient allocation of resources. When RE is close to 0,
the NPPF this means that countries tend to specialize according to CAs.
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Figure 2.5: The efficient point of production and the gains from spe-
cialization. Point E represents which could be the net product if coun-
tries exploited fully their CAs, while Y represents the historical net
product. SegmentEY represents how much it could be gained through
a proper specialization.
When it is close to 1, the countries considered are close to the most ineffi-
cient allocation of resources. Values of the RE close to 0.5 mean that the
set of countries is somehow in the middle way between these two extremes
and this is still a poor evidence of the working of CAs. In fact, it has to be
stressed that, according to the theory on CAs, both the GS and the RE
should be 0.
In an n-dimensional context, point Y is called vector NTP, so that E
and W become NTPE and NTPW . The algorithm to compute them is a
variation of the one explained in Appendix 1.A. What changes with respect
to the original algorithm is just the length of the national frontiers and
hence the width of the domain in which the vector of the surplus can move
in order to improve the efficiency of the overall system—see Section 2.2.2.
In the following part of the paper, the GS and the LS index are called
GSF and LSF , where the F stands for final. This is because the Algorithm
used is iterative and at each step an NTPE and an NTPW are computed,
with the related GS and LS indexes. Since we take just the GS and the LS
computed in the the last loop, they are called GSF and LSF .
Table 2.2 reports the vectors GSF and the LSF for 2008 and compares
them with GSF∗2008 and LSF∗2008, which are the index computed under
the assumption of no mobility of the means of production. As can be seen,
theGSF and the LSF are the same for all the Sectors considered except for
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Table 2.2: Potential gains from specialization and costs of ineffi-
ciency in 2008. Column NTP2008 reports the net product of Europe
for each of the sectors considered. GSF2008 and LSF2008 represent re-
spectively how much it could be produced in the efficient and in the
most inefficient specialization patterns—see eq. 1.4.1 and eq. 2.4.2
Sectors NTP2008 GSF2008 GSF∗2008 LSF2008 LSF∗2008
1 1426.58 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
2 -1671.84 0% 0% 0% 0%
3 6003.20 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
4 1071.50 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
5 230.18 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
6 324.58 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
7 1956.09 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
8 1828.60 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
9 3630.32 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
10 501.55 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
11 1222.71 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
12 -510.52 0% 0% 0% 0%
13 4925.65 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
14 7272.64 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
15 6838.81 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
16 1672.14 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
17 2.826.68 37.59% 24.39% -28.14% -21.48%
Source: WIOD database for column 2. Column 3 has been computed using equation 1.4.1
Sector 2 and Sector 12.
The GSF and the LSF for Sector 2 and Sector 12 are null because the
net total production in these sectors is negative for most of the Sectors con-
sidered. As explained in Chapter 1, this creates problems when the free
mobility of the means of production is not allowed and hence, in order to
make a meaningful comparison with the scenario described there, the net
total product of Sector 2 and Sector 12 has been kept fixed also in this case.
In other Sectors the value of the indexes is the same because, as explained
above, by construction we search for that efficiency improving NTPE that
keeps unaltered the proportions between each element of the NTP.
Since all the elements of vectors GSF and LSF are equals except for
Sector 2, we use the notation GSF and LSF , which refers to a generic
element of the vectors GSF and LSF different from the second and the
twelfth element.
The first point to be noted is that with free mobility of the means of
production, the NTP in 2008 could be improved by the 37.59% using the
same amount of labour, the 13% more than the gains reachable without the
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Figure 2.6: Indexes of absolute and relative distance from the NPPF
and the IF
(a) GSF index. It represents how much
could be increased the net product of
Europe in the efficient specialization
pattern—see eq. 1.4.1
(b) RE index. It is a measure of the
position of the Net Total Product
between the NPPF and the IF . If
RE < 0.5, the set of countries is
closer to an efficient allocation of
resources than to the most inefficient
allocation pattern—see eq. 1.4.6
free mobility of the means of production.
The second point is that while the GSF is higher than the GSF ∗ by 13
percentage points, the LSF is lower than the LSF ∗ by 7 percentage points.
This means that the distance from the NPPF is higher in this case not just
in absolute terms as should be expected, but also in relative terms—that is
to say from the point of view of theRE index, which was 0.57 in 2008. This
also implies that in 2008 Europe was clearly closer to an inefficient use of
resource than to an efficient one.
The evolution of markets during the period 1995-2011 is described by
the two graphs in Fig. 2.6. The first shows the results of the GSF—Fig.
2.6a—,and the second the results of the RE index—Fig. 2.6b. The dashed
line represents the case of no mobility of the means of production.
As can be seen in Fig. 2.6a, the GSF is decisively higher in the sce-
nario analyzed here than in the original scenario for all the years consid-
ered. In both the cases, the trend until 2004 seems more or less stable and
then it becomes increasing in the subsequent years. The difference is that
while in the case of trade of final-goods-only the improvement is due to a
slight trend, in the case analyzed in this paper the acceleration of the GSF
is marked, especially in 2010 and 2011.
For what concerns Fig. 2.6b, it emerges that the RE index oscillated
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between 0.55 and 0.58 during all the period considered. Overall, hence,
Europe stayed permanently closer to an inefficient allocation of resources
than to an efficient allocation scenario. The results are clear: during the
period considered European countries did not specialize in the sectors in
which they had a CA and Europe did not approach an efficient scenario.
2.4.1 Comparative Advantages and labour reallocation


















where i = 1, ..., n identifies the sectors, c = 1, ...,m the countries and
t = 1, .., T the years. The matrix ESRt, which collects the ESR related to
each country and each sector at time t, is called from now on the efficient
specialization pattern at time t, while the matrix RSRt, an analogous matrix
for the all the RSR at time t, is called the real specialization pattern at time t.
Since in the dataset used here there are 17 × 17 I-O tables for 17 countries
and 17 years, the full tables describing the results of the ESR and of the
RSR cannot be included here and are provided in Appendix 2.B.
However, we can still analyze how much each country is far away from







where lEi,c,t and li,c,t are, respectively, the quantity of workers employed
in sector i of country c at time t in the efficient scenario and in the original
data set.
The complete results in the lm index would require as much space as
the Tables on the ESR and the RSR and are provided in Appendix 2.B.
However, the advantage of using the lm index is that it can be easily ag-
gregated across sectors in order to provide a synthetic measure of the struc-
tural changes that each country would have to bear in order to realize an
efficient specialization pattern. It is easy to compute the share of workers
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The LM index is just a sum across sectors of the absolute values of the
lm index, with the difference that the denominator is now doubled. This
is because, otherwise, each worker would be counted two times: when he
exits from a sector and when he enters into another.
Figure 2.7: Cross-country average and standard deviation of the
Labour Mobility index LM , 1995-2011. The LM index counts how
many workers should have changed their job in order to fully exploit
the CAs so as to realize the efficient specialization pattern.
(a) Cross-country average LM (b) Cross-year average LM
The results for the LM index are reported in Tab. 2.5. Figures 2.7a and
2.7b help to highlight a few characteristics of Tab. 2.5. The first represents
the average cross-country LM for each year, while the second the cross-
year average for each country. A first result that emerges in Fig. 2.7a is
that the social costs that should be bore by each country are very high:
on average more than the 85 % of the European workforce should have
changed job in order to reach the NPPF .
These results remark how far Europe was from the efficient scenario
assumed by CAs theories and they are in line with the results of the GSF
index. This may have been expected since the free mobility of the means of
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production allows for a high degree of specialization. The great majority
of the industrial sectors of each country should be closed and all the labour
force should be employed in 2-3 sectors on average.
However, what was less easily predictable is that the average quantity
of workers to be shifted does not change during the period considered.
Throughout the years, the cross-country average LM is always comprised
between the 85% and the 87% except for 1995 (88%).
Fig. 2.7b shows that there are some differences among countries with
respect to this index. Some countries are closer than others to the spe-
cialization pattern that would allow to reach the NPPF , as for example
Germany, Spain and France. The variability is not marked, but present.
Conclusions
The results of this paper confirm and reinforce what found in Chapter 1,
that is to say that Comparative Advantages (CAs) do not seem to have
worked in Europe during the period 1995-2011.
In this paper one fundamental assumption used in Chapter 1, namely
that the means of production had to be produced domestically, has been
relaxed in order to allow the means of production to be exchanged and a
new Product Possibility Frontier (NPPF ) has been computed.
The NPPF is an important tool to evaluate whether a particular eco-
nomic system has specialized in the direction suggested by CAs or not.
If an economic system approaches the NPPF , than a CAs compatible
specialization process is occurring, otherwise other forces are driving the
specialization process. Whether means of production are supposed to be
traded or not, we find that the distance from the NPPF increases during
the period considered.
Other indexes analyzed in the paper provide further evidence of the in-
effectiveness of CAs in Europe during the period 1995-2011. One of these
indexes is based on the Inefficient Frontier—IF—, which describes the
most inefficient allocation of resources—in the same way as theNPPF de-
scribes the efficient allocation of resources. Comparing the distance from
the NPPF with the distance from the IF , we can check whether an eco-
nomic system is closer to an efficient scenario or to an inefficient.
In Chapter 1 it has been found that Europe stayed constantly more or
less in the middle, although slightly closer to the IF than to the NPPF .
Here it has been found that Europe is even closer to the IF than to the
NPPF during almost all the period considered. The only exception is
year 2011, a year in which, in any case, the index still suggests a clearly
inefficient situation.
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Finally, a proxy of the social costs that should be bore to reach the
NPPF is given by the LM index, which computes the quantity of workers
that each country should shift from one industry to another in order to re-
alize a specialization pattern compatible with the CAs. The results in this
index are coherent with the rest of the analysis: during the period consid-
ered, the average quantity of workers to be shifted stayed almost always
above the 85% with no evident trend.
The results presented here are particularly significant considering the
fact that in Europe many measures have been taken to construct a uni-
fied free market. This is important because the role played by institutions
cannot be overlooked. In some cases a CAs incompatible specialization
pattern may be due to institutional underpinnings that are too different
from those supposed by the theory on CAs. However, in the case of Eu-
rope, there has been a specific effort in order to create a market as close
as possible to the concept of “free market” assumed by the theory on CAs.
Therefore, the results exposed above cast many doubts on the effectiveness
of the principle of CAs itself.
However, this conclusion should not be taken as definitive. The as-
sumption on the mobility of the means of production is just one of the fea-
ture of the original framework that could be modified. Other assumptions
implied in this paper concern migrations, which are assumed to be not
possible, and technologies, which are assumed to be not transferable from
one country to another. The database might also be improved, collecting
more disaggregated data on the industrial sectors that form the productive
structure of the countries considered. Nevertheless, the results provided
here seem at least sufficient to be skeptical about the real influence of CAs
on the structure of productive systems and to justify further investigations
on this topic.
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Table 2.3: The list of countries
1 AUT Austria 10 GRC Greece
2 BEL Belgium 11 HUN Hungary
3 CZE Czech Republic 12 IRL Ireland
4 DEU Germany 13 ITA Italy
5 DNK Denmark 14 NLD Netherlands
6 ESP Spain 15 POL Poland
7 FIN Finalnd 16 PRT Portugal
8 FRA France 17 SWE Sweden
9 GBR Great Britain
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Table 2.4: The list of sectors*
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
2 Mining and Quarrying
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
4 Textiles and Textile Products
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products
10 Rubber and Plastics
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
13 Machinery, Nec
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment
15 Transport Equipment
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
*The sectors excluded are Construction; Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Ve-
hicles and Motorcycles; Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except for Vehicles
and Motorcycles; Retail Trade Except for Vehicles and Motorcycles, Repair of House-
hold Goods; Hotels and Restaurant; Inland Transport; Water Transport; Air Trans-
port; Other Supporting and Auxiliary Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies; Post
and Telecommunications; Financial Intermediation; Real Estate Activities; Renting of
M&Eq and Other Business Activities; Public Administration and Defense, Compul-
sory Social Security; Education; Health and Social Work; Private Households with
Employed Persons.
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Table 2.5: Labour mobility index LM*, evolution 1995-2011
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Mean St. Dev.
AUT 90.59 86.79 86.62 90.04 89.98 93.42 89.45 89.51 92.28 95.76 89.01 88.89 88.61 90.73 92.36 77.18 86.78 89.29 3.83
BEL 95.59 92.53 90.11 96.84 83.25 92.71 86.64 86.09 84.02 85.76 83.63 85.33 85.18 84.95 85.46 83.92 82.17 87.31 4.37
CZE 82.85 95.15 84.14 84.93 85.52 86.30 83.60 87.47 87.66 88.09 88.55 88.82 85.84 85.58 88.52 88.87 89.91 87.16 2.82
DEU 66.62 67.76 73.44 61.36 71.46 72.46 60.86 72.97 60.27 60.81 52.09 49.82 51.37 59.05 71.31 65.64 70.05 63.96 7.59
DNK 89.42 86.31 98.82 99.22 93.18 96.47 99.19 97.18 82.25 73.24 82.18 79.48 83.04 86.53 83.09 82.86 81.90 87.90 7.78
ESP 83.56 70.99 71.72 72.42 73.73 74.64 66.96 62.90 75.85 70.90 59.26 77.17 77.40 77.37 88.83 89.29 85.42 75.20 8.06
FIN 92.40 91.91 90.96 90.76 89.02 88.77 88.67 88.97 89.30 89.09 88.84 88.95 88.82 88.92 88.72 88.72 89.34 89.54 1.15
FRA 78.93 72.40 72.41 72.54 69.87 69.92 77.30 77.20 69.72 69.36 76.45 69.09 69.83 74.91 76.78 79.90 80.22 73.93 3.88
GBR 86.00 80.43 84.94 82.61 85.35 85.18 84.80 84.05 82.10 91.85 92.03 89.82 85.46 87.02 79.51 89.02 85.84 85.65 3.44
GRC 98.91 98.90 98.87 96.29 98.85 97.52 97.50 97.42 97.35 97.17 97.28 97.44 95.82 95.95 90.22 97.63 87.75 96.52 2.93
HUN 89.36 89.37 89.61 89.48 94.16 90.86 88.93 89.20 88.27 81.72 74.47 85.80 97.84 97.55 94.46 93.36 91.62 89.77 5.44
IRL 95.32 90.70 94.71 94.56 94.33 94.29 93.73 93.33 93.40 93.24 93.87 94.15 94.08 93.42 87.06 93.83 94.91 93.47 1.87
ITA 85.08 84.82 77.17 81.60 83.76 75.94 74.99 79.53 79.09 78.69 78.63 78.49 81.54 81.17 78.95 79.30 64.98 79.04 4.46
NLD 72.87 82.94 61.63 72.18 67.67 71.99 88.49 88.49 88.57 88.62 88.63 88.67 88.84 88.30 87.21 91.45 81.25 82.22 8.96
POL 96.75 94.83 94.90 94.87 94.86 94.52 97.26 94.98 95.49 95.12 94.96 94.41 94.22 89.04 94.17 84.86 87.03 93.66 3.27
PRT 95.44 98.54 98.52 98.54 98.57 98.50 98.42 98.48 98.48 98.46 98.57 98.38 98.37 98.36 98.42 98.47 98.48 98.30 0.72
SWE 96.75 92.90 89.57 92.72 89.65 86.72 84.54 92.42 92.49 90.69 90.69 90.77 90.59 90.12 89.62 90.70 90.69 90.68 2.54
Mean 88.03 86.90 85.77 86.53 86.07 86.48 85.96 87.07 85.68 85.21 84.07 85.03 85.70 86.41 86.75 86.76 85.20
St. Dev. 8.73 9.13 10.66 10.83 9.70 9.51 10.52 9.18 9.84 10.71 12.40 11.50 11.19 9.23 6.77 7.95 8.02
*The labour mobility index LMc,t computes the share of workers that should change their job inside each country in order to reach the










Appendix 2.A Computation of the repreportion-
ing factor that brings an entire in-
dustry to 0
In order to explain the procedure to compute the two extremes of a na-
tional frontier when the means of production are free to move across coun-
tries, it is useful to define a general element of the subsystem i as sk,j,i.
For example, the gross product of coal in the original subsystem of iron is
s2,5,1 = 1.78, the gross product of coal in the original subsystem of coal is
s2,5,2 = 9.73 and, finally, the gross product of coal in the original subsystem
of wheat is s2,5,3 = 2.49. As explained above, we have that
b2 = s2,5,1 + s2,5,2 + s2,5,3. (2.A.1)
Suppose to compute firstly the left extreme of the coal-iron frontier in
the case of free mobility of the means of production. The coordinates of the
new point are denoted with (yˇ2, yˆ1), which are respectively the minimum
possible net product in coal and the corresponding maximum net output
in iron. We need to know the minimum net product in coal yˇ2, such that b2
becomes zero and all the labour force l2 is redistributed in sectors 1 and 3
in order to obtain yˆ1. Mathematically, reminding that y2 is the original net






b2 = sˆ2,5,1 + sˇ2,5,2 + s2,5,3 = 0 (2.A.3)
where sˇ2,5,2 and sˆ2,5,1 identify the gross output in coal respectively in
the subsystems of coal and iron which allow to nullify b2.
Eq. 2.A.2 is a direct consequence of the linearity property explained in
Section 2.2.1—eq. (2.2.2)—, which basically implies that, given a subsys-
tem Si and the related net output yi, in order to find the subsystem related
to a new objective net output y′i we just have to multiply all the elements
of the original subsystem for y′i/yi.
Eq. 2.A.3 is the fundamental condition of the problem. If it is satis-
fied, this implies that all the labour force of the coal subsystem has been
devoted to the iron subsystem. Actually, as is explained below, 2.A, we
could rewrite the equations using s2,4,i for i = (1, 2, 3), the element of the
subsystems 1,2 and 3 related to labour in the coal sector, and results would
be exactly the same.
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Clearly, the system defined by equations 2.A.2-2.A.3 is not defined, be-
cause there are three unknowns: yˇ2, sˇ2,5,2 and sˆ2,5,1. A way to close the sys-
tem is to find the relation between sˇ2,5,1 and yˇ2, which is straightforward.





and then, since the extreme (yˇ2, yˆ1) must lie on a prolongation of the fron-
tier in Fig. 2.1, we have that
yˆ1 = yˇ2g + q (2.A.5)
where g and q are given and represent the gradient and the quotient of the





Eq.s 2.A.2, 2.A.3 and 2.A.6 represent the system from which yˇ2 can be






s2,5,2 + s2,5,3 = 0 (2.A.7)









Summing up, with eq. (2.A.8) we determine the minimum net product
in coal that brings the gross production in coal to 0, the consequent maxi-
mum production in iron yˆ1 through eq. (2.A.5), and hence the factors yˆ1/y1
and yˇ2/y2 that multiply the subsystem of iron and coal respectively.
It is important to note that, for the properties of subsystems, if we com-
pute a factor yˇi/yi, and the related factor yˆj/yj , that brings the gross product
of a generic industry i to 0 and the net product of industry j to its maxi-
mum, then all the inputs of industry i will be brought to 0.
This is due to the fact, described by equations (2.1.3)-(2.1.4), that a row
in a subsystem is simply the row of the original system, multiplied by a
constant xk,i < 1. This is because, in a subsystem, the original productive
technologies must be respected, and hence the proportions in which each
input enters into the productive process of an industry must be the original
ones.
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Continuing the example of Section 2.2.2, in the subsystem of coal we
have that row 2 is determined multiplying the original inputs and output






where s2,i,2 identifies a generic element of row 2 of the subsystem of coal—
see Section 2.2.2.
In the same way, row 2 of the subsystems of iron and wheat are deter-
mined by the factors x2,1 and x2,3












x2,2 + x2,3 = 0
(2.A.9)
This means that the determination of the minimum net output in coal
depend just on the factors x2,1, x2,2 and x2,3, not on b2. If we rewrite eq.


















x2,2 + x2,3 = 0
(2.A.10)
the result is the same, which in turn demonstrates that the same repropor-
tioning factors yˆ1/y1 and yˇ2/y2 that bring b2 to 0, bring to 0 also a2,1 and the
same is true for whichever input of the industry of coal.
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Appendix 2.B Tables on Comparative Advantages
and labour mobility Index
2.B.1 Comparative Advantages Indexes
The indexes suggested in the article to perform an analysis of Comparative

















where i = 1, ..., n identifies the sectors, c = 1, ...,m the countries and
t = 1, .., T the years. The matrix ESRt, which collects the ESR related to
each country and each sector at time t, is called from now on the efficient
specialization pattern at time t, while the matrix RSRt, an analogous matrix
for the all the RSR at time t, is called the real specialization pattern at time t.
The results of these two indexes are reported in Tables 2.6-2.22.
The results for Sector 2 and, in some years, for Sector 12 in some years
have not been reported because, as explained in Section 2.4, the great ma-
jority of countries are in deficits in this index, implying a negative Net Total
Product in this sector. For this reason, although countries can reduce their
deficits in Sector 2 and Sector 12, nobody can specialize in it, making the
comparison between the ESR and the RSR not very interesting. Since Ta-
bles 2.6-2.22 contain a lot of data, it is better to avoid reporting irrelevant
information. Therefore, we have chosen to exclude Sector 2 from Tables
2.6-2.22.
When the ESR is higher than theRSR, the countries considered have a
CA in that Sector. The results in CAs obtained under the assumption of free
mobility of the means of production are different from those presented in
Appendix 1.B—where it was assumed that just final goods were traded—,
but there are many similarities.
Without mobility of means of production Austria had a CA in Sec-
tor 12—Basic Metal and Fabricated Metal—during the period 1996-2004,
in Sector 15—Transport Equipment—during the period 2006-2010 and in
Sector 8—Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel—during the period
2007-2011—see Tab. 1.6.
In this case, as it emerges from Tab. 2.6, the CA of Austria in Sector 12 is
confirmed, although the CAs in Sectors 8 and 15 almost completely disap-
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pear. Therefore, the new efficient scenario is different, but not completely
revolutionized with the respect to the one presented in Tab. 1.6.
For what concerns Germany the CA in Sector 15 is confirmed, the CAs
in Sector 6 and 11 are more sporadic, while there is a fairly stable CA in
Sector 12 that was not present in Tab. 1.12 of Appendix 1.B.
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Table 2.6: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Austria*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10 -0.05 -0.28 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -1.73 -0.03 -0.031
R 2.23 1.99 0.91 -0.10 1.88 1.71 1.53 1.46 1.49 1.52 1.46 1.27 1.31 1.25 1.08 1.23 1.34
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.033
R 1.80 1.74 1.73 1.68 1.64 1.61 1.61 1.66 1.67 1.71 1.73 1.76 1.78 1.81 1.84 1.83 1.81
E -0.10 -0.14 -0.16 -0.10 -0.13 -0.40 -0.09 -0.09 -0.13 -0.52 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15 -0.20 -0.24 -0.14 -0.154
R 1.81 1.88 1.88 1.80 1.79 1.78 1.73 1.75 1.74 1.57 1.56 1.59 1.49 1.44 1.34 1.50 1.38
E -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -2.45 -0.06 -0.06 -0.23 -0.19 -0.06 -0.24 -0.055
R 1.41 1.45 1.50 1.52 1.65 1.68 1.72 1.69 1.78 1.86 1.63 1.41 1.20 1.35 1.47 1.44 1.65
E -0.92 -1.29 -1.38 -1.05 -4.44 -0.93 -1.28 -1.15 -0.56 -1.02 -0.97 -1.13 -1.11 -0.69 -1.67 -1.11 -1.356
R 7.22 7.08 7.23 7.55 -0.49 6.96 6.97 6.88 7.41 7.98 8.18 8.82 9.32 9.05 8.59 9.15 9.67
E -0.34 -0.61 -0.61 -0.33 -0.32 -0.53 -0.29 -0.23 -0.37 -0.52 -0.22 -0.23 -0.26 -0.44 36.34 -0.25 -0.267
R 2.49 2.47 2.65 2.68 2.80 2.69 2.69 2.69 2.63 2.55 2.56 2.57 2.66 2.75 2.82 2.91 2.82
E -1.07 -1.02 -0.94 -1.02 -0.85 -0.89 -0.96 -0.83 -0.18 -0.37 -1.36 -1.24 -1.17 135.00 -0.42 -1.08 -1.138
R 0.96 1.17 0.81 1.41 1.41 1.25 1.37 1.18 1.16 1.06 1.18 1.23 1.30 1.09 1.03 0.79 0.87
E -0.82 -1.04 -1.01 -0.78 -0.69 -4.24 -0.55 -0.45 -1.04 -0.67 -0.62 -0.73 -0.79 -1.32 -1.31 -0.63 -0.819
R 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.83 0.87 0.94 0.87 1.01 0.97 1.14 1.24 1.22 1.33 1.38 1.47 1.21 1.19
E -1.61 -1.21 -1.14 -1.81 -1.82 58.53 -1.48 -1.65 -2.78 -7.20 -1.31 -1.49 -1.58 -3.22 -1.43 -1.65 -1.7610
R 2.37 2.19 2.55 2.64 2.60 2.72 2.67 2.34 2.19 2.21 2.16 2.21 2.18 2.20 2.17 1.91 1.86
E -0.92 62.09 68.42 -0.92 -0.92 41.21 -0.59 -0.59 -1.47 -2.08 -0.60 -0.67 -0.69 -0.58 31.98 -0.75 -0.8111
R 3.78 3.98 3.81 3.58 3.29 3.37 3.34 3.24 3.32 2.78 3.20 3.20 3.31 3.34 3.42 3.46 3.32
E 45.34 13.69 10.30 49.83 48.93 -1.31 46.06 42.71 -4.31 -9.88 44.59 44.99 46.06 / / / /12
R 3.25 3.18 3.43 3.81 3.83 3.66 3.62 3.31 3.62 3.61 4.08 4.14 4.38 / / / /
E -0.39 -0.40 -0.39 -0.37 -0.36 -0.33 -0.41 -0.42 -0.53 -4.21 -0.44 -0.41 -0.42 25.66 -0.30 1.83 -0.4813
R 2.48 2.48 2.54 2.65 2.74 2.67 2.70 2.77 2.87 2.77 2.87 3.10 3.14 3.35 3.27 3.15 3.23
E -0.39 -0.30 -0.29 -0.36 -0.33 -0.19 -0.26 -0.24 29.89 -3.45 -0.29 -0.22 -0.24 -1.66 -0.10 -0.34 -0.2614
R 2.70 2.64 2.59 2.59 2.46 2.34 2.58 2.62 2.56 2.49 2.35 2.33 2.38 2.49 2.50 2.43 2.32
E -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 34.98 -0.06 -0.10 -0.11 -0.28 -0.03 -0.10 -0.1215
R 1.22 1.36 1.34 1.29 1.36 1.37 1.42 1.75 1.67 1.89 1.91 1.93 1.84 1.76 1.61 1.61 1.80
E -0.48 -0.38 -0.45 -0.62 -0.61 -0.72 -1.21 -1.37 -0.26 -1.36 -1.30 -1.50 -1.82 -0.27 -0.40 -1.60 -1.8916
R 2.96 3.25 3.07 2.93 2.76 2.72 2.83 3.03 2.96 2.91 2.83 2.90 2.96 3.37 3.68 3.55 3.49
E -0.90 -1.19 -1.22 -0.83 -0.91 -1.13 -0.96 -0.94 -0.49 -0.60 -1.46 -1.44 -0.98 -0.46 -1.66 -1.07 -1.1017
R 1.69 1.78 1.84 1.82 2.17 2.31 2.44 2.50 2.61 2.62 2.41 2.35 2.30 2.28 2.57 1.92 2.52






and represents the share of European net output that Austria should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Austria actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Austria had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.7: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Belgium*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -0.01 -0.12 -0.12 -0.31 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -2.88 -0.05 -0.35 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -4.84 0.00 -0.051
R 0.76 0.57 0.81 1.25 1.08 1.10 0.08 0.69 0.68 -1.22 1.17 1.05 1.05 0.98 0.78 0.81 0.79
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 4.39 -0.04 -0.043
R 3.25 3.23 3.23 3.31 3.09 3.15 3.34 3.20 3.15 3.33 3.11 3.10 3.17 3.31 3.41 3.34 3.43
E -0.04 -0.37 -0.42 -1.20 -0.67 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.24 -0.09 -0.104
R 3.74 3.99 4.33 4.47 4.62 3.90 3.90 3.84 3.74 3.88 3.56 3.84 3.83 3.65 4.00 4.26 4.50
E -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.025
R 0.57 0.62 0.49 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.53 0.59 0.66 0.65
E -1.09 -0.84 -0.84 -0.70 -0.78 -0.53 -0.43 -0.36 154.52 -0.36 22.56 -0.09 -0.48 -0.40 154.43 -0.29 2.856
R 2.19 2.16 2.39 2.30 3.03 3.35 3.60 3.55 3.93 3.85 3.66 3.74 3.76 3.73 3.60 3.57 3.84
E -0.51 -0.56 -0.53 -0.71 -0.52 -0.66 -0.20 -0.17 -0.57 -0.15 -0.20 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.96 -0.10 -0.107
R 2.43 2.40 2.37 2.33 2.41 2.46 2.68 2.59 2.66 2.77 2.36 2.32 2.34 2.41 2.39 2.37 2.42
E -0.66 -0.79 -0.75 -0.86 -1.16 -0.14 -0.69 -0.51 -0.44 -0.61 -0.47 -0.46 -0.50 -0.45 -0.38 -0.37 -0.368
R 5.13 6.06 4.22 5.63 4.60 6.04 5.68 4.95 4.88 5.72 6.64 6.27 5.51 5.02 5.18 4.93 4.15
E -1.43 -5.97 -7.10 -17.30 -7.79 -1.43 -1.18 -1.04 -2.10 -1.09 -0.96 -0.85 -0.90 -0.82 -1.33 -0.66 -0.699
R 4.70 4.73 5.34 4.85 5.24 5.78 5.49 5.29 6.00 6.02 5.37 5.40 5.19 5.45 5.65 5.87 6.26
E -0.69 45.51 56.48 148.44 68.73 -5.79 -1.59 -1.46 -1.95 -1.36 -1.07 -0.99 -1.02 -0.93 -1.74 -0.83 -0.8910
R 2.27 2.28 2.70 2.73 2.94 2.24 2.12 2.17 2.06 2.39 3.16 2.96 3.09 3.04 2.77 3.07 3.40
E 91.78 59.39 51.91 -0.32 -0.61 -1.39 -1.15 -0.96 -0.86 -0.96 -0.54 -0.49 -0.48 -0.47 -0.90 -0.50 -0.5011
R 4.52 4.49 4.62 4.45 4.16 4.09 4.28 4.21 4.13 4.04 3.63 3.68 3.66 3.89 4.53 4.50 4.71
E -2.01 -1.54 -0.40 -1.06 26.01 -4.05 51.56 45.93 8.09 45.62 36.34 42.52 43.95 / / / /12
R 5.35 5.18 5.57 5.69 6.06 5.94 6.17 5.87 5.93 5.86 5.95 5.97 6.76 / / / /
E -0.35 -0.27 -0.25 -0.16 -0.24 -0.19 -0.27 -0.26 -0.08 -0.27 -0.28 -0.31 -0.32 -0.29 -0.19 -0.25 -0.2513
R 1.79 1.72 1.84 1.90 1.85 1.94 1.88 1.76 1.86 1.83 1.57 1.46 1.44 1.41 1.43 1.36 1.33
E -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.30 30.69 -0.49 -0.47 -0.13 -0.44 -0.35 -0.38 -0.37 -0.34 -0.13 -0.32 -0.3314
R 1.85 1.76 1.77 1.77 1.71 2.16 1.91 1.67 1.70 1.63 1.26 1.14 0.99 0.99 1.02 0.93 0.81
E -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.12 -0.24 -0.23 -0.07 -0.21 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.04 -0.11 -0.1015
R 3.02 2.97 2.76 2.75 2.66 2.74 2.93 2.94 2.63 2.64 2.37 2.35 2.17 2.07 2.17 1.83 1.90
E -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.16 -0.44 -0.39 -1.25 -1.45 -0.70 -1.83 -1.28 -1.52 -1.04 -0.89 -0.45 -1.26 -0.8516
R 2.97 2.77 2.70 2.61 2.43 2.86 2.92 2.62 2.62 2.57 2.60 2.62 2.63 2.58 2.36 2.25 2.35
E -1.53 -1.28 -1.35 -0.81 -1.45 -0.65 -1.81 -1.44 -0.75 -1.31 -1.29 -1.57 -1.44 -1.38 -0.52 -1.08 -1.1317
R 1.67 1.68 1.62 1.60 1.79 1.55 1.54 1.68 1.61 1.51 1.24 1.14 1.36 1.17 1.34 1.30 1.38






and represents the share of European net output that Belgium should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Belgium actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Belgium had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.8: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Czech Republic*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 24.07 -0.08 20.22 23.68 23.00 24.47 20.38 26.62 30.89 27.35 31.63 29.54 25.30 24.75 26.12 23.00 26.151
R 2.93 2.47 2.10 1.82 1.84 1.65 1.77 1.68 1.86 1.61 2.24 1.92 1.78 1.76 1.87 1.60 1.84
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.45 -0.03 -0.56 -0.60 -0.59 -0.71 -0.59 -0.74 -0.70 -0.66 -0.60 -0.60 -0.55 -0.55 -0.66 -0.55 -0.683
R 2.04 2.08 2.06 2.14 2.11 1.99 2.14 2.17 2.03 2.01 1.89 1.89 1.84 1.85 1.91 1.76 1.76
E -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 -0.12 -0.14 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.094
R 1.44 1.36 1.23 1.23 1.19 1.25 1.17 1.00 1.22 1.32 1.26 1.35 1.44 1.47 1.29 1.26 1.32
E -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.20 -0.10 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.015
R 1.41 1.19 0.87 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.68 0.28 0.42 0.48 0.34 0.25 0.09 0.18 0.58 0.19 0.61
E -0.44 -0.14 -0.57 -0.66 -0.80 -0.35 -1.03 -0.57 -0.53 -0.25 -0.59 -1.16 -0.61 -0.71 -0.88 -0.86 -1.046
R 2.45 2.82 2.57 1.97 2.16 2.31 2.39 2.62 3.07 3.22 2.49 0.84 2.92 3.25 3.44 3.10 3.14
E -0.03 -0.19 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 8.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.137
R 1.25 1.28 1.38 1.33 1.29 1.27 1.37 1.49 1.44 1.55 1.53 1.66 1.73 1.84 1.83 1.74 1.76
E -3.22 131.31 125.93 -1.29 -1.17 -0.90 -1.14 -1.04 -1.34 -1.18 -1.21 -1.06 -1.04 -1.02 -1.02 -0.91 -1.048
R 16.28 2.55 1.55 2.06 1.78 1.24 1.47 1.59 1.52 1.59 1.55 2.06 1.83 1.88 1.87 1.79 1.46
E -0.25 -0.24 -0.80 -0.61 -0.65 -0.55 -0.69 -0.60 -0.55 -0.60 -0.61 -0.61 -0.53 -0.51 -0.54 -0.56 -0.759
R 0.56 0.92 0.90 0.68 0.56 0.48 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.46 0.44 0.35 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.42
E -0.09 -0.28 -0.24 -0.25 -0.19 -0.19 -0.42 -0.57 -0.56 -0.35 -0.49 -0.51 -0.42 -0.43 -0.50 -0.51 -0.6510
R 1.07 1.28 1.11 0.62 0.50 0.75 0.82 0.76 1.15 1.40 1.35 1.68 2.06 2.31 2.13 1.99 1.89
E -0.06 -0.24 -0.14 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.17 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.0811
R 2.22 2.31 2.40 2.27 2.36 2.46 2.39 2.41 2.44 2.55 2.58 2.77 2.78 2.93 2.72 2.68 2.56
E -0.15 -1.65 -0.35 -0.27 -0.17 -0.14 -0.31 -0.26 -0.23 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.24 / / / /12
R 3.72 3.26 3.21 2.88 2.57 2.43 2.30 1.70 1.94 1.89 1.72 1.57 1.52 / / / /
E -0.08 -0.52 -0.19 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.26 -0.18 -0.29 -0.20 -0.27 -0.30 -0.29 -0.28 -0.30 -0.31 -0.4013
R 0.92 1.29 1.19 1.21 1.10 1.18 1.17 1.33 1.32 1.53 1.65 1.94 2.10 2.20 1.95 1.96 1.91
E -0.03 -0.95 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.18 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.0414
R 0.88 1.25 1.12 1.05 1.15 1.13 1.15 1.36 1.52 2.14 1.85 2.00 2.18 2.47 1.98 1.85 1.91
E -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.1415
R 0.79 0.95 1.04 1.11 1.16 1.39 1.57 1.71 1.62 1.77 2.12 2.46 2.61 2.86 3.18 3.16 3.45
E -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.0316
R 1.21 1.28 1.29 1.24 1.39 1.71 1.87 2.13 1.87 1.91 1.75 1.85 1.96 1.95 2.25 2.58 2.62
E -0.38 76.97 -1.08 -0.40 -0.45 -0.36 -0.67 -0.32 -0.29 -0.23 -0.37 -0.40 10.96 6.70 -0.37 -0.33 -0.3317
R 3.83 4.47 4.02 3.64 3.98 4.47 4.29 4.10 4.02 3.97 4.45 4.44 4.06 4.22 4.12 3.40 3.52






and represents the share of European net output that the Czech Republic should have produced in
order to realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European
countries considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that the Czech Republic actually
produced. An ESR > RSR means that the Czech Republic had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.9: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Denmark*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 1.00 1.23 -0.34 -0.27 0.14 -0.40 -0.29 -0.24 10.57 8.20 9.98 1.40 9.55 -0.02 11.88 9.03 10.021
R 1.24 1.28 1.34 1.33 1.30 1.51 1.29 1.26 1.38 1.26 1.35 1.06 1.42 1.28 1.42 1.83 1.87
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.32 -0.39 -0.20 -0.13 -0.11 -0.17 -0.23 -0.06 -0.26 -0.24 -0.27 -0.07 -0.29 -0.02 -0.31 -0.18 -0.183
R 1.88 1.78 1.76 1.82 1.74 1.70 1.70 1.72 1.69 1.69 1.71 1.66 1.59 1.61 1.55 1.50 1.40
E -0.42 -0.52 -0.07 -0.16 0.86 1.30 -0.26 21.34 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.17 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.014
R 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.60 0.59 0.57
E 104.54 104.34 104.55 77.43 106.34 105.55 90.62 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.005
R 0.47 0.43 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
E -0.12 -0.19 -0.09 -0.21 -0.15 -0.23 -0.30 -0.31 -0.26 -0.33 -0.26 -0.42 -0.24 -0.38 -0.12 -0.21 -0.126
R 1.46 1.42 1.54 1.33 1.86 1.46 1.27 1.30 1.41 1.54 1.57 1.75 1.60 1.52 1.35 1.13 1.04
E -0.33 -0.53 -0.23 -0.29 -0.18 -0.34 -0.27 -0.25 -0.09 -0.15 -0.07 -0.19 -0.13 -0.16 -0.05 -0.10 -0.057
R 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.23 1.21 0.86 1.03 0.92 1.00 0.79 1.06 1.01 0.89 0.90 1.02 0.88 0.84
E -0.16 -0.32 -0.06 -0.18 -0.09 -0.29 -0.41 -0.31 -0.64 -0.66 -0.91 -0.45 -0.68 -0.44 -0.60 -0.60 -0.518
R 0.75 0.96 0.66 0.86 0.77 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.44 0.52 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.31 0.25 0.20 0.04
E -1.03 -1.25 -0.64 -0.56 -0.60 -0.72 -0.70 -0.83 -0.34 -0.38 -0.40 -0.45 -0.37 -0.24 -0.27 -0.35 -0.269
R 0.71 0.72 0.98 0.93 1.11 1.16 1.32 1.26 1.24 1.27 1.42 1.38 1.40 1.38 1.73 1.59 1.68
E -0.45 -0.65 -0.30 -0.44 -0.34 -0.61 -0.64 -0.68 -0.29 -0.43 -0.31 -0.89 -0.32 -0.57 -0.18 -0.29 -0.1810
R 1.72 1.83 1.80 1.75 1.73 1.72 1.63 1.70 1.66 1.57 1.50 1.50 1.58 1.28 1.31 1.23 1.16
E -0.02 -0.19 -0.04 -0.23 -0.10 -0.23 -0.21 -0.20 -0.17 -0.23 -0.12 -0.76 -0.13 -0.16 -0.06 -0.14 -0.0811
R 1.37 1.36 1.41 1.45 1.34 1.17 1.03 1.09 1.01 0.97 1.10 1.12 1.19 1.15 0.97 0.84 0.83
E -0.29 -0.43 -0.19 -0.29 -0.26 -0.35 -0.53 -0.46 -0.50 -0.71 -0.47 -2.31 -0.52 / / / /12
R 0.87 0.85 0.82 0.93 0.80 0.83 0.74 0.87 0.72 0.67 0.36 0.41 0.50 / / / /
E -0.12 -0.19 -0.09 -0.18 -0.15 -0.21 -0.36 -0.23 -0.24 -0.29 -0.19 -0.63 -0.21 10.68 -0.15 -0.18 -0.1213
R 2.24 2.07 2.14 2.04 1.90 1.95 1.88 1.94 1.89 1.86 1.76 1.75 1.81 2.04 2.08 1.93 1.88
E -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 1.39 -0.15 9.18 -0.14 -1.10 -0.09 -0.15 -0.0914
R 1.33 1.39 1.28 1.27 1.39 1.36 1.50 1.62 1.52 1.50 1.58 1.62 1.59 1.51 1.65 1.72 1.52
E 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.04 -0.0115
R 0.62 0.63 0.54 0.51 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.17 0.17
E -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.17 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.06 -0.0316
R 2.42 2.35 2.37 2.30 2.09 2.15 2.08 2.01 1.96 1.98 2.07 2.09 1.96 1.66 1.57 1.68 1.60
E -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.36 -0.18 -0.16 -0.30 -0.30 -0.28 -0.25 -0.21 -0.22 -0.29 -0.22 -0.20 -0.29 -0.1717
R 1.19 1.25 1.27 1.19 1.37 1.40 1.31 1.27 1.30 1.27 1.22 1.23 1.11 1.10 1.13 1.17 1.20






and represents the share of European net output that Denmark should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Denmark actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Denmark had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.10: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Finland*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.011
R 1.00 0.82 0.53 -0.72 0.17 -0.52 0.63 -0.07 0.21 0.13 0.63 0.91 0.85 0.81 0.72 0.11 1.09
E 19.13 23.50 17.56 32.48 0.22 1.84 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.072
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /3
R 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.92 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.99
E -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 -0.08 -0.19 -0.16 -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.024
R 0.55 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50
E -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.045
R 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.38
E -0.56 -0.61 -0.64 -0.80 -0.88 -0.35 -0.26 -0.27 -0.23 -0.29 -0.58 -0.46 -0.39 -0.43 -0.40 -0.43 -0.376
R 7.10 7.11 7.98 8.42 11.14 8.89 8.22 8.23 8.39 8.52 7.44 7.40 8.44 7.72 7.22 7.93 7.86
E -0.53 -0.42 -0.41 -0.36 -0.90 -1.12 -1.15 -1.16 -1.25 -1.10 -1.28 -0.56 -0.63 -0.71 -0.64 -0.47 -0.477
R 4.65 4.31 4.74 5.16 4.55 4.82 4.44 4.64 4.65 4.60 4.19 4.60 4.54 4.28 3.83 4.43 4.14
E -1.05 -1.10 -0.70 -0.72 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.13 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.038
R 1.27 1.37 0.94 1.97 1.56 1.44 1.27 1.52 1.52 1.63 1.35 1.28 1.34 1.18 1.21 1.11 0.97
E -0.77 -0.84 -0.77 -0.66 -0.55 -0.29 -0.31 -0.33 -0.33 -0.39 -0.52 -0.51 -0.45 -0.49 -0.45 -0.25 -0.329
R 0.66 0.84 0.83 1.09 0.70 1.13 0.83 0.88 0.78 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.74 0.88 0.98 1.20 1.24
E -0.48 -0.52 -0.45 -0.40 -1.64 -3.08 -2.28 -1.64 -0.67 -0.80 -1.00 -0.76 -0.51 -0.64 -0.54 -0.43 -0.4410
R 1.69 1.70 1.79 1.94 1.78 1.88 1.78 1.84 1.84 1.82 1.86 1.79 1.84 1.88 1.76 1.84 1.89
E -0.41 -0.39 -0.39 -0.37 -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 -0.14 -0.18 -0.17 -0.23 -0.16 -0.20 -0.23 -0.20 -0.18 -0.2011
R 1.12 1.17 1.21 1.35 1.23 1.37 1.27 1.30 1.36 1.41 1.48 1.42 1.45 1.45 1.29 1.43 1.47
E 29.33 31.37 29.97 36.29 -2.14 -1.54 -1.75 -1.69 -1.45 -1.79 -1.72 -1.88 -2.15 / / / /12
R 1.27 1.91 2.08 2.86 2.16 2.93 2.21 2.20 2.10 2.34 2.61 2.46 2.54 / / / /
E -0.41 -0.37 -0.37 -0.28 -0.31 -0.39 -0.36 -0.32 -0.32 -0.40 -0.46 -0.51 -0.53 -0.63 -0.62 -0.51 -0.4813
R 2.07 2.20 2.32 2.33 2.18 1.99 1.91 1.84 1.82 1.96 2.11 2.16 2.30 2.41 2.32 2.05 2.27
E -0.17 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 20.70 22.41 21.32 24.02 24.91 26.14 29.52 29.74 32.16 38.07 31.79 30.42 28.6914
R 1.45 1.57 1.75 2.40 2.75 3.16 2.91 3.19 3.28 3.49 4.09 4.09 4.55 5.39 4.61 4.55 4.12
E -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.0315
R 0.65 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.47 0.64 0.68 0.66 0.54 0.35 0.43 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.37 0.30
E -0.41 -0.36 -0.33 -0.18 -0.11 -0.12 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.19 -0.19 -0.12 -0.1216
R 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.84 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.99 1.04 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.81 0.79
E -0.57 -0.56 -0.52 -0.48 -0.38 -0.17 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.17 -0.19 -0.21 -0.20 -0.17 -0.1517
R 0.63 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.73 0.96 0.82 0.86 0.96 0.93 0.84 0.80 0.86 0.83 0.91 1.02 0.90






and represents the share of European net output that Finland should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Finland actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Finland had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.11: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in France*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 135.97 108.65 60.34 75.29 64.43 44.45 126.82 123.28 50.30 64.80 97.73 60.05 49.49 62.42 132.55 147.49 141.701
R 23.03 22.94 23.03 23.27 22.09 24.26 21.06 22.15 21.12 22.68 22.15 22.94 21.65 23.22 23.13 22.25 26.16
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -1.58 -1.33 -0.77 -0.94 -1.03 -1.05 -2.29 -2.23 -1.29 -1.57 -2.54 -2.23 -2.30 -2.54 -3.16 -2.06 -2.193
R 12.55 12.48 12.84 13.48 15.35 15.13 14.92 14.80 14.98 14.79 14.91 14.81 14.99 14.45 16.42 15.69 14.78
E -0.17 -0.92 -2.41 -2.15 -3.78 -3.83 -1.05 -1.02 -4.45 -4.14 -2.34 -3.99 108.64 108.64 -1.22 -0.47 -0.414
R 8.82 8.82 8.97 9.19 11.31 11.75 11.62 12.41 12.15 12.50 12.47 12.01 12.62 12.15 12.54 11.60 11.96
E -0.08 -0.15 -0.30 -0.37 -0.53 -0.47 -0.12 -0.13 -0.58 -0.47 -0.13 -0.33 -0.97 -0.90 -0.18 -0.15 -0.145
R 8.30 8.39 8.72 9.45 11.53 11.32 10.68 9.60 9.07 8.53 8.79 8.79 8.48 8.73 8.56 8.69 7.13
E -1.92 -2.47 -3.56 -3.53 -6.16 -4.81 -3.15 -3.21 -5.09 -5.12 -3.75 -4.61 -3.04 -3.31 -4.65 -3.72 -3.836
R 4.68 4.81 5.03 4.71 6.14 5.22 5.28 5.87 6.11 6.50 5.96 6.78 6.55 6.07 7.05 6.52 5.82
E -0.25 -0.55 -1.09 -0.99 -1.71 -3.06 -2.16 -2.09 -2.79 -2.76 -3.83 -4.07 -4.72 -4.95 -2.03 -0.52 -0.417
R 10.42 10.25 10.28 10.59 11.94 11.54 11.77 11.72 11.56 11.67 11.67 11.43 11.16 11.32 11.84 10.73 11.75
E -1.62 -1.79 -1.42 -1.82 -2.88 -4.93 -6.71 -6.24 -5.21 -6.10 -12.81 -14.77 -15.27 -16.87 -13.15 -5.80 -7.908
R 7.82 8.60 6.41 10.21 10.56 12.40 19.21 16.89 15.17 13.16 12.35 18.89 15.89 20.70 27.33 26.64 30.54
E -5.25 -4.38 -4.05 -4.20 7.93 62.72 60.50 58.81 60.77 65.90 135.53 134.24 134.30 133.65 51.74 -3.66 -4.029
R 9.77 10.50 10.93 11.01 12.79 14.50 14.05 13.81 13.93 14.34 15.08 15.93 16.40 16.88 15.22 15.70 12.27
E -0.66 -7.39 -19.94 -16.06 -23.44 -27.16 -5.02 -5.21 -28.22 -25.52 -11.08 -23.33 -13.75 -12.98 -5.89 -1.26 -1.3510
R 7.43 7.39 7.22 7.21 7.84 8.85 8.37 8.17 8.75 10.16 10.39 11.10 11.88 12.93 14.54 14.84 12.66
E -0.43 -1.36 -2.97 -2.78 -4.78 -5.17 -1.59 -1.59 -5.09 -4.73 -2.86 -4.72 -3.05 -2.99 -1.89 -0.85 -0.8311
R 9.31 9.28 9.53 9.55 10.25 11.31 10.09 10.09 10.14 10.39 10.09 10.29 9.99 9.70 10.31 10.36 9.44
E -0.56 -13.08 -36.10 -33.69 -46.19 -42.68 -3.10 -3.14 -32.51 -28.51 -5.09 -20.95 -7.79 / / / /12
R 11.13 11.00 11.01 10.87 11.72 12.68 11.61 11.92 11.36 10.98 10.28 10.73 10.76 / / / /
E -0.87 -1.84 -3.91 -3.27 -5.43 -5.39 -1.48 -1.60 -5.61 -5.09 -1.61 -3.91 -1.70 -1.55 -2.11 -1.57 -1.6813
R 7.17 7.22 7.40 7.49 9.01 9.07 8.89 9.16 8.97 9.46 9.34 9.46 9.30 9.35 10.09 10.00 9.24
E -0.04 -2.91 -7.17 -5.70 -8.48 -8.52 -0.27 -0.31 -9.39 -8.11 -0.56 -5.67 -1.23 -0.58 -0.30 -0.08 -0.0914
R 10.04 9.53 9.63 9.60 10.59 11.21 11.64 12.29 12.01 12.27 12.28 11.84 11.50 11.71 14.73 13.31 13.75
E -0.12 38.22 103.80 80.00 103.71 105.01 -0.07 -0.12 83.16 69.46 -0.12 46.33 6.14 -0.10 -0.14 -0.09 -0.0815
R 17.39 16.68 16.36 15.58 17.82 17.29 16.87 15.67 16.56 17.10 17.55 16.37 15.51 15.86 15.76 15.69 11.57
E -0.04 -1.30 -4.21 -2.76 -3.71 -4.39 -0.34 -0.36 -5.80 -5.06 -0.72 -3.56 -1.49 -1.14 -0.39 -0.10 -0.0916
R 9.94 10.01 10.23 10.39 11.85 12.30 13.08 13.40 12.92 11.65 12.13 11.23 10.91 10.46 9.98 9.63 9.58
E -1.57 -2.15 -3.07 -2.55 -1.75 -3.99 -2.72 -2.73 -3.31 -3.43 -4.79 -5.30 -5.21 -5.51 -2.81 -1.06 -1.1117
R 21.11 20.69 20.62 20.46 11.23 11.29 11.97 12.14 12.10 11.93 11.21 11.21 10.98 11.21 10.52 11.06 11.07






and represents the share of European net output that France should have produced in order to realize
the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries consid-
ered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that France actually produced. An ESR > RSR
means that France had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.12: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Germany*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -71.86 -1.51 -2.39 -1.98 -2.40 -1.68 -1.29 -1.00 -0.45 -0.17 -0.21 -1.15 -0.18 -4.04 -0.65 -4.70 -4.941
R 7.13 7.08 7.30 7.23 6.86 6.77 8.04 7.74 8.04 8.45 8.23 8.06 8.33 7.63 8.97 8.16 9.40
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 83.29 -0.27 -0.26 -0.30 -0.24 -0.30 -0.42 -0.36 -0.26 -0.21 -0.34 -0.28 -0.33 -0.34 -0.27 -0.27 -0.273
R 19.85 19.51 19.10 18.52 18.56 18.94 18.86 18.79 18.53 18.28 18.09 18.11 17.72 17.65 15.25 15.04 15.12
E -1.26 70.20 108.20 109.85 110.61 107.95 108.41 88.02 -1.40 -0.68 -2.04 -1.50 -1.75 -1.76 105.82 107.90 91.984
R 14.66 14.41 14.01 13.78 13.32 12.89 12.99 12.22 12.01 12.42 12.70 12.87 13.20 12.76 11.61 12.01 12.51
E -0.57 -0.70 -0.70 -0.86 -0.80 -0.69 -0.90 -0.92 -0.71 -0.67 -0.89 -0.75 -1.03 -0.93 -0.85 -1.28 -1.065
R 6.99 6.90 6.65 6.90 6.66 6.23 6.62 7.03 6.26 6.55 5.98 6.08 6.13 5.69 5.87 5.62 6.34
E -10.79 -10.43 -7.56 -7.77 39.50 -6.75 -9.53 -8.95 -7.23 -6.39 -8.93 29.89 -8.31 140.87 -5.96 144.63 138.806
R 27.15 26.03 26.59 24.71 28.97 25.15 23.67 24.11 21.66 21.76 21.31 20.81 18.98 18.80 18.91 18.55 19.22
E -7.92 -3.76 -3.77 -4.32 -3.46 -3.24 -3.91 -3.76 -3.07 -2.93 -3.36 -2.88 -3.31 -3.17 -3.17 -3.56 -3.387
R 21.39 21.47 21.38 20.13 20.89 20.01 19.40 18.58 18.10 18.73 19.29 19.21 19.02 18.87 17.86 17.40 17.48
E -2.93 -3.33 -5.62 -3.53 -3.12 -3.46 -3.80 -3.95 -4.51 -3.80 -2.92 -3.37 -2.80 -3.44 -2.44 -2.64 -3.018
R 10.49 12.60 36.62 11.34 11.71 11.47 10.84 11.68 13.31 15.04 15.64 13.63 12.66 11.82 11.63 10.33 9.08
E -7.77 -10.90 -10.62 -12.01 -11.07 -10.96 -12.46 -9.83 -11.45 -7.05 -7.46 -7.26 -7.59 -8.37 -7.82 -10.10 -16.209
R 31.27 30.47 29.44 28.28 27.24 26.55 25.86 25.97 25.70 25.94 26.23 26.94 26.99 27.09 23.75 23.68 24.43
E 5.12 -24.26 -13.16 -16.48 -9.54 -5.16 -18.87 -28.70 81.69 -13.10 -35.00 -23.55 -33.10 -32.39 -27.39 -34.28 136.7410
R 34.89 33.98 33.52 32.48 31.64 31.58 31.27 32.00 30.81 30.71 29.86 29.08 27.83 27.70 27.07 27.99 28.20
E 20.47 -8.66 -6.36 57.34 116.90 -5.36 -6.98 -7.71 15.82 35.90 -7.67 -6.96 -7.27 -8.55 86.83 48.16 -7.9111
R 22.92 22.00 20.90 20.44 19.97 19.08 17.95 17.54 17.19 17.26 16.71 17.07 16.75 16.96 17.03 17.46 18.08
E -23.71 151.96 159.08 133.65 160.55 152.35 36.84 98.36 202.23 147.70 15.00 96.62 28.26 / / / /12
R 28.12 27.36 26.98 25.85 24.26 25.77 27.40 27.74 26.44 25.15 23.83 23.55 21.48 / / / /
E 5.35 13.60 59.84 34.01 16.82 62.85 23.96 -5.30 -6.29 56.72 28.72 32.47 29.47 -2.71 -7.28 5.16 -8.4913
R 35.89 35.15 34.67 34.97 34.92 34.67 35.00 34.35 34.04 33.75 33.79 33.79 34.16 35.00 33.82 33.27 33.77
E -7.71 -7.01 -5.62 -5.67 -3.39 -5.94 -9.97 -8.85 27.90 38.21 40.32 32.12 37.56 32.41 38.18 32.53 30.6514
R 30.16 28.94 28.38 27.76 27.19 26.46 26.01 26.42 27.30 28.11 29.14 30.84 31.84 31.73 29.96 32.74 35.32
E 103.27 65.14 -1.21 22.88 -0.90 -1.32 103.25 103.39 19.76 -1.42 103.09 56.83 97.05 103.37 103.58 104.28 104.6415
R 33.23 33.28 33.53 34.84 34.30 34.42 36.03 36.64 35.88 35.53 36.11 36.30 37.46 37.08 36.22 37.11 39.23
E -2.86 -4.02 -3.41 -3.32 -2.51 -3.54 -4.72 -5.77 -5.30 -4.61 -5.13 -5.65 -5.98 -6.59 -4.12 -4.78 -4.7716
R 20.31 19.56 19.31 19.17 18.29 18.04 17.73 16.40 15.82 15.61 16.10 16.92 17.11 18.21 16.36 16.52 16.85
E -5.87 -6.72 -6.40 -7.08 -8.14 -7.43 -6.68 -7.78 -7.62 -7.25 -6.06 -5.99 -6.15 -6.38 -5.41 -5.30 -5.1217
R 15.30 15.73 15.11 15.10 17.96 17.13 16.22 16.15 16.18 16.46 16.11 16.37 16.69 16.01 16.99 16.66 15.96






and represents the share of European net output that Germany should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Germany actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Germany had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.13: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Great Britain*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 3.96 -24.74 -32.62 -17.55 -30.36 -27.18 -23.41 -15.65 -0.12 -1.22 -1.46 -1.31 -1.46 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.181
R 6.58 7.23 7.85 8.34 7.10 7.48 7.13 7.85 6.94 7.65 8.11 7.50 8.11 8.46 7.91 7.85 7.18
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.34 34.31 45.71 26.08 47.80 39.88 39.65 29.23 -0.76 -0.75 -0.63 -0.58 -0.48 -0.47 -0.41 -0.38 -0.053
R 12.79 12.79 12.80 12.06 12.08 11.88 11.60 11.79 11.49 11.37 11.22 11.01 10.71 10.43 9.86 10.75 12.00
E 105.23 34.79 -2.40 -2.68 -2.72 -2.27 -2.38 -2.67 110.02 110.00 108.62 110.39 -1.89 -1.88 0.78 -1.93 12.184
R 12.19 12.06 11.73 10.83 10.90 9.74 8.61 8.61 8.93 8.63 8.53 8.75 8.72 8.64 8.76 9.31 10.36
E -1.15 -1.02 -1.03 -4.43 -1.85 -1.45 -1.41 104.72 108.86 107.31 103.83 104.76 105.36 104.92 103.84 104.25 103.605
R 6.29 5.92 5.51 2.65 4.02 3.87 3.79 3.78 3.28 2.81 2.79 2.83 2.83 2.91 3.06 3.24 4.42
E 135.02 125.41 134.89 125.44 92.11 124.31 127.67 126.73 -27.83 126.04 104.71 89.03 125.14 -23.79 -25.62 -24.99 -21.676
R 5.79 6.10 2.99 5.06 -3.09 1.89 3.89 5.30 5.89 6.46 6.80 6.75 6.65 7.00 7.36 7.48 7.16
E -4.43 -6.56 -6.80 -6.13 -6.07 -5.52 -5.65 -5.03 -3.73 -3.79 -3.10 -2.85 -2.21 -1.97 -1.92 -2.08 -2.037
R 17.99 18.18 17.70 18.21 17.84 16.43 16.71 16.78 16.99 16.56 15.69 15.11 15.39 15.12 14.94 15.09 14.82
E -1.36 -1.34 -0.93 -4.30 -0.93 -1.04 -1.05 -0.88 -0.85 -1.49 -1.41 -1.29 -1.53 -1.23 -1.01 -0.77 -0.628
R 9.71 12.12 8.76 10.78 10.86 12.23 10.35 9.62 9.69 10.92 11.02 8.39 8.32 7.78 7.07 7.96 8.63
E -7.15 -5.12 -4.00 -3.29 -3.15 -3.37 -3.22 -3.17 -4.45 -4.66 -3.77 -2.98 -2.24 -1.98 -1.67 -1.45 -1.439
R 16.50 16.64 16.13 16.98 15.99 15.04 15.27 14.65 14.50 15.05 13.00 12.50 11.60 11.41 11.43 10.43 10.99
E -10.23 -14.65 -17.05 -12.46 -14.94 -15.11 -14.93 -13.43 -9.83 -9.79 -9.06 -6.80 -6.55 -6.38 -7.07 -8.73 -8.1410
R 15.29 15.72 14.62 15.53 15.46 14.22 14.40 12.86 12.66 11.83 12.32 13.05 13.04 12.39 12.58 12.33 12.96
E -0.97 -2.06 -2.21 -1.51 -2.03 -2.11 -2.27 -2.00 -0.69 -1.11 -0.92 -0.82 -1.40 -1.26 -1.12 -0.65 -0.6411
R 9.99 9.80 9.71 9.45 9.39 8.96 8.85 8.60 9.00 9.45 9.15 8.76 8.58 8.56 9.25 10.09 10.16
E -8.57 -9.90 -10.05 -10.71 -10.40 -10.36 -10.57 -9.95 -9.50 -9.69 -9.30 -8.97 45.12 / / / /12
R 9.29 8.90 8.50 8.60 8.49 8.01 7.96 7.90 7.95 9.06 9.99 9.61 9.99 / / / /
E -1.24 -1.34 -1.39 -1.43 -2.01 -1.59 -1.63 -1.74 -1.66 -2.14 -2.07 -1.96 -2.14 -2.25 7.50 61.81 59.4713
R 11.87 12.04 11.72 11.29 9.61 9.46 9.53 8.90 9.11 8.65 8.97 8.32 8.12 7.91 8.60 9.86 10.49
E -0.68 -0.74 -0.67 -1.18 -0.78 -0.80 -0.82 -0.75 15.82 -0.78 -0.68 -0.68 -0.70 -0.86 -1.10 -2.64 -2.4214
R 16.59 17.03 16.91 17.52 17.24 16.58 14.86 13.88 12.89 11.70 10.57 10.13 9.62 9.38 9.76 9.67 9.44
E -0.69 -0.68 -0.66 -0.51 -0.51 -0.53 -0.60 -0.55 -0.53 -0.69 -0.66 -0.66 -0.64 -0.59 -0.77 -1.09 -1.0615
R 14.89 15.56 15.23 15.16 13.94 13.48 12.91 12.77 13.37 12.94 12.06 12.04 11.34 11.50 12.72 14.11 15.49
E 111.92 110.11 112.80 111.69 111.80 114.00 113.84 115.50 116.80 117.21 123.43 116.73 114.94 113.43 133.77 131.48 124.4516
R 12.97 13.36 12.97 13.26 12.83 12.23 12.19 12.91 12.86 14.02 13.63 13.20 12.80 12.58 13.16 13.90 15.01
E -2.91 -3.42 -3.66 118.40 -4.45 -4.12 -4.02 -3.97 6.01 0.58 0.63 12.63 -4.45 -5.30 -4.02 -2.72 -3.1217
R 13.60 13.51 13.60 14.92 13.52 15.55 14.52 14.56 15.39 14.76 16.73 16.33 16.55 17.63 16.20 16.51 17.24






and represents the share of European net output that Great Britain should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Great Britain actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Great Britain had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
135
Table 2.14: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Greece*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -0.47 -0.37 -0.38 -0.12 -0.29 -0.02 -0.01 -0.23 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -9.57 -0.04 -5.431
R 4.87 4.63 4.77 4.92 5.40 5.35 5.12 4.69 4.56 5.07 4.64 4.43 4.43 4.68 4.78 4.82 4.16
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.17 -0.21 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 18.41 0.05 10.653
R 2.18 2.27 2.22 2.30 2.21 2.09 2.30 2.29 2.27 2.26 2.28 2.28 2.16 2.36 2.43 2.26 2.03
E -0.41 -0.34 -0.30 -0.12 -0.21 -0.04 -0.05 -0.86 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 -0.134
R 2.62 2.66 2.55 2.77 3.18 2.71 2.34 2.20 2.90 2.26 2.34 1.83 1.83 2.52 2.87 2.72 2.53
E -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -3.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.035
R 1.04 1.09 0.94 1.04 0.99 0.98 1.10 0.80 0.53 0.84 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.09 1.05 0.96
E -0.55 -0.45 -0.43 -0.26 -0.49 -0.17 -0.23 -1.72 -1.70 -0.03 -0.06 -0.23 -0.10 -0.08 -3.47 -0.19 -2.216
R 1.86 1.81 1.64 1.65 2.43 1.62 1.06 0.64 0.83 0.54 0.70 0.30 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.09 0.17
E -0.49 -0.39 -0.37 -0.19 -0.30 -0.11 -0.15 -0.23 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.83 -0.13 -0.507
R 1.08 1.05 0.93 0.96 1.06 0.94 1.01 1.06 1.12 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.93 1.09 0.97 0.88
E -0.80 -0.76 -0.56 -1.12 -0.28 -1.01 -1.54 -1.84 -0.66 -0.08 -0.24 -1.44 -0.58 -0.11 -0.85 -0.69 -2.128
R 2.42 2.93 2.00 2.78 2.78 3.01 2.66 2.64 3.06 3.06 3.21 2.99 3.38 3.03 3.24 2.29 1.39
E -7.82 -6.26 -5.99 -1.71 -3.51 -0.12 -0.21 -0.47 -0.50 -0.02 -0.05 -0.17 -0.40 -0.64 -0.42 -0.17 -0.299
R 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.79 0.90 0.73 0.46 0.47 0.62 0.80 0.64 0.49 0.57 0.72 0.78 0.63 0.65
E 139.15 136.31 123.15 33.65 115.06 -0.11 -0.27 -0.50 -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 -0.16 4.90 10.95 -1.26 -0.18 -0.8410
R 1.64 1.64 1.48 1.46 1.52 1.46 1.65 1.57 1.72 1.70 1.45 1.37 1.45 1.37 1.31 1.19 1.04
E -0.32 -0.29 -0.29 57.00 -0.32 82.87 83.03 79.71 101.91 82.72 81.69 79.45 64.65 60.73 -1.92 72.96 -1.3111
R 2.22 2.42 2.49 2.60 2.62 2.52 2.56 2.36 3.00 2.81 2.73 2.60 2.47 2.21 1.67 1.57 1.39
E -0.95 -0.76 -0.74 -0.45 -0.53 -0.29 -0.55 -1.25 -0.50 -0.03 -0.09 -0.28 -0.16 / / / /12
R 0.82 0.81 0.81 1.10 1.43 1.25 0.85 0.84 1.47 2.12 1.91 1.88 1.84 / / / /
E -0.25 -0.22 -0.22 -0.46 -0.28 -0.38 -0.26 -0.43 -0.15 -0.01 -0.05 -0.18 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.23 -0.2413
R 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.24 0.21
E -0.21 -0.23 -0.34 -1.91 -3.70 -3.13 -0.33 -0.40 -0.11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.15 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.20 -0.1814
R 0.34 0.25 0.13 -0.35 -2.02 -0.74 0.46 0.48 0.53 0.45 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.24 0.19 0.16
E -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.0315
R 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.18
E -0.22 -0.18 -0.18 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.14 -0.18 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.0516
R 1.03 1.03 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.04 1.06 0.86 0.87 1.04 0.95 0.89 0.89 1.39 1.52 1.42 1.27
E -1.10 -0.91 -0.95 -1.02 -1.23 -1.20 -1.71 -2.65 -1.34 -0.10 -0.48 -1.66 -0.80 -0.45 -1.67 -1.69 15.3817
R 1.24 1.23 1.30 1.38 1.76 1.86 1.61 1.78 1.93 2.09 2.08 1.90 2.14 1.98 1.70 1.64 1.51






and represents the share of European net output that Greece should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Greece actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Greece had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.15: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Hungary*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -17.40 -20.50 -18.89 -15.72 -0.19 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.14 -0.08 15.89 -0.11 -0.10 -0.14 -0.10 -0.11 -0.161
R 1.81 1.64 1.79 1.86 1.83 1.84 2.72 2.29 0.25 3.14 3.22 3.02 2.33 3.54 3.39 3.32 4.49
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 21.58 24.02 20.34 18.01 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.42 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.033
R 3.08 3.21 2.63 2.46 2.39 2.37 1.85 1.82 1.99 1.61 1.56 1.62 1.53 1.48 1.43 1.38 1.42
E -0.53 -0.21 -0.17 -0.53 -0.56 -0.14 -0.38 -0.35 -0.20 -0.17 -0.02 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19 -0.21 -0.224
R 1.22 1.37 1.29 1.36 1.29 1.20 1.32 1.14 1.26 1.07 0.86 0.78 0.59 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.55
E -0.30 -0.13 -0.12 -0.32 -0.34 -0.14 -0.47 -0.59 -0.65 -0.49 -0.02 -0.14 -0.09 -0.10 -0.16 -0.34 -0.205
R 1.37 1.54 1.58 1.56 1.45 1.21 1.16 0.74 0.60 0.39 0.43 0.65 0.83 0.66 0.86 0.34 1.57
E -0.73 -0.47 -0.41 -0.56 -0.73 -0.29 -0.38 -0.29 -0.28 -0.24 -0.17 -0.94 -1.04 -1.15 -0.29 -0.38 -0.326
R 0.97 1.00 0.91 0.84 1.01 0.99 1.14 1.01 1.12 1.05 1.03 1.07 0.95 1.01 0.84 0.81 0.71
E -1.69 -1.28 -1.21 -1.63 -0.35 -0.18 -0.58 -0.56 -0.55 -0.45 -0.03 -0.20 -0.34 -0.40 -0.30 -0.39 -0.367
R 0.68 0.68 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.97 0.94 1.07 1.03 1.05 0.98 0.92 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.97
E 130.48 -3.19 -1.85 122.56 118.79 -10.14 -1.04 -0.29 -0.36 -0.70 -0.61 -1.25 -1.45 -1.61 -0.36 -0.50 -0.468
R 5.19 5.65 3.79 6.20 6.47 4.11 1.31 2.32 2.70 2.58 2.90 2.43 3.10 2.64 1.91 2.30 2.21
E -3.74 -1.47 -1.25 -3.05 -1.34 -0.31 -0.97 -0.67 -0.68 -0.59 -0.43 -0.69 -0.91 -1.02 -0.51 -0.67 -0.709
R 2.15 1.86 1.58 1.22 0.81 0.62 0.64 0.56 0.72 0.68 0.80 0.76 0.71 0.72 0.65 0.71 0.77
E -2.19 -1.94 -1.93 -2.31 -0.83 -0.86 -3.95 -3.68 -3.47 -2.83 -0.15 -1.18 -0.96 -1.08 -1.49 -2.09 -1.9910
R 0.73 0.69 0.74 0.73 0.67 0.60 0.79 0.72 0.97 0.96 1.03 0.96 1.03 1.17 1.32 1.53 1.85
E -0.96 -0.77 -0.66 -0.88 -0.32 -0.26 -0.77 -0.64 -0.73 -0.70 -0.07 46.21 60.21 64.60 -0.53 -0.66 -0.6411
R 0.91 0.93 0.91 1.01 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.92 0.98 0.97 1.13 1.26 1.30 1.62 1.39 1.25 1.28
E -2.15 -1.01 -0.96 -2.07 -2.21 -1.36 -2.53 -2.03 -1.79 -1.61 -0.18 -1.13 -1.11 / / / /12
R 0.90 0.89 0.76 0.51 0.42 0.49 0.63 0.47 0.60 0.60 0.48 0.61 0.39 / / / /
E -0.84 -0.16 -0.14 -0.86 -1.03 -0.32 -0.50 -0.50 -0.46 -0.40 -0.06 -0.34 -0.35 -0.42 22.03 25.82 24.8213
R 0.33 0.31 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.27 0.37 0.40 0.48 0.53 0.62 0.50 0.47 0.98 1.55 1.97
E -0.34 -0.07 -0.07 -0.49 -1.02 0.21 21.25 19.71 19.74 15.80 -0.03 2.05 -0.18 -0.17 -1.41 -2.01 -1.8014
R 0.36 0.47 0.80 1.12 2.01 2.50 2.77 2.49 2.72 2.63 2.74 2.80 3.22 2.99 2.48 2.72 2.37
E -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.16 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.39 -0.44 -0.4715
R 0.46 0.51 0.81 1.06 0.99 1.02 0.99 0.98 1.19 1.12 1.20 1.35 1.47 1.59 1.38 1.29 1.32
E -0.17 -0.05 -0.05 -0.17 -0.17 -0.08 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.16 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.18 -0.20 -0.1916
R 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
E -11.62 -3.51 -2.77 -8.24 77.36 92.91 -0.73 -0.46 -0.48 4.46 -0.32 -2.41 -2.70 -2.81 -0.74 -0.82 -0.8117
R 4.61 4.36 4.18 3.97 4.49 4.54 4.30 3.73 3.62 3.73 3.33 3.87 3.45 3.20 3.09 3.17 3.02






and represents the share of European net output that Hungary should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Hungary actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Hungary had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.16: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Ireland*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -0.08 -0.05 -0.15 -0.13 -0.15 -0.19 -0.17 -0.20 -0.22 -0.18 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 -0.051
R 0.96 0.94 0.97 1.17 1.15 1.20 1.03 1.16 1.00 0.81 0.64 0.50 0.49 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.86
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.10 -0.18 -0.21 -0.18 -0.16 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.22 -0.21 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.28 -0.04 -0.053
R 1.52 1.49 1.44 1.33 1.35 1.40 1.61 1.57 1.85 1.93 1.97 2.07 2.19 2.11 2.28 2.50 2.47
E -0.08 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 -0.12 -0.16 -0.11 -0.24 -0.14 -0.11 -0.23 -0.10 -0.124
R 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.50 0.42 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.36
E -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.11 -0.23 -0.13 -0.06 -0.20 -0.03 -0.035
R 0.43 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.32
E -0.06 -0.42 -0.11 -0.08 -0.15 -0.13 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.22 -0.27 -0.17 -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.226
R 0.70 0.76 0.88 0.91 1.12 0.93 0.83 0.91 1.15 1.18 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.13 1.14 1.40 1.45
E -0.45 37.47 -0.65 -0.71 -0.98 -1.20 -1.20 -1.20 -1.40 -1.44 55.87 65.28 65.61 61.89 8.96 79.42 95.107
R 2.32 2.77 3.05 3.35 3.69 3.92 2.99 3.11 3.34 3.76 4.14 4.68 4.96 5.19 5.20 6.42 6.69
E -0.13 -0.07 -0.16 -0.16 -0.19 -0.31 -0.29 -0.24 -0.32 -0.55 -0.23 -0.23 -0.16 -0.14 -0.41 -0.12 -0.148
R 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.21 0.29 0.47 0.33 0.34 0.25 0.19
E 43.62 0.63 53.67 66.28 68.85 82.02 83.32 82.44 79.48 77.45 -0.65 -1.11 -0.86 -0.67 82.44 -0.83 -1.049
R 2.02 2.45 3.16 4.43 4.66 5.66 6.35 7.01 6.60 6.48 6.49 5.75 6.63 6.83 8.76 9.20 9.48
E -0.31 -0.70 -0.55 -0.57 -0.62 -0.86 -0.62 -0.50 -0.62 -0.64 -0.28 -0.43 -0.36 -0.28 -1.08 -0.31 -0.3710
R 0.76 0.78 0.65 0.48 0.57 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.59 0.66 0.58 0.57 0.79 0.70 0.68 0.52 0.55
E -0.14 -0.20 -0.22 -0.18 -0.20 -0.26 -0.20 -0.16 -0.18 -0.19 -0.24 -0.27 -0.13 -0.09 -0.25 -0.10 -0.1211
R 0.69 0.75 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.92 1.08 1.15 1.24 1.33 1.06 1.04 0.92 0.94
E -0.13 -0.14 -0.21 -0.20 -0.28 -0.36 -0.30 -0.26 -0.29 -0.27 -0.12 -0.22 -0.15 / / / /12
R 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.32 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.25 / / / /
E -0.08 -0.26 -0.11 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 -0.18 -0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.10 -0.16 -0.09 -0.1313
R 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.25
E -0.17 -0.25 -0.19 -0.19 -0.25 -0.36 -0.36 -0.32 -0.36 -0.42 -0.66 -0.78 -0.55 -0.52 -0.57 -0.48 -0.5514
R 3.22 3.38 3.93 3.74 4.52 4.86 4.93 5.07 4.98 4.86 5.09 4.88 4.56 4.40 4.68 4.38 4.19
E -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.0615
R 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.18
E -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.14 -0.05 -0.0616
R 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.24 0.33 0.56 0.55 0.67 0.59 0.60
E -0.14 -0.11 -0.20 -0.18 -0.22 -0.33 -0.34 -0.22 -0.28 -0.31 -0.17 -0.45 -0.34 -0.27 -0.62 -0.26 -0.3617
R 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.55 0.83 0.60 0.59 0.65 0.69 0.75






and represents the share of European net output that Ireland should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Ireland actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Ireland had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.17: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Italy*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -0.77 -0.75 -22.05 -0.79 -0.68 -55.88 -13.93 -3.81 -30.71 -40.71 -42.70 -42.39 -41.92 -38.80 -25.33 -55.31 -19.341
R 12.75 12.28 12.65 12.51 12.51 13.29 12.61 11.84 11.83 11.96 11.98 11.75 11.72 11.06 9.97 10.10 9.14
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.14 -0.13 23.15 -0.31 -0.15 66.02 16.45 4.45 36.44 53.61 58.47 59.43 59.79 57.62 41.30 85.99 31.973
R 11.32 11.19 11.39 11.93 11.58 11.74 11.40 11.47 11.70 11.75 11.82 11.50 11.61 11.51 11.66 11.33 11.03
E -0.59 -0.56 -0.51 -0.93 -0.93 -0.70 -0.89 -0.73 -1.39 -2.11 -1.25 -1.11 -0.89 -0.89 -0.86 -0.76 -0.834
R 33.01 32.79 32.80 33.66 31.51 34.25 35.83 35.89 35.07 35.66 35.86 35.80 35.34 35.61 36.25 36.47 34.50
E -1.94 -1.80 -1.90 29.13 -2.29 -1.86 12.82 -2.32 -2.67 -2.72 -2.15 -2.56 -2.24 -2.04 -1.83 -1.54 -1.535
R 50.09 49.76 50.03 51.15 48.61 49.63 50.94 51.67 53.88 54.80 55.40 55.95 56.62 55.38 54.50 55.87 53.35
E -2.53 -2.46 -2.83 -2.42 -3.79 -4.24 -3.31 -2.85 -4.50 -4.91 -4.48 -4.23 -3.98 -3.73 -2.97 -3.91 -3.436
R 9.51 9.14 9.45 9.49 6.58 9.25 10.30 8.89 8.33 7.90 7.59 7.76 7.50 7.33 7.02 6.04 5.51
E -3.67 -3.35 -3.27 -3.12 -3.14 -3.91 -3.27 -2.86 -3.73 -4.31 -3.85 -3.60 -3.65 -3.53 -2.87 -3.80 -2.137
R 11.18 11.20 10.98 11.20 10.96 10.07 10.54 10.61 10.41 10.47 10.37 10.30 10.12 10.01 9.77 9.43 8.69
E -1.17 -1.08 -0.99 -1.36 -1.15 -1.15 -1.07 -0.75 -0.92 -1.16 -1.05 -0.97 -0.87 -0.77 -0.64 -0.90 -0.848
R 14.69 16.30 11.51 18.81 16.18 15.15 16.25 14.51 15.09 15.53 14.85 12.93 13.36 11.61 7.65 8.46 6.61
E -4.69 -4.69 -4.82 -4.68 -4.28 -4.24 -3.93 -3.36 -6.68 -12.14 -5.50 -4.32 -2.97 -2.65 -2.40 -2.95 -2.469
R 9.43 9.19 9.33 9.35 9.70 8.26 8.78 9.16 8.21 7.81 7.75 7.46 7.13 6.89 7.41 7.05 6.66
E -18.68 -19.76 -17.13 -20.28 -20.33 -12.34 -16.57 -17.92 59.69 158.11 38.89 14.48 -9.36 -8.99 -8.53 -5.38 -5.8910
R 17.28 17.13 17.91 18.33 18.17 17.79 17.52 18.45 18.33 17.86 17.05 16.16 15.05 14.03 12.77 12.11 11.97
E -4.78 -4.89 -5.29 -4.65 -4.89 -6.09 -5.46 -5.17 -5.17 -5.17 -5.48 -5.38 -5.39 -4.93 -3.96 -8.06 -4.5911
R 18.66 18.84 18.49 18.24 18.12 18.01 18.53 18.97 18.59 18.23 17.96 16.76 16.72 16.18 15.59 13.89 15.23
E -66.63 -60.82 -43.59 -62.07 -64.49 -32.10 -54.79 -61.94 -53.49 -31.13 -37.44 -36.20 -38.41 / / / /12
R 15.38 16.53 16.30 17.11 17.75 16.35 16.81 17.38 17.85 16.80 17.85 18.40 18.65 / / / /
E 105.02 94.13 49.36 75.06 95.11 49.02 85.09 114.44 117.58 58.47 81.01 78.49 79.19 74.15 85.95 12.99 32.6613
R 23.42 23.19 23.41 23.16 23.73 23.35 22.97 23.27 23.44 23.35 22.67 22.23 21.56 20.49 19.88 19.22 18.84
E 112.52 115.04 116.18 117.42 99.13 35.41 72.74 64.37 -5.86 -3.77 -4.49 -4.28 -4.13 -3.89 -4.23 -1.27 -2.5414
R 16.14 15.69 15.43 14.84 13.89 12.41 12.96 13.28 13.03 12.94 12.63 12.17 11.91 11.06 10.33 9.83 8.82
E -1.17 -1.16 -0.94 -1.17 -1.19 -0.77 -1.19 -1.38 -1.29 -1.21 -1.17 -1.14 -1.15 -1.10 -1.20 -0.36 -0.8415
R 11.84 11.35 11.49 10.70 10.43 10.50 9.83 9.85 9.04 8.86 8.27 8.60 8.67 8.40 8.38 7.42 6.57
E -2.21 -1.85 -1.98 -2.22 -2.24 -1.77 -2.83 -3.42 -2.68 -2.26 -2.27 -2.19 -2.18 -2.07 -2.20 -1.25 -3.6016
R 24.41 24.03 23.61 22.94 23.20 23.61 22.73 23.08 23.18 22.57 22.55 22.64 22.39 21.33 21.72 21.90 21.28
E -4.04 -3.89 -4.25 -3.88 -4.74 -6.23 -5.13 -4.91 -5.82 -6.54 -5.81 -6.06 -5.65 -5.44 4.03 7.10 -3.7717
R 11.03 10.77 10.84 10.84 13.12 12.42 11.68 11.91 11.93 11.86 11.57 11.63 11.53 11.57 12.26 12.10 11.40






and represents the share of European net output that Italy should have produced in order to realize the
efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries considered
here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Italy actually produced. An ESR > RSR means
that Italy had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.18: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Netherlands*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 26.81 -22.44 14.29 -28.69 -22.69 25.80 -41.26 -35.88 -40.65 -36.83 -34.50 -34.12 -34.47 -30.32 -25.10 -1.55 -3.631
R 7.59 7.04 7.00 7.74 7.70 8.39 8.28 8.12 8.99 8.14 8.77 8.64 8.75 8.66 8.98 8.90 7.04
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -1.38 21.58 12.65 37.12 38.75 -0.73 49.16 48.18 47.72 48.22 47.96 47.72 47.77 46.45 41.67 -0.22 3.903
R 7.25 7.32 7.20 7.17 7.16 7.11 6.92 6.96 6.85 6.84 6.86 6.86 6.81 6.94 7.15 7.16 7.31
E -0.40 -0.50 -0.25 -0.31 -0.24 -0.15 -0.21 -0.25 -0.26 -0.23 -0.24 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 -0.68 -0.654
R 2.14 2.08 2.06 2.04 2.11 2.13 2.08 2.06 2.08 1.98 2.03 2.11 2.19 2.14 2.16 2.31 2.46
E -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.12 -0.125
R 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.58 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.88 0.94 0.92
E -1.33 -1.56 -0.82 -1.05 -1.07 -0.56 -0.66 -0.56 -0.55 -0.54 -0.65 -0.57 -0.61 -0.57 -0.53 -1.02 -0.966
R 3.64 3.73 3.87 3.85 4.63 3.49 3.74 3.44 3.28 3.20 3.34 3.36 3.26 3.37 3.56 2.94 3.02
E -1.87 -3.60 -1.63 -3.03 -2.94 -0.72 -3.09 -3.14 -3.10 -2.92 -3.01 -2.75 -2.76 -2.67 -2.50 -1.58 -1.667
R 4.96 4.99 5.07 5.34 5.13 4.87 4.87 4.80 4.68 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.71 4.66 4.84 4.72 4.56
E -6.95 -9.27 -2.99 -2.50 -0.37 -0.54 -0.41 -0.54 -0.34 -0.43 -0.37 -0.35 -0.33 -0.29 129.63 123.51 126.328
R 7.84 8.59 5.66 9.01 7.50 6.84 6.89 6.27 6.78 6.76 6.50 5.50 5.66 5.72 6.17 5.07 4.93
E 76.94 88.65 30.17 22.21 -1.31 -1.57 -1.26 -1.24 -1.26 -1.35 -1.18 -1.02 -0.98 -0.91 -1.67 138.49 136.219
R 10.08 9.88 9.80 9.54 9.14 9.22 9.37 9.42 9.51 9.78 9.61 9.72 9.75 8.85 10.16 10.86 12.64
E -2.78 -4.14 -1.89 -3.23 -2.62 -1.95 -2.85 -2.72 -2.68 -2.47 -2.64 -2.39 -2.16 -2.02 -1.93 -3.27 -3.2210
R 3.64 3.75 3.94 3.79 3.85 3.94 3.92 4.02 3.93 3.83 3.76 3.76 3.89 3.82 3.90 3.83 3.72
E -0.72 -1.32 -0.65 -1.09 -1.04 -0.89 -1.18 -1.12 -1.11 -1.12 -1.12 -1.07 -1.02 -1.00 -0.93 -0.85 -0.8211
R 3.48 3.70 3.68 3.78 3.73 3.70 3.56 3.36 3.15 3.15 3.17 3.29 3.38 3.56 3.66 3.41 3.48
E -1.88 -2.85 -1.32 -2.47 -2.10 -4.45 -2.12 -2.05 -2.00 -1.92 -1.95 -1.84 -1.79 / / / /12
R 4.58 4.81 4.84 4.91 4.75 4.45 4.47 4.42 4.35 4.62 4.66 4.66 5.17 / / / /
E -0.94 -0.81 -0.53 -0.51 -0.48 -0.60 -0.27 -0.28 -0.28 -0.26 -0.28 -0.25 -0.21 -0.19 -0.24 -0.65 -0.6013
R 2.84 3.10 3.31 3.27 3.22 3.52 3.74 3.82 3.67 3.82 3.76 3.87 3.97 3.69 3.98 4.24 4.09
E -1.15 -1.45 -0.63 -0.85 -0.62 31.23 -0.65 -0.53 -0.54 -0.57 -0.55 -0.46 -0.43 -0.42 -0.43 -1.14 -1.0814
R 5.02 5.16 5.25 5.07 4.95 4.80 4.48 4.30 4.25 4.12 4.08 3.97 3.63 3.61 3.78 3.74 3.73
E -0.63 -0.83 -0.33 -0.33 -0.15 -1.27 -0.21 -0.19 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -1.08 -0.9515
R 1.75 1.70 1.60 1.80 1.69 1.56 1.64 1.66 1.56 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.70 1.70 1.24 1.33 1.61
E -0.32 -0.54 -0.37 -0.50 -0.46 -0.29 -0.69 -0.72 -0.64 -0.60 -0.59 -0.56 -0.56 -0.53 -0.58 -0.99 -0.9016
R 4.88 5.19 5.26 5.34 5.42 5.36 5.23 5.27 5.30 5.15 5.18 5.14 5.24 5.26 5.47 5.52 5.26
E -2.60 -2.51 -1.80 -1.59 -1.53 -1.28 -1.26 -1.21 -1.19 -1.17 -1.22 -1.31 -1.21 -1.11 -1.36 -3.31 -3.2117
R 3.89 4.07 3.96 3.87 4.27 4.43 4.68 4.59 4.49 4.39 4.16 4.05 3.98 3.86 4.23 3.84 3.82






and represents the share of European net output that Netherlands should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Netherlands actually produced. An
ESR > RSR means that Netherlands had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.19: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Poland*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -4.30 -3.69 -5.18 -5.68 -5.72 -6.14 -3.63 -3.49 -5.36 -3.53 -3.45 -3.78 -2.98 -5.88 -2.88 -17.61 -43.961
R 11.24 10.61 10.05 10.17 10.23 5.24 9.74 9.58 9.46 9.37 7.98 6.88 7.21 7.04 7.90 7.48 6.10
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20 -0.14 -0.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.25 -0.32 -0.37 3.06 -0.35 17.96 57.253
R 3.88 4.50 5.02 5.28 4.76 5.25 5.51 5.42 5.69 5.91 6.28 7.13 7.71 8.29 8.21 8.56 8.92
E -0.31 -0.35 -0.50 -0.53 -0.62 -0.33 -0.72 -0.95 -1.14 -1.09 -1.70 -2.25 -2.81 -2.80 -2.72 -2.80 -0.844
R 2.32 2.43 2.56 2.57 2.39 2.31 2.27 2.36 2.43 2.64 2.55 2.94 3.10 3.46 3.71 3.68 3.87
E -0.09 -0.14 -0.16 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.19 -0.23 -0.27 -0.29 -0.25 -0.34 -0.255
R 1.71 1.97 2.06 1.97 2.06 1.78 1.66 1.81 1.69 1.70 1.61 1.90 2.05 2.34 2.74 2.66 3.22
E -2.41 -2.74 -4.18 -4.54 -6.45 -2.42 -2.48 -3.53 -4.23 -4.26 -2.97 -3.16 -3.30 -3.79 -4.13 -3.64 -2.336
R 5.12 5.50 5.95 6.52 8.70 7.66 7.01 6.89 7.22 7.98 8.22 8.95 9.55 10.25 10.83 12.04 12.30
E 100.37 87.00 122.65 124.73 125.06 121.86 115.61 123.76 122.51 122.42 65.52 54.22 54.47 57.86 71.78 35.50 18.447
R 1.87 1.85 1.99 2.14 2.44 3.30 3.51 3.58 3.47 3.47 3.53 3.82 4.26 4.60 4.80 4.78 5.07
E -0.62 -2.98 -1.12 -1.44 -1.44 -1.57 -0.98 -0.90 -1.18 -1.42 -2.58 -3.08 -3.43 -3.17 -2.87 -3.50 -2.768
R 2.39 2.65 2.09 2.80 3.11 5.71 5.38 4.22 5.03 7.50 7.31 7.90 8.91 9.01 8.18 9.63 9.70
E -1.82 -2.19 -2.50 -2.50 -2.07 -3.26 -3.41 -3.78 -4.94 -7.86 -9.26 -10.81 -12.54 -11.64 -11.00 -11.58 -2.449
R 1.63 1.29 1.54 1.18 1.25 1.56 1.38 1.41 1.61 0.43 1.47 1.70 1.69 1.89 1.91 1.90 1.54
E -1.95 -2.45 -3.23 -3.38 -3.39 -2.71 -2.63 -3.61 13.50 10.17 127.96 151.07 168.56 162.32 163.91 164.34 -6.2210
R 1.94 2.08 2.32 2.59 2.80 4.25 4.38 4.83 5.43 5.62 6.13 6.69 7.31 8.07 8.51 9.18 10.07
E -0.12 -0.38 -0.27 -0.36 -0.41 -0.75 -0.54 -1.18 -0.92 -0.82 -2.59 -3.13 -3.62 -3.77 -3.88 -4.83 -2.0211
R 2.69 3.09 3.40 3.71 3.87 4.02 3.88 4.08 4.14 4.39 4.32 4.91 5.54 6.08 6.72 7.64 8.32
E -0.40 -1.35 -1.00 -1.30 -1.10 -0.89 -0.58 -1.34 -0.87 -0.82 -2.24 -2.45 -2.86 / / / /12
R 2.85 2.68 2.66 2.52 2.45 2.57 2.20 2.24 2.65 3.32 2.94 3.11 3.17 / / / /
E -0.32 -0.77 -0.63 -0.64 -0.49 -0.53 -0.61 -0.48 -0.64 -0.47 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 -0.55 -0.61 -0.60 -0.5313
R 0.90 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.18 1.25 1.16 1.21 1.37 1.44 1.69 1.94 2.16 2.33 2.68 2.37 1.85
E -0.18 -0.62 -0.43 -0.46 -0.47 -0.55 -0.25 5.61 -0.36 -0.35 -0.38 -0.38 -0.36 -0.38 -0.40 -0.46 -0.3114
R 1.34 1.47 1.55 1.66 1.76 1.66 1.69 1.85 2.04 1.97 2.03 2.19 2.29 2.41 2.59 2.60 2.05
E -0.05 -0.12 -0.11 -0.20 -0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.15 -0.17 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 -0.25 -0.2115
R 1.07 1.26 1.42 1.47 1.84 1.79 1.62 1.60 1.98 2.52 2.65 2.93 3.17 3.48 4.19 3.70 4.02
E -0.81 -0.86 -1.25 -1.17 -0.96 -0.48 -0.39 -0.49 -0.49 -0.43 -0.55 -0.63 -0.76 -0.81 -0.85 -0.79 -0.5916
R 2.08 2.29 2.94 2.94 3.01 2.85 3.11 3.24 4.28 4.74 4.68 5.35 5.99 6.35 6.84 6.61 7.52
E -0.38 51.00 11.11 10.80 16.35 40.63 -3.45 -3.65 -3.58 -4.08 -3.75 -3.56 -3.59 -3.66 -3.15 -3.32 -3.4317
R 9.12 8.87 9.63 9.12 10.45 10.73 10.64 9.89 9.21 9.58 9.85 9.42 9.48 9.45 9.03 9.41 9.29






and represents the share of European net output that Poland should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Poland actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Poland had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.20: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Portugal*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -2.05 -0.41 -0.48 -0.16 -0.15 -0.40 -0.22 -0.20 -0.14 -0.12 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.051
R 1.35 1.55 1.18 1.64 1.93 1.49 1.00 1.68 2.00 1.90 1.49 1.61 1.47 1.43 1.51 1.40 1.20
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.09 -0.15 -0.16 -0.26 -0.15 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.033
R 2.28 2.19 2.14 1.80 1.82 1.93 1.90 1.76 1.76 1.79 1.84 1.97 2.11 2.16 2.03 2.19 2.13
E -0.34 -0.64 -0.70 -0.79 -1.17 -0.78 -0.16 -0.19 -0.16 -0.16 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.134
R 5.11 5.05 5.25 5.27 4.48 4.54 4.72 4.70 4.64 4.66 4.58 4.30 4.12 4.27 4.25 4.17 4.12
E -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.12 -0.44 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.035
R 6.29 6.32 6.41 6.17 5.68 5.94 5.47 5.76 5.63 5.42 5.33 5.04 4.88 5.24 5.49 5.39 5.26
E -0.52 -0.23 -0.27 -0.33 -0.41 -0.61 -0.10 -0.27 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.25 -0.22 -0.29 -0.30 -0.276
R 3.84 4.11 4.76 4.69 5.24 3.91 3.94 3.69 3.70 3.36 3.38 2.98 2.81 2.94 2.84 2.55 2.37
E 23.37 -1.32 -1.35 -1.66 -2.89 -0.45 -0.48 -0.47 -0.47 -0.53 -0.56 -0.52 -0.63 -0.51 -0.43 -0.47 -0.427
R 1.50 1.53 1.49 1.44 0.84 1.17 1.23 1.16 1.27 1.23 1.25 1.29 1.31 1.39 1.67 1.64 1.54
E -1.39 -3.29 -3.69 -1.27 -3.13 -0.82 123.00 120.82 118.17 119.62 -8.36 -4.02 -5.04 -4.13 -4.22 -4.15 -3.298
R 2.58 2.98 3.10 1.20 2.84 3.45 3.55 10.27 8.75 3.42 2.21 1.43 1.36 1.32 1.14 0.89 0.62
E 27.38 56.76 62.41 64.85 62.37 -10.66 -4.71 -5.65 -3.80 -4.23 -0.42 -0.39 -0.47 -0.38 -0.46 -0.48 -0.469
R 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.15 0.28 0.12 0.23 0.36 0.39 0.34 0.35 0.40 0.29 0.22 0.20
E -1.31 -1.26 -1.49 -1.79 -1.78 119.31 -0.27 -0.27 -0.28 -0.34 -0.28 -0.27 -0.34 -0.29 -0.36 -0.40 -0.3510
R 0.79 0.75 0.83 0.90 1.05 0.96 1.04 0.92 0.92 0.83 1.21 1.10 1.06 1.11 1.10 0.93 0.84
E -0.18 -0.35 -0.40 -0.55 -0.55 -0.30 -0.28 -0.46 -0.38 -0.38 -0.38 -0.40 -0.49 -0.42 -0.57 -0.63 -0.5611
R 2.39 2.57 2.69 2.62 2.66 2.81 3.00 2.94 2.77 2.76 2.75 2.71 2.70 2.83 3.02 3.14 2.95
E -0.94 -1.76 -2.06 -2.94 -2.95 -2.53 -0.58 -0.61 -0.57 -0.69 -0.66 -0.65 -0.83 / / / /12
R 0.45 0.38 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.56 0.64 0.70 0.69 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.64 / / / /
E -0.07 -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.18 -0.53 -0.24 -0.21 -0.20 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.28 -0.25 -0.37 -0.37 -0.3413
R 0.51 0.49 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.42 0.36
E -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -1.04 -1.00 -1.19 -1.36 -1.47 -1.28 -1.42 -1.23 -1.81 -2.01 -1.7914
R 0.61 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.75 0.70 0.69 0.84 0.86 0.81 0.79 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.47 0.41
E -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.21 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.0315
R 0.45 0.83 0.88 0.84 0.70 0.61 0.58 0.65 0.66 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.57 0.61 0.51 0.47
E -0.17 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.64 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.0516
R 1.86 1.68 1.72 1.85 1.61 1.61 1.63 1.51 1.55 1.58 1.51 1.40 1.39 1.41 1.47 1.46 1.35
E -1.25 -0.39 -0.46 -0.64 -0.72 -0.84 119.11 124.33 120.82 121.49 129.57 119.98 124.17 127.80 123.27 118.23 113.7417
R 1.24 1.24 1.30 1.39 1.74 1.91 1.92 1.90 1.85 1.88 1.89 2.00 2.12 2.15 2.03 2.01 1.95






and represents the share of European net output that Portugal should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Portugal actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Portugal had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.21: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Spain*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E 5.46 82.60 90.17 89.76 87.82 97.65 37.25 24.25 103.29 82.62 27.64 92.11 96.97 92.31 -0.05 0.04 0.001
R 13.43 15.38 16.30 16.34 15.75 18.03 16.52 16.46 18.62 15.93 14.61 16.67 17.52 16.13 15.74 17.63 15.38
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E -0.20 -1.81 -1.97 -2.03 -2.07 -2.20 -1.03 -0.61 -2.42 2.41 -0.90 -2.71 -2.86 -2.86 -0.11 -0.09 -0.123
R 11.22 11.11 11.39 11.67 11.20 10.85 11.39 11.53 11.37 11.76 11.74 11.15 11.10 11.05 11.42 11.36 11.03
E -0.49 -0.12 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19 -1.65 -1.79 -0.20 -0.28 -0.33 -0.23 -0.23 -0.21 -0.33 -0.39 -0.404
R 8.21 8.38 8.72 8.55 9.51 9.29 9.18 9.49 9.53 9.18 9.44 9.54 9.24 9.15 8.56 7.95 7.55
E -0.16 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.065
R 12.25 12.79 13.25 14.56 14.42 14.17 13.93 14.61 14.50 14.16 14.24 13.71 13.46 14.11 13.56 13.18 13.22
E -2.61 -0.64 -0.81 -0.90 -1.24 -0.81 -2.18 -2.19 -0.83 -1.32 -2.50 -0.75 -0.82 -0.78 -2.65 -2.67 -2.856
R 6.18 6.30 5.94 5.84 7.53 6.02 5.84 6.15 6.17 5.07 6.03 6.18 5.80 6.28 5.90 5.36 5.13
E -0.69 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 -0.29 -0.87 -1.03 -0.09 -0.32 -0.63 -0.23 -0.27 -0.11 -0.47 -0.43 -0.737
R 6.72 6.69 6.49 5.44 4.86 7.73 7.87 8.16 8.17 7.89 8.60 8.45 8.26 7.94 8.06 7.63 7.42
E -1.38 -0.69 -0.56 -0.71 -0.82 127.88 -1.94 -2.14 -0.93 -0.91 134.69 134.16 135.00 -1.13 -1.13 -1.37 -2.038
R 8.97 11.14 8.46 10.01 13.60 11.19 9.18 8.17 7.10 7.44 8.66 10.46 12.93 12.68 11.44 13.85 15.14
E -3.91 -1.18 -1.27 -1.47 -1.33 -2.13 -9.46 -9.33 -1.63 -1.60 -2.95 -1.59 -1.61 -1.34 -3.69 -3.48 -3.709
R 6.59 6.57 6.08 6.37 6.55 6.19 6.29 6.06 6.11 6.02 6.46 6.35 6.60 6.38 6.72 6.53 6.59
E -2.42 -0.50 -0.57 -0.63 -0.66 -1.13 173.09 184.55 -1.31 -1.73 -2.22 -0.98 -1.11 -1.10 -2.81 -2.78 -2.5310
R 4.61 4.92 4.69 4.80 4.88 4.99 5.22 5.30 5.08 4.83 4.78 4.58 4.53 4.78 4.63 4.03 4.18
E -1.82 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.32 39.18 42.71 -0.23 -0.59 41.59 -0.34 -0.40 -0.25 -2.02 -2.24 121.7511
R 12.06 11.69 12.37 13.18 13.84 13.89 15.89 16.48 16.45 16.40 17.35 17.34 17.21 16.74 15.59 15.24 13.30
E 135.16 -0.88 -0.94 -1.21 -1.44 -1.86 -4.42 -1.09 -1.31 -1.68 67.47 -1.87 -2.06 / / / /12
R 7.41 7.56 7.54 7.32 8.11 7.30 7.15 7.57 7.71 7.74 8.05 8.06 7.81 / / / /
E -3.70 -0.15 -0.18 -0.19 -0.23 -0.55 -1.68 -2.02 -0.33 -0.38 -2.46 -0.61 -0.63 -0.34 -2.28 -1.95 -2.2813
R 3.10 3.44 3.41 3.81 3.69 4.05 4.02 4.21 4.05 3.89 3.89 4.07 3.98 4.06 4.34 3.66 3.48
E -0.72 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.28 -0.52 -0.04 -0.05 -0.42 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 -0.45 -0.46 -0.4214
R 5.46 5.75 5.47 5.57 5.31 5.10 5.29 4.57 4.98 4.79 4.75 4.59 4.26 4.05 3.90 3.29 2.76
E -0.14 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 -0.14 -0.16 -0.11 -0.08 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.0915
R 8.69 8.63 8.84 8.67 8.59 8.78 8.65 8.74 8.77 8.43 8.26 8.19 8.13 8.05 8.15 7.12 6.72
E -3.83 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.28 -0.78 -0.08 -0.11 -10.78 -0.16 -0.23 -0.19 -23.70 -19.77 -10.8916
R 9.20 9.55 9.84 10.09 10.15 9.55 9.65 9.79 9.97 10.30 10.15 9.81 9.41 9.27 9.40 8.78 7.63
E -3.72 -0.49 -0.55 -0.58 -0.75 -4.40 -2.82 7.01 -0.70 -0.83 -3.80 -1.78 -1.84 -1.01 -4.30 -3.60 -4.9817
R 4.95 4.99 5.35 5.33 6.32 4.36 6.84 7.94 7.99 8.08 7.98 8.46 8.43 8.66 8.90 9.05 9.27






and represents the share of European net output that Spain should have produced in order to realize the
efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries considered
here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Spain actually produced. An ESR > RSR means
that Spain had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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Table 2.22: Percentage Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) and Real Specialization Ratio (R) in Sweden*
Year
Sector E/R 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
E -0.27 -17.76 -2.30 -17.23 -12.51 -0.08 -0.09 -13.30 -14.28 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.031
R 1.11 1.54 1.38 1.22 1.18 1.24 1.44 1.43 1.57 1.61 1.33 1.79 1.58 1.50 1.20 1.78 1.97
E / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /2
R / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
E 0.01 24.67 2.64 23.90 18.47 -0.01 -0.04 23.03 22.43 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.043
R 2.26 2.23 2.18 2.15 2.15 1.99 2.09 2.14 2.07 2.08 2.12 2.14 2.05 2.03 2.16 2.36 2.37
E -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.054
R 0.70 0.67 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.81 0.97
E -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.045
R 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.14 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.37 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05
E -8.44 -0.48 -10.39 -0.58 -4.07 -1.13 -2.28 -0.44 -0.40 -0.65 -0.92 -0.68 -0.67 -0.71 -0.66 -0.73 -0.686
R 10.14 10.10 10.30 10.14 13.02 10.90 10.84 10.52 10.35 9.89 10.92 11.12 10.34 10.34 10.10 11.34 11.59
E -0.55 -1.28 -0.60 -1.09 -1.15 -0.51 -0.44 -1.54 -1.20 -1.02 -1.14 -1.09 -0.90 -0.85 -0.80 -0.95 -0.897
R 7.87 7.68 7.49 7.67 7.23 7.05 6.90 7.16 7.43 7.33 7.11 6.99 6.78 6.88 7.06 7.89 8.16
E -5.98 -0.29 -3.58 -0.27 -1.11 -0.62 -0.88 -0.22 -0.25 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 -0.09 -0.088
R 3.39 4.21 3.30 4.77 4.16 3.88 3.88 3.45 3.67 3.89 4.05 3.91 3.56 3.88 4.34 3.51 3.47
E -1.48 -0.49 -1.42 -0.52 -0.81 -0.90 -0.74 -0.51 -0.49 -0.71 -0.75 -0.76 -0.71 -0.67 -0.62 -0.67 -0.649
R 1.93 1.96 1.98 2.05 2.04 2.05 2.43 2.62 2.92 2.83 2.87 2.93 2.58 2.35 2.59 2.72 2.99
E -0.41 -2.11 -0.57 -2.00 -1.66 -0.78 -0.70 -2.01 -2.11 -1.70 -1.92 -1.82 -1.92 -1.98 -1.70 -1.93 -1.9210
R 1.88 1.88 2.15 2.02 2.00 1.56 1.89 1.82 1.90 1.62 1.39 1.46 1.39 1.23 1.44 1.48 1.75
E -0.39 -0.29 -0.33 -0.30 -0.34 -0.69 -0.62 -0.45 -0.49 -0.33 -0.43 -0.43 -0.51 -0.56 -0.53 -0.62 -0.6411
R 1.67 1.61 1.53 1.50 1.40 1.45 1.58 1.55 1.40 1.37 1.48 1.56 1.64 1.73 1.80 2.13 2.55
E -1.47 -0.85 -1.44 -1.03 -1.21 51.92 47.70 -0.93 -1.01 -4.41 -3.96 -5.22 -5.32 / / / /12
R 4.36 4.41 4.78 4.27 4.48 4.53 5.02 4.59 4.34 4.27 4.39 3.98 4.13 / / / /
E -0.72 -0.30 -0.66 -0.29 -0.45 -0.58 -0.60 -0.33 -0.30 -0.65 -0.70 -0.69 -0.85 -0.88 -0.79 -0.89 -0.9413
R 3.92 3.77 3.73 3.74 3.78 3.69 3.84 4.02 4.09 4.06 4.23 4.22 4.37 4.22 3.49 4.42 4.84
E -0.58 -0.12 -0.44 -0.19 -0.34 -0.12 -0.34 -0.13 -0.06 37.78 40.26 41.31 40.39 40.84 41.14 48.63 52.5614
R 2.51 3.14 3.46 3.81 4.37 4.32 4.18 4.06 3.83 4.11 4.38 4.48 4.55 4.84 5.22 5.59 6.29
E -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.18 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.19 -0.18 -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32 -0.31 -0.27 -0.36 -0.4215
R 3.56 3.33 3.24 3.34 3.39 3.67 3.55 3.63 3.80 4.02 4.15 4.07 4.10 3.82 3.19 4.19 5.01
E -0.18 -0.20 -0.22 -0.22 -0.16 -1.19 -1.25 -0.23 -0.22 -0.39 -0.43 -0.42 -0.41 -0.41 -0.39 -0.40 -0.3416
R 2.31 2.20 2.20 2.40 2.52 2.49 2.35 2.19 2.20 2.28 2.12 2.22 2.38 2.21 2.16 2.23 2.22
E 138.61 -0.75 117.23 -0.57 33.18 -1.24 13.62 -0.62 -0.57 -0.31 -0.27 -0.31 -0.28 -0.28 -0.26 -0.30 -0.3317
R 4.56 4.33 4.34 4.28 4.81 4.76 4.79 4.55 4.35 4.54 4.38 3.98 4.36 4.09 4.35 5.05 5.19






and represents the share of European net output that Sweden should have produced in order to
realize the efficient specialization pattern, that is to say the pattern of specialization that would have placed the set of European countries
considered here on their n-dimensional NPPF . The RSR is the share of European net output that Sweden actually produced. An ESR >
RSR means that Sweden had a Comparative Advantage in the relative sector.
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2.B.2 Comparative Advantages ranking
The following Tables present the Efficient Specialization Ratio—see eq.
2.B.1—in another perspective. A Table represent a sector and in each col-
umn are reported the countries with the highest ESR. Presenting the data
in this way offers allow to identify rapidly which countries that should
play a leading role in specific sectors.
Aside the value in the ESR, a sign +, - or = has been reported in Tables
2.23-2.38. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved
(+), lowered (-), or kept more or less constant (=) the net product. If the
distance between the ESR and the RSR has been lower than the 20% of
the RSR, the country has been considered to be close to its CA and an
equals sign has been reported.
The results tend to be similar to those in Chapter 1, although some dif-
ferences emerge. For example, Sector 1 is still dominated by France and
Spain, but in this case Spain occupies the first position much more fre-
quently. Another example is Sector 10—Rubber and Plastics—, in which
Poland is a dominant country here during the period 2005-2010, a result
that did not emerge in Tab. 1.31.
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Table 2.23: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
FRA FRA ESP ESP ESP ESP FRA FRA ESP ESP FRA ESP ESP ESP FRA FRA FRA1
135.97+ 108.65+ 90.17+ 89.76+ 87.82+ 97.65+ 126.82+ 123.28+ 103.29+ 82.62+ 97.73+ 92.11+ 96.97+ 92.31+ 132.55+ 147.49+ 141.70+
NLD ESP FRA FRA FRA FRA ESP CZE FRA FRA CZE FRA FRA FRA CZE CZE CZE2
26.81+ 82.60+ 60.34+ 75.29+ 64.43+ 44.45+ 37.25+ 26.62+ 50.30+ 64.80+ 31.63+ 60.05+ 49.49+ 62.42+ 26.12+ 23.00+ 26.15+
CZE DNK CZE CZE CZE NLD CZE ESP CZE CZE ESP CZE CZE CZE DNK DNK DNK3
24.07+ 1.23= 20.22+ 23.68+ 23.00+ 25.80+ 20.38+ 24.25+ 30.89+ 27.35+ 27.64+ 29.54+ 25.30+ 24.75+ 11.88+ 9.03+ 10.02+
ESP FIN NLD FIN DNK CZE FIN FIN DNK DNK HUN DNK DNK BEL FIN ESP ESP4
5.46- -0.01- 14.29+ -0.01+ 0.14- 24.47+ -0.01- -0.01+ 10.57+ 8.20+ 15.89+ 1.40+ 9.55+ -0.00- -0.02- 0.04- 0.00-
GBR IRL FIN AUT FIN BEL GRC BEL FIN GRC DNK GRC BEL GRC SWE BEL FIN5
3.96- -0.05- -0.01- -0.10- -0.01- -0.01- -0.01- -0.04- -0.01- -0.00- 9.98+ -0.01- -0.00- -0.01- -0.03- -0.00- -0.01-
DNK AUT AUT GRC AUT GRC AUT AUT AUT SWE GRC BEL GRC DNK ESP FIN AUT6
1.00= -0.07- -0.11- -0.12- -0.05- -0.02- -0.04- -0.04- -0.04- -0.02- -0.00- -0.01- -0.01- -0.02- -0.05- -0.02- -0.03-
FIN CZE BEL IRL PRT FIN BEL HUN GRC FIN SWE AUT FIN FIN GBR AUT SWE7
-0.01- -0.08- -0.12- -0.13- -0.15- -0.03+ -0.05- -0.05- -0.06- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.03- -0.05- -0.03- -0.03-
BEL BEL IRL PRT IRL SWE HUN PRT GBR AUT FIN FIN AUT SWE PRT SWE IRL8
-0.01- -0.12- -0.15- -0.16- -0.15- -0.08- -0.06- -0.20- -0.12- -0.05- -0.02- -0.04- -0.02- -0.03- -0.06- -0.03- -0.05-
AUT GRC DNK DNK HUN HUN SWE IRL PRT BEL AUT SWE SWE AUT HUN GRC BEL9
-0.05- -0.37- -0.34- -0.27- -0.19- -0.09- -0.09- -0.20- -0.14- -0.05+ -0.04- -0.05- -0.03- -0.03- -0.10- -0.04- -0.05-
IRL PRT GRC BEL BEL IRL IRL GRC HUN HUN IRL PRT IRL IRL IRL IRL PRT10
-0.08- -0.41- -0.38- -0.31- -0.20- -0.19- -0.17- -0.23- -0.14- -0.08- -0.06- -0.05- -0.05- -0.05- -0.13- -0.04- -0.05-
SWE ITA PRT ITA GRC AUT PRT DNK IRL PRT PRT IRL PRT PRT DEU GBR HUN11
-0.27- -0.75- -0.48- -0.79- -0.29- -0.28- -0.22- -0.24- -0.22- -0.12- -0.06- -0.08- -0.06- -0.05- -0.65- -0.05- -0.16-
GRC DEU SWE DEU ITA DNK DNK DEU DEU DEU DEU HUN HUN GBR AUT PRT GBR12
-0.47- -1.51- -2.30- -1.98- -0.68- -0.40- -0.29- -1.00- -0.45- -0.17- -0.21- -0.11- -0.10- -0.06- -1.73- -0.06- -0.18-
ITA POL DEU POL DEU PRT DEU POL BEL IRL BEL DEU DEU HUN POL HUN NLD13
-0.77- -3.69- -2.39- -5.68- -2.40- -0.40- -1.29- -3.49- -2.88- -0.18- -0.35- -1.15- -0.18- -0.14- -2.88- -0.11- -3.63-
PRT SWE POL HUN POL DEU POL ITA POL GBR GBR GBR GBR DEU BEL NLD DEU14
-2.05- -17.76- -5.18- -15.72- -5.72- -1.68- -3.63- -3.81- -5.36- -1.22- -1.46- -1.31- -1.46- -4.04- -4.84- -1.55- -4.94-
POL HUN HUN SWE SWE POL ITA SWE SWE POL POL POL POL POL GRC DEU GRC15
-4.30- -20.50- -18.89- -17.23- -12.51- -6.14- -13.93- -13.30- -14.28- -3.53- -3.45- -3.78- -2.98- -5.88- -9.57- -4.70- -5.43-
HUN NLD ITA GBR NLD GBR GBR GBR ITA NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD POL ITA16
-17.40- -22.44- -22.05- -17.55- -22.69- -27.18- -23.41- -15.65- -30.71- -36.83- -34.50- -34.12- -34.47- -30.32- -25.10- -17.61- -19.34-
DEU GBR GBR NLD GBR ITA NLD NLD NLD ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA POL17
-71.86- -24.74- -32.62- -28.69- -30.36- -55.88- -41.26- -35.88- -40.65- -40.71- -42.70- -42.39- -41.92- -38.80- -25.33- -55.31- -43.96-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.24: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Food, Beverages and Tobacco*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DEU GBR GBR NLD GBR ITA NLD NLD NLD ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA NLD ITA POL1
83.29+ 34.31+ 45.71+ 37.12+ 47.80+ 66.02+ 49.16+ 48.18+ 47.72+ 53.61+ 58.47+ 59.43+ 59.79+ 57.62+ 41.67+ 85.99+ 57.25+
HUN SWE ITA GBR NLD GBR GBR GBR ITA NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD ITA POL ITA2
21.58+ 24.67+ 23.15+ 26.08+ 38.75+ 39.88+ 39.65+ 29.23+ 36.44+ 48.22+ 47.96+ 47.72+ 47.77+ 46.45+ 41.30+ 17.96+ 31.97+
SWE HUN HUN SWE SWE GRC ITA SWE SWE ESP GRC GRC GRC POL GRC GRC GRC3
0.01- 24.02+ 20.34+ 23.90+ 18.47+ -0.01- 16.45+ 23.03+ 22.43+ 2.41- -0.00- -0.01- -0.01- 3.06- 18.41+ 0.05- 10.65+
AUT NLD NLD HUN AUT SWE GRC ITA AUT GRC PRT PRT PRT GRC BEL HUN NLD4
-0.02- 21.58+ 12.65+ 18.01+ -0.02- -0.01- -0.01- 4.45- -0.03- -0.00- -0.03- -0.03- -0.04- -0.01- 4.39+ -0.03- 3.90-
BEL AUT SWE GRC GRC PRT AUT AUT PRT HUN AUT AUT SWE DNK HUN AUT HUN5
-0.04- -0.03- 2.64+ -0.02- -0.04- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.04- -0.02- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03-
GRC CZE AUT AUT BEL HUN PRT HUN HUN PRT SWE FIN AUT PRT PRT PRT PRT6
-0.06- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.05- -0.03- -0.04- -0.03- -0.04- -0.04- -0.04- -0.04- -0.04- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03-
FIN GRC GRC BEL DNK AUT SWE PRT BEL SWE BEL SWE FIN SWE SWE FIN AUT7
-0.07- -0.05- -0.05- -0.09- -0.11- -0.03- -0.04- -0.04- -0.05- -0.04- -0.05- -0.04- -0.05- -0.04- -0.04- -0.04- -0.03-
PRT BEL BEL FIN FIN BEL HUN BEL FIN BEL IRL HUN HUN HUN FIN IRL FIN8
-0.09- -0.05- -0.05- -0.10- -0.11- -0.06- -0.04- -0.04- -0.15- -0.06- -0.13- -0.04- -0.05- -0.05- -0.05- -0.04- -0.04-
POL FIN FIN DNK HUN FIN BEL DNK POL AUT FIN BEL BEL BEL AUT SWE SWE9
-0.10- -0.09- -0.09- -0.13- -0.13- -0.16- -0.05- -0.06- -0.18- -0.07- -0.19- -0.05- -0.05- -0.05- -0.08- -0.04- -0.04-
IRL POL POL POL PRT DNK POL POL GRC FIN POL DNK IRL FIN ESP BEL BEL10
-0.10- -0.10- -0.14- -0.14- -0.15- -0.17- -0.14- -0.17- -0.21- -0.16- -0.25- -0.07- -0.10- -0.05- -0.11- -0.04- -0.04-
ITA ITA PRT IRL ITA POL FIN GRC IRL POL DNK IRL DNK AUT DEU ESP GBR11
-0.14- -0.13- -0.16- -0.18- -0.15- -0.20- -0.16- -0.17- -0.22- -0.20- -0.27- -0.12- -0.29- -0.06- -0.27- -0.09- -0.05-
ESP PRT DNK PRT IRL IRL IRL FIN DNK DEU DEU DEU DEU IRL IRL DNK IRL12
-0.20- -0.15- -0.20- -0.26- -0.16- -0.21- -0.20- -0.20- -0.26- -0.21- -0.34- -0.28- -0.33- -0.06- -0.28- -0.18- -0.05-
DNK IRL IRL DEU POL DEU DNK IRL DEU IRL HUN POL POL DEU DNK NLD ESP13
-0.32- -0.18- -0.21- -0.30- -0.18- -0.30- -0.23- -0.20- -0.26- -0.21- -0.42- -0.32- -0.37- -0.34- -0.31- -0.22- -0.12-
GBR DEU DEU ITA DEU CZE DEU DEU CZE DNK CZE GBR GBR GBR POL DEU DNK14
-0.34- -0.27- -0.26- -0.31- -0.24- -0.71- -0.42- -0.36- -0.70- -0.24- -0.60- -0.58- -0.48- -0.47- -0.35- -0.27- -0.18-
CZE DNK CZE CZE CZE NLD CZE ESP GBR CZE GBR CZE CZE CZE GBR GBR DEU15
-0.45- -0.39- -0.56- -0.60- -0.59- -0.73- -0.59- -0.61- -0.76- -0.66- -0.63- -0.60- -0.55- -0.55- -0.41- -0.38- -0.27-
NLD FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA ESP CZE FRA GBR ESP FRA FRA FRA CZE CZE CZE16
-1.38- -1.33- -0.77- -0.94- -1.03- -1.05- -1.03- -0.74- -1.29- -0.75- -0.90- -2.23- -2.30- -2.54- -0.66- -0.55- -0.68-
FRA ESP ESP ESP ESP ESP FRA FRA ESP FRA FRA ESP ESP ESP FRA FRA FRA17
-1.58- -1.81- -1.97- -2.03- -2.07- -2.20- -2.29- -2.23- -2.42- -1.57- -2.54- -2.71- -2.86- -2.86- -3.16- -2.06- -2.19-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.25: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Textiles and Textile Production*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GBR DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU GBR GBR GBR GBR FRA FRA DEU DEU DEU1
105.23+ 70.20+ 108.20+ 109.85+ 110.61+ 107.95+ 108.41+ 88.02+ 110.02+ 110.00+ 108.62+ 110.39+ 108.64+ 108.64+ 105.82+ 107.90+ 91.98+
SWE GBR FIN CZE DNK DNK SWE DNK DNK GRC HUN FIN DNK FIN GBR DNK GBR2
-0.02- 34.79+ -0.02- -0.02- 0.86= 1.30+ -0.04- 21.34+ -0.03- -0.01- -0.02- -0.03- -0.02- -0.03- 0.78- -0.02- 12.18=
CZE FIN SWE FIN CZE CZE GRC SWE SWE SWE GRC SWE FIN GRC DNK FIN DNK3
-0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.05- -0.05- -0.04- -0.03- -0.02- -0.05- -0.03- -0.03- -0.01- -0.02- -0.01-
BEL SWE CZE SWE FIN GRC AUT FIN GRC DNK DNK CZE GRC DNK FIN GRC FIN4
-0.04- -0.06- -0.02- -0.06- -0.07- -0.04- -0.09- -0.08- -0.05- -0.04- -0.02- -0.06- -0.04- -0.04- -0.03- -0.04- -0.02-
FIN CZE DNK IRL SWE SWE IRL IRL IRL CZE SWE GRC SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE5
-0.04- -0.09- -0.07- -0.07- -0.07- -0.05- -0.11- -0.09- -0.12- -0.08- -0.04- -0.07- -0.05- -0.06- -0.05- -0.05- -0.05-
IRL ESP IRL AUT IRL IRL FIN AUT AUT BEL CZE BEL CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE6
-0.08- -0.12- -0.11- -0.10- -0.10- -0.12- -0.13- -0.09- -0.13- -0.14- -0.04- -0.10- -0.05- -0.06- -0.06- -0.07- -0.09-
AUT AUT ESP GRC AUT BEL BEL CZE BEL PRT AUT PRT BEL BEL GRC BEL BEL7
-0.10- -0.14- -0.14- -0.12- -0.13- -0.13- -0.14- -0.12- -0.13- -0.16- -0.10- -0.11- -0.11- -0.10- -0.10- -0.09- -0.10-
FRA IRL AUT ESP ESP FIN CZE BEL CZE IRL IRL AUT PRT IRL PRT IRL IRL8
-0.17- -0.14- -0.16- -0.16- -0.17- -0.13- -0.15- -0.13- -0.14- -0.16- -0.11- -0.13- -0.12- -0.11- -0.13- -0.10- -0.12-
POL HUN HUN DNK GRC HUN PRT PRT PRT FIN BEL HUN IRL PRT HUN PRT GRC9
-0.31- -0.21- -0.17- -0.16- -0.21- -0.14- -0.16- -0.19- -0.16- -0.16- -0.12- -0.13- -0.14- -0.11- -0.19- -0.13- -0.13-
PRT GRC NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD NLD FIN HUN FIN DNK HUN HUN NLD AUT PRT10
-0.34- -0.34- -0.25- -0.31- -0.24- -0.15- -0.21- -0.25- -0.19- -0.17- -0.13- -0.17- -0.15- -0.17- -0.20- -0.14- -0.13-
NLD POL GRC POL HUN ESP DNK HUN ESP NLD PRT NLD AUT AUT IRL HUN AUT11
-0.40- -0.35- -0.30- -0.53- -0.56- -0.19- -0.26- -0.35- -0.20- -0.23- -0.13- -0.21- -0.15- -0.20- -0.23- -0.21- -0.15-
GRC BEL BEL HUN POL POL HUN ITA HUN ESP NLD ESP NLD NLD BEL ESP HUN12
-0.41- -0.37- -0.42- -0.53- -0.62- -0.33- -0.38- -0.73- -0.20- -0.28- -0.24- -0.23- -0.21- -0.21- -0.24- -0.39- -0.22-
DNK NLD POL PRT BEL AUT POL GRC NLD AUT ESP IRL ESP ESP AUT FRA ESP13
-0.42- -0.50- -0.50- -0.79- -0.67- -0.40- -0.72- -0.86- -0.26- -0.52- -0.33- -0.24- -0.23- -0.21- -0.24- -0.47- -0.40-
ESP DNK ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA POL POL DEU ITA ITA ITA ITA ESP NLD FRA14
-0.49- -0.52- -0.51- -0.93- -0.93- -0.70- -0.89- -0.95- -1.14- -0.68- -1.25- -1.11- -0.89- -0.89- -0.33- -0.68- -0.41-
HUN ITA PRT BEL PRT PRT FRA FRA ITA POL POL DEU DEU DEU ITA ITA NLD15
-0.53- -0.56- -0.70- -1.20- -1.17- -0.78- -1.05- -1.02- -1.39- -1.09- -1.70- -1.50- -1.75- -1.76- -0.86- -0.76- -0.65-
ITA PRT GBR FRA GBR GBR ESP ESP DEU ITA DEU POL GBR GBR FRA GBR ITA16
-0.59- -0.64- -2.40- -2.15- -2.72- -2.27- -1.65- -1.79- -1.40- -2.11- -2.04- -2.25- -1.89- -1.88- -1.22- -1.93- -0.83-
DEU FRA FRA GBR FRA FRA GBR GBR FRA FRA FRA FRA POL POL POL POL POL17
-1.26- -0.92- -2.41- -2.68- -3.78- -3.83- -2.38- -2.67- -4.45- -4.14- -2.34- -3.99- -2.81- -2.80- -2.72- -2.80- -0.84-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.26: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Leather, Leather and Footwear*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK DNK GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR1
104.54+ 104.34+ 104.55+ 77.43+ 106.34+ 105.55+ 90.62+ 104.72+ 108.86+ 107.31+ 103.83+ 104.76+ 105.36+ 104.92+ 103.84+ 104.25+ 103.60+
BEL SWE FIN ITA CZE CZE ITA DNK DNK DNK GRC GRC GRC GRC DNK GRC DNK2
-0.01- -0.01- -0.01- 29.13- -0.01- -0.00- 12.82- 0.02- -0.00- 0.00- -0.00- -0.00- -0.00- -0.00- -0.00- -0.01- -0.00-
FIN FIN SWE FIN FIN SWE SWE FIN SWE GRC DNK CZE DNK CZE CZE DNK CZE3
-0.01- -0.01- -0.01- -0.01- -0.01- -0.01- -0.00- -0.01- -0.01- -0.00- -0.00- -0.02- -0.01- -0.02- -0.01- -0.01- -0.01-
CZE BEL CZE CZE GRC GRC GRC SWE FIN FIN CZE PRT CZE PRT GRC CZE BEL4
-0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.01- -0.02- -0.01- -0.01- -0.01- -0.01- -0.01- -0.01- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.01- -0.02- -0.02-
SWE GRC BEL GRC SWE FIN FIN AUT PRT CZE HUN DNK PRT BEL PRT IRL PRT5
-0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.01- -0.01- -0.03- -0.04- -0.02- -0.02- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03-
PRT IRL GRC SWE BEL AUT IRL PRT IRL PRT FIN BEL BEL DNK SWE BEL GRC6
-0.02- -0.03- -0.02- -0.02- -0.03- -0.02- -0.02- -0.04- -0.06- -0.03- -0.02- -0.03- -0.04- -0.03- -0.03+ -0.03- -0.03-
IRL AUT IRL BEL IRL IRL CZE IRL BEL SWE PRT SWE SWE SWE ESP PRT IRL7
-0.02- -0.03- -0.02- -0.04- -0.03- -0.04- -0.03- -0.05- -0.06- -0.04- -0.03- -0.06- -0.05- -0.05- -0.04- -0.03- -0.03-
GRC CZE AUT AUT AUT BEL AUT BEL ESP BEL BEL AUT NLD IRL BEL SWE SWE8
-0.03- -0.04- -0.03- -0.05- -0.05- -0.07- -0.04- -0.05- -0.07- -0.06- -0.03- -0.06- -0.08- -0.06- -0.04- -0.04+ -0.04+
AUT PRT NLD IRL ESP NLD PRT NLD NLD IRL SWE NLD ESP NLD NLD ESP FIN9
-0.04- -0.06- -0.06- -0.05- -0.06- -0.09- -0.04- -0.09- -0.07- -0.07- -0.04- -0.08- -0.08- -0.06- -0.05- -0.04- -0.04-
FRA ESP PRT ESP NLD ESP BEL POL AUT NLD AUT ESP HUN ESP AUT FIN AUT10
-0.08- -0.08- -0.06- -0.09- -0.07- -0.10- -0.05- -0.11- -0.08- -0.09- -0.06- -0.09- -0.09- -0.07- -0.06- -0.06- -0.05-
NLD NLD ESP POL POL POL NLD GRC CZE POL ESP FIN FIN HUN FIN NLD ESP11
-0.08- -0.09- -0.08- -0.10- -0.10- -0.12- -0.09- -0.11- -0.10- -0.10- -0.08- -0.12- -0.09- -0.10- -0.07- -0.12- -0.06-
POL HUN HUN NLD PRT HUN POL ESP POL ESP NLD HUN IRL FIN HUN FRA NLD12
-0.09- -0.13- -0.12- -0.10- -0.12- -0.14- -0.10- -0.11- -0.12- -0.10- -0.09- -0.14- -0.13- -0.11- -0.16- -0.15- -0.12-
ESP POL POL PRT HUN PRT FRA FRA FRA FRA IRL IRL AUT AUT FRA AUT FRA13
-0.16- -0.14- -0.16- -0.10- -0.34- -0.44- -0.12- -0.13- -0.58- -0.47- -0.11- -0.23- -0.23- -0.19- -0.18- -0.24- -0.14-
HUN FRA FRA HUN FRA FRA ESP CZE HUN HUN FRA POL POL POL IRL HUN HUN14
-0.30- -0.15- -0.30- -0.32- -0.53- -0.47- -0.14- -0.20- -0.65- -0.49- -0.13- -0.23- -0.27- -0.29- -0.20- -0.34- -0.20-
DEU DEU DEU FRA DEU DEU HUN HUN DEU DEU POL FRA FRA FRA POL POL POL15
-0.57- -0.70- -0.70- -0.37- -0.80- -0.69- -0.47- -0.59- -0.71- -0.67- -0.19- -0.33- -0.97- -0.90- -0.25- -0.34- -0.25-
GBR GBR GBR DEU GBR GBR DEU DEU ITA AUT DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU16
-1.15- -1.02- -1.03- -0.86- -1.85- -1.45- -0.90- -0.92- -2.67- -2.45- -0.89- -0.75- -1.03- -0.93- -0.85- -1.28- -1.06-
ITA ITA ITA GBR ITA ITA GBR ITA GRC ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA17
-1.94- -1.80- -1.90- -4.43- -2.29- -1.86- -1.41- -2.32- -3.63- -2.72- -2.15- -2.56- -2.24- -2.04- -1.83- -1.54- -1.53-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.27: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Wood and Products of Wood and Cork*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR BEL GBR GBR GBR GBR DEU BEL DEU DEU1
135.02+ 125.41+ 134.89+ 125.44+ 92.11+ 124.31+ 127.67+ 126.73+ 154.52+ 126.04+ 104.71+ 89.03+ 125.14+ 140.87+ 154.43+ 144.63+ 138.80+
IRL CZE DNK IRL DEU IRL IRL IRL IRL GRC BEL DEU GRC GRC DNK IRL BEL2
-0.06- -0.14- -0.09- -0.08- 39.50+ -0.13- -0.09- -0.06- -0.09- -0.03- 22.56+ 29.89+ -0.10- -0.08- -0.12- -0.17- 2.85-
DNK DNK IRL DNK IRL GRC PRT PRT PRT IRL GRC BEL IRL IRL IRL GRC DNK3
-0.12- -0.19- -0.11- -0.21- -0.15- -0.17- -0.10- -0.27- -0.21- -0.10- -0.06- -0.09- -0.17- -0.12- -0.14- -0.19- -0.12-
CZE PRT PRT GRC DNK DNK GRC FIN FIN PRT HUN PRT DNK PRT HUN DNK IRL4
-0.44- -0.23- -0.27- -0.26- -0.15- -0.23- -0.23- -0.27- -0.23- -0.21- -0.17- -0.21- -0.24- -0.22- -0.29- -0.21- -0.22-
PRT IRL HUN PRT PRT HUN FIN HUN DNK HUN PRT GRC PRT DNK PRT BEL PRT5
-0.52- -0.42- -0.41- -0.33- -0.41- -0.29- -0.26- -0.29- -0.26- -0.24- -0.21- -0.23- -0.25- -0.38- -0.29- -0.29- -0.27-
GRC GRC GRC HUN GRC FIN DNK DNK HUN CZE IRL IRL FIN BEL FIN PRT HUN6
-0.55- -0.45- -0.43- -0.56- -0.49- -0.35- -0.30- -0.31- -0.28- -0.25- -0.22- -0.27- -0.39- -0.40- -0.40- -0.30- -0.32-
FIN HUN CZE SWE HUN CZE HUN BEL SWE FIN DNK DNK BEL FIN NLD HUN FIN7
-0.56- -0.47- -0.57- -0.58- -0.73- -0.35- -0.38- -0.36- -0.40- -0.29- -0.26- -0.42- -0.48- -0.43- -0.53- -0.38- -0.37-
HUN SWE FIN CZE BEL BEL BEL SWE CZE DNK FIN FIN NLD NLD SWE FIN SWE8
-0.73- -0.48- -0.64- -0.66- -0.78- -0.53- -0.43- -0.44- -0.53- -0.33- -0.58- -0.46- -0.61- -0.57- -0.66- -0.43- -0.68-
AUT FIN ESP BEL CZE NLD NLD NLD NLD BEL CZE NLD CZE AUT CZE SWE NLD9
-0.92- -0.61- -0.81- -0.70- -0.80- -0.56- -0.66- -0.56- -0.55- -0.36- -0.59- -0.57- -0.61- -0.69- -0.88- -0.73- -0.96-
BEL ESP NLD FIN FIN PRT CZE CZE AUT NLD NLD SWE SWE CZE AUT CZE CZE10
-1.09- -0.64- -0.82- -0.80- -0.88- -0.61- -1.03- -0.57- -0.56- -0.54- -0.65- -0.68- -0.67- -0.71- -1.67- -0.86- -1.04-
NLD BEL BEL ESP NLD ESP AUT AUT ESP SWE SWE ESP ESP SWE ESP NLD AUT11
-1.33- -0.84- -0.84- -0.90- -1.07- -0.81- -1.28- -1.15- -0.83- -0.65- -0.92- -0.75- -0.82- -0.71- -2.65- -1.02- -1.35-
FRA AUT AUT AUT ESP AUT ESP GRC GRC AUT AUT HUN HUN ESP ITA AUT GRC12
-1.92- -1.29- -1.38- -1.05- -1.24- -0.93- -2.18- -1.72- -1.70- -1.02- -0.97- -0.94- -1.04- -0.78- -2.97- -1.11- -2.21-
POL NLD ITA NLD ITA SWE SWE ESP POL ESP ESP AUT AUT HUN GRC ESP POL13
-2.41- -1.56- -2.83- -1.05- -3.79- -1.13- -2.28- -2.19- -4.23- -1.32- -2.50- -1.13- -1.11- -1.15- -3.47- -2.67- -2.33-
ITA ITA FRA ITA SWE POL POL ITA ITA POL POL CZE FRA FRA POL POL ESP14
-2.53- -2.46- -3.56- -2.42- -4.07- -2.42- -2.48- -2.85- -4.50- -4.26- -2.97- -1.16- -3.04- -3.31- -4.13- -3.64- -2.85-
ESP FRA POL FRA AUT ITA FRA FRA FRA ITA FRA POL POL ITA FRA FRA ITA15
-2.61- -2.47- -4.18- -3.53- -4.44- -4.24- -3.15- -3.21- -5.09- -4.91- -3.75- -3.16- -3.30- -3.73- -4.65- -3.72- -3.43-
SWE POL DEU POL FRA FRA ITA POL DEU FRA ITA ITA ITA POL DEU ITA FRA16
-8.44- -2.74- -7.56- -4.54- -6.16- -4.81- -3.31- -3.53- -7.23- -5.12- -4.48- -4.23- -3.98- -3.79- -5.96- -3.91- -3.83-
DEU DEU SWE DEU POL DEU DEU DEU GBR DEU DEU FRA DEU GBR GBR GBR GBR17
-10.79- -10.43- -10.39- -7.77- -6.45- -6.75- -9.53- -8.95- -27.83- -6.39- -8.93- -4.61- -8.31- -23.79- -25.62- -24.99- -21.67-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.28: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
POL POL POL POL POL POL POL POL POL POL POL IRL IRL IRL POL IRL IRL1
100.37+ 87.00+ 122.65+ 124.73+ 125.06+ 121.86+ 115.61+ 123.76+ 122.51+ 122.42+ 65.52+ 65.28+ 65.61+ 61.89+ 71.78+ 79.42+ 95.10+
PRT IRL CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE GRC IRL POL POL POL AUT POL POL2
23.37+ 37.47+ -0.04- -0.04- -0.03- -0.03- 8.10+ -0.04- -0.04- -0.03- 55.87+ 54.22+ 54.47+ 57.86+ 36.34+ 35.50+ 18.44+
CZE ESP ESP ESP ESP GRC GRC BEL GRC CZE HUN CZE GRC GRC IRL DNK DNK3
-0.03- -0.07- -0.08- -0.11- -0.12- -0.11- -0.15- -0.17- -0.06- -0.03- -0.03- -0.10- -0.06- -0.07- 8.96+ -0.10- -0.05-
FRA CZE DNK GRC DNK HUN BEL AUT DNK DNK GRC GRC BEL BEL DNK BEL BEL4
-0.25- -0.19- -0.23- -0.19- -0.18- -0.18- -0.20- -0.23- -0.09- -0.15- -0.03- -0.10- -0.11- -0.10- -0.05- -0.10- -0.10-
DNK GRC GRC DNK GRC ESP DNK GRC ESP BEL DNK BEL CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE5
-0.33- -0.39- -0.37- -0.29- -0.30- -0.29- -0.27- -0.23- -0.09- -0.15- -0.07- -0.13- -0.11- -0.10- -0.11- -0.11- -0.13-
AUT FIN FIN AUT AUT DNK AUT DNK AUT ESP CZE DNK DNK ESP HUN GRC AUT6
-0.34- -0.42- -0.41- -0.33- -0.32- -0.34- -0.29- -0.25- -0.37- -0.32- -0.10- -0.19- -0.13- -0.11- -0.30- -0.13- -0.26-
IRL DNK BEL FIN HUN PRT SWE PRT PRT HUN BEL HUN AUT DNK PRT AUT HUN7
-0.45- -0.53- -0.53- -0.36- -0.35- -0.45- -0.44- -0.47- -0.47- -0.45- -0.20- -0.20- -0.26- -0.16- -0.43- -0.25- -0.36-
GRC FRA SWE IRL BEL SWE PRT HUN HUN AUT AUT ESP ESP HUN ESP HUN FRA8
-0.49- -0.55- -0.60- -0.71- -0.52- -0.51- -0.48- -0.56- -0.55- -0.52- -0.22- -0.23- -0.27- -0.40- -0.47- -0.39- -0.41-
BEL BEL AUT BEL FIN AUT HUN ESP BEL PRT PRT AUT HUN AUT FIN ESP PRT9
-0.51- -0.56- -0.61- -0.71- -0.90- -0.53- -0.58- -1.03- -0.57- -0.53- -0.56- -0.23- -0.34- -0.44- -0.64- -0.43- -0.42-
FIN AUT IRL FRA IRL BEL ESP FIN SWE SWE ESP PRT PRT PRT SWE PRT FIN10
-0.53- -0.61- -0.65- -0.99- -0.98- -0.66- -0.87- -1.16- -1.20- -1.02- -0.63- -0.52- -0.63- -0.51- -0.80- -0.47- -0.47-
SWE SWE FRA SWE SWE NLD FIN IRL FIN FIN SWE FIN FIN FIN GRC FIN GRC11
-0.55- -1.28- -1.09- -1.09- -1.15- -0.72- -1.15- -1.20- -1.25- -1.10- -1.14- -0.56- -0.63- -0.71- -0.83- -0.47- -0.50-
ESP HUN HUN HUN FRA FIN IRL SWE IRL IRL FIN SWE SWE SWE BEL FRA ESP12
-0.69- -1.28- -1.21- -1.63- -1.71- -1.12- -1.20- -1.54- -1.40- -1.44- -1.28- -1.09- -0.90- -0.85- -0.96- -0.52- -0.73-
HUN PRT PRT PRT PRT IRL FRA FRA FRA FRA NLD NLD GBR GBR GBR SWE SWE13
-1.69- -1.32- -1.35- -1.66- -2.89- -1.20- -2.16- -2.09- -2.79- -2.76- -3.01- -2.75- -2.21- -1.97- -1.92- -0.95- -0.89-
NLD ITA NLD NLD NLD FRA NLD ITA DEU NLD GBR GBR NLD NLD FRA NLD NLD14
-1.87- -3.35- -1.63- -3.03- -2.94- -3.06- -3.09- -2.86- -3.07- -2.92- -3.10- -2.85- -2.76- -2.67- -2.03- -1.58- -1.66-
ITA NLD ITA ITA ITA DEU ITA NLD NLD DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU NLD GBR GBR15
-3.67- -3.60- -3.27- -3.12- -3.14- -3.24- -3.27- -3.14- -3.10- -2.93- -3.36- -2.88- -3.31- -3.17- -2.50- -2.08- -2.03-
GBR DEU DEU DEU DEU ITA DEU DEU ITA GBR FRA ITA ITA ITA ITA DEU ITA16
-4.43- -3.76- -3.77- -4.32- -3.46- -3.91- -3.91- -3.76- -3.73- -3.79- -3.83- -3.60- -3.65- -3.53- -2.87- -3.56- -2.13-
DEU GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR ITA ITA FRA FRA FRA DEU ITA DEU17
-7.92- -6.56- -6.80- -6.13- -6.07- -5.52- -5.65- -5.03- -3.73- -4.31- -3.85- -4.07- -4.72- -4.95- -3.17- -3.80- -3.38-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
151
Table 2.29: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
HUN CZE CZE HUN HUN ESP PRT PRT PRT PRT ESP ESP ESP AUT NLD NLD NLD1
130.48+ 131.31+ 125.93+ 122.56+ 118.79+ 127.88+ 123.00+ 120.82+ 118.17+ 119.62+ 134.69+ 134.16+ 135.00+ 135.00+ 129.63+ 123.51+ 126.32+
IRL IRL DNK IRL DNK FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN2
-0.13- -0.07- -0.06- -0.16- -0.09- -0.07- -0.09- -0.13- -0.05- -0.05- -0.04- -0.08- -0.06- -0.08- -0.04- -0.02- -0.03-
DNK SWE IRL DNK FIN BEL IRL SWE AUT GRC SWE SWE SWE GRC SWE SWE SWE3
-0.16- -0.29- -0.16- -0.18- -0.11- -0.14- -0.29- -0.22- -0.18- -0.08- -0.10- -0.12- -0.11- -0.11- -0.10- -0.09- -0.08-
POL DNK ESP SWE IRL DNK NLD IRL SWE SWE IRL IRL IRL SWE HUN IRL IRL4
-0.62- -0.32- -0.56- -0.27- -0.19- -0.29- -0.41- -0.24- -0.25- -0.09- -0.23- -0.23- -0.16- -0.13- -0.36- -0.12- -0.14-
BEL ESP GRC ESP GRC IRL DNK HUN IRL AUT GRC NLD NLD IRL BEL BEL BEL5
-0.66- -0.69- -0.56- -0.71- -0.28- -0.31- -0.41- -0.29- -0.32- -0.37- -0.24- -0.35- -0.33- -0.14- -0.38- -0.37- -0.36-
GRC GRC FIN FIN NLD NLD BEL DNK NLD NLD NLD DNK BEL NLD IRL HUN HUN6
-0.80- -0.76- -0.70- -0.72- -0.37- -0.54- -0.69- -0.31- -0.34- -0.43- -0.37- -0.45- -0.50- -0.29- -0.41- -0.50- -0.46-
FIN BEL BEL BEL ESP SWE SWE BEL HUN IRL BEL BEL GRC DNK AUT DNK DNK7
-1.05- -0.79- -0.75- -0.86- -0.82- -0.62- -0.88- -0.51- -0.36- -0.55- -0.47- -0.46- -0.58- -0.44- -0.42- -0.60- -0.51-
AUT AUT GBR AUT AUT PRT AUT NLD BEL BEL HUN ITA DNK BEL DNK GRC GBR8
-1.07- -1.02- -0.93- -1.02- -0.85- -0.82- -0.96- -0.54- -0.44- -0.61- -0.61- -0.97- -0.68- -0.45- -0.60- -0.69- -0.62-
ITA ITA AUT GRC GBR AUT POL ITA DNK DNK DNK CZE ITA ITA ITA GBR ITA9
-1.17- -1.08- -0.94- -1.12- -0.93- -0.89- -0.98- -0.75- -0.64- -0.66- -0.91- -1.06- -0.87- -0.77- -0.64- -0.77- -0.84-
GBR FIN ITA PRT SWE CZE HUN AUT GRC HUN ITA AUT CZE CZE GRC ITA CZE10
-1.36- -1.10- -0.99- -1.27- -1.11- -0.90- -1.04- -0.83- -0.66- -0.70- -1.05- -1.24- -1.04- -1.02- -0.85- -0.90- -1.04-
ESP GBR POL CZE ITA GRC GBR GBR GBR ESP CZE HUN AUT ESP GBR CZE AUT11
-1.38- -1.34- -1.12- -1.29- -1.15- -1.01- -1.05- -0.88- -0.85- -0.91- -1.21- -1.25- -1.17- -1.13- -1.01- -0.91- -1.13-
PRT FRA FRA ITA BEL GBR ITA POL ITA ITA AUT GBR HUN GBR CZE AUT ESP12
-1.39- -1.79- -1.42- -1.36- -1.16- -1.04- -1.07- -0.90- -0.92- -1.16- -1.36- -1.29- -1.45- -1.23- -1.02- -1.08- -2.03-
FRA POL HUN POL CZE ITA CZE CZE ESP CZE GBR GRC GBR HUN ESP ESP GRC13
-1.62- -2.98- -1.85- -1.44- -1.17- -1.15- -1.14- -1.04- -0.93- -1.18- -1.41- -1.44- -1.53- -1.61- -1.13- -1.37- -2.12-
DEU HUN NLD FRA POL POL GRC GRC POL POL POL POL DEU POL DEU DEU POL14
-2.93- -3.19- -2.99- -1.82- -1.44- -1.57- -1.54- -1.84- -1.18- -1.42- -2.58- -3.08- -2.80- -3.17- -2.44- -2.64- -2.76-
CZE PRT SWE NLD FRA DEU ESP ESP CZE GBR DEU DEU POL DEU POL POL DEU15
-3.22- -3.29- -3.58- -2.50- -2.88- -3.46- -1.94- -2.14- -1.34- -1.49- -2.92- -3.37- -3.43- -3.44- -2.87- -3.50- -3.01-
SWE DEU PRT DEU DEU FRA DEU DEU DEU DEU PRT PRT PRT PRT PRT PRT PRT16
-5.98- -3.33- -3.69- -3.53- -3.12- -4.93- -3.80- -3.95- -4.51- -3.80- -8.36- -4.02- -5.04- -4.13- -4.22- -4.15- -3.29-
NLD NLD DEU GBR PRT HUN FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA17
-6.95- -9.27- -5.62- -4.30- -3.13- -10.14- -6.71- -6.24- -5.21- -6.10- -12.81- -14.77- -15.27- -16.87- -13.15- -5.80- -7.90-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.30: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Chemicals and Chemical Products*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
NLD NLD PRT IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL FRA FRA FRA FRA IRL NLD NLD1
76.94+ 88.65+ 62.41+ 66.28+ 68.85+ 82.02+ 83.32+ 82.44+ 79.48+ 77.45+ 135.53+ 134.24+ 134.30+ 133.65+ 82.44+ 138.49+ 136.21+
IRL PRT IRL PRT PRT FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA GRC GRC DNK DNK FRA GRC DNK2
43.62+ 56.76+ 53.67+ 64.85+ 62.37+ 62.72+ 60.50+ 58.81+ 60.77+ 65.90+ -0.05- -0.17- -0.37- -0.24- 51.74+ -0.17- -0.26-
PRT IRL NLD NLD FRA GRC GRC FIN FIN GRC DNK PRT GRC PRT DNK FIN GRC3
27.38+ 0.63- 30.17+ 22.21+ 7.93- -0.12- -0.21- -0.33- -0.33- -0.02- -0.40- -0.39- -0.40- -0.38- -0.27- -0.25- -0.29-
CZE CZE DNK SWE FIN FIN FIN AUT DNK DNK PRT DNK FIN FIN GRC DNK FIN4
-0.25- -0.24- -0.64- -0.52- -0.55- -0.29- -0.31- -0.45- -0.34- -0.38- -0.42- -0.45- -0.45- -0.49- -0.42- -0.35- -0.32-
FIN SWE FIN DNK DNK HUN AUT GRC SWE FIN HUN FIN PRT CZE FIN PRT PRT5
-0.77- -0.49- -0.77- -0.56- -0.60- -0.31- -0.55- -0.47- -0.49- -0.39- -0.43- -0.51- -0.47- -0.51- -0.45- -0.48- -0.46-
AUT FIN CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE SWE GRC HUN FIN CZE CZE GRC PRT CZE SWE6
-0.82- -0.84- -0.80- -0.61- -0.65- -0.55- -0.69- -0.51- -0.50- -0.59- -0.52- -0.61- -0.53- -0.64- -0.46- -0.56- -0.64-
DNK AUT AUT FIN AUT DNK DNK CZE CZE CZE CZE HUN SWE SWE HUN AUT BEL7
-1.03- -1.04- -1.01- -0.66- -0.69- -0.72- -0.70- -0.60- -0.55- -0.60- -0.61- -0.69- -0.71- -0.67- -0.51- -0.63- -0.69-
BEL ESP HUN AUT SWE SWE SWE HUN HUN AUT AUT AUT AUT IRL CZE BEL HUN8
-1.43- -1.18- -1.25- -0.78- -0.81- -0.90- -0.74- -0.67- -0.68- -0.67- -0.62- -0.73- -0.79- -0.67- -0.54- -0.66- -0.70-
SWE DNK ESP ESP NLD BEL HUN DNK AUT SWE IRL SWE IRL BEL SWE HUN CZE9
-1.48- -1.25- -1.27- -1.47- -1.31- -1.43- -0.97- -0.83- -1.04- -0.71- -0.65- -0.76- -0.86- -0.82- -0.62- -0.67- -0.75-
POL HUN SWE GRC ESP NLD BEL BEL NLD BEL SWE BEL BEL NLD AUT SWE AUT10
-1.82- -1.47- -1.42- -1.71- -1.33- -1.57- -1.18- -1.04- -1.26- -1.09- -0.75- -0.85- -0.90- -0.91- -1.31- -0.67- -0.81-
HUN POL POL POL HUN ESP NLD NLD ESP NLD BEL NLD HUN HUN BEL IRL IRL11
-3.74- -2.19- -2.50- -2.50- -1.34- -2.13- -1.26- -1.24- -1.63- -1.35- -0.96- -1.02- -0.91- -1.02- -1.33- -0.83- -1.04-
ESP FRA GBR HUN POL POL GBR GBR BEL ESP NLD IRL NLD AUT NLD GBR GBR12
-3.91- -4.38- -4.00- -3.05- -2.07- -3.26- -3.22- -3.17- -2.10- -1.60- -1.18- -1.11- -0.98- -1.32- -1.67- -1.45- -1.43-
ITA ITA FRA GBR GBR GBR POL ITA PRT PRT ESP ESP ESP ESP GBR ITA POL13
-4.69- -4.69- -4.05- -3.29- -3.15- -3.37- -3.41- -3.36- -3.80- -4.23- -2.95- -1.59- -1.61- -1.34- -1.67- -2.95- -2.44-
FRA GBR ITA FRA GRC ITA ITA POL GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR ITA ESP ITA14
-5.25- -5.12- -4.82- -4.20- -3.51- -4.24- -3.93- -3.78- -4.45- -4.66- -3.77- -2.98- -2.24- -1.98- -2.40- -3.48- -2.46-
GBR BEL GRC ITA ITA AUT PRT PRT POL DEU ITA ITA ITA ITA ESP FRA ESP15
-7.15- -5.97- -5.99- -4.68- -4.28- -4.24- -4.71- -5.65- -4.94- -7.05- -5.50- -4.32- -2.97- -2.65- -3.69- -3.66- -3.70-
DEU GRC BEL DEU BEL PRT ESP ESP ITA POL DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU FRA16
-7.77- -6.26- -7.10- -12.01- -7.79- -10.66- -9.46- -9.33- -6.68- -7.86- -7.46- -7.26- -7.59- -8.37- -7.82- -10.10- -4.02-
GRC DEU DEU BEL DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU ITA POL POL POL POL POL POL DEU17
-7.82- -10.90- -10.62- -17.30- -11.07- -10.96- -12.46- -9.83- -11.45- -12.14- -9.26- -10.81- -12.54- -11.64- -11.00- -11.58- -16.20-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.31: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Rubber and Plastics*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GRC GRC GRC BEL GRC PRT ESP ESP DEU ITA POL POL POL POL POL POL DEU1
139.15+ 136.31+ 123.15+ 148.44+ 115.06+ 119.31+ 173.09+ 184.55+ 81.69+ 158.11+ 127.96+ 151.07+ 168.56+ 162.32+ 163.91+ 164.34+ 136.74+
DEU BEL BEL GRC BEL AUT GRC PRT ITA POL ITA ITA GRC GRC DNK GRC DNK2
5.12- 45.51+ 56.48+ 33.65+ 68.73+ 58.53+ -0.27- -0.27- 59.69+ 10.17+ 38.89+ 14.48= 4.90+ 10.95+ -0.18- -0.18- -0.18-
CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE GRC PRT GRC POL GRC GRC GRC DNK IRL PRT DNK PRT3
-0.09- -0.28- -0.24- -0.25- -0.19- -0.11- -0.27- -0.50- 13.50+ -0.01- -0.04- -0.16- -0.32- -0.28- -0.36- -0.29- -0.35-
IRL ESP DNK FIN DNK CZE CZE IRL GRC PRT HUN PRT PRT PRT CZE IRL IRL4
-0.31- -0.50- -0.30- -0.40- -0.34- -0.19- -0.42- -0.50- -0.12- -0.34- -0.15- -0.27- -0.34- -0.29- -0.50- -0.31- -0.37-
SWE FIN FIN DNK IRL DNK IRL CZE PRT CZE PRT IRL IRL CZE FIN PRT FIN5
-0.41- -0.52- -0.45- -0.44- -0.62- -0.61- -0.62- -0.57- -0.28- -0.35- -0.28- -0.43- -0.36- -0.43- -0.54- -0.40- -0.44-
DNK DNK IRL IRL ESP SWE DNK DNK DNK DNK IRL CZE CZE DNK IRL FIN CZE6
-0.45- -0.65- -0.55- -0.57- -0.66- -0.78- -0.64- -0.68- -0.29- -0.43- -0.28- -0.51- -0.42- -0.57- -1.08- -0.43- -0.65-
FIN IRL ESP ESP HUN IRL SWE BEL CZE IRL DNK FIN FIN FIN GRC CZE GRC7
-0.48- -0.70- -0.57- -0.63- -0.83- -0.86- -0.70- -1.46- -0.56- -0.64- -0.31- -0.76- -0.51- -0.64- -1.26- -0.51- -0.84-
FRA AUT SWE PRT FIN HUN AUT FIN IRL FIN CZE DNK HUN BEL AUT BEL BEL8
-0.66- -1.21- -0.57- -1.79- -1.64- -0.86- -1.48- -1.64- -0.62- -0.80- -0.49- -0.89- -0.96- -0.93- -1.43- -0.83- -0.89-
BEL PRT AUT AUT SWE ESP BEL AUT FIN BEL FIN ESP BEL HUN HUN FRA FRA9
-0.69- -1.26- -1.14- -1.81- -1.66- -1.13- -1.59- -1.65- -0.67- -1.36- -1.00- -0.98- -1.02- -1.08- -1.49- -1.26- -1.35-
PRT HUN PRT SWE PRT NLD FIN SWE ESP SWE BEL BEL ESP ESP SWE AUT AUT10
-1.31- -1.94- -1.49- -2.00- -1.78- -1.95- -2.28- -2.01- -1.31- -1.70- -1.07- -0.99- -1.11- -1.10- -1.70- -1.65- -1.76-
AUT SWE NLD HUN AUT POL POL NLD BEL ESP AUT HUN AUT SWE BEL SWE SWE11
-1.61- -2.11- -1.89- -2.31- -1.82- -2.71- -2.63- -2.72- -1.95- -1.73- -1.31- -1.18- -1.58- -1.98- -1.74- -1.93- -1.92-
POL POL HUN NLD NLD FIN NLD POL SWE NLD SWE AUT SWE NLD NLD HUN HUN12
-1.95- -2.45- -1.93- -3.23- -2.62- -3.08- -2.85- -3.61- -2.11- -2.47- -1.92- -1.49- -1.92- -2.02- -1.93- -2.09- -1.99-
HUN NLD POL POL POL DEU HUN HUN NLD HUN ESP SWE NLD AUT ESP ESP ESP13
-2.19- -4.14- -3.23- -3.38- -3.39- -5.16- -3.95- -3.68- -2.68- -2.83- -2.22- -1.82- -2.16- -3.22- -2.81- -2.78- -2.53-
ESP FRA DEU GBR DEU BEL FRA FRA AUT AUT NLD NLD GBR GBR FRA NLD NLD14
-2.42- -7.39- -13.16- -12.46- -9.54- -5.79- -5.02- -5.21- -2.78- -7.20- -2.64- -2.39- -6.55- -6.38- -5.89- -3.27- -3.22-
NLD GBR GBR FRA GBR ITA GBR GBR HUN GBR GBR GBR ITA ITA GBR ITA ITA15
-2.78- -14.65- -17.05- -16.06- -14.94- -12.34- -14.93- -13.43- -3.47- -9.79- -9.06- -6.80- -9.36- -8.99- -7.07- -5.38- -5.89-
GBR ITA ITA DEU ITA GBR ITA ITA GBR DEU FRA FRA FRA FRA ITA GBR POL16
-10.23- -19.76- -17.13- -16.48- -20.33- -15.11- -16.57- -17.92- -9.83- -13.10- -11.08- -23.33- -13.75- -12.98- -8.53- -8.73- -6.22-
ITA DEU FRA ITA FRA FRA DEU DEU FRA FRA DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU GBR17
-18.68- -24.26- -19.94- -20.28- -23.44- -27.16- -18.87- -28.70- -28.22- -25.52- -35.00- -23.55- -33.10- -32.39- -27.39- -34.28- -8.14-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.32: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Other Non-Metallic Mineral*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
BEL AUT AUT DEU DEU GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC HUN DEU GRC ESP1
91.78+ 62.09+ 68.42+ 57.34+ 116.90+ 82.87+ 83.03+ 79.71+ 101.91+ 82.72+ 81.69+ 79.45+ 64.65+ 64.60+ 86.83+ 72.96+ 121.75+
DEU BEL BEL GRC CZE AUT ESP ESP DEU DEU ESP HUN HUN GRC AUT DEU DNK2
20.47= 59.39+ 51.91+ 57.00+ -0.06- 41.21+ 39.18+ 42.71+ 15.82= 35.90+ 41.59+ 46.21+ 60.21+ 60.73+ 31.98+ 48.16+ -0.08-
DNK ESP DNK CZE DNK CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE3
-0.02- -0.09- -0.04- -0.08- -0.10- -0.05- -0.17- -0.06- -0.06- -0.05- -0.05- -0.06- -0.08- -0.07- -0.06- -0.06- -0.08-
CZE DNK ESP ESP ESP FIN FIN FIN DNK FIN HUN FIN DNK IRL DNK IRL IRL4
-0.06- -0.19- -0.11- -0.11- -0.12- -0.22- -0.20- -0.14- -0.17- -0.17- -0.07- -0.16- -0.13- -0.09- -0.06- -0.10- -0.12-
POL IRL CZE IRL IRL DNK IRL IRL FIN IRL DNK IRL IRL DNK FIN DNK FIN5
-0.12- -0.20- -0.14- -0.18- -0.20- -0.23- -0.20- -0.16- -0.18- -0.19- -0.12- -0.27- -0.13- -0.16- -0.20- -0.14- -0.20-
IRL CZE IRL DNK FIN IRL DNK DNK IRL DNK FIN ESP FIN FIN IRL FIN BEL6
-0.14- -0.24- -0.22- -0.23- -0.23- -0.26- -0.21- -0.20- -0.18- -0.23- -0.23- -0.34- -0.20- -0.23- -0.25- -0.18- -0.50-
PRT GRC POL SWE GRC HUN PRT SWE ESP SWE IRL PRT ESP ESP SWE BEL PRT7
-0.18- -0.29- -0.27- -0.30- -0.32- -0.26- -0.28- -0.45- -0.23- -0.33- -0.24- -0.40- -0.40- -0.25- -0.53- -0.50- -0.56-
GRC SWE GRC BEL HUN PRT POL PRT PRT PRT PRT SWE BEL PRT HUN SWE SWE8
-0.32- -0.29- -0.29- -0.32- -0.32- -0.30- -0.54- -0.46- -0.38- -0.38- -0.38- -0.43- -0.48- -0.42- -0.53- -0.62- -0.64-
SWE PRT SWE POL SWE ESP AUT AUT SWE ESP SWE BEL PRT BEL PRT PRT HUN9
-0.39- -0.35- -0.33- -0.36- -0.34- -0.32- -0.59- -0.59- -0.49- -0.59- -0.43- -0.49- -0.49- -0.47- -0.57- -0.63- -0.64-
FIN POL FIN FIN POL SWE SWE HUN GBR HUN BEL AUT SWE SWE BEL GBR GBR10
-0.41- -0.38- -0.39- -0.37- -0.41- -0.69- -0.62- -0.64- -0.69- -0.70- -0.54- -0.67- -0.51- -0.56- -0.90- -0.65- -0.64-
FRA FIN PRT PRT PRT POL HUN BEL HUN POL AUT DNK AUT AUT NLD HUN AUT11
-0.43- -0.39- -0.40- -0.55- -0.55- -0.75- -0.77- -0.96- -0.73- -0.82- -0.60- -0.76- -0.69- -0.58- -0.93- -0.66- -0.81-
NLD HUN NLD HUN BEL NLD BEL NLD BEL BEL GBR GBR NLD NLD GBR AUT NLD12
-0.72- -0.77- -0.65- -0.88- -0.61- -0.89- -1.15- -1.12- -0.86- -0.96- -0.92- -0.82- -1.02- -1.00- -1.12- -0.75- -0.82-
AUT NLD HUN AUT AUT BEL NLD POL POL GBR NLD NLD GBR GBR FRA FRA FRA13
-0.92- -1.32- -0.66- -0.92- -0.92- -1.39- -1.18- -1.18- -0.92- -1.11- -1.12- -1.07- -1.40- -1.26- -1.89- -0.85- -0.83-
HUN FRA GBR NLD NLD GBR FRA FRA NLD NLD POL POL FRA FRA GRC NLD GRC14
-0.96- -1.36- -2.21- -1.09- -1.04- -2.11- -1.59- -1.59- -1.11- -1.12- -2.59- -3.13- -3.05- -2.99- -1.92- -0.85- -1.31-
GBR GBR FRA GBR GBR FRA GBR GBR AUT AUT FRA FRA POL POL ESP ESP POL15
-0.97- -2.06- -2.97- -1.51- -2.03- -5.17- -2.27- -2.00- -1.47- -2.08- -2.86- -4.72- -3.62- -3.77- -2.02- -2.24- -2.02-
ESP ITA ITA FRA FRA DEU ITA ITA FRA FRA ITA ITA ITA ITA POL POL ITA16
-1.82- -4.89- -5.29- -2.78- -4.78- -5.36- -5.46- -5.17- -5.09- -4.73- -5.48- -5.38- -5.39- -4.93- -3.88- -4.83- -4.59-
ITA DEU DEU ITA ITA ITA DEU DEU ITA ITA DEU DEU DEU DEU ITA ITA DEU17
-4.78- -8.66- -6.36- -4.65- -4.89- -6.09- -6.98- -7.71- -5.17- -5.17- -7.67- -6.96- -7.27- -8.55- -3.96- -8.06- -7.91-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.33: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ESP DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU BEL DEU DEU DEU ESP DEU AUT GBR ESP ESP ESP1
135.16+ 151.96+ 159.08+ 133.65+ 160.55+ 152.35+ 51.56+ 98.36+ 202.23+ 147.70+ 67.47+ 96.62+ 46.06+ 83.26+ 141.64+ 142.68+ 67.63+
AUT FIN FIN AUT AUT SWE SWE BEL BEL BEL AUT AUT GBR DEU GBR BEL ITA2
45.34+ 31.37+ 29.97+ 49.83+ 48.93+ 51.92+ 47.70+ 45.93+ 8.09+ 45.62+ 44.59+ 44.99+ 45.12+ 42.95+ 57.95+ 42.79+ 45.02+
FIN AUT AUT FIN BEL CZE AUT AUT CZE GRC BEL BEL BEL BEL CZE AUT AUT3
29.33+ 13.69+ 10.30+ 36.29+ 26.01+ -0.14- 46.06+ 42.71+ -0.23- -0.03- 36.34+ 42.52+ 43.95+ 40.82+ -0.16- 38.65+ 42.05+
IRL IRL DNK IRL CZE GRC DEU CZE IRL CZE DEU CZE DEU IRL DNK IRL BEL4
-0.13- -0.14- -0.19- -0.20- -0.17- -0.29- 36.84+ -0.26- -0.29- -0.17- 15.00- -0.16- 28.26+ -0.12- -0.36- -0.12- 38.17+
CZE DNK IRL CZE DNK DNK IRL IRL DNK IRL GRC IRL IRL GRC IRL CZE IRL5
-0.15- -0.43- -0.21- -0.27- -0.26- -0.35- -0.30- -0.26- -0.50- -0.27- -0.09- -0.22- -0.15- -0.17- -0.44- -0.18- -0.13-
DNK GRC CZE DNK IRL IRL CZE DNK GRC PRT IRL GRC GRC CZE BEL GRC CZE6
-0.29- -0.76- -0.35- -0.29- -0.28- -0.36- -0.31- -0.46- -0.50- -0.69- -0.12- -0.28- -0.16- -0.18- -0.52- -0.39- -0.20-
POL SWE BEL GRC GRC POL DNK PRT PRT DNK CZE PRT CZE PRT AUT DNK DNK7
-0.40- -0.85- -0.40- -0.45- -0.53- -0.89- -0.53- -0.61- -0.57- -0.71- -0.17- -0.65- -0.24- -0.68- -0.67- -0.41- -0.23-
FRA ESP GRC SWE POL AUT GRC SWE POL POL HUN HUN DNK ESP PRT FRA PRT8
-0.56- -0.88- -0.74- -1.03- -1.10- -1.31- -0.55- -0.93- -0.87- -0.82- -0.18- -1.13- -0.52- -0.92- -0.79- -0.82- -0.74-
PRT HUN ESP BEL SWE HUN PRT ESP SWE HUN DNK NLD PRT HUN GRC PRT GRC9
-0.94- -1.01- -0.94- -1.06- -1.21- -1.36- -0.58- -1.09- -1.01- -1.61- -0.47- -1.84- -0.83- -1.20- -1.22- -1.02- -0.80-
GRC POL HUN ESP ESP FIN POL GRC ESP ESP PRT ESP HUN NLD NLD FIN FRA10
-0.95- -1.35- -0.96- -1.21- -1.44- -1.54- -0.58- -1.25- -1.31- -1.68- -0.66- -1.87- -1.11- -1.67- -1.66- -2.07- -0.82-
SWE BEL POL POL NLD ESP FIN POL FIN FIN FIN FIN NLD FIN FRA NLD FIN11
-1.47- -1.54- -1.00- -1.30- -2.10- -1.86- -1.75- -1.34- -1.45- -1.79- -1.72- -1.88- -1.79- -2.58- -2.79- -3.06- -1.74-
NLD CZE NLD HUN FIN PRT NLD FIN HUN NLD NLD DNK ESP POL POL POL POL12
-1.88- -1.65- -1.32- -2.07- -2.14- -2.53- -2.12- -1.69- -1.79- -1.92- -1.95- -2.31- -2.06- -2.74- -2.82- -3.98- -2.03-
BEL PRT SWE NLD HUN BEL HUN HUN NLD SWE POL POL FIN DNK FIN SWE NLD13
-2.01- -1.76- -1.44- -2.47- -2.21- -4.05- -2.53- -2.03- -2.00- -4.41- -2.24- -2.45- -2.15- -3.67- -2.94- -5.76- -2.51-
HUN NLD PRT PRT PRT NLD FRA NLD AUT GBR SWE SWE POL SWE SWE HUN SWE14
-2.15- -2.85- -2.06- -2.94- -2.95- -4.45- -3.10- -2.05- -4.31- -9.69- -3.96- -5.22- -2.86- -5.11- -4.81- -7.32- -4.46-
GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR ESP FRA GBR AUT FRA GBR SWE FRA HUN ITA HUN15
-8.57- -9.90- -10.05- -10.71- -10.40- -10.36- -4.42- -3.14- -9.50- -9.88- -5.09- -8.97- -5.32- -5.57- -4.98- -9.39- -6.31-
DEU FRA FRA FRA FRA ITA GBR GBR FRA FRA GBR FRA FRA AUT ITA GBR GBR16
-23.71- -13.08- -36.10- -33.69- -46.19- -32.10- -10.57- -9.95- -32.51- -28.51- -9.30- -20.95- -7.79- -7.42- -33.77- -30.58- -23.35-
ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA FRA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA DEU DEU DEU17
-66.63- -60.82- -43.59- -62.07- -64.49- -42.68- -54.79- -61.94- -53.49- -31.13- -37.44- -36.20- -38.41- -35.02- -41.65- -59.02- -49.55-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.34: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Machinery, Nec*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ITA ITA DEU ITA ITA DEU ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA GBR GBR1
105.02+ 94.13+ 59.84+ 75.06+ 95.11+ 62.85+ 85.09+ 114.44+ 117.58+ 58.47+ 81.01+ 78.49+ 79.19+ 74.15+ 85.95+ 61.81+ 59.47+
DEU DEU ITA DEU DEU ITA DEU IRL BEL DEU DEU DEU DEU AUT HUN HUN ITA2
5.35- 13.60- 49.36+ 34.01= 16.82- 49.02+ 23.96- -0.13- -0.08- 56.72+ 28.72= 32.47= 29.47= 25.66+ 22.03+ 25.82+ 32.66+
PRT PRT DNK IRL CZE CZE IRL CZE GRC GRC GRC IRL GRC DNK GBR ITA HUN3
-0.07- -0.12- -0.09- -0.10- -0.14- -0.12- -0.13- -0.18- -0.15- -0.01- -0.05- -0.12- -0.07- 10.68+ 7.50= 12.99- 24.82+
IRL ESP IRL BEL IRL IRL PRT PRT IRL IRL HUN GRC IRL GRC GRC DEU DNK4
-0.08- -0.15- -0.11- -0.16- -0.14- -0.17- -0.24- -0.21- -0.19- -0.18- -0.06- -0.18- -0.13- -0.05- -0.09- 5.16- -0.12-
CZE HUN HUN CZE DNK BEL GRC DNK PRT CZE IRL PRT NLD IRL DNK AUT IRL5
-0.08- -0.16- -0.14- -0.16- -0.15- -0.19- -0.26- -0.23- -0.20- -0.20- -0.09- -0.22- -0.21- -0.10- -0.15- 1.83- -0.13-
DNK DNK PRT PRT PRT DNK CZE BEL DNK PRT DNK NLD DNK NLD IRL IRL GRC6
-0.12- -0.19- -0.14- -0.17- -0.18- -0.21- -0.26- -0.26- -0.24- -0.24- -0.19- -0.25- -0.21- -0.19- -0.16- -0.09- -0.24-
GRC GRC ESP DNK ESP HUN NLD NLD NLD NLD PRT CZE PRT PRT BEL DNK BEL7
-0.25- -0.22- -0.18- -0.18- -0.23- -0.32- -0.27- -0.28- -0.28- -0.26- -0.24- -0.30- -0.28- -0.25- -0.19- -0.18- -0.25-
POL IRL CZE ESP BEL AUT BEL FIN CZE BEL CZE BEL CZE CZE NLD GRC PRT8
-0.32- -0.26- -0.19- -0.19- -0.24- -0.33- -0.27- -0.32- -0.29- -0.27- -0.27- -0.31- -0.29- -0.28- -0.24- -0.23- -0.34-
BEL BEL GRC FIN GRC GRC FIN SWE SWE DNK BEL HUN BEL BEL AUT BEL CZE9
-0.35- -0.27- -0.22- -0.28- -0.28- -0.38- -0.36- -0.33- -0.30- -0.29- -0.28- -0.34- -0.32- -0.29- -0.30- -0.25- -0.40-
AUT SWE BEL SWE FIN FIN DNK AUT FIN ESP NLD AUT HUN ESP CZE CZE FIN10
-0.39- -0.30- -0.25- -0.29- -0.31- -0.39- -0.36- -0.42- -0.32- -0.38- -0.28- -0.41- -0.35- -0.34- -0.30- -0.31- -0.48-
FIN FIN FIN AUT AUT PRT AUT GRC ESP HUN AUT FIN AUT HUN PRT PRT AUT11
-0.41- -0.37- -0.37- -0.37- -0.36- -0.53- -0.41- -0.43- -0.33- -0.40- -0.44- -0.51- -0.42- -0.42- -0.37- -0.37- -0.48-
SWE AUT AUT GRC SWE POL HUN POL HUN FIN FIN POL FIN POL POL FIN POL12
-0.72- -0.40- -0.39- -0.46- -0.45- -0.53- -0.50- -0.48- -0.46- -0.40- -0.46- -0.53- -0.53- -0.55- -0.61- -0.51- -0.53-
HUN CZE NLD NLD NLD ESP SWE HUN AUT POL POL ESP POL FIN FIN POL NLD13
-0.84- -0.52- -0.53- -0.51- -0.48- -0.55- -0.60- -0.50- -0.53- -0.47- -0.53- -0.61- -0.53- -0.63- -0.62- -0.60- -0.60-
FRA POL POL POL POL SWE POL FRA POL SWE SWE DNK ESP SWE SWE NLD SWE14
-0.87- -0.77- -0.63- -0.64- -0.49- -0.58- -0.61- -1.60- -0.64- -0.65- -0.70- -0.63- -0.63- -0.88- -0.79- -0.65- -0.94-
NLD NLD SWE HUN HUN NLD FRA GBR GBR GBR FRA SWE SWE FRA FRA SWE FRA15
-0.94- -0.81- -0.66- -0.86- -1.03- -0.60- -1.48- -1.74- -1.66- -2.14- -1.61- -0.69- -0.85- -1.55- -2.11- -0.89- -1.68-
GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR ESP FRA AUT GBR GBR FRA GBR ESP FRA ESP16
-1.24- -1.34- -1.39- -1.43- -2.01- -1.59- -1.63- -2.02- -5.61- -4.21- -2.07- -1.96- -1.70- -2.25- -2.28- -1.57- -2.28-
ESP FRA FRA FRA FRA FRA ESP DEU DEU FRA ESP FRA GBR DEU DEU ESP DEU17
-3.70- -1.84- -3.91- -3.27- -5.43- -5.39- -1.68- -5.30- -6.29- -5.09- -2.46- -3.91- -2.14- -2.71- -7.28- -1.95- -8.49-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.35: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Electrical and Optical Equipment*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA AUT DEU DEU SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE SWE1
112.52+ 115.04+ 116.18+ 117.42+ 99.13+ 35.41+ 72.74+ 64.37+ 29.89+ 38.21+ 40.32+ 41.31+ 40.39+ 40.84+ 41.14+ 48.63+ 52.56+
DNK ESP DNK CZE FIN NLD FIN FIN DEU SWE SWE DEU DEU FIN DEU DEU DEU2
-0.02- -0.03- -0.03- -0.02- 20.70+ 31.23+ 21.32+ 24.02+ 27.90= 37.78+ 40.26+ 32.12= 37.56= 38.07+ 38.18+ 32.53= 30.65=
PRT PRT ESP ESP CZE BEL HUN HUN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN DEU FIN FIN FIN3
-0.02- -0.04- -0.03- -0.04- -0.01- 30.69+ 21.25+ 19.71+ 24.91+ 26.14+ 29.52+ 29.74+ 32.16+ 32.41= 31.79+ 30.42+ 28.69+
CZE HUN CZE PRT ESP FIN CZE POL HUN HUN CZE DNK GRC ESP CZE CZE CZE4
-0.03- -0.07- -0.04- -0.05- -0.04- 22.41+ -0.09- 5.61+ 19.74+ 15.80+ -0.02- 9.18+ -0.06- -0.04- -0.03- -0.03- -0.04-
FRA BEL PRT DNK DNK HUN DNK CZE GBR DNK HUN HUN ESP GRC GRC FRA DNK5
-0.04- -0.09- -0.04- -0.10- -0.05- 0.21- -0.17- -0.02- 15.82+ 1.39= -0.03- 2.05- -0.12- -0.04- -0.06- -0.08- -0.09-
BEL DNK HUN FIN PRT CZE POL SWE CZE GRC GRC CZE DNK CZE DNK DNK FRA6
-0.11- -0.10- -0.07- -0.10- -0.06- -0.01- -0.25- -0.13- -0.02- -0.01- -0.04- -0.02- -0.14- -0.10- -0.09- -0.15- -0.09-
IRL SWE BEL BEL IRL DNK AUT DNK ESP CZE DNK ESP HUN HUN AUT GRC GRC7
-0.17- -0.12- -0.08- -0.11- -0.25- -0.10- -0.26- -0.17- -0.04- -0.02- -0.15- -0.11- -0.18- -0.17- -0.10- -0.20- -0.18-
FIN FIN FIN IRL BEL ESP FRA AUT SWE ESP AUT GRC CZE BEL BEL BEL AUT8
-0.17- -0.13- -0.12- -0.19- -0.30- -0.10- -0.27- -0.24- -0.06- -0.05- -0.29- -0.15- -0.18- -0.34- -0.13- -0.32- -0.26-
POL GRC IRL SWE AUT PRT ESP FRA GRC POL BEL AUT AUT POL FRA AUT POL9
-0.18- -0.23- -0.19- -0.19- -0.33- -0.12- -0.28- -0.31- -0.11- -0.35- -0.35- -0.22- -0.24- -0.38- -0.30- -0.34- -0.31-
GRC IRL AUT AUT SWE SWE GRC IRL BEL IRL POL POL POL NLD POL ESP BEL10
-0.21- -0.25- -0.29- -0.36- -0.34- -0.12- -0.33- -0.32- -0.13- -0.42- -0.38- -0.38- -0.36- -0.42- -0.40- -0.46- -0.33-
HUN AUT GRC POL POL AUT SWE GRC DNK BEL ESP BEL BEL IRL NLD POL ESP11
-0.34- -0.30- -0.34- -0.46- -0.47- -0.19- -0.34- -0.40- -0.19- -0.44- -0.42- -0.38- -0.37- -0.52- -0.43- -0.46- -0.42-
AUT POL POL HUN NLD IRL IRL BEL IRL NLD NLD NLD NLD FRA ESP IRL IRL12
-0.39- -0.62- -0.43- -0.49- -0.62- -0.36- -0.36- -0.47- -0.36- -0.57- -0.55- -0.46- -0.43- -0.58- -0.45- -0.48- -0.55-
SWE GBR SWE NLD GBR POL BEL ESP POL GBR FRA GBR IRL GBR IRL NLD NLD13
-0.58- -0.74- -0.44- -0.85- -0.78- -0.55- -0.49- -0.52- -0.36- -0.78- -0.56- -0.68- -0.55- -0.86- -0.57- -1.14- -1.08-
GBR CZE NLD GBR HUN GBR NLD NLD NLD PRT IRL IRL GBR DNK GBR ITA PRT14
-0.68- -0.95- -0.63- -1.18- -1.02- -0.80- -0.65- -0.53- -0.54- -1.36- -0.66- -0.78- -0.70- -1.10- -1.10- -1.27- -1.79-
ESP NLD GBR GRC DEU GRC GBR GBR PRT AUT GBR PRT FRA PRT HUN PRT HUN15
-0.72- -1.45- -0.67- -1.91- -3.39- -3.13- -0.82- -0.75- -1.19- -3.45- -0.68- -1.28- -1.23- -1.23- -1.41- -2.01- -1.80-
NLD FRA DEU DEU GRC DEU PRT PRT ITA ITA PRT ITA PRT AUT PRT HUN GBR16
-1.15- -2.91- -5.62- -5.67- -3.70- -5.94- -1.04- -1.00- -5.86- -3.77- -1.47- -4.28- -1.42- -1.66- -1.81- -2.01- -2.42-
DEU DEU FRA FRA FRA FRA DEU DEU FRA FRA ITA FRA ITA ITA ITA GBR ITA17
-7.71- -7.01- -7.17- -5.70- -8.48- -8.52- -9.97- -8.85- -9.39- -8.11- -4.49- -5.67- -4.13- -3.89- -4.23- -2.64- -2.54-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.36: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Transport Equipment*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DEU DEU FRA FRA FRA FRA DEU DEU FRA FRA DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU1
103.27+ 65.14+ 103.80+ 80.00+ 103.71+ 105.01+ 103.25+ 103.39+ 83.16+ 69.46+ 103.09+ 56.83+ 97.05+ 103.37+ 103.58+ 104.28+ 104.64+
DNK FRA DNK DEU DNK DNK DNK PRT DEU AUT GRC FRA FRA GRC AUT FIN DNK2
-0.00- 38.22+ -0.00- 22.88- -0.01- -0.02- -0.03- -0.03- 19.76- 34.98+ -0.01- 46.33+ 6.14- -0.02- -0.03- -0.03- -0.01-
PRT PRT PRT DNK PRT AUT PRT DNK PRT GRC HUN PRT GRC PRT PRT PRT PRT3
-0.01- -0.01- -0.02- -0.01- -0.02- -0.04- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.00- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.02- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03-
CZE DNK IRL PRT IRL IRL IRL IRL DNK PRT PRT HUN PRT IRL BEL DNK FIN4
-0.01- -0.01- -0.02- -0.02- -0.03- -0.04- -0.04- -0.04- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.04- -0.03- -0.04- -0.04- -0.04- -0.03-
IRL GRC GRC IRL AUT GRC FIN AUT GRC DNK DNK IRL DNK FIN GRC IRL GRC5
-0.01- -0.02- -0.02- -0.03- -0.04- -0.05- -0.05- -0.05- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.06- -0.04- -0.05- -0.04- -0.05- -0.03-
GRC IRL HUN BEL FIN CZE CZE FIN IRL FIN IRL FIN IRL CZE DNK ESP IRL6
-0.02- -0.03- -0.03- -0.03- -0.05- -0.05- -0.05- -0.05- -0.04- -0.04- -0.04- -0.06- -0.06- -0.07- -0.04- -0.08- -0.06-
AUT HUN CZE GRC CZE HUN AUT GRC FIN IRL FIN GRC FIN FRA FIN GRC FRA7
-0.05- -0.04- -0.05- -0.04- -0.06- -0.06- -0.06- -0.08- -0.06- -0.05- -0.05- -0.06- -0.07- -0.10- -0.04- -0.08- -0.08-
POL CZE BEL FIN GRC FIN POL CZE BEL CZE AUT DNK CZE HUN IRL FRA ESP8
-0.05- -0.05- -0.05- -0.06- -0.06- -0.06- -0.07- -0.09- -0.07- -0.06- -0.06- -0.07- -0.08- -0.10- -0.08- -0.09- -0.09-
BEL BEL AUT AUT BEL POL FRA POL CZE ESP CZE CZE HUN ESP ESP CZE BEL9
-0.06- -0.05- -0.05- -0.06- -0.08- -0.08- -0.07- -0.09- -0.08- -0.08- -0.07- -0.10- -0.09- -0.12- -0.09- -0.09- -0.10-
HUN AUT FIN CZE HUN BEL GRC HUN AUT POL BEL AUT AUT BEL CZE AUT AUT10
-0.08- -0.05- -0.07- -0.06- -0.10- -0.12- -0.08- -0.11- -0.09- -0.10- -0.11- -0.10- -0.11- -0.12- -0.10- -0.10- -0.12-
FIN FIN ESP HUN POL ESP ESP FRA POL HUN FRA BEL NLD NLD NLD BEL CZE11
-0.10- -0.08- -0.10- -0.08- -0.14- -0.16- -0.14- -0.12- -0.10- -0.10- -0.12- -0.11- -0.11- -0.12- -0.12- -0.11- -0.14-
FRA ESP POL ESP NLD PRT HUN ESP ESP NLD NLD NLD BEL DNK FRA POL POL12
-0.12- -0.10- -0.11- -0.12- -0.15- -0.21- -0.16- -0.16- -0.11- -0.15- -0.14- -0.12- -0.13- -0.12- -0.14- -0.25- -0.21-
SWE POL SWE SWE ESP SWE NLD SWE HUN BEL ESP ESP ESP POL POL SWE SWE13
-0.12- -0.12- -0.14- -0.18- -0.15- -0.24- -0.21- -0.19- -0.12- -0.21- -0.14- -0.15- -0.15- -0.21- -0.22- -0.36- -0.42-
ESP SWE NLD POL SWE GBR SWE NLD NLD SWE POL POL POL AUT SWE ITA HUN14
-0.14- -0.13- -0.33- -0.20- -0.24- -0.53- -0.22- -0.19- -0.17- -0.27- -0.15- -0.17- -0.20- -0.28- -0.27- -0.36- -0.47-
NLD GBR GBR NLD GBR ITA BEL BEL SWE GBR SWE SWE SWE SWE HUN HUN ITA15
-0.63- -0.68- -0.66- -0.33- -0.51- -0.77- -0.24- -0.23- -0.18- -0.69- -0.29- -0.31- -0.32- -0.31- -0.39- -0.44- -0.84-
GBR NLD ITA GBR DEU NLD GBR GBR GBR ITA GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR NLD NLD16
-0.69- -0.83- -0.94- -0.51- -0.90- -1.27- -0.60- -0.55- -0.53- -1.21- -0.66- -0.66- -0.64- -0.59- -0.77- -1.08- -0.95-
ITA ITA DEU ITA ITA DEU ITA ITA ITA DEU ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA GBR GBR17
-1.17- -1.16- -1.21- -1.17- -1.19- -1.32- -1.19- -1.38- -1.29- -1.42- -1.17- -1.14- -1.15- -1.10- -1.20- -1.09- -1.06-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.37: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR GBR1
111.92+ 110.11+ 112.80+ 111.69+ 111.80+ 114.00+ 113.84+ 115.50+ 116.80+ 117.21+ 123.43+ 116.73+ 114.94+ 113.43+ 133.77+ 131.48+ 124.45+
CZE PRT DNK CZE DNK CZE PRT CZE CZE GRC GRC GRC GRC GRC CZE CZE CZE2
-0.02- -0.04- -0.02- -0.03- -0.03- -0.01- -0.07- -0.03- -0.03- -0.00- -0.00- -0.02- -0.01- -0.01- -0.02- -0.02- -0.03-
IRL IRL PRT DNK PRT HUN CZE PRT GRC CZE HUN CZE CZE CZE DNK GRC DNK3
-0.04- -0.05- -0.05- -0.04- -0.05- -0.08- -0.08- -0.07- -0.03- -0.02- -0.01- -0.02- -0.03- -0.02- -0.04- -0.02- -0.03-
FRA ESP HUN IRL IRL DNK IRL IRL DNK DNK CZE PRT PRT PRT PRT IRL GRC4
-0.04- -0.05- -0.05- -0.05- -0.06- -0.08- -0.10- -0.08- -0.06- -0.06- -0.02- -0.05- -0.06- -0.05- -0.06- -0.05- -0.05-
DNK HUN CZE PRT ESP ESP DNK FIN PRT PRT DNK HUN IRL IRL GRC DNK PRT5
-0.04- -0.05- -0.06- -0.05- -0.06- -0.09- -0.13- -0.15- -0.06- -0.07- -0.05- -0.07- -0.07- -0.06- -0.07- -0.06- -0.05-
BEL DNK IRL ESP CZE IRL GRC DNK ESP ESP IRL IRL DNK HUN IRL PRT IRL6
-0.10- -0.07- -0.06- -0.06- -0.09- -0.09- -0.14- -0.17- -0.08- -0.11- -0.06- -0.07- -0.07- -0.10- -0.14- -0.06- -0.06-
PRT CZE ESP GRC FIN GRC FIN GRC IRL IRL PRT FIN HUN DNK HUN FRA FRA7
-0.17- -0.07- -0.06- -0.14- -0.11- -0.12- -0.15- -0.18- -0.10- -0.12- -0.07- -0.15- -0.08- -0.12- -0.18- -0.10- -0.09-
HUN BEL BEL BEL GRC FIN HUN HUN FIN FIN FIN DNK FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN8
-0.17- -0.11- -0.13- -0.16- -0.15- -0.12- -0.22- -0.22- -0.14- -0.14- -0.16- -0.15- -0.16- -0.19- -0.19- -0.12- -0.12-
SWE GRC GRC HUN SWE NLD ESP SWE HUN HUN SWE ESP ESP ESP FRA HUN HUN9
-0.18- -0.18- -0.18- -0.17- -0.16- -0.29- -0.28- -0.23- -0.21- -0.16- -0.43- -0.16- -0.23- -0.19- -0.39- -0.20- -0.19-
GRC SWE SWE FIN HUN BEL FRA FRA SWE SWE POL SWE SWE AUT SWE SWE SWE10
-0.22- -0.20- -0.22- -0.18- -0.17- -0.39- -0.34- -0.36- -0.22- -0.39- -0.55- -0.42- -0.41- -0.27- -0.39- -0.40- -0.34-
NLD FIN FIN SWE BEL POL POL POL AUT POL NLD NLD NLD SWE AUT POL POL11
-0.32- -0.36- -0.33- -0.22- -0.44- -0.48- -0.39- -0.49- -0.26- -0.43- -0.59- -0.56- -0.56- -0.41- -0.40- -0.79- -0.59-
FIN AUT NLD NLD NLD PRT NLD NLD POL NLD FRA POL POL NLD BEL NLD BEL12
-0.41- -0.38- -0.37- -0.50- -0.46- -0.64- -0.69- -0.72- -0.49- -0.60- -0.72- -0.63- -0.76- -0.53- -0.45- -0.99- -0.85-
AUT NLD AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT ESP NLD AUT BEL AUT BEL POL NLD ITA NLD13
-0.48- -0.54- -0.45- -0.62- -0.61- -0.72- -1.21- -0.78- -0.64- -1.36- -1.28- -1.50- -1.04- -0.81- -0.58- -1.25- -0.90-
POL POL POL POL POL SWE BEL AUT BEL BEL AUT BEL FRA BEL POL BEL AUT14
-0.81- -0.86- -1.25- -1.17- -0.96- -1.19- -1.25- -1.37- -0.70- -1.83- -1.30- -1.52- -1.49- -0.89- -0.85- -1.26- -1.89-
ITA FRA ITA ITA ITA ITA SWE BEL ITA ITA ITA ITA AUT FRA ITA AUT ITA15
-2.21- -1.30- -1.98- -2.22- -2.24- -1.77- -1.25- -1.45- -2.68- -2.26- -2.27- -2.19- -1.82- -1.14- -2.20- -1.60- -3.60-
DEU ITA DEU FRA DEU DEU ITA ITA DEU DEU DEU FRA ITA ITA DEU DEU DEU16
-2.86- -1.85- -3.41- -2.76- -2.51- -3.54- -2.83- -3.42- -5.30- -4.61- -5.13- -3.56- -2.18- -2.07- -4.12- -4.78- -4.77-
ESP DEU FRA DEU FRA FRA DEU DEU FRA FRA ESP DEU DEU DEU ESP ESP ESP17
-3.83- -4.02- -4.21- -3.32- -3.71- -4.39- -4.72- -5.77- -5.80- -5.06- -10.78- -5.65- -5.98- -6.59- -23.70- -19.77- -10.89-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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Table 2.38: Ranking of the Efficient Specialization Ratio (E) in Electricity, Gas and Water Supply*
Year
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
POL IRL IRL DNK DNK FIN DNK IRL IRL GRC FIN DNK SWE DNK DNK IRL DNK4
-0.38- -0.11- -0.20- -0.36- -0.18- -0.17- -0.30- -0.22- -0.28- -0.10- -0.19- -0.22- -0.28- -0.22- -0.20- -0.26- -0.17-
CZE PRT PRT CZE IRL IRL IRL DNK DNK FIN DNK SWE DNK IRL SWE DNK CZE5
-0.38- -0.39- -0.46- -0.40- -0.22- -0.33- -0.34- -0.30- -0.28- -0.16- -0.21- -0.31- -0.29- -0.27- -0.26- -0.29- -0.33-
FIN ESP FIN FIN FIN CZE CZE CZE CZE CZE SWE CZE IRL SWE CZE SWE SWE6
-0.57- -0.49- -0.52- -0.48- -0.38- -0.36- -0.67- -0.32- -0.29- -0.23- -0.27- -0.40- -0.34- -0.28- -0.37- -0.30- -0.33-
AUT FIN ESP SWE CZE BEL HUN HUN HUN DNK HUN IRL GRC GRC BEL CZE IRL7
-0.90- -0.56- -0.55- -0.57- -0.45- -0.65- -0.73- -0.46- -0.48- -0.25- -0.32- -0.45- -0.80- -0.45- -0.52- -0.33- -0.36-
GRC SWE GRC ESP PRT PRT AUT SWE AUT SWE CZE NLD AUT AUT IRL HUN HUN8
-1.10- -0.75- -0.95- -0.58- -0.72- -0.84- -0.96- -0.62- -0.49- -0.31- -0.37- -1.31- -0.98- -0.46- -0.62- -0.82- -0.81-
PRT GRC CZE PRT ESP AUT NLD AUT SWE IRL GRC AUT NLD ESP HUN FRA AUT9
-1.25- -0.91- -1.08- -0.64- -0.75- -1.13- -1.26- -0.94- -0.57- -0.31- -0.48- -1.44- -1.21- -1.01- -0.74- -1.06- -1.10-
BEL AUT AUT BEL AUT GRC GRC NLD ESP AUT NLD BEL BEL NLD NLD AUT FRA10
-1.53- -1.19- -1.22- -0.81- -0.91- -1.20- -1.71- -1.21- -0.70- -0.60- -1.22- -1.57- -1.44- -1.11- -1.36- -1.07- -1.11-
FRA BEL BEL AUT GRC SWE BEL BEL BEL ESP BEL GRC ESP BEL AUT BEL BEL11
-1.57- -1.28- -1.35- -0.83- -1.23- -1.24- -1.81- -1.44- -0.75- -0.83- -1.29- -1.66- -1.84- -1.38- -1.66- -1.08- -1.13-
NLD FRA NLD GRC BEL NLD FRA GRC NLD NLD AUT ESP HUN HUN GRC GRC GBR12
-2.60- -2.15- -1.80- -1.02- -1.45- -1.28- -2.72- -2.65- -1.19- -1.17- -1.46- -1.78- -2.70- -2.81- -1.67- -1.69- -3.12-
GBR NLD HUN NLD NLD FRA ESP FRA GRC BEL POL HUN POL POL FRA GBR NLD13
-2.91- -2.51- -2.77- -1.59- -1.53- -3.99- -2.82- -2.73- -1.34- -1.31- -3.75- -2.41- -3.59- -3.66- -2.81- -2.72- -3.21-
ESP GBR FRA FRA FRA GBR POL POL FRA FRA ESP POL GBR GBR POL NLD POL14
-3.72- -3.42- -3.07- -2.55- -1.75- -4.12- -3.45- -3.65- -3.31- -3.43- -3.80- -3.56- -4.45- -5.30- -3.15- -3.31- -3.43-
ITA HUN GBR ITA GBR ESP GBR GBR POL POL FRA FRA FRA ITA GBR POL ITA15
-4.04- -3.51- -3.66- -3.88- -4.45- -4.40- -4.02- -3.97- -3.58- -4.08- -4.79- -5.30- -5.21- -5.44- -4.02- -3.32- -3.77-
DEU ITA ITA DEU ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA DEU ITA FRA ESP ESP ESP16
-5.87- -3.89- -4.25- -7.08- -4.74- -6.23- -5.13- -4.91- -5.82- -6.54- -5.81- -5.99- -5.65- -5.51- -4.30- -3.60- -4.98-
HUN DEU DEU HUN DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU ITA DEU DEU DEU DEU DEU17
-11.62- -6.72- -6.40- -8.24- -8.14- -7.43- -6.68- -7.78- -7.62- -7.25- -6.06- -6.06- -6.15- -6.38- -5.41- -5.30- -5.12-






and represents the share of European net output that each country should have produced to exploit its
Comparative Advantages. The values are followed by a sign. The sign specifies whether the country should have improved (+) or reduced
(-) its production, or whether it was close to the ESR (=). A country has been considered close to the ESR if the difference with the real
share of European net production is lower than the 20% of the original share.
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2.B.3 The Labour Mobility Index







where lEi,c,t and li,c,t are, respectively, the quantity of workers employed in
sector i of country c at time t in the efficient scenario and in the original
data set.
In words, the index shows the flows workers into or from specific Sec-
tors. In this case the results in Sector 2 and Sector 12 are reported, because
the quantity of data is much lower than in Tables 2.6-2.22 and reporting the
full data does not worsen the clearness of Tables. If the index is positive,
this means that the country should have increased the employment in the
Sector considered in order to realize an Efficient Specialization Patterns.
Therefore, a positive number is also an index of CA.
For example, in Austria most of the labour force should have been con-
centrated in Sector 12—see Tab. 2.39, which is the Sector in which Austria
had the more stable and marked CA—see Tab. 2.6.
However, this way of evaluating CAs may lead to weigh in different
ways the closeness of single sectors, or even of countries, to the efficient
specialization pattern. This happens because adjusting the net output in
one sector implies a reallocation of labour that involves all the system. This
is due to the complexity of industrial relations assumed by the approach
of subsystems.
It may happen that a slight adjustment of the net product of a sector
i in country c involves more labour reallocation than a considerable net
product adjustment in sector j in country d. It all depends on how tight
are the linkages among the Sector considered and the rest of the system.
For this reason, comparing the ESR and the RSR should be considered
the proper way of evaluating CAs, while the lm may offer additional in-
formation on the distance of the single sectors of specific countries from
the Efficient Specialization Pattern.
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Table 2.39: Labour mobility index of Austria*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -32.29 -31.87 -31.50 -30.85 -30.73 -30.44 -30.15 -30.41 -30.43 -30.34 -29.76 -29.06 -27.83 -30.44 -27.59 -26.20 -29.39
2 -0.80 -0.80 -0.79 -0.77 -0.74 -0.73 -0.70 -0.69 -0.69 -0.67 -0.64 -0.65 -0.66 -0.83 -0.77 -0.90 -0.81
3 -8.44 -8.47 -8.40 -8.24 -8.16 -8.08 -8.00 -8.04 -8.11 -8.19 -8.10 -8.18 -8.21 -7.10 -7.27 -7.87 -7.47
4 -4.01 -3.81 -3.64 -3.55 -3.40 -3.26 -3.17 -3.00 -2.81 -2.68 -2.51 -2.49 -2.33 -2.25 -2.10 -2.18 -1.96
5 -0.74 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.68 -0.66 -0.65 -0.61 -0.59 -0.54 -0.52 -0.51 -0.49 -0.46 -0.48 -0.46
6 -3.65 -3.74 -3.79 -3.80 -3.80 -3.84 -3.85 -3.86 -3.90 -3.93 -3.93 -4.05 -4.19 -3.96 -3.96 -4.75 -4.62
7 -5.01 -5.13 -5.17 -5.20 -5.20 -5.18 -5.16 -5.20 -5.18 -5.18 -5.14 -5.28 -5.01 -4.59 61.78 -4.83 -4.41
8 -0.29 -0.27 -0.26 -0.25 -0.23 -0.21 -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 16.18 -0.30 -0.17 -0.25
9 -2.61 -2.67 -2.65 -2.67 -2.67 -2.64 -2.64 -2.74 -2.81 -2.79 -2.81 -2.86 -3.00 -2.61 -2.63 -2.50 -2.37
10 -2.69 -2.66 -2.60 -2.65 -2.76 45.55 -2.66 -2.85 -2.86 -2.82 -2.81 -2.88 -3.00 -3.06 -3.19 -2.95 -2.60
11 -3.77 62.55 71.00 -3.62 -3.61 47.87 -3.76 -3.74 -3.72 -3.72 -3.72 -3.70 -3.79 -3.14 30.58 -3.27 -3.02
12 90.59 24.24 15.62 90.04 89.98 -10.17 89.45 89.51 -10.52 -10.63 89.01 88.89 88.61 -11.89 -14.22 77.18 86.78
13 -7.15 -7.39 -7.51 -7.78 -7.86 -7.90 -8.09 -8.22 -8.28 -8.36 -8.55 -8.72 -9.02 74.56 -9.93 -1.45 -9.68
14 -7.84 -7.72 -7.70 -7.81 -7.77 -7.95 -8.10 -7.74 92.28 -7.46 -7.56 -7.66 -8.23 -8.53 -8.82 -8.48 -8.61
15 -2.73 -2.89 -3.25 -3.51 -3.74 -3.84 -3.95 -3.92 -4.00 95.76 -4.69 -4.62 -4.55 -4.36 -4.17 -4.04 -4.70
16 -5.38 -5.37 -5.36 -5.34 -5.28 -5.28 -5.22 -5.11 -5.00 -4.99 -4.86 -4.93 -4.94 -4.48 -3.64 -3.74 -3.30
17 -3.19 -3.26 -3.28 -3.28 -3.28 -3.24 -3.15 -3.14 -3.16 -3.22 -3.22 -3.11 -3.18 -3.00 -3.30 -3.36 -3.14
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.40: Labour mobility index of Belgium*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -11.79 -11.67 -11.62 -11.60 -11.64 -11.31 -11.02 -11.20 -11.43 -11.67 -11.72 -11.66 -11.56 -10.77 -10.85 -10.75 -10.38
2 -0.52 -0.52 -0.51 -0.49 -0.49 -0.48 -0.43 -0.43 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 -0.45 -0.43 -0.49 -0.50 -0.50
3 -12.27 -12.51 -12.67 -12.68 -12.71 -12.60 -12.69 -12.87 -13.21 -13.43 -13.52 -13.52 -13.60 -13.70 8.62 -13.08 -13.21
4 -8.19 -7.79 -7.64 -7.55 -7.27 -6.99 -6.70 -6.46 -6.24 -5.99 -5.69 -5.45 -5.36 -5.12 -5.55 -5.38 -5.20
5 -0.50 -0.48 -0.41 -0.36 -0.34 -0.32 -0.30 -0.28 -0.27 -0.27 -0.26 -0.24 -0.23 -0.27 -0.27 -0.26 -0.25
6 -1.75 -1.75 -1.74 -1.76 -1.79 -1.85 -1.91 -1.92 79.04 -1.96 11.46 -1.81 -2.05 -1.93 76.84 -1.59 0.05
7 -6.44 -6.50 -6.57 -6.59 -6.71 -6.76 -6.77 -6.61 -6.56 -6.54 -6.52 -6.50 -6.46 -6.49 -6.19 -5.97 -5.94
8 -0.74 -0.76 -0.74 -0.70 -0.69 -0.69 -0.68 -0.78 -0.79 -0.87 -0.82 -0.81 -0.80 -0.77 -1.98 -2.10 -2.08
9 -8.72 -8.78 -8.85 -8.93 -9.13 -9.35 -9.30 -9.39 -9.61 -9.60 -9.73 -9.89 -9.89 -9.99 -9.51 -9.79 -9.99
10 -2.93 29.63 35.67 96.84 44.46 -3.26 -3.48 -3.48 -3.45 -3.53 -3.58 -3.51 -3.62 -3.50 -3.10 -3.36 -3.60
11 95.59 62.90 54.45 -4.50 -4.44 -4.37 -4.45 -4.45 -4.43 -4.37 -4.35 -4.28 -4.34 -4.54 -4.98 -4.79 -4.53
12 -13.59 -13.63 -11.15 -13.42 38.80 -13.52 86.64 86.09 4.98 85.76 72.17 85.33 85.18 84.95 -16.10 83.92 82.12
13 -5.33 -5.43 -5.51 -5.56 -5.46 -5.52 -5.63 -5.63 -5.55 -5.57 -5.62 -5.80 -5.99 -6.26 -6.13 -6.10 -6.27
14 -7.09 -7.06 -6.97 -6.99 -7.08 92.71 -7.38 -6.88 -6.58 -6.29 -6.24 -6.14 -6.23 -6.41 -6.56 -6.47 -6.38
15 -7.86 -7.87 -7.96 -7.98 -7.85 -8.19 -8.33 -8.15 -7.96 -7.85 -7.85 -7.87 -7.23 -7.20 -6.73 -6.66 -6.55
16 -4.39 -4.27 -4.22 -4.15 -4.11 -4.05 -4.16 -4.11 -4.02 -4.01 -3.93 -3.86 -3.74 -3.65 -3.16 -3.10 -3.13
17 -3.49 -3.52 -3.55 -3.56 -3.54 -3.46 -3.42 -3.47 -3.48 -3.40 -3.36 -3.54 -3.66 -3.92 -3.87 -4.03 -4.15
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.41: Labour mobility index of the Czech Republic*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 82.85 -16.27 67.36 84.93 85.52 86.30 66.04 87.47 87.66 88.09 88.55 88.82 79.39 82.77 88.52 88.87 89.91
2 -5.14 -4.85 -4.61 -4.26 -3.99 -3.69 -3.56 -3.15 -2.95 -2.85 -2.73 -2.80 -2.74 -2.87 -2.68 -2.69 -2.28
3 -8.33 -8.82 -8.89 -8.99 -8.82 -8.81 -8.70 -9.00 -8.94 -8.82 -8.58 -8.25 -8.26 -8.27 -9.30 -8.97 -8.79
4 -8.44 -7.87 -7.72 -7.84 -7.71 -7.47 -7.10 -6.87 -6.43 -6.18 -5.62 -4.87 -4.44 -4.12 -3.80 -4.15 -4.11
5 -1.82 -1.65 -1.45 -1.34 -1.22 -1.16 -1.11 -0.97 -0.81 -0.72 -0.65 -0.66 -0.54 -0.50 -0.46 -0.51 -0.53
6 -3.71 -3.72 -3.70 -3.75 -3.80 -3.89 -4.05 -4.29 -4.68 -4.69 -4.65 -4.82 -4.59 -4.64 -5.01 -4.80 -4.68
7 -3.25 -3.33 -3.22 -3.31 -3.25 -3.23 17.56 -3.67 -3.78 -3.77 -3.91 -3.80 -4.03 -4.01 -4.16 -4.01 -4.29
8 -0.57 25.95 16.78 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 -0.23 -0.23 -0.28 -0.36
9 -2.29 -2.40 -2.58 -2.65 -2.59 -2.55 -2.53 -2.48 -2.57 -2.53 -2.61 -2.48 -2.39 -2.34 -2.66 -2.71 -2.55
10 -2.11 -2.32 -2.71 -2.85 -3.01 -3.25 -3.53 -3.64 -3.92 -4.18 -4.44 -4.89 -5.20 -5.51 -5.26 -5.29 -5.72
11 -4.55 -4.64 -4.75 -4.71 -4.85 -5.02 -4.99 -4.95 -4.84 -4.78 -4.76 -4.67 -4.43 -4.28 -4.06 -4.16 -4.05
12 -13.29 -13.52 -13.56 -13.34 -13.61 -13.31 -13.37 -13.20 -13.35 -13.77 -13.90 -13.91 -14.18 -14.53 -13.87 -14.51 -15.05
13 -9.56 -9.39 -9.41 -9.30 -9.08 -8.98 -8.97 -8.88 -9.03 -8.97 -9.29 -9.63 -10.14 -10.00 -9.20 -9.02 -9.60
14 -6.82 -7.31 -7.71 -8.22 -8.94 -9.70 -10.07 -10.52 -10.78 -11.19 -11.26 -11.96 -11.86 -11.66 -11.15 -11.28 -10.77
15 -4.81 -4.83 -5.00 -5.01 -5.19 -5.86 -6.33 -6.62 -6.62 -6.78 -7.55 -7.81 -8.30 -8.29 -8.20 -8.00 -8.91
16 -3.86 -4.25 -4.65 -4.86 -5.01 -5.05 -5.08 -5.03 -4.86 -4.85 -4.74 -4.63 -4.56 -4.33 -4.75 -4.77 -4.52
17 -4.30 69.20 -4.18 -4.29 -4.24 -4.12 -4.00 -4.01 -3.90 -3.84 -3.67 -3.46 6.45 2.81 -3.71 -3.72 -3.72
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.42: Labour mobility index of Denmark*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -8.34 -5.43 -17.84 -17.47 -13.57 -16.66 -16.60 -16.95 52.55 43.55 54.65 -6.32 51.73 -15.87 71.25 45.00 59.90
2 -0.58 14.55 3.86 32.04 9.76 23.19 26.81 26.03 29.70 28.29 27.53 28.12 31.31 16.71 11.83 37.86 22.00
3 -14.48 -14.39 -14.21 -13.90 -13.72 -13.97 -14.16 -14.59 -14.66 -14.71 -14.21 -13.92 -13.37 -13.40 -14.83 -16.28 -15.83
4 -3.30 -3.00 -2.65 -2.58 1.63 3.22 -2.25 71.05 -2.05 -1.94 -1.83 -1.75 -1.65 -1.62 -1.40 -1.50 -1.50
5 89.42 71.77 94.96 67.17 81.80 70.06 72.38 0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
6 -2.51 -2.57 -2.62 -2.68 -2.67 -2.75 -2.67 -2.63 -2.61 -2.77 -2.94 -3.05 -2.94 -2.90 -2.58 -2.30 -2.25
7 -8.56 -8.86 -8.96 -9.25 -9.48 -9.48 -8.96 -8.89 -8.61 -8.45 -8.27 -8.04 -7.90 -7.98 -7.61 -8.09 -7.54
8 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.57 -0.28 -0.41
9 -4.48 -4.36 -4.57 -4.61 -4.62 -4.52 -4.97 -5.01 -5.56 -5.76 -5.90 -5.79 -5.99 -6.11 -5.49 -5.36 -5.16
10 -3.31 -3.45 -3.54 -3.70 -3.82 -3.86 -3.92 -3.90 -4.11 -4.15 -4.09 -4.10 -4.17 -3.92 -3.73 -3.66 -3.34
11 -3.38 -3.29 -3.34 -3.52 -3.72 -3.53 -3.40 -3.20 -3.04 -3.05 -3.07 -3.22 -3.33 -3.49 -3.08 -3.31 -3.01
12 -9.30 -9.52 -9.55 -9.36 -9.44 -9.59 -9.77 -9.50 -9.47 -9.69 -9.71 -10.21 -10.72 -11.00 -8.90 -8.91 -9.38
13 -11.63 -11.94 -11.89 -12.20 -11.98 -12.05 -12.24 -12.16 -12.33 -12.36 -12.20 -12.37 -12.55 69.82 -13.31 -13.58 -13.57
14 -7.13 -7.43 -7.44 -7.73 -8.29 -8.56 -9.23 -9.48 -9.11 1.40 -9.30 51.36 -9.71 -9.85 -11.15 -11.15 -11.09
15 -3.74 -3.66 -3.60 -3.44 -3.23 -2.92 -2.83 -2.86 -2.56 -2.36 -2.67 -2.57 -2.71 -2.94 -3.26 -0.57 -0.64
16 -5.63 -5.44 -5.65 -5.72 -5.71 -5.66 -5.53 -5.31 -5.33 -5.21 -5.13 -5.11 -4.94 -4.31 -4.34 -4.84 -5.01
17 -2.90 -2.84 -2.85 -2.93 -2.80 -2.81 -2.55 -2.57 -2.58 -2.58 -2.65 -2.80 -2.85 -2.93 -2.78 -2.97 -3.11
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.43: Labour mobility index of Finland*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -26.79 -25.60 -24.62 -22.69 -22.64 -22.07 -21.27 -20.89 -21.18 -21.41 -21.34 -21.12 -21.02 -21.24 -19.96 -20.68 -20.02
2 -0.92 -0.93 -1.03 -0.93 -0.94 -0.93 -0.95 -0.98 -0.98 -0.95 -1.00 -1.10 -1.06 -1.09 -1.17 -1.24 -1.32
3 -7.69 -7.66 -7.41 -7.45 -7.19 -6.85 -6.76 -6.92 -7.14 -6.96 -6.82 -6.66 -6.60 -6.49 -6.42 -6.65 -6.80
4 -2.96 -2.86 -2.86 -2.91 -2.86 -2.71 -2.67 -2.65 -2.49 -2.34 -2.23 -2.15 -2.02 -1.80 -1.97 -1.85 -1.91
5 -0.65 -0.59 -0.53 -0.55 -0.54 -0.50 -0.49 -0.46 -0.46 -0.43 -0.43 -0.41 -0.38 -0.35 -0.38 -0.36 -0.37
6 -4.96 -4.81 -4.97 -5.08 -5.07 -5.13 -5.08 -5.13 -5.16 -5.29 -5.18 -5.25 -5.20 -4.93 -5.51 -5.63 -5.60
7 -12.20 -12.03 -11.89 -11.86 -11.87 -11.83 -11.79 -11.85 -11.84 -11.74 -11.22 -10.87 -10.29 -9.69 -10.41 -10.35 -10.44
8 -0.55 -0.57 -0.56 -0.55 -0.52 -0.60 -0.58 -0.56 -0.49 -0.52 -0.42 -0.43 -0.46 -0.43 -0.52 -0.52 -0.49
9 -3.13 -3.13 -3.04 -3.09 -3.04 -3.03 -3.09 -3.15 -3.24 -3.24 -3.17 -3.10 -3.16 -3.27 -3.43 -3.45 -3.46
10 -2.31 -2.39 -2.60 -2.79 -2.91 -3.06 -2.96 -3.04 -2.87 -2.90 -2.87 -2.79 -2.77 -2.80 -2.83 -2.80 -2.93
11 -2.30 -2.27 -2.33 -2.48 -2.58 -2.71 -2.68 -2.72 -2.76 -2.79 -2.91 -2.98 -2.97 -2.97 -2.81 -2.82 -2.79
12 92.40 91.91 90.96 90.76 -9.18 -9.46 -10.03 -10.21 -10.41 -10.48 -10.93 -11.20 -11.66 -11.82 -12.48 -12.23 -12.40
13 -9.27 -9.91 -9.81 -10.14 -9.76 -9.98 -10.30 -10.50 -10.62 -10.63 -10.96 -11.37 -11.64 -12.42 -11.07 -10.67 -11.45
14 -8.47 -9.07 -9.30 -10.09 89.02 88.77 88.67 88.97 89.30 89.09 88.84 88.95 88.82 88.92 88.72 88.72 89.34
15 -4.03 -3.97 -3.79 -3.86 -3.77 -3.95 -4.03 -4.03 -3.92 -3.64 -3.62 -3.78 -3.86 -3.98 -4.11 -3.85 -3.83
16 -2.81 -2.78 -2.98 -3.08 -3.06 -3.13 -3.14 -3.10 -3.07 -3.07 -3.01 -3.03 -3.08 -2.84 -2.60 -2.65 -2.64
17 -3.35 -3.35 -3.26 -3.21 -3.07 -2.84 -2.85 -2.77 -2.68 -2.69 -2.72 -2.73 -2.67 -2.80 -3.05 -2.97 -2.90
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.44: Labour mobility index of France*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 78.93 58.38 21.89 32.74 24.63 8.78 67.02 66.50 16.47 25.66 50.38 23.24 17.66 25.36 68.46 79.90 80.22
2 -1.02 -1.00 -0.94 -0.87 -0.81 -0.79 -0.64 -0.64 -0.65 -0.67 -0.69 -0.70 -0.71 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75
3 -10.79 -11.08 -11.39 -11.60 -11.71 -11.76 -11.72 -12.19 -12.47 -12.48 -12.68 -12.93 -13.09 -13.96 -12.21 -12.64 -12.55
4 -5.66 -5.44 -5.28 -5.13 -4.89 -4.48 -4.28 -4.03 -3.84 -3.53 -3.27 -3.00 27.56 25.99 -2.85 -2.79 -2.56
5 -1.09 -1.04 -1.00 -0.95 -0.92 -0.88 -0.86 -0.82 -0.79 -0.73 -0.68 -0.67 -0.67 -0.68 -0.76 -0.74 -0.68
6 -2.00 -1.97 -1.93 -1.89 -1.86 -1.86 -1.85 -1.88 -1.92 -1.94 -1.90 -1.93 -1.95 -2.00 -1.83 -1.76 -1.77
7 -6.31 -6.28 -6.29 -6.33 -6.38 -6.37 -6.42 -6.32 -6.30 -6.33 -6.22 -6.12 -6.06 -5.96 -6.22 -6.29 -6.47
8 -0.67 -0.67 -0.64 -0.57 -0.53 -0.54 -0.55 -0.54 -0.57 -0.58 -0.59 -0.60 -0.58 -0.60 -0.50 -0.51 -0.71
9 -3.18 -3.14 -3.12 -3.10 -0.19 10.84 10.28 10.70 11.20 11.68 26.07 24.78 24.62 23.56 8.32 -3.30 -2.98
10 -3.89 -3.92 -3.95 -4.05 -4.14 -4.34 -4.46 -4.53 -4.59 -4.76 -4.77 -4.73 -4.69 -4.61 -4.55 -4.65 -4.49
11 -3.11 -3.10 -3.03 -3.01 -2.99 -2.98 -2.99 -2.98 -2.97 -2.99 -2.99 -2.92 -3.02 -3.12 -3.12 -3.01 -2.91
12 -11.66 -11.81 -11.87 -12.00 -12.13 -12.29 -12.46 -12.47 -12.38 -12.37 -12.34 -12.46 -12.57 -12.43 -11.95 -11.74 -13.53
13 -7.00 -7.01 -7.01 -6.99 -7.04 -7.00 -7.04 -6.84 -6.90 -7.02 -7.06 -7.02 -7.12 -7.22 -7.90 -7.75 -8.13
14 -8.47 -8.58 -8.55 -8.69 -8.83 -9.04 -9.14 -8.96 -8.65 -8.16 -7.98 -8.14 -8.20 -8.32 -6.99 -6.97 -7.43
15 -6.73 14.02 50.53 39.80 45.25 50.29 -7.19 -7.33 42.05 32.02 -7.49 21.07 -3.37 -7.31 -8.86 -8.77 -6.87
16 -3.88 -3.87 -3.89 -3.88 -3.96 -3.99 -4.05 -4.00 -4.01 -4.01 -3.99 -3.97 -3.89 -4.03 -3.79 -3.56 -3.64
17 -3.47 -3.48 -3.52 -3.47 -3.49 -3.60 -3.66 -3.69 -3.66 -3.77 -3.82 -3.88 -3.91 -3.94 -4.51 -4.67 -4.74
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.45: Labour mobility index of Germany*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -10.70 -9.99 -9.97 -10.02 -10.02 -9.88 -9.77 -9.76 -9.76 -9.82 -9.75 -9.66 -9.70 -8.35 -10.08 -10.47 -10.09
2 -1.93 -1.84 -1.63 -1.51 -1.42 -1.35 -1.11 -1.10 -1.10 -1.06 -1.03 -0.99 -0.94 -0.94 -0.77 -0.74 -0.57
3 39.76 -9.31 -9.57 -9.72 -9.94 -10.08 -10.07 -10.47 -10.85 -10.77 -10.79 -10.83 -10.58 -10.63 -9.06 -9.46 -9.10
4 -3.31 15.99 25.03 24.86 23.45 23.37 22.34 17.88 -2.18 -2.10 -2.01 -1.97 -1.85 -1.76 17.13 16.56 13.08
5 -0.43 -0.41 -0.40 -0.39 -0.36 -0.36 -0.35 -0.33 -0.31 -0.30 -0.26 -0.27 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27 -0.26 -0.25
6 -2.42 -2.44 -2.31 -2.24 0.57 -2.17 -2.04 -2.06 -1.92 -2.08 -1.89 0.91 -1.81 8.53 -1.38 8.81 8.08
7 -7.68 -7.81 -7.97 -7.96 -7.11 -7.21 -7.16 -7.17 -7.06 -6.98 -7.04 -6.95 -6.88 -6.17 -5.00 -5.24 -5.19
8 -0.25 -0.24 -0.23 -0.22 -0.25 -0.24 -0.25 -0.26 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.20 -0.18 -0.14 -0.15
9 -5.35 -5.67 -5.59 -5.39 -5.43 -5.37 -5.36 -5.35 -5.49 -5.22 -5.19 -5.22 -5.22 -5.22 -4.77 -4.86 -4.70
10 -0.48 -4.08 -4.20 -4.29 -4.32 -3.54 -3.15 -4.41 6.06 -4.48 -4.55 -4.41 -4.45 -4.73 -4.30 -4.60 16.15
11 0.73 -3.44 -3.30 6.39 15.62 -3.28 -3.16 -3.08 0.77 3.67 -2.88 -2.84 -2.81 -2.79 11.39 5.63 -2.51
12 -7.99 37.12 35.30 26.83 31.82 34.54 9.08 25.38 50.93 36.75 7.42 27.48 12.06 14.82 -13.96 -15.56 -16.20
13 -7.12 -3.69 13.11 3.28 -3.76 14.54 0.41 -10.64 -12.19 12.93 3.02 4.02 3.62 -11.14 -14.88 -7.48 -14.64
14 -11.53 -11.37 -11.51 -11.36 -11.36 -11.59 -11.79 -11.80 2.50 7.46 10.15 5.07 7.81 5.22 8.08 5.37 3.68
15 26.13 14.65 -9.39 -1.04 -10.43 -10.66 29.02 29.71 -2.73 -11.37 31.49 12.35 27.88 30.48 34.71 29.26 29.07
16 -3.79 -3.83 -3.77 -3.73 -3.70 -3.58 -3.50 -3.36 -3.20 -3.10 -3.17 -3.14 -3.36 -3.57 -3.12 -3.12 -3.01
17 -3.64 -3.66 -3.60 -3.50 -3.37 -3.14 -3.16 -3.19 -3.23 -3.29 -3.30 -3.31 -3.26 -3.28 -3.55 -3.73 -3.64
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.46: Labour mobility index of Great Britain*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -5.47 -11.01 -11.22 -10.67 -10.29 -10.00 -9.88 -10.26 -10.78 -11.48 -12.49 -12.43 -12.63 -13.66 -14.83 -14.35 -14.57
2 -1.79 -1.66 -1.62 -1.59 -1.58 -1.77 -1.87 -1.82 -1.69 -1.59 -1.55 -1.69 -1.89 -1.94 -1.97 -2.00 -1.98
3 -10.52 26.12 37.21 17.51 40.38 33.81 34.84 24.53 -11.20 -11.48 -11.37 -11.32 -11.23 -11.07 -10.90 -10.80 -10.93
4 44.45 12.71 -4.62 -4.47 -4.13 -3.78 -3.45 -3.13 39.49 35.15 35.58 35.52 -2.37 -2.34 -1.44 -2.22 1.75
5 -0.63 -0.55 -0.50 -0.47 -0.46 -0.41 -0.35 9.86 9.04 7.31 7.16 7.15 7.23 6.97 6.56 6.00 5.82
6 15.69 14.99 18.75 17.17 15.03 20.30 19.23 20.06 -1.16 20.68 17.58 15.89 22.24 -1.38 -1.36 -1.33 -1.14
7 -10.37 -10.09 -9.80 -9.99 -10.57 -10.77 -10.84 -10.83 -10.82 -10.80 -10.69 -10.64 -10.56 -10.41 -10.25 -9.55 -8.87
8 -1.45 -1.51 -1.45 -1.40 -1.53 -1.48 -1.41 -1.67 -1.70 -1.81 -1.79 -1.79 -1.77 -1.75 -1.72 -2.03 -2.51
9 -7.78 -7.65 -7.38 -7.18 -7.50 -7.57 -7.74 -8.08 -8.15 -8.15 -8.07 -8.03 -7.97 -7.86 -7.73 -6.90 -6.49
10 -3.90 -3.91 -4.02 -4.39 -4.48 -4.58 -4.66 -4.58 -4.65 -4.76 -4.71 -4.69 -4.65 -4.59 -4.52 -4.18 -4.09
11 -3.05 -3.02 -2.88 -2.86 -2.81 -2.86 -2.83 -2.91 -3.04 -3.11 -3.08 -3.07 -3.04 -3.00 -2.95 -2.86 -2.74
12 -10.85 -10.65 -10.61 -11.13 -10.86 -10.51 -10.30 -10.11 -10.04 -9.89 -9.79 -9.74 23.37 47.20 33.99 -9.58 -9.62
13 -7.61 -7.37 -7.50 -7.66 -7.50 -7.47 -7.39 -7.29 -7.34 -7.23 -7.16 -7.13 -7.07 -6.97 2.06 49.14 47.43
14 -10.30 -10.33 -10.42 -10.61 -10.87 -11.37 -11.11 -10.14 4.54 -8.95 -8.86 -8.82 -8.75 -8.63 -8.49 -8.23 -7.61
15 -9.46 -9.75 -10.08 -10.19 -10.00 -9.90 -10.05 -10.26 -10.38 -10.55 -10.44 -10.39 -10.31 -10.17 -10.00 -11.59 -11.92
16 25.86 26.61 28.98 29.50 29.94 31.08 30.73 29.60 29.04 28.71 31.71 31.26 32.61 32.85 36.90 33.87 30.84
17 -2.84 -2.94 -2.86 18.43 -2.78 -2.72 -2.91 -2.98 -1.16 -2.05 -2.03 -0.07 -3.22 -3.26 -3.35 -3.39 -3.36
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.47: Labour mobility index of Greece*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -58.60 -58.10 -58.03 -57.39 -57.80 -57.21 -54.43 -54.10 -54.00 -50.93 -50.94 -50.37 -49.30 -45.87 -48.06 -49.12 -46.67
2 -1.11 -1.15 -1.13 -1.12 -1.00 -1.12 -1.19 -1.05 -1.17 -1.24 -1.20 -1.21 -1.23 -1.06 -1.33 -1.23 -1.32
3 -7.81 -7.95 -8.15 -8.12 -8.18 -8.51 -9.37 -9.84 -9.77 -9.99 -10.61 -11.11 -10.91 -11.33 90.22 -9.45 68.83
4 -8.18 -8.09 -7.80 -7.85 -7.74 -7.96 -7.37 -7.20 -7.30 -6.86 -6.41 -6.20 -6.39 -6.93 -7.44 -7.23 -7.47
5 -0.76 -0.77 -0.67 -0.67 -0.66 -0.64 -0.72 -0.57 -0.54 -0.65 -0.73 -0.64 -0.57 -0.40 -0.39 -0.38 -0.39
6 -1.85 -1.95 -1.91 -1.89 -1.90 -1.87 -1.76 -1.67 -1.65 -2.25 -2.27 -1.94 -1.78 -1.55 -1.43 -1.35 -1.12
7 -2.84 -2.90 -3.00 -3.08 -3.08 -2.99 -3.15 -3.25 -3.19 -3.77 -3.66 -3.94 -4.29 -5.12 -3.93 -3.98 -3.77
8 -0.34 -0.33 -0.31 -0.34 -0.33 -0.30 -0.38 -0.41 -0.41 -0.49 -0.51 -0.42 -0.37 -0.36 -0.61 -0.37 -0.32
9 -1.79 -1.77 -1.81 -1.86 -1.77 -1.82 -2.02 -2.15 -1.86 -2.47 -2.80 -2.84 -2.96 -3.31 -3.21 -2.17 -2.77
10 98.91 98.90 98.87 27.85 98.85 -1.09 -1.51 -1.52 -1.43 -1.70 -1.49 -1.52 3.89 10.61 -2.00 -3.07 -2.75
11 -2.36 -2.40 -2.47 68.44 -2.46 97.52 97.50 97.42 97.35 97.17 97.28 97.44 91.92 85.34 -2.41 97.63 -2.62
12 -3.13 -3.17 -3.15 -3.32 -3.39 -3.40 -4.36 -4.66 -4.78 -5.01 -4.78 -4.93 -5.10 -5.48 -7.42 -6.09 -6.15
13 -1.73 -1.79 -1.79 -1.87 -1.80 -1.85 -2.05 -1.74 -2.00 -2.48 -2.27 -2.32 -2.49 -2.44 -2.01 -2.01 -2.71
14 -0.93 -1.04 -1.02 -1.09 -1.13 -1.16 -1.51 -1.82 -1.82 -1.83 -1.85 -2.23 -2.35 -2.46 -1.84 -1.52 -1.40
15 -1.77 -1.68 -1.65 -1.68 -1.59 -1.59 -1.58 -1.53 -1.58 -1.71 -1.81 -1.90 -1.89 -2.45 -2.03 -2.38 -2.94
16 -3.15 -3.12 -3.23 -3.29 -3.31 -3.31 -3.42 -3.47 -3.57 -3.34 -3.56 -3.50 -3.71 -4.94 -3.89 -5.08 -5.36
17 -2.57 -2.68 -2.76 -2.72 -2.72 -2.71 -2.66 -2.44 -2.28 -2.45 -2.41 -2.38 -2.48 -2.24 -2.21 -2.20 18.92
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.48: Labour mobility index of Hungary*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -36.75 -37.90 -36.56 -34.43 -34.08 -32.62 -30.39 -29.79 -27.27 -26.23 74.47 -24.99 -23.74 -24.28 -24.11 -26.02 -28.46
2 -2.09 -2.00 -1.66 -1.53 -1.46 -1.21 -0.84 -0.94 -0.88 -1.01 -1.09 -1.11 -1.09 -0.69 -0.60 -0.91 -0.49
3 80.13 89.37 89.61 83.84 -9.89 -10.00 -10.49 -10.84 -11.04 -10.07 -10.30 -11.10 -10.19 -12.77 -14.20 -12.53 -13.17
4 -8.28 -7.83 -8.35 -8.91 -8.38 -8.50 -8.29 -7.88 -8.06 -7.27 -6.38 -6.18 -5.55 -4.48 -4.50 -4.28 -3.75
5 -2.04 -2.14 -2.40 -2.41 -2.33 -2.28 -2.18 -2.28 -1.73 -1.29 -1.08 -1.10 -0.97 -0.81 -0.81 -0.77 -0.95
6 -2.15 -2.27 -2.34 -2.23 -2.49 -2.40 -2.34 -2.54 -2.55 -2.75 -2.88 -3.01 -3.17 -2.33 -1.99 -1.75 -1.46
7 -2.89 -2.89 -2.55 -2.68 -2.81 -2.80 -3.13 -3.18 -3.30 -3.30 -3.46 -2.93 -3.55 -3.79 -3.84 -4.22 -3.54
8 9.23 -0.36 -0.31 5.64 5.70 -0.41 -0.45 -0.46 -0.44 -0.36 -0.43 -0.46 -0.48 -0.63 -0.54 -0.70 -0.70
9 -3.99 -3.91 -3.58 -3.69 -3.72 -3.36 -3.07 -3.04 -3.33 -3.73 -3.90 -3.44 -3.46 -3.47 -3.61 -3.22 -3.05
10 -1.82 -1.78 -2.10 -2.13 -2.38 -2.90 -2.69 -2.98 -2.89 -3.07 -3.01 -3.27 -3.41 -3.90 -3.66 -3.78 -3.74
11 -2.13 -2.02 -1.83 -1.85 -1.95 -2.13 -2.41 -2.25 -2.57 -2.41 -2.33 85.80 97.84 97.55 -2.19 -1.83 -1.80
12 -5.77 -5.42 -5.68 -5.76 -6.10 -6.08 -6.62 -7.12 -7.55 -7.55 -7.89 -8.19 -8.39 -7.70 -7.80 -6.20 -6.31
13 -5.41 -4.86 -5.12 -5.10 -5.06 -4.22 -4.41 -4.26 -4.46 -4.48 -4.52 -4.81 -5.26 -5.35 94.46 93.36 91.62
14 -5.74 -6.26 -6.60 -7.57 -7.80 -5.87 88.93 89.20 88.27 80.27 -13.67 -1.46 -14.31 -12.81 -11.91 -13.30 -9.62
15 -2.08 -2.47 -2.53 -3.11 -3.30 -3.13 -3.57 -4.06 -4.28 -4.70 -5.29 -5.30 -6.25 -6.09 -5.77 -5.02 -6.04
16 -2.26 -1.86 -2.04 -2.17 -2.44 -2.97 -3.00 -2.84 -3.23 -3.50 -3.43 -3.38 -3.15 -3.12 -3.16 -2.66 -2.61
17 -5.96 -5.41 -5.96 -5.90 88.47 90.86 -5.05 -4.73 -4.69 1.44 -4.81 -5.06 -4.86 -5.33 -5.76 -6.15 -5.92
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.49: Labour mobility index of Ireland*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -35.70 -33.73 -32.37 -30.91 -31.04 -29.14 -28.17 -28.61 -28.30 -28.05 -28.11 -28.33 -28.31 -27.48 -25.45 -23.51 -18.13
2 -1.35 -1.21 -1.48 -1.46 -1.33 -1.48 -1.56 -1.63 -1.69 -1.81 -1.83 -2.08 -2.08 -2.13 -2.11 -1.88 -1.78
3 -12.00 -12.27 -11.88 -11.97 -11.88 -12.06 -13.00 -13.30 -13.70 -13.23 -13.32 -12.69 -12.49 -11.34 -11.87 -11.50 -12.99
4 -5.36 -5.02 -4.55 -3.98 -3.13 -2.83 -2.66 -2.50 -2.21 -1.89 -1.78 -1.59 -1.64 -1.78 -1.69 -1.50 -1.23
5 -0.36 -0.29 -0.29 -0.30 -0.25 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 -0.17 -0.14 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07
6 -1.31 -1.35 -1.47 -1.46 -1.62 -1.79 -1.81 -2.04 -2.29 -2.05 -2.31 -2.26 -2.23 -2.07 -1.95 -2.29 -2.36
7 -5.49 90.70 -6.03 -6.26 -6.32 -6.27 -6.47 -6.55 -6.31 -6.42 93.87 94.15 94.08 93.42 9.52 93.83 94.91
8 -1.81 -1.90 -2.06 -2.16 -1.99 -2.28 -2.33 -2.44 -2.36 -2.54 -2.50 -2.72 -2.57 -6.03 -5.75 -5.09 -3.97
9 95.32 -1.44 94.71 94.56 94.33 94.29 93.73 93.33 93.40 93.24 -6.77 -7.03 -7.04 -6.55 77.53 -9.39 -9.84
10 -2.54 -2.77 -2.61 -2.76 -2.63 -2.77 -2.56 -2.58 -2.71 -2.80 -2.83 -2.73 -2.79 -2.56 -2.71 -2.32 -2.78
11 -2.73 -2.78 -2.85 -2.83 -2.91 -3.08 -2.97 -3.00 -2.78 -3.43 -3.40 -3.36 -3.37 -2.67 -2.58 -2.21 -2.64
12 -3.90 -4.22 -4.20 -4.47 -4.57 -5.06 -4.69 -4.95 -5.13 -5.09 -5.29 -5.47 -5.48 -5.65 -5.27 -5.05 -5.37
13 -3.91 -3.96 -4.03 -3.89 -3.98 -3.89 -3.97 -3.68 -3.47 -3.45 -3.37 -3.42 -3.41 -3.09 -3.62 -4.68 -5.34
14 -11.74 -12.46 -14.21 -15.10 -15.79 -16.86 -16.46 -14.88 -14.70 -15.01 -15.27 -15.80 -15.72 -16.38 -17.15 -18.19 -21.67
15 -2.50 -2.49 -2.39 -2.38 -2.42 -2.39 -2.57 -2.63 -2.77 -2.67 -2.60 -2.46 -2.50 -1.96 -3.05 -2.34 -2.87
16 -1.42 -1.45 -1.50 -1.64 -1.54 -1.29 -1.22 -1.21 -1.55 -1.25 -1.10 -1.02 -1.22 -0.96 -0.96 -0.85 -0.82
17 -3.20 -3.35 -2.77 -3.01 -2.93 -2.91 -3.09 -3.14 -3.27 -3.43 -3.29 -3.13 -3.14 -2.67 -2.79 -2.94 -3.03
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.50: Labour mobility index of Italy*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -19.97 -19.37 -19.16 -18.24 -17.57 -17.53 -17.67 -17.14 -16.13 -16.44 -16.48 -16.63 -16.21 -15.98 -15.86 -16.82 -16.10
2 -0.66 -0.64 -0.65 -0.66 -0.68 -0.65 -0.65 -0.71 -0.68 -0.66 -0.67 -0.65 -0.64 -0.64 -0.79 -0.71 -0.66
3 -7.41 -7.22 11.19 -7.67 -7.57 44.98 5.64 -3.72 21.96 36.59 40.19 43.18 44.65 44.62 31.04 79.30 28.00
4 -11.74 -11.46 -11.29 -11.28 -10.58 -10.50 -10.54 -10.53 -10.55 -10.26 -9.76 -9.16 -9.04 -9.25 -9.85 -9.42 -9.30
5 -3.62 -3.67 -3.67 -1.03 -3.51 -3.47 -2.25 -3.34 -3.34 -3.16 -2.92 -2.82 -2.86 -2.90 -2.86 -2.74 -2.91
6 -3.03 -2.89 -2.83 -2.88 -2.98 -3.01 -3.01 -3.06 -3.02 -2.97 -2.80 -2.79 -2.71 -2.54 -2.32 -2.31 -2.14
7 -4.26 -4.37 -4.24 -4.30 -4.39 -4.33 -4.33 -4.34 -4.38 -4.38 -4.37 -4.36 -4.29 -4.33 -4.20 -4.19 -4.12
8 -0.40 -0.40 -0.39 -0.41 -0.42 -0.43 -0.42 -0.38 -0.39 -0.40 -0.42 -0.42 -0.43 -0.42 -0.33 -0.60 -0.79
9 -3.29 -3.25 -3.31 -3.34 -3.41 -3.38 -3.36 -3.44 -3.35 -3.32 -3.39 -3.37 -3.36 -3.32 -3.52 -3.46 -3.72
10 -2.94 -3.08 -3.24 -3.38 -3.46 -3.51 -3.48 -3.48 7.54 21.74 4.40 0.70 -3.14 -3.24 -2.90 -2.90 -3.05
11 -3.97 -4.05 -4.02 -3.86 -4.01 -4.06 -4.19 -4.24 -4.21 -4.12 -4.22 -4.07 -4.20 -4.01 -3.53 -3.54 -3.47
12 -11.56 -12.20 -12.27 -12.53 -13.05 -12.95 -13.20 -13.34 -13.93 -13.77 -13.99 -14.54 -14.92 -15.06 -14.47 -14.39 21.86
13 37.40 34.32 14.37 26.80 35.04 14.94 32.13 46.87 49.60 20.36 34.04 34.61 36.89 36.54 47.90 -0.85 15.12
14 47.68 50.50 51.61 54.80 48.73 16.02 37.22 32.66 -7.43 -7.44 -7.68 -7.78 -7.86 -7.47 -6.98 -7.04 -6.40
15 -4.60 -4.61 -4.68 -4.65 -4.64 -4.61 -4.49 -4.41 -4.35 -4.44 -4.47 -4.53 -4.60 -4.49 -5.13 -4.96 -5.02
16 -5.14 -5.07 -4.99 -5.00 -5.21 -5.21 -5.18 -5.21 -5.20 -5.25 -5.34 -5.22 -5.18 -5.38 -5.46 -5.37 -5.07
17 -2.50 -2.53 -2.43 -2.36 -2.31 -2.28 -2.21 -2.19 -2.13 -2.08 -2.12 -2.15 -2.10 -2.13 -0.74 0.00 -2.23
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.51: Labour mobility index of Netherlands*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 26.76 -21.29 32.06 -9.80 1.07 24.38 -20.87 -21.23 -21.50 -21.52 -21.57 -21.36 -21.10 -20.55 -21.03 -21.38 -20.81
2 3.03 -0.81 -0.76 -0.77 -0.74 -0.72 -0.69 -0.74 -0.73 -0.73 -0.64 -0.62 -0.62 -0.63 -0.62 -0.63 -0.60
3 -11.91 31.91 15.70 62.80 66.59 -11.68 88.49 88.49 88.57 88.62 88.63 88.67 88.84 88.30 80.34 -10.03 -0.14
4 -2.56 -2.32 -2.31 -2.20 -2.15 -2.11 -2.07 -1.95 -1.86 -1.72 -1.64 -1.62 -1.61 -1.56 -1.48 -1.45 -1.47
5 -0.39 -0.34 -0.34 -0.30 -0.27 -0.24 -0.25 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13
6 -1.68 -1.69 -1.75 -1.76 -1.73 -1.71 -1.69 -1.66 -1.58 -1.60 -1.64 -1.62 -1.67 -1.69 -1.57 -1.48 -1.41
7 -10.90 -10.46 -10.28 -9.95 -9.86 -9.69 -9.33 -9.02 -9.06 -8.97 -8.95 -8.95 -8.89 -8.67 -8.13 -7.86 -7.99
8 -0.49 -0.53 -0.51 -0.50 -0.47 -0.45 -0.46 -0.48 -0.49 -0.52 -0.53 -0.52 -0.53 -0.62 6.87 4.46 4.58
9 43.09 51.03 13.87 9.37 -5.33 -5.33 -5.35 -5.50 -5.54 -5.52 -5.52 -5.54 -5.46 -5.19 -5.42 86.99 76.68
10 -2.38 -2.33 -2.45 -2.56 -2.61 -2.69 -2.73 -2.70 -2.71 -2.76 -2.78 -2.77 -2.79 -2.79 -2.64 -2.58 -2.72
11 -2.58 -2.59 -2.58 -2.74 -2.66 -2.69 -2.57 -2.52 -2.50 -2.46 -2.47 -2.49 -2.47 -2.48 -2.35 -2.26 -2.29
12 -9.29 -9.57 -9.55 -9.68 -9.85 -9.86 -9.86 -9.90 -9.78 -9.72 -9.81 -9.85 -10.08 -11.04 -10.29 -10.19 -10.37
13 -6.04 -6.24 -6.37 -6.81 -6.88 -6.96 -7.11 -6.95 -6.94 -7.06 -7.19 -7.32 -7.58 -7.38 -7.60 -7.29 -6.95
14 -7.53 -7.66 -7.71 -7.52 -7.39 47.61 -7.50 -7.38 -7.06 -6.96 -6.87 -6.94 -6.91 -6.83 -7.09 -7.18 -7.35
15 -4.19 -4.01 -3.93 -4.15 -4.23 -4.27 -4.21 -4.25 -4.25 -4.18 -4.07 -4.01 -4.08 -4.06 -4.29 -4.22 -4.19
16 -10.15 -10.40 -10.49 -10.85 -10.98 -11.17 -11.41 -11.53 -11.88 -12.22 -12.28 -12.42 -12.39 -12.13 -12.19 -12.35 -12.15
17 -2.80 -2.71 -2.60 -2.60 -2.53 -2.43 -2.38 -2.46 -2.47 -2.46 -2.49 -2.45 -2.49 -2.53 -2.36 -2.42 -2.68
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.52: Labour mobility index of Poland*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -50.60 -51.88 -51.66 -51.82 -53.55 -55.02 -44.62 -46.25 -44.78 -43.79 -42.74 -40.00 -38.24 -36.96 -37.47 -38.87 -35.17
2 -4.93 -4.61 -4.34 -4.07 -3.68 -3.36 -4.47 -4.45 -4.40 -3.96 -3.91 -4.11 -4.22 -3.93 -3.92 -3.94 -4.01
3 -7.19 -6.72 -7.43 -7.17 -7.11 -7.00 -8.34 -8.50 -9.24 -9.23 -9.07 -9.06 -9.36 -4.58 -9.45 16.89 74.43
4 -7.06 -6.44 -6.12 -6.24 -5.51 -4.83 -6.37 -5.90 -5.76 -5.63 -5.73 -5.65 -5.25 -5.39 -5.30 -5.33 -5.51
5 -1.23 -1.28 -1.09 -0.86 -1.07 -0.79 -1.01 -0.87 -0.80 -0.74 -0.79 -0.69 -0.85 -0.88 -0.86 -0.87 -0.99
6 -1.63 -1.83 -1.79 -1.81 -1.85 -2.11 -3.59 -3.45 -3.45 -3.03 -3.12 -3.33 -3.28 -3.37 -3.31 -3.52 -3.62
7 96.75 74.50 92.00 91.99 90.90 83.15 97.26 88.73 91.73 92.56 49.52 42.28 39.38 39.59 47.25 23.06 12.60
8 -0.29 -0.18 -0.26 -0.29 -0.23 -0.32 -0.51 -0.49 -0.28 -0.29 -0.28 -0.24 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 -0.43 -0.53
9 -1.86 -1.75 -1.69 -1.63 -1.55 -1.61 -1.95 -1.95 -1.96 -2.06 -2.03 -2.10 -2.02 -2.07 -2.04 -2.21 -2.18
10 -1.58 -1.52 -1.59 -1.68 -1.76 -1.71 -2.21 -1.98 3.77 2.56 45.44 52.13 54.84 49.45 46.92 44.91 -3.10
11 -1.86 -1.99 -2.05 -2.15 -2.08 -2.42 -2.55 -2.71 -2.99 -2.75 -2.72 -2.75 -2.93 -3.00 -2.95 -3.03 -3.32
12 -5.21 -4.95 -5.02 -5.12 -4.60 -4.33 -5.60 -5.43 -5.44 -5.57 -6.10 -7.13 -7.04 -7.22 -7.10 -7.00 -8.33
13 -3.56 -3.64 -3.51 -3.37 -3.15 -3.22 -3.05 -2.92 -3.01 -3.16 -3.13 -3.23 -3.73 -3.83 -3.77 -3.69 -3.27
14 -2.20 -2.44 -2.42 -2.58 -2.90 -2.56 -2.63 6.25 -2.70 -2.95 -2.96 -3.21 -3.68 -3.78 -3.72 -2.93 -2.61
15 -2.52 -2.83 -2.61 -2.84 -2.41 -2.51 -2.73 -2.60 -3.00 -3.49 -3.91 -4.48 -4.76 -4.88 -4.81 -4.15 -4.61
16 -2.88 -2.75 -3.31 -3.23 -3.40 -2.72 -3.22 -2.93 -3.22 -4.57 -4.49 -4.52 -4.86 -4.99 -4.91 -4.51 -5.10
17 -2.15 20.33 2.90 2.88 3.96 11.38 -4.41 -4.56 -4.46 -3.90 -3.98 -3.90 -3.70 -3.87 -4.27 -4.37 -4.67
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.53: Labour mobility index of Portugal*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -38.29 -38.32 -38.09 -36.91 -36.11 -37.11 -38.21 -37.79 -38.75 -38.41 -38.72 -38.76 -38.70 -39.00 -40.94 -42.05 -44.13
2 -0.87 -0.85 -0.93 -0.94 -0.97 -0.99 -1.00 -1.05 -1.03 -1.04 -1.07 -1.40 -1.39 -1.38 -1.34 -1.31 -1.29
3 -6.96 -6.98 -6.74 -7.04 -7.14 -7.11 -6.99 -7.06 -7.13 -7.31 -7.55 -7.52 -7.71 -7.67 -7.43 -7.28 -7.01
4 -17.12 -16.66 -16.49 -16.65 -16.58 -16.10 -15.70 -15.60 -14.99 -14.92 -14.38 -13.58 -13.20 -13.14 -12.73 -12.47 -12.00
5 -4.56 -4.46 -4.43 -4.34 -4.31 -4.13 -4.10 -4.08 -3.93 -3.80 -3.68 -3.25 -3.20 -3.18 -3.08 -3.02 -2.90
6 -3.79 -3.65 -3.72 -3.93 -3.84 -3.67 -3.61 -3.66 -3.63 -3.62 -3.67 -3.78 -3.75 -3.74 -3.62 -3.55 -3.41
7 46.34 -3.22 -3.21 -3.26 -3.21 -3.19 -3.05 -3.11 -3.14 -3.16 -3.22 -3.18 -3.14 -3.11 -2.98 -3.01 -2.94
8 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 2.33 0.89 0.99 2.42 -0.06 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13
9 49.10 98.54 98.52 98.54 98.57 -1.37 -1.31 -1.39 -1.39 -1.38 -1.41 -1.46 -1.48 -1.47 -1.43 -1.40 -1.34
10 -1.30 -1.34 -1.29 -1.36 -1.44 98.50 -1.48 -1.58 -1.57 -1.65 -1.68 -1.77 -1.79 -1.78 -1.72 -1.69 -1.63
11 -4.11 -4.15 -4.17 -4.24 -4.40 -4.33 -4.27 -4.26 -4.17 -4.22 -4.15 -4.10 -4.08 -4.06 -3.94 -3.86 -3.71
12 -5.14 -5.29 -5.44 -5.76 -6.00 -5.93 -5.92 -6.03 -6.05 -6.23 -6.28 -6.45 -6.69 -6.66 -6.45 -6.32 -6.08
13 -2.63 -2.60 -2.69 -2.62 -2.77 -2.74 -2.65 -2.75 -2.78 -2.83 -2.82 -2.98 -3.12 -3.11 -3.01 -2.95 -2.84
14 -3.07 -3.25 -3.41 -3.41 -3.54 -3.60 -3.46 -3.17 -3.02 -2.97 -2.95 -3.00 -3.03 -3.02 -2.93 -2.87 -2.76
15 -2.02 -2.12 -2.18 -2.32 -2.37 -2.44 -2.46 -2.53 -2.42 -2.40 -2.44 -2.55 -2.55 -2.54 -2.46 -2.41 -2.32
16 -3.70 -3.83 -3.94 -4.05 -4.11 -4.09 -4.23 -4.41 -4.47 -4.52 -4.48 -4.45 -4.39 -4.37 -4.24 -4.15 -3.99
17 -1.78 -1.72 -1.72 -1.70 -1.74 -1.66 96.09 97.59 97.49 96.04 98.57 98.38 98.37 98.36 98.42 98.47 98.48
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.54: Labour mobility index of Spain*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -21.86 70.99 71.72 72.42 73.73 72.48 14.16 2.55 75.85 70.90 9.02 74.66 75.13 77.37 -24.19 -25.45 -25.55
2 -1.35 -1.30 -1.21 -1.10 -1.08 -1.01 -1.03 -1.05 -1.09 -1.13 -1.08 -1.07 -1.08 -1.02 -0.94 -0.95 -1.25
3 -11.15 -10.83 -10.66 -10.47 -10.47 -10.18 -9.97 -10.03 -10.41 -5.26 -10.90 -11.02 -11.05 -11.53 -13.04 -12.99 -12.70
4 -6.53 -6.46 -6.69 -6.77 -6.88 -6.69 -6.51 -6.11 -5.84 -5.43 -5.13 -4.88 -4.47 -4.14 -3.70 -3.82 -3.72
5 -1.99 -2.23 -2.17 -2.22 -2.07 -2.03 -1.88 -1.95 -1.87 -1.78 -1.67 -1.53 -1.51 -1.44 -1.29 -1.33 -1.46
6 -2.46 -2.50 -2.51 -2.59 -2.65 -2.74 -2.74 -2.79 -2.77 -2.83 -2.73 -2.82 -2.71 -2.68 -2.28 -2.22 -2.04
7 -4.76 -4.86 -5.06 -5.08 -5.12 -5.41 -5.27 -5.55 -5.57 -5.78 -5.87 -6.10 -6.06 -6.00 -6.31 -6.35 -6.52
8 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 2.16 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 2.87 2.51 2.27 -0.47 -0.46 -0.47 -0.72
9 -3.85 -3.71 -3.76 -3.76 -3.79 -3.83 -3.88 -3.95 -4.05 -4.04 -4.06 -4.08 -4.17 -4.24 -4.70 -4.94 -4.90
10 -2.41 -2.54 -2.57 -2.64 -2.71 -2.88 43.59 49.13 -3.09 -3.08 -3.05 -3.04 -3.14 -3.33 -3.29 -3.01 -2.93
11 -4.50 -4.29 -4.34 -4.43 -4.67 -4.83 9.20 10.81 -5.13 -5.14 10.20 -5.46 -5.60 -5.25 -4.56 -4.17 38.49
12 83.56 -9.26 -9.42 -9.69 -10.08 -10.49 -11.05 -8.55 -11.48 -11.46 37.18 -11.89 -12.14 -11.84 88.83 89.29 46.93
13 -4.12 -4.25 -4.28 -4.46 -4.65 -4.86 -5.05 -5.21 -5.16 -5.18 -5.37 -5.41 -5.53 -5.48 -5.29 -5.17 -5.58
14 -4.39 -4.50 -4.49 -4.53 -4.59 -4.72 -4.86 -4.43 -4.27 -4.21 -4.22 -4.39 -4.46 -4.21 -3.89 -3.85 -3.48
15 -6.61 -6.56 -6.92 -6.94 -7.09 -7.18 -7.03 -7.08 -7.05 -7.31 -7.09 -7.30 -7.36 -7.38 -6.54 -6.78 -6.99
16 -5.17 -5.36 -5.40 -5.61 -5.86 -5.93 -5.98 -6.00 -6.04 -6.11 -6.01 -6.05 -5.89 -6.01 -5.53 -5.01 -4.74
17 -2.18 -2.11 -2.02 -1.91 -1.81 -1.85 -1.50 0.41 -1.83 -1.97 -2.07 -2.14 -2.23 -2.34 -2.82 -2.78 -2.84
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and







Table 2.55: Labour mobility index of Sweden*
Year
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 -15.20 -14.66 -13.80 -13.12 -13.07 -13.35 -12.41 -12.36 -11.90 -11.97 -11.58 -11.42 -11.06 -11.21 -12.82 -13.37 -12.85
2 -0.95 -0.88 -0.93 -0.92 -0.86 -0.79 -0.79 -0.84 -0.89 -0.90 -0.94 -0.96 -0.89 -1.00 -1.45 -1.37 -1.19
3 -7.14 92.90 3.92 92.72 69.75 -6.89 -7.23 92.42 92.49 -7.29 -7.11 -7.04 -6.81 -6.64 -6.86 -7.12 -6.95
4 -1.55 -1.49 -1.42 -1.39 -1.35 -1.33 -1.28 -1.30 -1.24 -1.20 -1.12 -1.12 -1.11 -1.11 -1.14 -1.14 -1.25
5 -0.16 -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 -4.12 -4.10 -4.25 -4.21 -4.17 -4.27 -4.33 -4.30 -4.37 -4.48 -4.55 -4.61 -4.61 -3.82 -3.19 -3.48 -3.19
7 -11.27 -11.13 -10.70 -10.48 -10.46 -10.28 -10.00 -9.89 -9.87 -9.84 -9.79 -9.68 -9.43 -9.67 -9.45 -10.26 -9.92
8 -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29 -0.28 -0.31 -0.33 -0.35 -0.42 -0.40 -0.39 -0.41 -0.24 -0.34 -0.43
9 -3.97 -4.03 -4.20 -4.42 -4.36 -4.36 -4.44 -4.65 -4.58 -4.46 -4.45 -4.47 -4.36 -4.23 -3.46 -3.66 -3.56
10 -2.67 -2.83 -2.78 -2.80 -2.80 -2.85 -2.83 -2.83 -2.94 -2.78 -2.74 -2.78 -2.74 -2.63 -2.47 -2.55 -2.63
11 -2.04 -2.09 -2.02 -1.99 -1.98 -1.99 -2.02 -2.09 -1.99 -1.97 -2.02 -2.08 -2.16 -2.25 -2.10 -2.17 -2.33
12 -11.24 -11.44 -12.00 -12.25 -12.15 86.72 78.02 -12.37 -12.60 -12.89 -13.14 -13.25 -13.67 -13.77 -13.92 -13.63 -14.22
13 -10.77 -10.72 -11.02 -11.11 -11.13 -10.80 -10.97 -11.31 -11.46 -11.46 -11.73 -11.94 -12.38 -12.32 -13.15 -11.75 -12.11
14 -10.09 -10.48 -10.58 -10.51 -10.79 -10.21 -11.49 -10.37 -9.76 90.69 90.69 90.77 90.59 90.12 89.62 90.70 90.69
15 -9.45 -9.65 -9.69 -10.23 -10.37 -10.39 -10.47 -10.82 -11.24 -11.68 -11.73 -11.64 -11.60 -11.38 -10.08 -9.98 -10.62
16 -5.82 -5.80 -5.72 -5.69 -5.74 -5.78 -5.86 -5.79 -5.70 -5.57 -5.48 -5.39 -5.44 -5.62 -4.92 -5.06 -4.58
17 96.75 -3.11 85.65 -3.16 19.90 -2.99 6.52 -3.06 -3.50 -3.71 -3.72 -3.81 -3.77 -3.91 -4.35 -4.81 -4.85
*The labour mobility index lmi,t is the percentage of workers that should exit or enter into sector i in order to reach the n-dimensional NPPF and








An Empirical Investigation on Environmental Preser-
vation and Economic Efficiency
Michele Boglioni
Abstract
In this paper we show that, given a specific vector of net output
of a group of countries, there are many specialization patterns that
would allow its production and at the same time would allow sub-
stantial reductions of the global CO2 emissions.
Environmental benefits are not incompatible with improvements
in terms of economic efficiency. Empirical estimates of these potential
gains are provided using a set of 30 Input-Output tables during the
period 1995-2009.
Therefore, with a proper coordination mechanism, the negative
environmental impact of the economic activity could be improved
maintaining fixed or even increasing the global net product.
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Introduction
The reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions has been set as one of the
goals of the Kyoto Conference of 19971. Specifically, the Kyoto Protocol,
which entered into force in 2005, had the objective of reducing the global
emissions of CO2 and of five more gases2 by the 5.2% with respect to the
1990 emissions3.
The emissions of CO2 on a global scale are strictly linked to the avail-
able productive technologies in two different ways. On the one hand, the
technological progress makes available productive technologies that allow
to reduce energy consumption and pollution. On the other hand, as long
as the technologies adopted by the single countries imply different CO2
emissions, the specialization patterns also affect the environment in differ-
ent ways and intensities.
This second relation between technologies, specialization patterns and
CO2 emissions is the main topic of this paper. Extending the approach
based on Input-Output tables and subsystems developed in the first two
chapters, we show that a specific vector of net product can be produced
through many different specialization patterns. This implies that, once the
vector of the final demand and the technologies are given, it is possible to
identify the CO2-minimizing specialization pattern.
The methodology adopted here is similar to the one suggested by (Miller
and Blair, 2009, p. 457), but the application of the notion of subsystem as
in the Sraffa-Gossling-Pasinetti tradition is specific of our approach (Sraffa,
1960; Gossling, 1972; Pasinetti, 1980), as well as the algorithms built to per-
form the computation.
Using a set of Input-Output tables for 30 countries taken from the World
Input-Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015), we compute the reduction of
CO2 emissions for the case in which national productive specializations are
allowed. We reach the conclusion that an improved coordination among
countries may have a strong impact on the environment.
1I would like to thank very much professor Stefano Zambelli for his comments and
suggestions. He is a virtual co-author of this chapter.
2Methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocar-
bons.
3The first enforcing period of the protocol ended in 2012, but in december 2012, the
parties of the Kyoto Protocol has adopted the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol,
which basically revise some of the articles and renews the goals of the Protocol. The
Doha Amendment sets new objectives for the participating countries, with the view to
reduce the emissions of the six gases that were in the original Kyoto protocol plus a new
gas—nitrogen trifluoride—by the 18% with respect to the 1990 levels during the period
2013-2020. The Doha amendment has not still entered into force.
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This result is somewhat compatible with the conclusions of Carbone
et al. (2009). Basing their analysis on a different theoretical ground with re-
spect to the one adopted in this paper—General Equilibrium Models and
Game Theory—they claim that international agreements on carbon emis-
sions may be effective for reducing CO2 emissions. But here, based also on
the results presented in the previous chapters, coordination may be desir-
able because of the demonstrated market inefficiency.
Several studies concerned with reduction of C02 emission address also
the trade-off between environmental regulation and economic efficiency,
which is a sort of conventional wisdom in economics (Rauscher, 2003, p.
1410). A version of this “orthodox” view has been provided by Palmer
et al. (1995), according to which environmental regulations would result in
a distorted set of prices, which must imply a damage for firms’ profits and
competitiveness, and hence a loss of wellbeing4.
However, in this paper it is shown that such kind of trade-offs would
emerge on a global scale only in the case in which the theory on Com-
parative Advantages (CAs) worked well. A key assumption of this the-
ory suggests that if markets were left free to work, the “invisible hand”
would naturally lead countries to specialize in those sectors in which they
had a CA, in such a way that the overall net output would be maximized
(Samuelson, 2001, p. 1205).
If this assumption of well functioning international trade markets and
of efficient specializations could be proven to hold, any kind of interven-
tion aiming at modifying the specialization patterns to reduce CO2 emis-
sions would result in a lower net output and hence in a loss of economic
efficiency. But since international trade markets and national economies
seem not to be efficient, we show that there is scope for reducing CO2
emissions and improving the vector of net product at the same time.
The paper is structured in five Sections. In Section 3.1 the concept of
subsystems, which is the fundamental tool of the minimization algorithm,
is introduced, along with an explanation of how to use it to study spe-
cialization patterns. In Section 3.2 the concepts of Net Product Possibility
Frontiers is presented and it is explained how to study CO2 minimizing
specialization patterns. In Section 3.3 the dataset used is briefly described
and in Section 3.4 the empirical results are discussed. The conclusions are
devoted to a summary of the results and to some comments on their impli-
cations.
4The article by Palmer et al. (1995) came as a response to a series of studies sum-
marized in Porter and van der Linde (1995), who argued that environmental regulations
would result in an incentive to innovate that would fully offset the cost of complying with
the regulation.
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3.1 The enviromental impact of different special-
ization patterns
In order to explain how different specialization patterns affect the environ-
ment, it is convenient to start by way of an example from a hypothetical
economic system as the following
Table 3.1: An hypothetical economic system
Sector Input Labour Gross Net CO2
Iron Coal Wheat Output Output
Iron 2 3 2 2/5 16 3 5
Coal 5 4 2 2/5 14 5 6
Wheat 6 2 3 1/5 9 2 2
Tot 13 9 7 1 / / 13
The three industries produce iron, coal and wheat using up the same
three goods used as inputs plus labour. In order to produce this goods, the
transformation process of the inputs into the outputs generates emissions,
for example in CO2, which can be treated as an additional output of the
system.
We want to study how this system would look like if it specialized in
some sectors. In order to do this, it is convenient to introduce some math-
ematical symbols to represent a generic Input-Output system as the one in
Tab. 3.1. We denote with A the input matrix, with l the labour vector and
with b the gross output vector. It is useful to introduce the concept of so-
cial or national net product, which is that part of the national gross product
that goes to the final demand, and it is denoted with y. In matrix notation,
the equation to compute the national net product is the following:
y = (diag(b)−A)′ι (3.1.1)
where diag(b) is a diagonal matrix with the gross output vector b on its
main diagonal and ι is the summation vector—i.e., all entries are equal to
1. In the case of the system above y′ = [3, 5, 2].
As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, in the study of specialization pro-
cesses, a fundamental concept is that of subsystem. The notion of subsys-
tem was introduced by Sraffa in the first appendix of his work Production
of Commodities by Means of Commodities as a “smaller self-replacing system
the net product of which consists of only one kind of commodity” Sraffa
(1960, p. 105).
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Basically, in a subsystem, the means of production and the labour which
is directly and indirectly necessary and barely sufficient to produce a spe-
cific net output in just one sector are considered. In order to compute a
subsystem, each row of A, as well as the relative amount of labour and
gross output, must be reproportioned in such a way that each component
of the net output vector is 0, except for the commodity in which we are
interested. Denote with y¯i the vector (0, ..., yi, ..., 0)′, where i identifies the
sector. In order to find a subsystem, we have to compute a reproportioning
vector xi such that
(diag(b)−A)′xi = y¯i (3.1.2)
from which we have
xi = ((diag(b)−A)′)−1y¯i (3.1.3)





where the index i is relative to the different industries, sectors or produced
commodities.
A fundamental property of subsystems is the “additive property”: the
sum of the subsystems gives back the original system—see Gossling (1972).











Assuming that the vector of CO2 emissions, denoted co2, are a linear
function of the gross product vector b, we can compute the CO2 emission
vector co2i in the same way, that is to say
co2i = diag(xi)co2 (3.1.6)
CO2i = co2′iι (3.1.7)
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Adding up the elements of co2i as in eq. 3.1.7, we can compute the total
CO2 emission, directly and indirectly implied in the production of the net
product yi in Sector i. In this of the paper, the symbols in italic denote a
matrix, a vector, or a scalar relative to subsystems.
The three subsystems with the CO2 relative to Tab. 3.1 are those re-
ported in Tab. 3.2
Table 3.2: The subsystems relative to the economic system in Tab. 3.1
Airon liron biron y¯iron co2iron
0.65 0.97 0.65 0.13 5.19 3 1.62
0.64 0.51 0.25 0.05 1.78 0 0.76
0.90 0.30 0.45 0.03 1.36 0 0.30
2.19 1.78 1.36 0.21 / / 2.69
Acoal lcoal bcoal y¯coal co2coal
0.81 1.22 0.81 0.16 6.49 0 2.03
3.47 2.78 1.39 0.28 9.73 5 4.17
2.20 0.73 1.10 0.07 3.30 0 0.73
6.49 4.73 3.30 0.51 / / 6.93
Awheat lwheat bwheat y¯wheat co2wheat
0.54 0.81 0.54 0.11 4.32 0 1.35
0.89 0.71 0.36 0.07 2.49 0 1.07
2.90 0.97 1.45 0.10 4.34 2 0.97
4.32 2.49 2.34 0.28 / / 3.38
Applying the of equations in 3.1.5 to the three subsystems in Tab. 3.2
we would obtain the values of the original system of Table 3.1. That is
A = Airon+Acoal+Awheat, l = liron+lcoal+lwheat and b = biron+bcoal+bwheat.
Please note that a superficial reading of Table 1 would indicate the iron
sector as the one responsible of 5 units of CO2 emissions, but when we read
the data in terms of subsystems we see that the production of the surplus
in iron implies a much lower level of CO2 emissions (2.69), while the C02
emission associated to the production of coal goes from 6 to 6.93 and that
of wheat from 2 to 3.38. The total amount of emissions would be the same,
but the imputed values are different.
If we consider an autarkic situation, in order to reduce CO2 emissions
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the country has two possibilities. The first is to search for CO2 reducing
new methods of production and the second is to change the production of
the net output in favour of products which would imply lower CO2 emis-
sions. In this paper we focus our attention on the second CO2 reducing
factor. The primary non producible resources of the system is represented
by labour.
Using the above information on the subsystems, we can analyze how
the original system would look like if it specialized in the three sectors con-
sidered. In order to do this, it is sufficient to rescale all the elements of a
subsystem for the reciprocal of the quantity of labour involved in it—the
total quantity of labour has to be set equal to unity. For example, to simu-
late a complete specialization in iron, all the elements of the first subsystem
must be divided by 0.21.
In order to identify a system in which a full specialization has occurred,
we use the hat above the symbols. For example Âiron denotes the matrix of
the physical inputs of a system in which the net product of iron has been
maximized.
The specialized systems are reported in Tab. 3.3
Table 3.3: Specialized systems. The Table shows how the economic
system in Tab. 3.1
Âiron lˆiron bˆiron yˆiron ĉo2iron
3.08 4.62 3.08 0.62 24.62 14.24 7.69
3.02 2.42 1.21 0.24 8.46 0.00 3.63
4.29 1.43 2.14 0.14 6.43 0.00 1.43
10.38 8.46 6.43 1.00 / / 12.75
Âcoal lˆcoal bˆcoal yˆcoal ĉo2coal
1.58 2.37 1.58 0.32 12.63 0.00 3.95
6.77 5.41 2.71 0.54 18.95 9.74 8.12
4.29 1.43 2.14 0.14 6.43 0.00 1.43
12.63 9.21 6.43 1.00 / / 13.50
Âwheat lˆwheat bˆwheat yˆwheat ĉo2wheat
1.96 2.94 1.96 0.39 15.69 0.00 4.90
3.22 2.58 1.29 0.26 9.02 0.00 3.87
10.50 3.50 5.25 0.35 15.76 7.26 3.50
15.69 9.02 8.50 1.00 / / 12.27
As can be noted, the total CO2 emissions in the three cases are different,
and they would be minimized if the country fully specialized in wheat.
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That is CO2 would be minimized if the consumption or surplus of the
system would be only in wheat with the production of iron and coal lim-
ited only to the quantities necessary to produce wheat.
If we assume for simplicity that the actual produced net output is also
the desired net output of the system, here we face a trade-off: a decrease in
CO2, which may be considered to increase social welfare, would be associ-
ated with a change in consumption, which may be considered to decrease
the social welfare of the system. For a country alone there is no way to
reduce CO2, maintaining fixed its final demand vector. However, the in-
sertion of another country in the framework opens new scopes.
Suppose that it exists a second country, which has exactly the same
matrices A, l and b of the first country, but they adopt techniques with a
different environmental impact as in Tab. 3.4.
Table 3.4: The hypothetical economic system of country 2
Sector Input Labour Gross Net CO2
Iron Coal Wheat Output Output
Iron 2 3 2 2/5 16 3 8
Coal 5 4 2 2/5 14 5 2
Wheat 6 2 3 1/5 9 2 2
Tot 13 9 7 1 / / 12
The CO2 produced in the first and the second sector is different while,
for the sake of the argument, the second country has the same means of
production, same gross output and hence same net output of the first coun-
try.
Using the proper algorithm as the one explained in Appendix 3.A, we
can study how they could specialize in order to keep fixed the sum of their
surplus and, at the same time, have global lower emissions of CO2. The
vectors of surplus of the two countries require that the overall surplus
to be produced is 6 in iron, 10 in coal and 4 in wheat. Clearly, the total
labour employed must be 1 for each country. The CO2 emissions in the
non-specialized, autarkic case amounts to 25.
The CO2-minimizing specialization patterns of the two countries are
reported in Tab. 3.5.
The symbol over the letters, as for example qA1 identifies a specialization
pattern in which the global CO2 has been minimized, while the superscript
identifies the country.
The constraint on labour is satisfied, while summing up yˇ1 to yˇ2, we
obtain a global surplus of 6 in iron, 10 in coal and 4 in wheat, which is the
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Table 3.5: Co2-minimizing specialization patterns. The Table shows
how the economic systems in Tab. 3.1 and in Tab. 3.4 should have to
specialize in order to minimize the global CO2 emissions, maintaining
fixed at the same time the sum of their original vectors of surplus.
qA1 lˇ1 bˇ1 yˇ1 }co21
2.42 3.63 2.42 0.48 19.37 6.00 6.05
3.23 2.59 1.29 0.26 9.05 0.26 3.88
7.71 2.57 3.86 0.26 11.57 4.00 2.57
13.37 8.79 7.57 1.00 12.50
qA2 lˇ2 bˇ2 yˇ2 }co22
1.58 2.37 1.58 0.32 12.63 0.00 6.32
6.77 5.41 2.71 0.54 18.95 9.74 2.71
4.29 1.43 2.14 0.14 6.43 0.00 1.43
12.63 9.21 6.43 1.00 10.45
original one. However, the total CO2 emission is now 22.95, the 91.8% of
the original ones.
A solution of this kind is viable as long as the two countries can share
somehow their net product in order to satisfy its original or autarkic do-
mestic demand. Therefore, minimizing CO2 emission requires the exis-
tence of a mechanism that redistribute somehow the global net output. It
is very likely that the decrease in CO2 emissions would be larger for the
cases in which the methods of production of the different countries would
be different.
3.2 Environmental preservation and Comparative
Advantages
Suppose now that there are many countries and that there is a coordination
mechanism that allows them to share their production. They can import
the means of production or final consumption goods from each other, and
they can specialize in one or two sectors, because they can give up part of
their net product in exchange for that good they don’t produce.
For the scope of this section, it does not really matter which redistribu-
tion mechanism we consider, it might be trade as well as a planned coordi-
nation mechanism. In order to be convenient for the countries involved, it
is sufficient that the mechanism is successful in providing to each country
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amounts of commodities which are at least sufficient to cover the domestic
demand each country would have realized in an autarkic context.
In this paper, we analyze how different specialization patterns of a
group of countries may influence the environmental impact of carrying
out productive activities. Considerations on how the institutional mech-
anism may redistribute the production among countries in a “satisfying”
way are left for future studies.
Supposing that such a redistribution mechanism exists and it is imple-
mented, the countries’ productive system is not bound to produce domes-
tically the amount necessary for the satisfaction of the domestic consump-
tion demand. Consequently, countries are free to specialize in different sec-
tors. This also implies that the same global net product, which is the sum
of the vector of the surpluses of the single countries, could be produced in
many different ways.
Given that yc = [yc,1, ..., yc,n]′, where n is the number of sectors, is the
vector of the historically observed net output of country c, the matrix of













where m is the number of countries.
Summing up all the sectoral net products of each country, i.e. the el-
ements of each column of Y, the vector of the Net Total Product NTP is
obtained—see (1.4.3).












Given a specific NTP vector, there is a huge number of matrices Y that
allows to produce it.
Suppose to denote with L the matrix of the direct and indirect labour








Given that we denoted with lc,i the labour vector of the subsystem of
good i in country c, we have that Lc,i = ι′lc,i.
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Figure 3.1: An example of different specialization leading to the
same NTP. The shaded area represents those vectors of net output that
the three countries could jointly produce. Each point strictly inside the
shaded area can be produced with an infinite combination of special-
ization patterns.
(a) (b)
The sum by rows of the matrix gives the country employment, while
the sum by columns gives the global employment necessary for the pro-
duction of the global sectoral net output. The sum of all the entries of the
matrix gives the global employment.
Furthermore, we denote with CO2 the matrix of the direct and indi-
rect emissions associated with the subsystems producing the net output of








The sum by rows of the matrix of CO2 emissions gives the individual
countries CO2 emission, while the sum by columns gives global CO2 emis-
sions divided by sectors (or commodities). The sum of all the entries of the
matrix gives global emissions.
For each matrix Y there is an associated matrix L and an associated
matrix CO2, determined through subsystems. The use of of subsystems
is extremely powerful. With the appropriate mathematical programming
problem it is possible to find a matrix Y such that the sum by rows of the
related matrix L is fixed and determined by the original endowment of
labour, while the sum by rows and by columns of the related matrix CO2
is minimized—see Appendix 3.A.
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Fig. 3.1 helps to visualize how the same NTP can be reached in differ-
ent ways. Consider the graph on the left—Fig. 3.1a. The graph shows a
three countries example of a specific specialization pattern in the sectors of
coal and iron. The segments below the shaded area are the national coal-
iron frontiers for each country, that is to say, they represent the achievable
combinations of net product of coal and iron of each country, keeping fixed
the constraint on the labour employed5.
Suppose that the domestic demand in coal and iron of the three coun-
tries is described by y1, y2 and y3. As explained in Section 3.1, in autarky,
the countries couldn’t divert their production from these points without
lowering welfare—assuming that the domestic demand is satisfied in y1,
y2 and y3. The NTP would be represented by point Y which, as explained
in eq. 3.2.2, can be computed simply summing up the net products in coal
and in iron of the single countries.
But if a redistribution mechanism of the kind explained above exists,
countries would be free to shift their production point wherever it is more
convenient. Suppose for example that shifting their surplus in y′1, y′2 and
y′3 as in Fig. 3.1b, the CO2 emissions would be lower. As can be noted
point Y is exactly the original one. What changes is just the proportion
in which each country produces the net product in coal and in iron. More
generally, the number of combinations—specialization pattern—that allow
to reach point Y is most likely a large number. This makes possible, at least
in principle, to realize the specialization pattern that minimizes CO2 emis-
sions, without any consequence on the final demand and on the quantity
of workers employed.
It might be even possible to increase the NTP, reducing at the same
time CO2 emissions. The shaded area is called SS, which stands for Spe-
cialization Space, since it describes the area in which point Y can be moved
with an appropriate specialization pattern. Suppose now that country 2
could shift its production to yE2 and country to yE3 in Fig. 3.1b. The new
NTP becomes Y E which is higher than Y in both the goods considered.
Actually, point Y E can be considered an efficient production point, in the
sense that in Y E the net total product of one good cannot be increased
without increasing the net total product of another good.
All the points inside the triangle Y QR represent points that achievable
combinations of net total product that improve it both in coal and in iron.
If the point is internal to the Y QR area, than it is possible to find another
point that improves the net product in both the goods. If the point lies
5For a description of how to compute the national frontiers, see Sections 1.2.1 and
2.2.1 in the case of mobility of the means of production, which is the case assumed in Fig.
3.1.
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on the upper boundary of the NPPF , this is not possible, since improv-
ing the net total product would imply to decrease the net total product of
the other good. This set of points is the Net Product Possibility Frontier
(NPPF )6. As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, a Net Total Output vector
with this characteristic can be reached when the countries considered ex-
ploit their Comparative Advantages.
Moreover, point Y E has an additional interesting feature. Point YE is
simply the original NTP represented by Y , multiplied by a factor greater
than 1. That is to say that both iron and coal are increased by the same
proportion.
Fig. 3.2 has been constructed to clarify this point. Point YE lies at the
same time on the NPPF and on the ray passing through the origin and










that is to say that all the points that lie on Y Y E the percentage improve-
ment in good 1 is equal to the percentage improvement in good 2.
Focusing the attention on segment Y Y E is important for two reasons.
Firstly, the points belonging to it allow, at least in principle, to redistribute
to the single countries the additional surplus according to their prefer-
ences. The total produced net national product is along the ray greater than
the actual historically realized production. A proper reallocation mecha-
nism could allow higher consumption for countries. The motion along the
ray do represent points where so called Pareto improvements are possible—
on this, see Chapter 1. The second is that in these points, it is possible to
measure the improvements in the NTP with a scalar number instead of
a vector. This scalar number has been called GS—which stands for Gains
from Specialization—index.
Therefore, to sum up, in a point like Y E we have that:
- Comparative Advantages are exploited at best, so that the NTP vec-
tor is higher than the original one;
- The Net Total Product in both the goods considered is increased by
the same proportion
6The set of points on the lower boundary of the SS form the Inefficient Frontier (IF ).
It is called the Inefficient Frontier because it describes those points in which the available
resources are exploited in the worst possible way. If the quantity of workers in the sub-
systems of coal and iron is kept fixed, point Y cannot go below the IF . For a detailed
description of how the national frontiers, the NPPF and the IF can be constructed and
their relations with Comparative Advantages theory see Chapters 1 and 2
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Figure 3.2: The Gains from Specialization index. The graph shows
how to compute the GS index–see eq. 3.2.5.
When the NTP reaches a point like that, the gains from specialization
index reaches its maximum and it is called GSF .
Whether the CO2 emissions implied in a point like Y E , in which Com-
parative Advantages are exploited and the NTP is efficient, are higher
than the original ones, depends on the specific CO2 related to the subsys-
tems in the original countries. This point is going to be developed further
below for the case in which actual data is used.
3.3 The Data
The data used for this paper are taken from the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD). The WIOD provides 35×35 Input-Output (I-O) tables for 40 coun-
tries for the period 1995-2011 and the related historical CO2 emissions for
the period 1995-2009, so that the time span covered here is 1995-2009.
Among the 40 countries available, the 30 countries reported in Tab. 3.6
have been selected. The choice of excluding 10 countries is mainly due to
their little dimensions or particular economic structure.
The number of sectors has been reduced from 35 to 17, and specifi-
cally to the primary and secondary sectors—see Tab. 3.7. This is because,
as explained above, the underlying assumption in studying Net Product
Possibility Frontiers and the related Specialization Space is that the goods
considered can be standardized and exported. For this reason, the sectors
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included are those that enter the Standard International Trade Classifica-
tion of the United Nations.
Another feature of the approach is that the NPPF are constructed as-
suming to work with real quantities, while the I-O tables are constructed
aggregating in industrial sectors a large number of goods through the use
of market prices. The aggregation problem cannot be solved without hav-
ing finely disaggregated I-O tables, but it is at least possible to deflate the
I-O tables properly in order to take into account the fact that prices changes
across countries and through the years. For a discussion of these problems
and of the procedure adopted to deflate the I-O tables see Section 1.3.1 and
Chapter 4.
3.4 CO2 emissions and specialization patterns: em-
pirical results
3.4.1 The historical evolution of CO2 emissions
A first statistics that it is possible to construct using the subsystems ap-
proach is the CO2 emissions per unit of net output. The statistics is just
the sum of the CO2 directly and indirectly involved in the production of a
certain net product computed using the notion of subsystems as in (3.1.7),
divided by the net output of the good under analysis.
The use of subsystems allow a very clear and theoretically well de-
fined notion of CO2 total—i.e. direct and indirect—emissions associated to
the production of individual commodities net output—see equations 3.1.6,
3.1.7 and 3.2.4.
The complete results are provided in the Tables 3.9-3.25. Each Table
represents a Sector and it is reported the subsystems-CO2 per unit of net
output, i.e. the CO2 that is directly and indirectly involved in the produc-
tion of a net output, for each country.
That may be useful to analyze for each sector which are the countries
that produce the lowest CO2 per unit of net output. For example the coun-
tries that emerge as environmentally virtuous in Sector 1 are Indonesia and
India, although also as Austria or Sweden have fairly low emissions.
Tables 3.9-3.25 show that during the period 1995 to 2009 there has been
in most cases a substantial decrease in the (direct and indirect) CO2 emis-
sions for the production of the countries sectoral net output. This reduction
could be attributed to technological improvements, but it could have to be
attributed to reallocations as well.
These statistics may be interesting to compare countries for the point
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of view of the single Sectors, but it cannot give an overall view of how
each country performed. This is provided by another index, which is the
weighted average of the subsystems CO2-emission per unit of net output.
The weights are given by the quantity of labour employed in each sub-
system, over the total quantity of labour of each country. The formula is









where i identifies the sector, c the country, t the year and n is the total
number of sectors7.
The full results of this statistics are reported in Tab. 3.8, while in Fig.
3.3 are reported some examples for each area considered—Europe, North
America, Asia and Others.
In Fig. 3.3a are shown the three countries Germany, Italy and Poland,
in order to represent Northern, Southern and Eastern European countries.
The country that started with the highest emission was Poland, but it im-
proves them at a fast pace especially during the 90s. Italy and Germany
also had a positive trend, even if they started from a low level. The graph
also shows the results for Europe, which have been computed summing up
the I-O Tables and the related CO2 emissions of the 17 European countries
that enters into this sample—see Tab. 3.6.
For what concerns the Northern American countries, they all started
from low levels compared to the countries of other areas, but Mexico and
Canada succeeded to improve their emissions, while the US didn’t—see
Fig. 3.3b.
In Asia—Fig. 3.3c—, China was by far the worst country in 1995—more
or less on the same level as Poland in Europe. The emissions decreased
constantly until the beginning of the 00s, but then the trend stopped. Japan
is a country with low emissions and its trend was increasing until 2003
more or less, but then the trend reversed, so there is little difference be-
tween the values in 1995 and the values in 2009. Overall in “Asia”, i.e. the
group of the 5 Asian countries reported in Tab. 3.6 considered as a whole,
the emissions in 2009 are slightly lower than those in 1995.
Finally, in Fig. 3.3d are reported the series for Australia, Brazil and
Russia, along with the data for all the countries considered as whole (the
World). Russia and Brazil stayed stable, while Australia increased its CO2
emissions.
7If a country is a net importer of a good, its net product is negative. The sectors with
a negative net product have been excluded from the computation.
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Figure 3.3: C02-emissions per unit of product. The graphs represents
the cross-sector average of the emissions per unit of net output com-
puted as in eq. 3.4.1. The results for the full sample are reported in Tab.
3.8.
(a) Europe (b) North America
(c) Asia (d) Others & the World
As the solid blue line shows, the overall trend for the World is slightly
decreasing. There are some important countries as Japan or the US that
did not improve sensitively, while others, as Australia, even increased
the emissions with respect to the co2 index. However, it has to be noted
that these countries started from fairly low levels when compared to other
countries that reduced the CO2 emission.
3.4.2 CO2 isoquants
Fig. 3.4 shows an NPPF and the related Specialization Space built on the
basis of real data. It has been constructed in order to study those combina-
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Figure 3.4: The C02-emissions isoquants. Each curve inside the
shaded area represents those combinations of net output that could
have been produced in 1997 keeping fixed the—minimized—quantity
of emissions of CO2. The scale of each isoquant is 104 kilotonnes of
CO2.
tions that improve at the same time the NTP and the CO2 emissions. The
two sectors considered are Sector 5—“Leather and Footwear”—and Sector
9—“Chemical products”—in 1997.
The vector NTP is represented by point Y . Inside the SS are drawn the
“CO2 isoquants”, that is to say, those combinations of net outputs in which
the minimum emissions of CO2, computed with the algorithm explained
in Appendix 3.A, are constant.
The values of CO2 reported are the values implied in the subsystems
of Sector 5 and Sector 9 of all the 30 countries considered, computed with
equations 3.1.6, 3.1.7 and 3.2.4.
The thickest CO2-isoquant, which is called “Historical CO2 isoquant”
in the Figure, represents those combinations of net output that can be pro-
duced with an emission of CO2 equivalent to the historically recorded one.
For all the points inside the SS that lie below the “Historical CO2 isoquant”
can be produced with a quantity of CO2 emissions that are lower with re-
spect to the historically observed ones.
It can be noted, for example, that the value of the CO2-isoquant pass-
ing through point Y is 14.56 × 104 kilotonnes of CO2. Since the value of
the “Historical CO2 isoquant” is 17 × 104 kilotonnes of CO2, the figure
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shows that the original NTP in “Leather and Footwear” and “Chemical
products” could have been produce with 14.56/17 ∗ 100 = 85.65% of the
original emissions implied in the two subsystems. Please note that these
benefits are reachable considering just two sectors. As shown below, when
the number of sectors increases, the gains may be much higher.
Generally, all the combinations of net total output inside the triangle
Y Q′R′ represent those combinations in which:
- the net total output is improved in both the sectors considered with
respect to the original one, using the same amount of resources and
exploiting the Comparative Advantages of each country;
- the CO2 emissions are lower than those historically recorded.
3.4.3 CO2 in an optimized framework: the case of Europe
As explained in Sections 3.2 and 3.4.2, the same vector of Net Total Prod-
uct can be obtained through many different specialization patterns, each
of which has a different environmental impact. With the appropriate algo-
rithm, it is possible to identify the CO2 minimizing one and it may also be
possible to improve the Net Total Product reducing, at the same time, the
CO2 emissions.
In this paper we apply the algorithm explained in Appendix 3.A. We
start from a sub-sample composed by the 17 European countries that enters
into Tab. 3.6, in order to study the CO2 emissions associated to the NPPF
used in Chapter 2.
Focusing on European countries is interesting also because of the pres-
ence of common European institutions that might facilitate the adoption
of environmental-friendly policies. Therefore Europe, as any other area
with common institutions, is a privileged case for studying potential CO2-
reducing specialization patterns. What distinguishes Europe from other
areas is data availability and the political power of the common institu-
tions that could determine coordinated policies.
Fig. 3.5 shows which would be the CO2 emissions in an optimized
framework as a ratio of the historical CO2 emissions in Europe. The results
are striking: they suggest that the CO2 might be reduced to a 24%-28% of
those actually produced.
There does not seem to be any trend—neither positive nor negative.
This implies that there seems to be ample scope for coordinated policies to
improve CO2 emissions through proper specialization processes, and that
there was no improvement in this sense during the years considered.
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Figure 3.5: Optimized CO2 emissions. In the graph it is represented
the ratio between the CO2-emissions in the optimal framework and the
historical CO2 emissions.
In order to study the achievable combinations of increased NTP and
reduced CO2, it is useful to use the GS index. As explained in Section
3.2, the GS index is a scalar measure of how much the Net Total product
of a group of countries could be improved thanks to the exploitation of
Comparative Advantages. The maximum achievableGS, which represents
the gains achievable when Comparative Advantages are exploited at best,
is called GSF .
In Fig. 3.6 is reported a graph in which are shown all the possible
combinations of GS and—minimized—CO2 in 2005. In other words, it
describes how the minimized CO2 changes as the GS increases from 0
to its maximum level—the GSF—, which is represented by the vertical
dotted line. The horizontal, thickest dotted line represents the historically
recorded CO2 emissions.
As can be noted, the majority of the blue line stays below the historical
emissions line. All those points represent achievable specialization pat-
terns in which the NTP is improved and CO2 is reduced. As can be noted,
the historical emissions line is crossed when the GSF—which is 0.35—is
very close. A GS of 0.3 is achievable with CO2 emissions that are less than
the half of those historically observed.
This implies that the European Net Total Product in 2005 could have
been increased by the 30%, halving at the same time the CO2 emissions.
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Figure 3.6: Gains from specialization and CO2 in Europe. The
graph shows the combination of gains from specialization (GS) and
CO2 emissions which was possible to reach in 2005 through an opti-
mized specialization pattern among European countries. The ascissa
reports the distance between the historically determined total net na-
tional product vector and the net national production vectors obtain-
able when specialization and reallocation is occurring.
The case in Fig. 3.6 is just one of the 15 years considered, but the evolu-
tion is very similar in all the years.
Fig. 3.6 also shows that the solid blue line has a slight slope for most
part of the domain of the GS index, while it starts to grow rapidly and
crosses the historical emissions line just when the GSF is close.
This is due to the fact that when the GS is far from the GSF , the NTP
vector is interior to the Specialization Space, and hence far from theNPPF—
see Figures 3.1, 3.4 and 3.2. As explained in Section 3.1, this implies that
there is a wide alternative of specialization patterns that realize a specific
NTP vector, among which the one with the lowest CO2 can be chosen.
The more the GS get close to the GSF and the NTP to the NPPF ,
the more the constraints of the minimization problem become tight—see
Appendix 3.A. In other words, close to the NPPF the range of alterna-
tives that allows to produce a specific NTP vector becomes narrower and,
when the NPPF is reached and CAs are exploited at best, this range is
extremely limited, we have practically only one specialization pattern, and
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Figure 3.7: Optimized CO2 emissions, full sample. The graph rep-
resents the optimized CO2 emissions as a percentage of the historical
CO2 emissions when the full sample is considered.
in the majority of cases, it implies CO2 emissions higher than the original
ones.
But since, as explained in Chapters 1 and 2, the European countries
were far from exploiting CAs during the period 1995-2009, it seems to exist
a wide range of specialization patterns that improves the Net Total Product
and reduces the CO2 produced by the European countries at the same time.
An additional result is that since, as it has been noted, CO2 emissions
increase rapidly just when the GSF is close, even in the case CAs worked
well, it would be possible to achieve substantial gains in terms of CO2
emissions, with a little loss in terms of efficiency.
3.4.4 CO2 in an optimized framework, full sample
Extending the computation to the full sample, the spaces for reducing CO2
emissions and improving gains from specialization are even wider. Fig. 3.7
shows the ratio between the minimized CO2 and the original emissions
when the Net Total Product is kept fixed.
Between 1995 and 2001, an appropriate specialization pattern could re-
duce the CO2 emissions down to the the 20%-22% of the historical emis-
sions. In the period 2002-2009 the percentage of emissions could have been
even lower, with the lowest point in 2009, in which the emissions could
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Figure 3.8: Gains from specialization and CO2, full sample. The
graph shows the combination of gains from specialization (GS) and
CO2 emissions which was possible to reach in 1998 through an opti-
mized specialization pattern.
have been less than the 17%. Extending the sample, the benefits could
have been even higher than those reachable in Europe.
This holds both for the environmental benefits and for the gains from
specialization as it can be inferred from Fig. 3.8. The graph shows the
achievable combinations of gains from specialization and minimized CO2
when the full sample is used.
The blue line is far below the historical emissions line for most part
of the domain of the GS also in this case, but the maximum possible GS,
the GSF , is much higher. It passes from 0.35 in the case of the European
countries to almost 1. This means that if the countries of the full sample
exploited their Comparative Advantages, the Net Total Product could have
been almost doubled in 2005. This also implies that with the full sample,
the 30% more of the Net Total Product could have been produced with
more or less 1/3 of the original C02 emissions.
This evidence once again suggests that there are wide scopes for im-
proving at the same time the economic efficiency and the environmental
impact of the economic activity. The more countries are involved, the more
seem to be the potential gains deriving from CO2 minimizing and/or eco-
nomically efficient specialization patterns.
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Conclusions
The results of this paper suggest that the group of countries considered
here are far from specializing in such a way to minimize the environmen-
tal impact in terms of CO2 emissions. Through a proper specialization
pattern, the emissions during the period 1995-2009 could have been more
or less the 20% of those historically recorded. This is a very surprising and
striking result. Further investigations on this point are therefore necessary
and desirable.
Another important result is that these gains would not necessarily come
at the expense of economic efficiency. Indeed, it seems possible to combine
the gains from a better exploitation of Comparative Advantages (CAs), and
from the reduction in pollution due to CO2.
The principle of CAs suggests that the net output of a group of coun-
tries depends on their choices in terms of allocation of resources. One key
assumption of the theory on CAs implies that the “invisible hand” of free
markets will push countries to allocate resources in such a way that the
overall net output will be maximized (Samuelson, 2001)—taking the quan-
tity of resources and the state of technology of each country as given.
In this paper it is shown that if this assumption were verified and coun-
tries exploited at best CAs, there would be a trade-off between economic
efficiency and CO2 emissions. However, since there is poor evidence of
the workings of CAs, there seem to be ample scopes for exploiting them
better, and hence increasing the net output, reducing at the same time CO2
emissions—and without implying workers layoff.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that even in the case that CAs were
fully exploited, it would be sufficient a little loss in terms of economic ef-
ficiency to reduce sensitively CO2 emissions. This once again reinforce
the idea that interventions aiming at preserving the environment through
proper specialization patterns is an idea that deserves to be further inves-
tigated.
The approach adopted here is based on the computation of Net Prod-
uct Possibility Frontiers (NPPF ), assuming that final goods and means of
production can be traded across countries. As stressed in Chapter 2, this
kind of approach consists in using as benchmark a scenario that implies
a strong restructuring of the economies considered and it might seem an
extreme scenario.
In Chapter 1 it has also been noted that the database might be improved
because the Input-Output tables used for this study are fairly aggregated.
More disaggregated Tables would improve the precision and reliability of
the computation.
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Nevertheless, the results presented here suggest that the scope for di-
minishing CO2 emissions through a proper specialization of countries are
so ample that it would be sufficient a slight improvement in the “right”,
i.e. CO2 minimizing, direction to obtain substantial benefits for the envi-
ronment.
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Table 3.6: The list of countries*
1 AUS Australia 16 IDN Indonesia
2 AUT Austria 17 IND India
3 BEL Belgium 18 IRL Ireland
4 BRA Brazil 19 ITA Italy
5 CAN Canada 20 JPN Japan
6 CHN China 21 KOR Korea
7 CZE Czech Republic 22 MEX Mexico
8 DEU Germany 23 NLD Netherlands
9 DNK Denmark 24 POL Poland
10 ESP Spain 25 PRT Portugal
11 FIN Finland 26 RUS Russia
12 FRA France 27 SWE Sweden
13 GBR Great Britain 28 TUR Turkey
14 GRC Greece 29 TWN Taiwan
15 HUN Hungary 30 USA United States
*The countries excluded are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia
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Table 3.7: The list of sectors*
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
2 Mining and Quarrying
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
4 Textiles and Textile Products
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products
10 Rubber and Plastics
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
13 Machinery, Nec
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment
15 Transport Equipment
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
*The sectors excluded are Construction; Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Ve-
hicles and Motorcycles; Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except for Vehicles
and Motorcycles; Retail Trade Except for Vehicles and Motorcycles, Repair of House-
hold Goods; Hotels and Restaurant; Inland Transport; Water Transport; Air Trans-
port; Other Supporting and Auxiliary Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies; Post
and Telecommunications; Financial Intermediation; Real Estate Activities; Renting of
M&Eq and Other Business Activities; Public Administration and Defense, Compul-
sory Social Security; Education; Health and Social Work; Private Households with
Employed Persons.
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Table 3.8: Cross-sectors average CO2 emissions. The Table shows the results of the index computed as in eq. 3.4.1, which
is the cross-sector weighted average of the emissions per unit of net output of each country.
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.94 1.02 1.06 1.01 1.03 1.07
AUT 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.30
BEL 0.67 0.65 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.45
BRA 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.28
CAN 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.54 0.49 0.46
CHN 1.54 1.45 1.32 1.38 1.18 1.00 0.93 0.91 0.98 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.02 0.97 0.93
CZE 0.98 1.09 1.11 1.14 1.06 1.06 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.82 0.77 0.69 0.65
DEU 0.60 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.42
DNK 0.59 0.68 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.48 0.44 0.42 0.41
ESP 0.51 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.42
FIN 0.78 0.82 0.74 0.72 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.72 0.65 0.54 0.63 0.55 0.49 0.52
FRA 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.26
GBR 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.40
GRC 1.22 1.27 1.26 1.27 1.09 1.25 1.21 1.09 1.68 1.80 1.52 1.34 1.46 1.43 1.21
HUN 0.61 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.46 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.33
IDN 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.42 0.46
IND 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.53
IRL 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.64 0.69 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.33
ITA 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.36
JPN 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.53
KOR 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.93 0.87 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.77
MEX 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46
NLD 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34
POL 1.73 1.71 1.55 1.39 1.24 1.22 1.19 1.11 1.09 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.83 0.79 0.75
PRT 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.47
RUS 1.42 1.44 1.38 1.43 1.35 1.37 1.31 1.28 1.30 1.23 1.22 1.19 1.14 1.12 1.16
SWE 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17
TUR 0.69 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.76 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.75 0.64 0.71
TWN 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.81 0.91 1.07 1.59 2.15 2.50 3.61 2.69 3.68 1.31
USA 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.54
207
Appendix 3.A The algorithm for the computation
of a CO2 minimizing productive
pattern
A key feature of the algorithm is that the CO2 emissions of a certain sec-
tor are supposed to be a linear function of the gross product of the same
sector—see Section 3.1.
As stressed in Chapter 2, the equations 3.1.2-3.1.3 used to compute the
vector xi,c, which identifies the subsystem of good i for country c, are all
linear equations. As a consequence, denoting with CO2i,c the total emis-
sions related to subsystem i of country c, computed as in eq. (3.1.7), we
conclude that CO2i,c is a linear function of the net output yi,c and hence
that
CO2i,c = ei,cyi,c (3.A.1)
where ei,c is a scalar and it is a given parameter which may be called the en-
vironmental impact factor. It is convenient to organize the environmental








As a consequence, in matrix notation, we have that












where matrix Y is the matrix of the net national product—see eq. 3.2.1.
The symbol ◦ is the Hadamard product, that is to say that in CO2, each
element in the position ic of E is multiplied by the element in the same
position of Y, as explained in eq. 3.A.1.
We want to find a new matrix Y∗, such that the sum by column and by
row of the related matrix CO2∗ is minimized, and such that
NTP∗ >= NTP (3.A.4)
In a mathematical context, this is a typical linear programming prob-
lem. The objective function and the constraints of the problem are ex-
plained step by step.
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The objective function
In order to simplify the exposition of how to construct the minimization
problem, suppose we have 3 countries and 3 goods. We can reorganize
matrix CO2 in a vector in order to obtain an objective function of the fol-
lowing type
tco2 = [co2′1, co2′2, co2′3] =
= [CO21,1, CO21,2, CO21,3, CO22,1, CO22,2, CO22,3, CO23,1, CO23,2, CO23,3]′
(3.A.5)
tco2 is the objective function of the minimization problem.
The Net Total Product constraint
Matrix Y can be reorganized in the matrix
YC =
y1,1 0 0 y2,1 0 0 y3,1 0 00 y1,2 0 0 y2,2 0 0 y3,2 0
0 0 y1,3 0 0 y2,3 0 0 y3,3
 (3.A.6)
Basically the problem is to minimize tco2′x with respect to x, under the
constraint
YCx >= NTP (3.A.7)
Solving this problem, we would find a vector of reproportioning factors
x which, applied to the respective subsystems, would minimize the envi-
ronmental impact keeping fixed or higher the quantity of goods produced
by the three countries in an autarkic context. However, there are two more
constraints that should be satisfied in our problem. They are respectively
the labour constraint and the non-negative values constraint.
The labour constraint
The first is the total amount of work for each country, which is supposed
to be fixed. We call Lc,i = ι′lc,i the total quantity of labour employed in
subsystem i of country c, while Lc =
∑3
i=1 Li,c the total labour employed
by country c. Then L = [L1,L2,L3]′ is the vector of total labour of the three




L1,1 L1,2 L1,3 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 L2,1 L2,2 L2,3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 L3,1 L3,2 L3,3
 (3.A.8)
The second condition to be respected is
LCx = L (3.A.9)
The non-negative value constraint
As explained in Chapter 2, when the means of production are free to move,
this means that a country can run a deficit in specific sectors. This would
generate negative subsystems. Intuitively this should arise because, with-
out further constraints, it may emerge the case in which a country imports
more than it needs to run the production in the other sectors.
When this happens, it may emerge the case in which, summing up the
subsystems in order to obtain the system—remind the additive property
synthetized by equation 3.1.5—, we obtain negative coefficients in matri-
ces A and in vectors l and b. Therefore, we have to introduce another to
avoid this possibility. In order to do this, suppose that a generic element
of subsystem i of country c is called sj,k,i,c, where j identifies the row and
k the column of the subsytem.
What we want is that for every country c, the sum of the n subsystems
gives non-negative inputs and non-negative outputs. We denote with a
minuscule ai,j,c, li,c and bi,c a generic element of, respectively, the matrix
of the inputs A, of the labour vector l or of the gross output vector b of
country c.
Moreover we identify with si,j,k,c a generic element of the subsystem Sk
of country c, defined as follows






for each c = 1, 2, 3.
In Appendix 2.A it has been showed that if the elements s1,1,1,c, s1,1,2,c
and s1,1,3,c have been determined such that the element a1,1,c of country c
is 0, it necessary follows that the elements a1,2,1, a1,3,1, l1,1 and b1,1 will be
also 0, and the same argument applies to co21,1. The same demonstration
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implies that if a1,1 >= 0, all the elements belonging to the same row will
be non-negative.
Therefore, we just have to constrain the sum of the elements of the first
column of each row to be non-negative in order to ensure that we will




s1,1,1,1 s1,1,2,1 s1,1,3,1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s2,1,1,1 s2,1,2,1 s2,1,3,1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s3,1,1,1 s3,1,2,1 s3,1,3,1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 s1,1,1,2 s1,1,2,2 s1,1,3,2 0 0 0
0 0 0 s2,1,1,2 s2,1,2,1 s2,1,3,2 0 0 0
0 0 0 s3,1,1,2 s3,1,2,1 s3,1,3,2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 s1,1,1,3 s1,1,2,3 s1,1,3,3
0 0 0 0 0 0 s2,1,1,3 s2,1,2,3 s2,1,3,3
0 0 0 0 0 0 s3,1,1,3 s3,1,2,3 s3,1,3,3

(3.A.12)
The non-negative value constraint is that
SCx >= 0 (3.A.13)
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Appendix 3.B Tables on subsystems-CO2 emis-
sions per unit of net output disag-
gregated for sectors
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Table 3.9: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 1 - Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.53 0.51 0.47
AUT 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.22
BEL 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.64 0.65 0.64
BRA 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33
CAN 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.74 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.44
CHN 0.87 0.84 0.79 0.86 0.79 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.51 0.48
CZE 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.95 0.94 0.83 0.81 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.65 0.70 0.67 0.59
DEU 0.61 0.60 0.53 0.56 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.36
DNK 0.87 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.72 0.76 0.69 0.71 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.57
ESP 0.37 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.31
FIN 0.74 0.77 0.66 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.65 0.63 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.45
FRA 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.26
GBR 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37
GRC 0.76 0.80 0.75 0.73 0.63 0.71 0.67 0.63 0.80 0.88 0.78 0.81 0.86 0.81 0.61
HUN 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.27
IDN 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.28
IND 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.30
IRL 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.32
ITA 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.33
JPN 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.47
KOR 0.70 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.57 0.56
MEX 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.53
NLD 0.78 0.84 0.74 0.76 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.59
POL 1.28 1.28 1.25 1.11 1.07 1.12 1.02 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.79 0.74 0.73 0.68
PRT 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.34
RUS 0.87 0.75 0.80 0.83 0.64 0.69 0.64 0.63 0.69 0.68 0.73 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.66
SWE 0.38 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.36
TUR 0.48 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.56
TWN 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.71 1.13 1.63 1.89 2.66 2.05 2.90 0.96
USA 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.60 0.51 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.43
213
Table 3.10: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 2 - Mining and Quarrying
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49
AUT 1.03 0.71 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.76 0.69 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.77 0.83 0.78 0.68 0.65
BEL 0.64 0.58 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.45 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.39
BRA 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.36
CAN 0.70 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.82 0.76 0.67 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.67
CHN 2.61 2.46 2.18 2.47 2.16 1.77 1.71 1.63 1.72 1.68 1.54 1.45 1.43 1.30 1.34
CZE 1.19 1.37 1.49 1.59 1.74 1.82 1.88 1.80 1.89 1.76 2.10 2.03 1.84 1.80 1.78
DEU 0.76 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.85 0.84 0.89 0.84 0.73 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.85 0.79 0.81
DNK 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.47
ESP 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.65 0.81 0.62 0.56 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.49
FIN 0.66 0.58 0.52 0.63 0.53 0.64 0.56 0.56 0.66 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.41 0.32 0.28
FRA 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.55
GBR 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.57 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.54 0.62
GRC 5.46 5.64 5.64 5.25 5.76 5.26 5.58 4.89 5.75 6.23 5.72 5.01 5.13 5.04 5.52
HUN 0.90 0.87 0.88 1.06 1.12 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.06 1.01 0.93 0.75 0.74 0.53 0.86
IDN 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.40 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.63 0.58 0.63
IND 1.27 1.35 1.28 1.22 1.33 1.34 1.32 1.19 1.11 1.37 1.28 1.32 1.38 1.52 1.78
IRL 0.45 0.52 0.39 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.44 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.26 0.36 0.38 0.33
ITA 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.32
JPN 0.94 0.91 0.99 0.98 1.03 0.94 1.09 1.18 1.29 1.50 1.47 1.47 1.51 1.84 2.00
KOR 0.56 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.52 0.59 2.52 2.90 2.04 2.48 2.82 2.60 2.45 2.66 3.11
MEX 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.45 0.46
NLD 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.31
POL 1.18 1.14 1.08 1.03 0.97 1.05 0.93 0.82 0.84 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.63
PRT 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.89 0.89 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.93 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.11
RUS 1.54 2.16 2.11 2.07 2.14 2.05 1.98 1.88 1.78 1.57 1.54 1.52 1.56 1.42 1.30
SWE 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.37
TUR 0.38 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.65 0.64 0.59 0.75 0.65 0.66 0.74 0.64 0.50 0.51
TWN 2.50 3.25 3.65 3.73 4.98 8.37 10.57 10.95 15.91 17.60 18.86 20.10 16.75 14.93 6.82
USA 0.39 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.33
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Table 3.11: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 3 - Food, Beverages and Tobacco
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.39
AUT 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.19
BEL 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.33
BRA 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19
CAN 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.30
CHN 1.29 1.12 1.00 1.12 0.97 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.73 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.57
CZE 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.66 0.63 0.56 0.59 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.37
DEU 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30
DNK 0.51 0.55 0.50 0.48 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.38 0.38 0.37
ESP 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.24
FIN 0.53 0.54 0.48 0.49 0.43 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.26
FRA 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.25
GBR 0.39 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28
GRC 1.33 1.34 1.33 1.31 1.12 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.48 1.60 1.42 1.38 1.37 1.38 1.35
HUN 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.24
IDN 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.25
IND 0.54 0.73 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.75 0.73 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.68 0.73
IRL 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.18
ITA 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.28
JPN 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.35
KOR 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.64 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.56 0.53 0.50 0.51
MEX 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27
NLD 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.25
POL 1.11 1.16 0.99 0.86 0.72 0.85 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.63 0.56 0.51 0.48 0.45
PRT 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.30
RUS 0.87 0.85 0.78 0.80 0.74 0.71 0.67 0.67 0.63 0.59 0.56 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.49
SWE 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
TUR 0.52 0.58 0.62 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.58 0.62 0.57 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.61
TWN 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.77 1.21 1.32 1.73 1.46 2.15 0.78
USA 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.43
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Table 3.12: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 4 - Textiles and Textile Products
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.34
AUT 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09
BEL 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.20
BRA 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17
CAN 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.22
CHN 1.57 1.33 1.17 1.29 1.10 0.98 0.95 0.95 1.01 1.10 1.05 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.84
CZE 0.80 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.44 0.40
DEU 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25
DNK 0.22 0.26 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.14
ESP 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28
FIN 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.18
FRA 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09
GBR 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27
GRC 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.56 2.27 0.76 0.68 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.71
HUN 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16
IDN 0.42 0.42 0.50 0.54 0.66 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.83 0.88 0.92 1.06 1.09 0.81 0.87
IND 1.01 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.91 0.85 0.78 0.71 0.70 0.65 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.59
IRL 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.23
ITA 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.27
JPN 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.34
KOR 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.66 0.67 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.69 0.65 0.64 0.65
MEX 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.36
NLD 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17
POL 1.28 1.38 1.09 0.90 0.75 0.74 0.71 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.55 0.49 0.43 0.39 0.35
PRT 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.34
RUS 1.38 1.42 1.29 1.27 1.25 1.18 1.12 1.10 1.16 1.10 1.01 0.95 0.87 0.80 0.92
SWE 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09
TUR 0.84 0.94 0.89 0.90 0.79 0.73 0.68 0.64 0.68 0.59 0.49 0.48 0.65 0.34 0.38
TWN 0.84 0.80 0.82 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.96 1.08 1.53 2.34 2.36 3.29 2.76 3.51 1.41
USA 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.38
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Table 3.13: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 5 - Leather, Leather and Footwear
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.35
AUT 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07
BEL 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.18
BRA 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
CAN 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.21
CHN 1.04 0.89 0.82 0.93 0.81 0.70 0.66 0.64 0.71 0.78 0.74 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.60
CZE 0.55 0.44 0.47 0.68 0.64 0.58 0.50 0.37 0.41 0.51 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.15
DEU 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.17
DNK 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
ESP 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17
FIN 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.08
FRA 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09
GBR 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14
GRC 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.72 0.59 0.79 0.60 0.53 0.42 0.42 0.33 0.20
HUN 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.14
IDN 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.37 0.41 0.35 0.31 0.38
IND 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.32
IRL 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.35
ITA 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13
JPN 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.27
KOR 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.44
MEX 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24
NLD 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
POL 1.08 1.14 0.95 0.92 0.64 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.47 0.41 0.37 0.34
PRT 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13
RUS 1.00 1.01 0.81 1.05 0.91 0.88 0.82 0.82 0.89 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.72 0.67 0.79
SWE 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00
TUR 0.49 0.60 0.71 0.77 0.69 0.65 0.57 0.52 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.43 0.47 0.29 0.33
TWN 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.57 0.64 0.69 0.94 1.36 1.41 1.96 1.62 2.09 0.82
USA 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21
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Table 3.14: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 6 - Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.32
AUT 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.19
BEL 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18
BRA 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18
CAN 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.39 0.34
CHN 1.35 1.18 1.05 1.24 1.06 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.94 1.01 0.98 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.80
CZE 0.67 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.42 0.39
DEU 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.30
DNK 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.20
ESP 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.37 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.25
FIN 0.62 0.60 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.44 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.31 0.31
FRA 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18
GBR 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.30
GRC 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.69 2.97 0.52 0.55 0.49 0.53 0.55 0.45
HUN 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.28
IDN 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.40 0.41 0.47
IND 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.79 0.77 0.72 0.66 0.53 0.58 0.75 0.74 0.80 0.94 1.03
IRL 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.28
ITA 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.21
JPN 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.37
KOR 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.60 0.55 0.59 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.58
MEX 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.37
NLD 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.20
POL 1.46 1.58 1.42 1.23 0.99 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.96 0.78 0.72 0.69 0.60 0.56 0.52
PRT 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.33
RUS 1.10 1.27 1.36 1.24 1.29 1.23 1.17 1.16 1.14 1.06 0.93 0.92 0.83 0.73 0.86
SWE 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15
TUR 0.63 0.96 1.15 1.43 2.40 3.85 2.65 3.32 4.17 3.80 3.21 3.75 2.82 0.64 1.00
TWN 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.42 0.48 0.53 0.65 0.65 0.90 1.49 1.43 1.94 1.70 2.10 0.78
USA 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.43 0.42
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Table 3.15: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 7 - Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.32
AUT 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.50 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.33
BEL 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.34
BRA 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24
CAN 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.37 0.37 0.31 0.28
CHN 1.80 1.51 1.36 1.42 1.17 1.02 0.94 0.90 0.99 1.10 1.09 1.11 1.07 1.05 0.98
CZE 0.48 0.57 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.52 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.33
DEU 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28
DNK 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.12
ESP 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.37 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.27
FIN 1.02 1.09 0.98 0.85 0.83 0.70 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.72 0.61 0.72 0.66 0.57 0.58
FRA 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.15
GBR 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19
GRC 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.53 0.88 1.05 0.70 0.52 0.58 0.54 0.45
HUN 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.15
IDN 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.42 0.52 0.58 0.53 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.63 0.59 0.62
IND 1.27 1.30 1.29 1.23 1.15 1.15 1.25 1.13 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.88
IRL 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
ITA 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.34
JPN 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35
KOR 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.50 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.64 0.67 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.58
MEX 0.36 0.40 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.33
NLD 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15
POL 1.08 1.05 0.98 0.81 0.66 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.34
PRT 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.41
RUS 1.00 1.12 1.00 0.97 1.06 1.13 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.73 0.68 0.74
SWE 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14
TUR 1.15 1.24 1.24 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.83 0.87 0.71 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.56 0.58
TWN 1.04 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.95 1.26 1.95 1.96 2.60 2.26 2.90 1.21
USA 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.29
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Table 3.16: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 8 - Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 1.18 1.21 1.11 1.10 1.05 1.05 1.01 0.97 0.97 0.94 1.05 1.02 1.07 1.02 1.08
AUT 1.20 1.18 1.12 1.07 1.00 0.93 0.91 1.09 1.15 1.18 1.06 1.02 0.94 0.72 0.61
BEL 0.67 0.72 0.74 0.83 0.76 0.67 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.70 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.52
BRA 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.52
CAN 1.49 1.48 1.47 1.53 1.44 1.41 1.38 1.48 1.53 1.42 1.25 1.18 1.17 1.07 1.14
CHN 2.60 2.51 2.34 2.60 2.23 1.85 1.77 1.69 1.83 1.76 1.64 1.60 1.53 1.39 1.43
CZE 0.53 0.13 0.22 0.99 1.12 1.15 1.21 0.90 0.90 1.11 1.19 1.20 1.05 1.01 0.41
DEU 0.81 0.71 0.51 1.03 0.90 0.88 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.71
DNK 1.82 2.18 1.80 1.77 1.44 1.13 1.28 1.14 1.24 1.12 1.00 1.27 1.30 1.17 1.22
ESP 1.09 0.98 0.97 1.07 0.93 1.13 1.06 1.07 1.17 1.23 1.11 0.91 0.80 0.78 0.76
FIN 1.30 1.45 1.34 1.29 1.26 1.20 1.12 1.04 1.15 1.06 1.26 1.31 1.25 1.20 1.20
FRA 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.11 1.02 0.96 0.71 0.72 0.79 0.86 0.86 0.65 0.65 0.56 0.44
GBR 1.20 1.23 1.21 1.29 1.13 0.99 1.09 1.13 1.14 1.05 1.10 1.08 1.11 1.06 1.17
GRC 2.86 3.20 2.75 3.15 2.37 3.27 3.03 2.60 3.15 2.95 2.83 3.32 3.03 2.83 3.31
HUN 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.37 0.46 0.46 0.38 0.39 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.26 0.32
IDN 0.68 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.55 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.34 0.47
IND 1.10 1.10 1.18 1.08 1.29 1.29 1.22 1.10 1.04 1.08 0.98 0.96 0.94 1.00 1.07
IRL 0.95 0.91 0.83 1.01 1.08 0.98 0.98 1.05 1.07 0.84 0.69 0.56 0.59 0.68 0.62
ITA 0.77 0.80 0.84 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.81 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.93 1.12
JPN 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.81 0.77 0.85 0.91 1.02 1.15 1.11 1.10 1.08 1.14 1.28
KOR 0.90 0.98 0.99 1.01 0.83 0.88 2.10 2.26 1.82 2.05 2.28 2.05 1.88 2.03 2.18
MEX 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.09 1.09 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.12 1.12 1.18 1.19 1.22 1.24 1.22
NLD 0.71 0.70 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.75 0.56
POL 1.83 1.91 1.71 1.62 1.44 1.44 1.39 1.41 1.38 0.99 1.04 1.04 0.95 0.87 0.94
PRT 0.84 0.77 0.66 1.43 0.88 1.01 0.99 0.86 0.84 1.05 1.23 1.43 1.41 1.40 1.59
RUS 1.24 0.64 0.59 0.73 0.80 0.82 0.72 0.77 1.21 1.13 1.11 1.01 0.96 0.92 0.92
SWE 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.41
TUR 0.45 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.57 0.68 0.77 1.11 1.13 0.97 1.00 1.13 1.03 1.02 1.27
TWN 1.32 1.75 1.83 1.77 2.41 1.81 2.41 4.08 7.42 9.33 11.63 14.48 11.13 11.79 4.80
USA 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.68
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Table 3.17: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 9 - Chemicals and Chemical Products
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.84
AUT 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.53 0.54 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.34 0.35 0.30
BEL 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.73 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.53
BRA 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.47 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.34
CAN 1.12 1.12 1.07 1.09 1.07 1.00 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.92 0.87 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.72
CHN 3.24 3.00 2.65 2.85 2.41 2.10 1.94 1.88 1.93 1.86 1.81 1.78 1.67 1.60 1.51
CZE 2.65 2.43 2.06 2.33 2.10 2.47 2.20 1.80 1.80 1.79 1.80 1.54 1.63 1.52 1.83
DEU 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.43
DNK 0.33 0.38 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13
ESP 0.49 0.43 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.39
FIN 0.94 0.95 0.88 0.77 0.75 0.67 0.74 0.71 0.77 0.67 0.62 0.60 0.57 0.52 0.47
FRA 0.70 0.69 0.64 0.61 0.49 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.28
GBR 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.36
GRC 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.68 0.82 0.65 0.66 1.34 2.56 1.49 0.79 0.98 1.00 0.44
HUN 0.80 0.72 0.71 0.67 0.74 0.80 0.77 0.73 0.97 0.78 0.80 0.72 0.80 0.76 0.77
IDN 0.78 0.66 0.70 0.65 0.71 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.66 0.73
IND 1.70 1.68 1.68 1.54 1.54 1.45 1.37 1.29 1.18 1.15 1.10 1.02 0.99 0.95 0.93
IRL 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
ITA 0.75 0.69 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.49
JPN 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.64 0.70
KOR 1.06 1.06 0.95 0.85 0.83 0.83 1.14 1.04 0.93 1.04 1.16 1.03 0.99 1.07 1.08
MEX 0.64 0.65 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.46
NLD 0.79 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.41
POL 3.09 2.92 2.57 2.44 2.24 2.44 2.21 1.92 1.78 1.75 1.56 1.36 1.21 1.19 1.20
PRT 1.21 1.04 1.12 1.25 0.98 1.15 1.21 1.23 1.24 1.28 1.27 1.33 1.35 1.24 0.86
RUS 2.77 3.23 3.06 2.87 2.72 3.65 3.35 3.27 3.18 2.86 2.68 2.71 2.67 2.66 3.25
SWE 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17
TUR 1.61 2.24 2.12 2.64 1.75 1.69 1.49 1.34 1.52 1.45 1.22 1.15 0.86 0.47 0.53
TWN 1.30 1.31 1.34 1.41 1.57 1.62 1.78 2.20 3.32 4.38 5.28 7.60 5.95 7.49 2.71
USA 0.65 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.69 0.68 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.54 0.54 0.63 0.56
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Table 3.18: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 10 - Rubber and Plastics
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.39
AUT 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.15
BEL 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.17
BRA 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.21
CAN 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.35
CHN 2.08 1.90 1.69 1.86 1.60 1.37 1.29 1.25 1.34 1.40 1.37 1.35 1.30 1.25 1.17
CZE 0.94 0.98 0.90 1.01 0.95 1.01 0.95 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.70 0.67 0.56 0.54
DEU 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22
DNK 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.17
ESP 0.31 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.37 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.24
FIN 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.34 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.23
FRA 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.13
GBR 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.29
GRC 0.52 0.47 0.52 0.59 0.51 0.67 0.78 0.72 0.79 1.26 1.07 0.79 0.82 0.79 0.65
HUN 0.70 0.77 0.69 0.66 0.62 0.62 0.92 0.90 0.51 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.30
IDN 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.51 0.47 0.49
IND 1.14 1.11 1.04 1.09 1.06 1.03 0.98 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.83 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78
IRL 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.28
ITA 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.29
JPN 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.40
KOR 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.65 0.70 0.63 0.61 0.65 0.67
MEX 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.41
NLD 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.18
POL 1.30 1.45 1.26 1.08 0.94 0.96 0.88 0.79 0.76 0.82 0.69 0.63 0.57 0.54 0.50
PRT 0.51 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.46 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.42
RUS 1.51 1.63 1.40 1.46 1.52 1.63 1.48 1.47 1.52 1.41 1.37 1.30 1.29 1.23 1.40
SWE 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
TUR 0.92 1.25 1.32 1.55 1.46 1.77 1.46 1.49 1.69 1.45 1.26 1.41 1.12 0.59 0.84
TWN 0.66 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.80 0.73 0.91 1.50 2.41 2.73 4.10 3.47 4.32 1.47
USA 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.38
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Table 3.19: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 11 - Other Non-Metallic Mineral
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 2.60 2.51 2.51 2.56 2.44 2.27 2.20 2.04 2.02 2.05 1.98 1.96 1.94 1.86 1.76
AUT 1.18 1.16 1.25 1.21 1.11 1.07 1.07 1.10 1.13 1.17 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.14 1.18
BEL 1.95 1.91 1.87 1.90 1.81 1.86 1.71 1.77 1.73 1.76 1.94 1.91 1.84 1.79 1.56
BRA 1.30 1.33 1.42 1.49 1.56 1.56 1.62 1.59 1.51 1.51 1.45 1.47 1.53 1.50 1.45
CAN 2.77 2.54 2.41 2.32 2.40 2.20 2.03 2.02 1.87 1.88 1.77 1.64 1.36 1.25 1.02
CHN 4.31 3.85 3.47 3.76 3.30 2.93 2.73 2.74 2.96 3.37 3.17 2.99 2.74 2.82 2.65
CZE 1.69 1.64 1.45 1.46 1.40 1.35 1.44 1.21 1.19 1.22 1.27 1.33 1.27 1.12 1.11
DEU 1.49 1.50 1.50 1.49 1.42 1.41 1.34 1.32 1.37 1.38 1.31 1.25 1.30 1.27 1.39
DNK 1.89 2.08 2.08 1.94 1.89 1.87 2.01 1.96 2.04 2.16 1.81 1.83 1.83 1.66 1.69
ESP 2.53 2.53 2.50 2.43 2.34 2.38 2.09 2.07 2.12 2.09 2.03 1.96 1.91 1.75 1.84
FIN 1.25 1.21 1.10 1.04 1.10 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.11 1.04 0.92 0.99 0.91 0.88 0.83
FRA 1.92 1.88 1.77 1.76 1.48 1.39 1.42 1.42 1.38 1.37 1.35 1.31 1.31 1.30 1.21
GBR 1.43 1.45 1.46 1.49 1.40 1.35 1.32 1.31 1.24 1.17 1.17 1.19 1.21 1.10 1.02
GRC 2.38 2.29 2.31 2.36 2.08 2.27 2.65 1.91 3.09 4.05 3.59 2.53 3.01 3.11 2.03
HUN 2.47 2.36 2.35 2.15 2.22 2.10 2.22 2.32 2.17 1.98 1.66 1.49 1.43 1.21 1.21
IDN 3.57 3.11 3.32 4.61 5.56 2.69 4.14 3.77 3.65 3.90 3.68 3.84 3.94 3.94 4.03
IND 3.14 2.83 2.87 3.14 2.86 2.95 2.89 2.84 2.77 2.98 2.91 2.76 2.72 2.61 2.53
IRL 1.44 1.50 1.53 1.47 1.45 1.68 1.87 1.79 1.83 1.76 1.59 1.45 1.37 1.58 1.26
ITA 1.66 1.57 1.57 1.58 1.65 1.66 1.61 1.54 1.68 1.71 1.67 1.71 1.63 1.67 1.58
JPN 1.69 1.65 1.63 1.61 1.70 1.67 1.67 1.71 1.74 1.67 1.70 1.66 1.54 1.66 1.92
KOR 2.33 2.38 2.45 2.49 2.43 2.32 2.91 2.78 2.56 2.64 2.86 2.50 2.49 2.68 2.44
MEX 1.76 1.69 1.71 1.76 1.74 1.76 1.78 1.79 1.71 1.76 1.76 1.75 1.86 1.75 1.74
NLD 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.52
POL 6.05 5.35 4.64 3.89 3.28 2.96 2.57 2.33 2.33 2.25 2.13 2.04 1.96 1.74 1.68
PRT 2.68 2.45 2.42 2.44 2.46 2.33 2.17 2.35 2.30 2.37 2.43 2.29 2.25 2.16 2.02
RUS 3.93 5.48 5.31 5.29 5.14 5.12 4.95 4.90 5.15 4.80 5.02 4.70 4.11 4.19 4.76
SWE 1.32 1.37 1.32 1.40 1.33 1.38 1.35 1.26 1.29 1.26 1.20 1.15 1.06 1.06 1.09
TUR 5.48 5.64 5.33 5.05 4.64 4.78 4.05 3.76 3.60 3.27 3.13 2.99 3.11 3.58 3.75
TWN 3.28 3.38 3.33 3.44 3.69 4.05 4.48 5.14 6.46 6.99 7.24 8.58 7.72 8.48 5.23
USA 1.44 1.41 1.38 1.35 1.36 1.40 1.41 1.38 1.40 1.44 1.41 1.43 1.40 1.50 1.48
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Table 3.20: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 12 - Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 1.83 1.79 1.78 1.76 1.77 1.66 1.50 1.40 1.37 1.50 1.46 1.37 1.27 1.30 1.17
AUT 0.91 0.86 0.88 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.77 0.65
BEL 1.28 1.23 1.06 1.15 1.04 0.97 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.77 0.67 0.72 0.47
BRA 0.57 0.61 0.64 0.69 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.79
CAN 1.20 1.18 1.12 1.16 1.05 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.73 0.78 0.73 0.78 0.71 0.62
CHN 4.28 3.97 3.77 4.10 3.61 3.03 2.91 2.81 2.82 2.79 2.81 2.50 2.32 2.16 2.09
CZE 1.67 1.59 1.59 1.58 1.45 1.61 1.22 1.35 1.57 1.68 1.49 1.46 1.38 1.26 1.28
DEU 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.58
DNK 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16
ESP 0.53 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.38
FIN 1.16 1.10 1.09 1.02 1.04 0.96 0.97 0.99 1.11 0.97 0.86 0.87 0.77 0.73 0.71
FRA 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.31
GBR 0.86 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.75 0.74 0.68 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.57
GRC 1.74 1.74 1.81 1.87 1.61 1.80 1.92 1.62 2.70 3.88 2.74 1.39 1.85 2.12 1.31
HUN 1.55 1.55 1.20 1.24 1.21 1.08 1.11 1.11 1.05 0.96 0.90 0.77 0.75 0.70 0.95
IDN 2.28 2.01 2.21 2.44 2.58 2.71 2.48 2.40 3.05 2.97 3.20 4.72 3.77 3.00 2.97
IND 1.75 1.71 1.70 1.61 1.59 1.68 1.67 1.71 1.71 1.86 2.01 1.95 1.98 2.02 1.88
IRL 1.26 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.20 1.11 1.14 1.09 1.00 0.97 0.79 0.83 0.91 0.94 0.88
ITA 0.47 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.29
JPN 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.89 0.95 0.90 1.00 1.02 1.01 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.95 0.98
KOR 1.77 1.80 1.77 1.79 1.80 1.78 2.10 1.78 1.58 1.63 1.63 1.62 1.58 1.74 1.67
MEX 1.03 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.77
NLD 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.42
POL 4.01 3.60 3.26 2.78 2.48 2.76 2.43 2.01 1.84 1.60 1.38 1.39 1.29 1.14 0.90
PRT 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.48 0.44 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.27
RUS 4.30 4.23 3.73 3.77 4.08 4.00 3.80 3.72 3.83 3.59 3.50 3.41 3.26 3.32 3.57
SWE 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.27
TUR 1.53 1.60 1.58 1.67 1.53 1.45 1.36 1.06 1.22 1.14 1.06 1.14 1.16 1.21 1.15
TWN 1.35 1.32 1.47 1.50 1.50 1.66 1.99 2.05 2.69 3.47 3.54 4.42 3.93 4.84 2.22
USA 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.56
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Table 3.21: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 13 - Machinery, Nec
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.48
AUT 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16
BEL 0.39 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.14
BRA 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.31
CAN 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.42 0.39 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.24
CHN 2.11 2.00 1.82 2.17 1.89 1.49 1.48 1.34 1.42 1.48 1.49 1.37 1.29 1.21 1.16
CZE 0.73 0.83 0.78 0.77 0.69 0.71 0.65 0.68 0.74 0.72 0.68 0.67 0.62 0.52 0.50
DEU 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18
DNK 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09
ESP 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.19
FIN 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.21
FRA 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11
GBR 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.20
GRC 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.82 0.60 0.76 0.97 0.72 1.09 1.44 0.93 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.46
HUN 0.52 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.22
IDN 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.32 0.37 1.25 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.42 0.39 0.42
IND 1.10 1.07 1.07 1.05 1.00 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.77
IRL 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.37
ITA 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.17
JPN 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.27
KOR 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.58 0.65 0.66 0.77 0.66 0.58 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.63 0.62
MEX 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35
NLD 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
POL 1.56 1.51 1.30 1.17 0.96 0.93 0.78 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.57 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.35
PRT 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.24
RUS 1.93 2.14 1.63 1.81 1.93 1.96 1.86 1.83 1.57 1.47 1.38 1.27 1.23 1.20 1.33
SWE 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
TUR 0.54 0.86 0.70 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.68 0.61 0.69 0.60 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.52 0.49
TWN 0.59 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.76 1.05 1.62 1.60 1.99 1.76 2.26 0.81
USA 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.19
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Table 3.22: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 14 - Electrical and Optical Equipment
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.55 0.49 0.47 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.38
AUT 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.13
BEL 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.11
BRA 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
CAN 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.21
CHN 1.69 1.62 1.56 1.91 1.62 1.19 1.16 1.06 1.13 1.20 1.22 1.13 1.08 1.02 0.97
CZE 0.67 0.78 0.68 0.64 0.55 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.27
DEU 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15
DNK 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08
ESP 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.18
FIN 0.34 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08
FRA 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10
GBR 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14
GRC 0.77 0.73 0.74 0.67 0.47 0.58 0.69 0.56 1.00 1.43 1.06 0.76 1.00 1.12 1.02
HUN 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.17
IDN 0.34 0.34 0.41 0.48 0.66 0.73 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.54 0.62 0.53 0.46 0.48
IND 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.66 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.62
IRL 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09
ITA 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15
JPN 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.28
KOR 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.47
MEX 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38
NLD 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10
POL 1.02 0.99 0.88 0.79 0.63 0.78 0.60 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.32
PRT 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14
RUS 1.63 1.89 1.29 1.59 1.76 1.76 1.64 1.62 1.53 1.46 1.40 1.34 1.32 1.29 1.42
SWE 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
TUR 0.52 0.58 0.62 0.77 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.55 0.61 0.53 0.48 0.51 0.47 0.40 0.41
TWN 0.49 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.53 0.58 0.81 1.26 1.35 1.95 1.71 2.16 0.86
USA 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12
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Table 3.23: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 15 - Transport Equipment
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.51 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.37 0.37
AUT 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13
BEL 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.13
BRA 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.22
CAN 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19
CHN 1.84 1.78 1.72 2.06 1.78 1.36 1.31 1.12 1.15 1.24 1.23 1.14 1.07 1.01 0.95
CZE 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.72 0.63 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.49 0.45 0.40 0.32 0.32
DEU 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20
DNK 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.11
ESP 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.31 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.20
FIN 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.27 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.22
FRA 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12
GBR 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19
GRC 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.51 0.65 0.77 0.43 0.67 1.09 1.12 0.89 0.99 0.88 0.94
HUN 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19
IDN 0.26 0.25 0.32 0.41 0.55 0.56 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.50 0.38 0.37 0.40
IND 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.14 1.10 1.06 1.03 0.99 0.97 0.89 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.81
IRL 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.28
ITA 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.19
JPN 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.32
KOR 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.58 0.65 0.64 0.73 0.65 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.56
MEX 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23
NLD 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11
POL 1.49 1.43 1.29 1.15 1.06 0.83 0.76 0.64 0.59 0.57 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.34
PRT 0.31 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16
RUS 1.31 1.38 0.92 1.12 1.27 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.26 1.20 1.23 1.16 1.08 1.03 1.22
SWE 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
TUR 0.52 0.58 0.60 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.67 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.53 0.45 0.44
TWN 0.47 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.54 0.79 1.34 1.29 1.77 1.49 1.85 0.76
USA 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.23
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Table 3.24: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 16 - Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.54 0.49 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.42
AUT 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17
BEL 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.21
BRA 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
CAN 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.24
CHN 2.16 1.78 1.44 1.67 1.40 1.08 1.02 0.92 0.96 1.06 1.01 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.78
CZE 0.50 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.33 0.28
DEU 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19
DNK 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10
ESP 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.19
FIN 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.36 0.31 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.26
FRA 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.47 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.32
GBR 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.24
GRC 0.63 0.63 0.68 0.69 0.55 0.63 0.61 0.68 2.34 0.82 0.67 0.62 0.65 1.09 0.51
HUN 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16
IDN 0.40 0.36 0.42 0.43 0.53 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.82 0.66 0.66 0.72
IND 1.25 1.23 1.19 1.16 0.95 0.87 0.76 0.62 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.39
IRL 0.75 0.78 0.72 0.81 0.93 1.02 0.96 1.02 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.59
ITA 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15
JPN 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.41
KOR 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.69 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.64 0.59 0.58 0.62 0.60
MEX 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.53 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.48
NLD 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11
POL 1.06 1.18 1.00 0.89 0.72 0.72 0.66 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.49 0.47 0.43 0.40 0.36
PRT 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25
RUS 1.36 1.56 1.06 1.41 1.38 1.39 1.31 1.34 1.33 1.33 1.26 1.20 1.16 1.13 1.25
SWE 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08
TUR 0.55 0.63 0.71 0.80 0.87 0.97 0.86 0.80 0.94 0.84 0.76 0.84 0.76 0.47 0.52
TWN 0.38 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.50 0.95 1.20 2.12 1.90 2.40 0.93
USA 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.20
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Table 3.25: Subsystems CO2 emissions per unit of net output in Sector 17 - Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Year
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AUS 6.92 7.11 6.97 7.55 7.69 7.65 8.20 8.68 8.46 8.69 8.96 9.21 8.78 8.76 8.41
AUT 1.68 1.74 1.71 1.53 1.48 1.39 1.37 1.27 1.45 1.35 1.35 1.30 1.16 1.06 0.98
BEL 3.18 2.86 2.69 3.02 2.64 2.89 2.56 2.73 2.90 2.92 3.04 2.82 2.68 2.54 2.81
BRA 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.46 0.31
CAN 2.87 2.81 3.11 3.62 3.46 3.54 3.73 3.39 3.46 3.22 3.13 2.96 3.26 3.00 2.50
CHN 11.94 12.91 11.64 11.37 10.23 10.12 9.51 9.43 9.84 8.31 8.02 9.34 8.25 7.54 7.56
CZE 4.00 3.75 4.41 4.45 4.42 4.57 4.36 4.57 4.32 4.47 3.73 3.54 3.89 3.36 3.47
DEU 5.81 5.49 5.35 5.18 4.89 5.13 5.21 5.05 5.08 4.66 4.53 4.65 4.54 4.28 4.20
DNK 7.70 9.71 7.80 6.93 6.20 5.52 5.68 5.78 6.56 5.17 4.46 6.06 5.42 4.77 5.02
ESP 3.53 2.77 3.19 3.04 3.49 3.47 2.84 3.11 2.81 2.94 3.01 2.60 2.72 2.16 1.90
FIN 6.24 7.15 6.56 5.62 5.46 5.09 6.23 6.48 7.57 6.74 4.45 6.96 6.29 4.90 5.38
FRA 0.55 0.60 0.55 0.69 1.16 1.02 0.77 0.88 0.92 0.85 0.97 0.89 0.87 0.79 0.82
GBR 3.34 3.22 2.96 2.74 2.95 2.98 3.15 2.99 2.96 2.87 2.51 2.73 2.68 2.41 2.52
GRC 9.90 9.60 10.05 9.85 8.70 9.19 9.48 8.02 8.41 8.65 8.13 7.64 8.05 8.26 8.10
HUN 1.39 1.42 1.50 1.62 1.67 1.57 1.61 1.66 1.69 1.46 1.42 1.24 1.35 1.26 1.26
IDN 10.24 8.71 8.30 7.03 6.11 5.40 5.81 6.34 6.78 6.86 6.81 6.61 6.30 5.86 5.36
IND 7.20 7.46 7.18 6.92 7.00 7.13 7.13 6.79 6.63 6.79 6.70 6.53 6.47 6.48 6.07
IRL 9.71 10.72 10.81 10.62 14.36 11.93 9.73 8.88 7.93 8.04 5.94 3.69 4.45 4.56 4.06
ITA 2.60 2.46 2.46 2.58 2.39 2.50 2.49 2.56 2.54 2.45 2.37 2.37 2.33 2.19 2.02
JPN 2.15 2.07 2.15 2.10 2.20 2.32 2.33 2.50 2.68 2.64 2.64 2.64 2.87 2.85 2.79
KOR 4.66 4.75 5.01 4.39 4.23 5.15 5.77 5.35 5.19 5.77 5.61 5.60 5.44 5.41 5.91
MEX 5.24 5.33 5.51 5.74 5.33 5.49 5.57 5.41 5.07 4.39 4.64 4.21 4.13 3.71 3.98
NLD 3.22 3.03 3.20 3.21 3.07 3.09 3.02 3.11 3.07 3.13 2.92 2.75 2.91 2.85 3.00
POL 5.66 5.79 5.42 5.30 5.04 4.48 4.33 4.49 4.76 4.33 4.05 4.27 4.09 3.79 4.02
PRT 3.69 2.83 2.82 3.08 3.84 3.05 2.91 3.34 2.62 2.72 2.92 2.42 2.01 1.90 2.16
RUS 4.72 4.62 4.84 4.42 4.45 4.37 4.23 4.05 4.18 3.94 3.93 3.80 3.77 3.77 3.66
SWE 0.62 0.82 0.64 0.67 0.54 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.64 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.47 0.47 0.54
TUR 8.50 7.57 7.72 7.31 8.48 8.03 7.62 6.00 5.61 5.28 5.39 5.56 6.33 8.01 7.80
TWN 4.95 5.06 5.43 5.70 5.95 6.32 6.99 7.46 9.00 10.61 11.42 13.04 11.96 12.99 7.88
USA 5.01 5.09 5.37 5.22 4.42 4.37 4.08 5.19 5.68 5.98 5.89 6.14 6.10 5.71 5.64
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Chapter 4
Deflation procedures for Input-Output tables
Michele Boglioni
Abstract
Empirical investigations based on Sraffian Schemes requires data
on the flows of real goods between industries on the structure of final
demand. However, this data is not generally collected. A possibility
is to use Input-Output tables, which represent the nominal value of
flows relative to aggregated industries.
In this paper it is shown that if Input-Output tables were finely
disaggregated and the price of goods were uniform across countries
and stable in time, working with nominal values instead of real quan-
tities would not alter the results of Chapters 1 and 2 and 3.
While the level of aggregation of Input-Output tables depends
on data availability, a proper deflation method can help to take into
account the problem of variability of prices. The deflation method
adopted in this thesis is then presented and discussed.
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Introduction
As explained in Chapter 1 Net Product Possibility Frontiers are constructed
on the basis of Sraffian Schemes, i.e. Input-Output (I-O) tables in which the
inputs and the outputs are assumed to represent real quantities. However,
the available data are generally standard, aggregated I-O tables, in which
the inputs and the outputs of each industry are the result of the sum of the
nominal value of many different goods.
This implies two problems. The first is the aggregation problem, i.e. the
fact that one industry of an I-O table is not formed by one good. The second
is the “nominal values” problem, i.e. the fact that the flows described by
I-O tables do not really represent real quantities.
Without having data on the quantities of the single goods, the problem
of aggregation cannot be solved, so that we have to work with index num-
bers which are assumed to represent real quantities. However, we can at
least take into account the fact that the price of a good changes across coun-
tries and in time. In this paper it is shown that in the theoretical framework
in which the price of a good is the same across countries and stable in time,
there would not be differences in using real quantities or nominal values
for the results provided in Chapter 1.
Therefore, the precision of the results depends on the accuracy of the
prices deflators used, and on the procedure chosen to deflate the I-O Ta-
bles. In this chapter the alternative methodologies proposed by the liter-
ature on I-O are briefly examined and then the procedure adopted in this
thesis is discussed.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 4.1 it is shown
that, assuming that each industry of an I-O table represents a good (or
commodity), if the prices of goods are uniform across countries and sta-
ble in time, the indexes used in Chapter 1 are not affected by the fact that
we use nominal values instead of real quantities. In Section 4.2 the main
approaches proposed by the literature to deflate I-O tables are discussed,
while in Section 4.3 the peculiarity of the methodology chosen for this the-
sis is presented. The conclusions are devoted to some remarks with respect
to the available methodologies and data for the empirical application of
Sraffian Schemes.
4.1 Monetary or Physical Quantities?
One the problems in computing Net Product Possibility Frontiers and Com-
parative Advantages indexes is that we have to rely on Input-Output (I-O)
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tables in which goods are aggregated in Sectors. This also implies that
the flows of goods between industries and to the final demand can just be
expressed in nominal terms and not in real terms. Without having finely
disaggregated tables, the problem of aggregation cannot be solved. How-
ever, we can at least deflate the I-O tables in order to take into account the
variation of prices across countries and in time.
Consider an example with three countries and three goods. The three
Sraffian Schemes are:
A1 l1 b1 A2 l2 b2 A3 l3 b3
2 3 2 2/5 17 3 1 2 2/5 17 6 2 5 3/7 13
5 4 2 2/5 16 1 2 5 1/2 10 3 3 4 1/7 14
6 2 3 1/5 9 4 6 1 1/10 20 1 2 4 3/7 15
where each matrix Ac represent the physical inputs of the production pro-
cesses of country c, lc the labour inputs and bc the gross output.
As explained in Chapter 1, each row of a Sraffian scheme represents a
sector, while in A, goods are homogeneous by column. A Sraffian Scheme
is basically an I-O Table, in which each element represents a real quantity
and not a nominal value. Matrix A is the transposed of the Leontief ma-
trix of the inter-industrial flows. Moreover, in Sraffian Schemes the labour
vector is always represented, while in I-O tables it is not.
Matrix Y, the matrix of the net products is the following
Y =
4 9 37 1 7
2 12 2
 (4.1.1)
From which we can compute the NTP vector




where ι is the summation vector. As in the rest of the thesis, the three
goods are iron, coal and wheat. We can observe the coal-iron NPPF and
IF in Fig. 4.1, along with the three points Y = (15, 16),E = (17.1385, 18.2810)
and W = (11.1732, 11.9181), which respectively represent the observed
NTP, the efficient NTP and the most inefficient NTP in the two goods con-
sidered.
The index to measure the distance from the NPPF is
GS = E1 − Y1
Y1




Figure 4.1: The efficient and the most inefficient points of produc-
tion. Point E represents which could be the net product if countries
exploited fully their CAs, while Y represents the historical net prod-
uct. Point W represents the net total product that would be obtained if
countries specialized in the worst possible way.
meaning that the NTP in coal and wheat could be improved by the 14.26
% with an appropriate specialization pattern, while the distance from the
IF is
LS = W1 − Y1
Y1
= W2 − Y2
Y2
= −0.2551 (4.1.4)
meaning that with the worst possible specialization pattern the NTP in
coal and wheat would be the 25.51 % lower than the observed one.
Suppose now that we cannot observe these quantities, but we can just
observe quantities multiplied by prices. Suppose the vector of market
prices is p = [2, 3, 1]′.
The Sraffian Schemes become
A∗1 l∗1 b∗1 A∗2 l∗2 b∗2 A∗3 l∗3 b∗3
4 9 2 2/5 34 6 3 2 2/5 17 12 6 5 3/7 26
10 12 2 2/5 48 2 6 5 1/2 30 6 9 4 1/7 42
12 6 3 1/5 9 8 18 1 1/10 20 2 6 4 3/7 15
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The new frontiers and the new Y ∗ = (45, 32), E∗ = (51.4154, 36.5620)
and W ∗ = (33.5196, 23.8362) are shown in Fig. 4.2
Figure 4.2: The efficient and the most inefficient points of produc-
tion in I-O tables expressed in prices. The graph represents the same
frontier of Fig. 4.1, but transformed with a vector of prices.
Because of the effect of prices, the new frontiers are more flattened than
before. Notwithstanding, the relative position of W ∗ and E∗ inside the IF
and the NPPF seems similar. In fact, the new distance from the frontiers
are
GS∗ = 51.4154− 4545 =
36.5620− 32
32 = 0.1426 (4.1.6)
and
LS∗ = 33.5196− 4545 =
23.8362− 45
45 = −0.2551 (4.1.7)
They are exactly the same. Basically, if the vector of prices is homo-
geneous across countries, all the points that form the new frontiers main-
tain certain proportions among them, in such a way that the distance from
point Y ∗, computed with the GS and the LS index, does not change.
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In order to verify this property in an n-dimensional framework, the
same test have been repeated on the deflated I-O Tables used in Chap-
ters 1 and 2 and 3. That is to say, once the I-O Tables taken from the World
Input-Output Database (WIOD) have been deflated with the procedure ex-
plained below, a vector of fictitious prices has been applied to them, to all
the countries and for all the years. Then, the n-dimensionalNPPF and IF
have been recomputed.
In the first vector of prices considered have been the following, the price
of the first good has been increased by a 50%. The
p1 = [1.5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]′ (4.1.8)
Then, the test has been repeated applying a randomly generated vector
of prices, in which prices allowed to vary between 0.9 and 1.1. Specifically,
the second vector of prices applied has been the following
p2 = [1.0629, 1.0812, 0.9254, 1.0827, 1.0265, 0.9195, 0.9557, 1.0094, ...(4.1.9)
1.0915, 1.0930, 0.9315, 1.0941, 1.0914, 0.9971, 1.0601, 0.9284, 0.9844]′
The results with respect in the GSF and in the LSF indexes computed
with the deflated I-O and with the fictitious prices I-O are reported in the
Tab. 4.1
As can be noted, until 2009, the difference between the original indexes
and the indexes after the prices tests is at most 0.01%. In 2010 the LSF can
varies by a 0.03% and in 2011 by a 0.05%. The maximum variation in the
GSF is 0.03% in 2011.
Moreover, the coefficient of correlation between the original efficient
specialization pattern and the efficient specialization pattern in the first
prices test is 0.99996. The coefficient of correlation between the two effi-
cient specialization patterns in the second prices test is 0.9998.
These computations confirm that if prices were all the same across coun-
tries and stable in time, working with prices or quantities would have no
substantial importance for what concerns the definition of the efficient spe-
cialization pattern and the computation of the gains from trade.
4.2 The deflation procedure
The tables used in this thesis are the World Input-Output Tables (WIOTs)
from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). The WIOD research group
has published I-O Tables computed in previous-years prices. In the techni-
cal report by Los et al. (2014) they have described the steps to be followed
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Table 4.1: The main indexes in the prices tests. In the Table are re-
ported the results obtained in the GSF index and in the LSF index in
Chapter 1, and then the same indexes obtained after applying to the
deflated I-O Tables the vectors of prices reported in eq. 4.1.8 and eq.
4.1.9
Year GSF GSF test 1 GSF test 2 LSF LSF test 1 LSF test 2
1995 22.84% 22.84% 22.84% -20.62% -20.62% -20.62%
1996 23.70% 23.71% 23.71% -21.07% -21.07% -21.07%
1997 22.91% 22.90% 22.91% -21.65% -21.65% -21.65%
1998 22.81% 22.80% 22.81% -20.98% -20.98% -20.98%
1999 20.68% 20.68% 20.69% -19.73% -19.73% -19.73%
2000 21.59% 21.60% 21.60% -19.28% -19.28% -19.29%
2001 22.65% 22.65% 22.66% -22.41% -22.41% -22.41%
2002 24.33% 24.32% 24.33% -21.20% -21.20% -21.21%
2003 24.83% 24.83% 24.84% -20.63% -20.63% -20.63%
2004 21.27% 21.27% 21.27% -19.45% -19.45% -19.45%
2005 24.86% 24.86% 24.86% -20.85% -20.85% -20.86%
2006 23.28% 23.28% 23.29% -20.82% -20.82% -20.82%
2007 26.38% 26.38% 26.39% -22.85% -22.85% -22.86%
2008 24.39% 24.39% 24.40% -21.48% -21.49% -21.49%
2009 27.42% 27.42% 27.42% -22.91% -22.91% -22.91%
2010 24.29% 24.29% 24.29% -14.64% -14.62% -14.61%
2011 27.10% 27.13% 27.07% -11.72% -11.77% -11.71%
to compute them. As they explain, there are two main strategies to deflate
I-O Tables.
The first is called “double deflation” method. In order to explain how it
works, suppose we have a matrix Z of means of productions or exchanges
between industries, a matrix M of the imports of means of production, a
final demand vector f, a vector of the imports for final demand fm, a gross
output vector x, and a series of row reporting transport margins, taxes, the
value added and other minor categories. For simplicity, in the following
schemes these rows are grouped under the label va′.





It may be important to remind that in Section 4.1 and in Chapters 1,
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2 and 3 the matrices are represented as in the Sraffian tradition, in which
goods are homogeneous by column and the elements aijs are supposed to
describe real quantities. A generic element aij ∈ A represent the quantity
of good j used up as a mean of production in sector i
The procedure explained here have been developed in the Leontief tra-
dition, in which goods are homogeneous by row, and a generic element
zij ∈ Z is expressed in monetary values. If pi is the price of good i, we have
that zij = ajipi. In matrix terms, we have that Z = A′diag(p), where p, as
before is the vector of prices and diag(p) is a diagonal matrix with vector
p on its main diagonal.
In order to avoid confusion, we write a′ij = aji, so that zij = a′ijpi. More-
over we have that a generic element xi ∈ x is the monetary value of bi,
that is to say that xi = pibi. Finally, since in Section 4.1, yi represents the
quantity of good i that goes to the final demand, we have that a generic
element fi ∈ f is given by fi = piyi.
If we have a price deflator pi,t/pi,t−1 we can compute, applying the













That is to say, the same price deflator can be applied to all the cell of a
row in matrix Z and to the respective elements of vectors f and x. For the
matrix M and vectors fm and m the same procedure can be applied, but
taking into consideration that we should know the prices of the imports
and the deflator for these prices. The vector va can be computed just by
the difference between x and the sum by column of Z + M.
Although in theory there should not be any problem with this proce-
dure, in practice it can lead to implausible Input-Output (I-O) tables. The
main reason is that the composition of each cell in a row of an I-O table
is not really homogeneous as assumed by the theory. The point has been
highlighted by Dietzenbacher and Hoen (1998), who showed that the use
of an alternative strategy, called RAS algorithm, could give more reliable
results.
The basic idea of the RAS algorithm is that if you have prices deflators
for the external columns of the I-O matrix, than the internal matrices and
columns can be estimated through an iterative procedure.
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For example, suppose that we have deflators for the gross product x,
for the total imports m, for the final demand vectors f and fm and for the
value added vector va. Therefore, we can compute the deflated vectors
xd, md, fd, fdm and vad with equations analogous to those in 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and
4.2.3.
By construction we know that the sum by row of Zd, the matrix of the
inter-industrial flows of goods at deflated prices, must be equal to xd − fd,
that is to say that
Zdι = xd − fd (4.2.4)
where ι is a summation vector of appropriate length.
In the same way, the following accounting identities must hold
Mdι = md − fdm (4.2.5)
ι′Zd + ι′Md = xd − vad (4.2.6)
The RAS algorithm multiplies recursively the rows and the columns of
matrices Z and M until the constraints of the problem, i.e. the right-hand
side of eq.s 4.2.4, 4.2.5 and 4.2.6, are verified. In Bacharach (1970) it is pro-
vided a mathematical treatment of the algorithm, while in Dietzenbacher
and Hoen (1998) are discussed some variations based on the availability
of different deflators. For example, instead of computing the deflated vec-
tors fd and fdm, one could compute just the deflated scalar fd—the sum of
vector fd plus the sum of vector fdm—and then leave the algorithm to esti-
mate fd and fdm too. This is the version chosen by the WIOD research group
although with a few important specifications.
As explained in (Los et al., 2014, p.1), the double-deflation method gave
results for the value-added that were inconsistent with data published on
other sources, and hence they chose to use a version of the RAS algorithm
which, with the proper deflators, seems more coherent with the other avail-
able databases.
Specifically, the WIOD research group applies a variation of the RAS
algorithm called GRAS suggested by Junius and Oosterhaven (2003) and
subsequently revised by Lenzen et al. (2007). In the case of Chapters 1 and
2 and 3 we have applied the same algorithm, although the deflators used
by the WIOD research group have been corrected to take into account the
variability of countries across countries—see below.
The main feature of the GRAS is that it can deal with negative numbers,
while the original RAS cannot. This is important since the final demand
vector of the WIOTs is divided in its components, so that we have a column
of inventories, which may be negative.
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Specifically, in the WIOTs, the final demand is divided in 5 columns: fi-
nal consumption by expenditure, final consumption by non-profit organi-
zations serving households, final consumption by government, gross fixed
capital formation, changes in inventories and valuables.
Therefore, they need five different deflators for each of the category of
the final demand. As they explain, they took the deflators for final con-
sumption expenditure, final consumption by government and gross fixed
capital formation from the UN National Accounts database1.
Although no explicit deflators have been found there, they publish the
GDP for each of the categories considered in current prices and in 2005
prices, so that implicit deflators can be obtained simply as a ratio between
the GDP at current prices and at constant prices.
In the case of inventories and final demand by non-profit institutions
serving households, the deflators for the gross output have been used, al-
though not in the standard way—for the details see Los et al. (2014).
The gross output deflators and the value added deflators for each coun-
try are provided by the WIOD itself for the period 1995-2009. The import
deflators are just the gross output deflators of the exporting country. The
deflators for the years 2010 and 2011 have been computed through a sim-
ple linear extrapolation based on the period 2006-2009, after modifying all
the deflators in order to take into account the differences in prices across
countries.
4.3 Deflators corrected for differences in prices
across countries
As explained in Chapter 1, the WIOD research group provides just time-
deflators, because their aim is to compute previous-year-prices tables. In
this case the aim is different, because we need I-O tables in which prices
are not just stable through time, but also uniform across countries.
In order to do this, we need indexes of the level of prices at the sectoral
level for the countries considered. These have been taken from the Interna-
tional Comparison Program (ICP) of the World Bank, a survey of the prices
of different goods across the world which have been realized in 2005 and
2011. Since the deflators for 2010 and 2011 are not provided by the WIOD,
so that we had to estimate them, we used the data for 2005.
The ICP explains the price level index (PLI) with the “Big Mac Index”
(International Comparison Program, 2008). Suppose a Big Mac in the US
1In the case of Taiwan, data has been taken from the national accounts provided by
their government
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costs 4.00 US dollars and in France 4.80 euros and suppose that the ex-
change rate is 1 US dollar for 0.67 euros. The price level index in France
with respect to the US is (4.80/0.67)/4.00 × 100 ≈ 179. That is to say, we
compute the price in dollars of a Big Mac in France and then we compute
the ratio with the price in dollars of the Big Mac in the US. As it is easy to
check, it does not matter whether you compute the ratio between prices in
dollars or in euros, the result is still 179. That is to say, the price in euros
of a Big Mac in the US is 4.00 × 0.67 = 2.68 euros. The PLI of France with
respect to the US is 4.80/2.68 ≈ 179. The indexes provided by the ICP are
computed having as a reference a measure of the World prices and not the
US prices, but the concept is the same.
From the point of view of our paper, we are interested in deflating the
I-O Tables in such a way that the monetary quantities we observe reflect
the ratio between the quantities produced.
Using the example above, suppose that we observe the value of the
quantity of Big Macs sold in France and in the US. For the sake of simplic-
ity, suppose that the quantity of Big Mac sold in France is 2 and in the US is
3. What we would observe in the I-O tables expressed in US dollars would
be (4.80× 2)/0.67 ≈ 14.33 for France and 4× 3 = 12 for the US. Therefore,
if we apply the PLI of 179 to France we obtain 14.33/179 × 100 ≈ 8. As
it can be noted, the ratio 8/12 between the deflated value of the Big Macs
sold in France and the value of the Big Macs sold in the US reflects the ratio
among the quantities of Big Macs sold in the two countries (2/3).
In other words, with a well deflated I-O Tables, we can compute how
the I-O tables would be if the same price would be applied everywhere,
and this is a key feature to compute prices-robust indexes of specialization
as explained in the Section 4.1.
This procedure cannot solve the problem that the mix of goods we have
in the real I-O tables change from one cell to another. However, with the
corrected deflators we can take a step towards the computation of I-O Ta-
bles that reflect the quantity of goods produced in each country, and mak-
ing them more suited for analysis as those of Chapters 1 and 2 and 3.
For example, suppose to denote the gross output deflator of a certain





The deflators provided by the WIOD are expressed in the currency of
the respective country c, while the I-O Tables are expressed in US dollars,
so that, they have to be corrected for the exchange rate. If the cost of 1 unit
2The default reference year for the deflators provided by WIOD is 1995
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of national currency in terms of US dollars is expressed by e, in order to













where pw2005,i,c is the measure of the world prices taken as a reference by the
ICP—see International Comparison Program (2008). As explained above,
the currency in which the nominator is expressed does not really matter
since what is important is just that for all the countries considered the same
currency is used. Since the I-O Tables provided by the WIOD are expressed
in dollars, we use dollars too.










For all the other deflators, i.e. value added deflators and final demand
deflators, the same procedure has been used, they have all been adjusted
in order to use as reference prices a measure of the 2005 world prices. The
only difference is that the final demand deflators were already expressed in
US dollars, so they do not have to be adjusted for exchange rate variations.
The problem in correcting the deflators with the PLI is that while the
WIOTs are constructed on the basis of industrial sectors, the PLI are col-
lected mainly to compare the goods that enter into the basket of the house-
holds. Therefore, there is no perfect matching between the sectors consid-
ered by the WIOD research group and those considered by the ICP. The
PLIs used for each Sector of the WIOTs are reported in Tab. 4.3, while the
PLIs for the final demand categories are reported in Tab. 4.4.
Conclusions
In this paper it is shown that for some empirical applications of the Sraffian
Schemes as those in Chapters 1 and 2 and 3, the reliability of the results
can be improved applying the proper deflation procedure to the available
Input-Output tables. The deflation procedure should aim at estimating
how Input-Output tables on different countries and different years would
241
look like if for each good the price would be uniform across countries and
stable in time.
In order to do this there are two main procedures: the “double defla-
tion” method and the methods based on the RAS algorithm. For the defla-
tion of the tables provided by the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)
, the GRAS algorithm, a variation of RAS, estimates previous-year-prices
tables that are more coherent with other data sources.
However, this evidence does not constitutes a general rule. Even in the
case of the WIOD, estimating previous-year-prices tables implies that it is
taken into account the fact that prices change from one year to the other,
but not the differences of prices across countries. In order to do this, the
deflators provided by the WIOD must be corrected with indexes of the
level of prices in different countries. We have no evidence that in this case
the GRAS method would still offer the more reliable estimation. Therefore,
further research on this topic seems to be necessary.
Moreover, as it is explained in the introduction, no deflation procedure
can help in solving the aggregation problem, that is to say that the available
Input-Output tables generally aggregate many goods in one single indus-
try. For solving this problem there does not seem to be any solution but
to collect data that allows to construct finely disaggregated Input-Output
tables.
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Table 4.3: The list of sectors used by the WIOTs and the match with the Price Level Indexes of the International Com-
parison Program*
# WIOTS Sector ICP Sector
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages
2 Mining and Quarrying Other Products
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages
4 Textiles and Textile Products Clothing and Footwear
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear Clothing and Footwear
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork Other Products
7 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing Recreation and Culture
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products Other Products
10 Rubber and Plastics Other Products
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Other Products
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Machinery and Equipment
13 Machinery, Nec Machinery and Equipment
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment Machinery and Equipment
15 Transport Equipment Machinery and Equipment
16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling Machinery and Equipment
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels
18 Construction Construction
19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles Transport
20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except for Vehicles and Motorcycles Individual Consumption Expenditure by Households
21 Retail Trade Except for Vehicles and Motorcycles, Repair of Household Goods Individual Consumption Expenditure by Households
22 Hotels and Restaurants Restaurants and Hotels
23 Inland Transport Transport
24 Water Transport Transport
25 Air Transport Transport
26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities by Travel Agencies Transport
27 Post and Telecommunications Communication
28 Financial Intermediation Miscellaneous Goods and Services
29 Real Estate Activities Miscellaneous Goods and Services
30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities Miscellaneous Goods and Services
31 Public Administration and Defense, Compulsory Social Security Collective Consumption Expenditure by Government
32 Education Education
33 Health and Social Work Health
34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services Miscellaneous Goods and Services
35 Private Households with Employed Persons Individual consumption expenditure by households
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Table 4.4: The list of the final demand categories used by the WIOTs and the match with the Price Level Indexes of the
International Comparison Program*
# WIOTS Sector ICP Sector
1 Final consumption expenditure by households Individual consumption expenditure by households
2 Final consumption expenditure by non-profit organizations serving households (NPISH) Individual consumption expenditure by households
3 Final consumption expenditure by government Individual consumption expenditure by government
4 Gross fixed capital formation Gross fixed capital formation
5 Changes in inventories and valuables GDP
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Conclusions
The main issues analyzed in this work are the real effect of Comparative
Advantages and the possibility of reducing CO2 emissions through proper
specialization patterns.
Two chapters have investigated the effectiveness of Comparative Ad-
vantages in the context of Europe under different set of assumptions. The
main objective was to provide an empirical check on the prediction of the
theory, i.e. that the exploitation of Comparative Advantages should be, ac-
cording to standard economic theory, the natural consequence of the action
of the “invisible hand” of international free markets. The results are clear:
there is no evidence that European markets succeeded in realizing such an
outcome.
European countries seem to be far from specialization patterns compat-
ible with Comparative Advantages. Moreover and most importantly, there
is no trend suggesting a reduction of this distance during the period con-
sidered (1995-2011). This implies that there might be scopes for improving
the economic efficiency of Europe through policies aiming at incentiviz-
ing the adoption of specialization patterns compatible with Comparative
Advantages.
Somewhat unexpectedly we have found that this evidence has some
important implications for CO2 emissions. The study of specialization
patterns and related CO2 has led to the conclusion that the exploitation
of proper specialization patterns may have a strong impact on the envi-
ronment. The adoption of technologies that produce less CO2 than those
actually employed is not the only way to contrast global warming. An
improved coordination among countries to exploit CO2-reducing special-
ization patterns seems to be an alternative with high potential.
If Comparative Advantages were fully exploited it would not be pos-
sible to implement CO2-reducing specialization patterns without affecting
the economic efficiency of the system—that is, without reduction of the to-
tal net national production produced. But since Comparative Advantages
are far from being reached, lowering CO2 emissions is not an aim incom-
patible with economic efficiency. Quite on the contrary, ample scopes seem
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to exist, both in Europe and, even more, on a global scale, to improve eco-
nomic efficiency and the environmental impact of the economic activity at
the same time.
These results are preliminary and should not be taken as definitive. As
explained in the Introduction and in last Chapter, one problem is that the
existing databases have some important limits for the empirical applica-
tion of Sraffian Schemes.
The available data do not comprise information about land, fixed cap-
ital and joint production and all the goods considered are basic goods, so
that we have to work in a framework in which the production processes
are simplified.
Even in this simplified framework, the available data are Input-Output
tables expressed in nominal terms, while Sraffian Schemes are supposed to
represent the flow of real goods. The estimation of deflated Input-Output
tables is a viable strategy, but there is little evidence on the procedure to be
followed to reach reliable estimations. However, this wouldn’t solve the
problem that the available Input-Output tables are often very aggregate
and this affects the precision of the results provided here.
Therefore, constructing more disaggregated tables, comprising data on
land, fixed capital and joint production, and investigating the most ade-
quate procedure to deflate them would be important steps to refine the
computation presented here. More generally, the empirical research on
Sraffian Schemes would benefit from more reliable data on productive pro-
cesses.
Leaving aside the problems related to data, the approach presented
here offers many other possibilities of further developments. A first line
of research consists in extending the uses of Net Product Possibility Fron-
tiers, the benchmark used in Chapters 1 and 2 to evaluate the action of
Comparative Advantages. The distance from the Net Product Possibility
Frontier is a measure of how much a group of countries could increase its
net product, exploiting a more efficient allocation of resources.
The Net Product Possibility Frontier has been computed under the as-
sumption that techniques cannot be transferred from one country to the
other and migrations are not possible—the total quantity of workers for
each country is assumed to be fixed here. Both these assumptions can be
relaxed, and this would offer new perspectives on the potential gains from
achievable specializations, i.e. new scenarios would have to be studied.
An important question that has been left open is how the potential
gains from a better specialization could be shared among the countries in-
volved. Here it has been investigated how much the overall net output
of a group of countries could be improved, but not how to redistribute it
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among the countries. An interesting matter would be to study the eco-
nomic policies or mechanisms that would allow the so-called markets to
find, at least in principle, a vector of prices that would make the efficient
specialization pattern convenient for each country.
In a Sraffian framework prices depend on the distribution of surplus
among wages and profits. This implies that there is a link between the
internal distribution of the surplus among social groups and the interna-
tional distribution of the surplus among the countries involved. This may
also have important consequences for the balance of payments of the coun-
tries involved and hence for the sustainability of alternative specialization
patterns, especially in the long run. The matter of the distribution of the
surplus and the relations with the mechanism of the formation of prices is
a multifaceted problem that has to be analyzed carefully.
Moreover, the two papers on Comparative Advantages and the paper
on CO2 emissions compare the historically observed specialization pat-
terns with alternative specialization patterns. In some sense, these studies
are based on the static comparison of alternative scenarios. The analysis of
the various problems related to the practical realization of a more efficient
or CO2-saving specialization pattern is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The comparative static approach has been used because the aim was
to check whether the available data is compatible with Comparative Ad-
vantages or to give a first measure of the potentialities of specialization
patterns in reducing greenhouse gases emissions. If the aim is to build
on this methodology in order to devise specific economic policies, all the
problems related to the transition from a given economic structure to an-
other, as for example financial and jobs-related problems, would have to
be considered—besides the reliability of the available data, which has been
discussed above.
Actually, such a process could be stimulated and financed in many dif-
ferent forms, e.g. through financial facilities, direct public intervention or
tax policies. Each of these alternatives may have pros and cons that would
have to be evaluated.
For what concerns the job market, realizing alternative specialization
patterns implies a requalification of workers which, as it has been shown
in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, may involve a high percentage of the workforce.
As it has been noted in the conclusions to Chapters 2 and 3, these results
are due to the fact that we make use of benchmark scenarios which may
seem too extreme, because they would require to restructure heavily the
economies involved.
However, the potential gains in economic efficiency and benefits in
terms of environmental preservation discussed in this thesis seem so strong
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in the benchmark scenarios, that most likely slight movements in the “right”
direction could achieve substantial improvements. Investigating how much
we could gain in economic and environmental terms through acceptable
reorganizations of the economic productive systems may be another im-
portant development of the empirical application of Sraffian Schemes.
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